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Economic crime is an important feature of the United Kingdom’s economy and yet 
it attracts less attention from the media, government and law enforcement 
agencies than violent crime, even though it is a major drain on the economy, it 
threatens the reputation of corporations and it poses a threat to national security. 
 
This thesis considers the economic crime components – fraud, bribery and 
corruption, and financial regulation, taking as the starting position the UK 
government’s analysis of the prosecution of fraud and regulation of financial 
services in the 1980’s. In strident terms, these were criticised for an ineffective 
approach towards the prosecution of fraud and the lack of an adequate system of 
financial regulation. This thesis critiques the development of government policy, 
legislation and anti-economic crime institutions over the succeeding 35 years by 
examining the field of economic crime as a whole, rather than as traditionally 
looking individually at its component parts. This approach is placed in sharp relief 
by the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent revelations of conspiracies and fraud 
and the differencing approaches of separate institutions which serve to emphasise 
the lack of a cohesive approach. 
 
Economic crime is a global phenomenon and although the UK, geographically, is 
an island in economic terms it is linked to other countries which have to face the 
same issues. This presented the research opportunity to consider how two other 
countries, the United States of America and Australia, coped with the 2008 
economic crisis and its aftermath and whether an analysis of their approaches 
would provide a beneficial template for the UK to adopt. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is that the Coalition government was correct in its 
ideal to hold those suspected of financial wrongdoing to account in a day of 
reckoning, but that this was doomed to failure because the anti-economic crime 
forces are competitors rather than colleagues. This thesis proposes creation of a 
cohesive and effective anti-economic crime policy and creation of a single 
Economic Crime Agency, to encompass existing agencies to remove areas of 
iii 
 
overlap and underlap and enabling the single agency to deploy criminal and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction1 
Economic crime is an important feature of the United Kingdom’s (UK) economy, 
yet it attracts less attention from the media, government and law enforcement 
agencies when compared to violent crime,2 underlining the classic polarity 
between ‘blue collar’ and ‘white collar’ crime.3  This thesis is focused on economic 
crime in the UK and considers whether the current anti-economic crime legislation 
and enforcement agencies are positioned to meet their objectives.4 However, 
since economic crime afflicts all countries,5 in order to ensure that the UK 
measures are appropriate, it is important to take advantage of experience in some 
other jurisdictions by comparing and contrasting their government policy and 
regulatory responses (both legislative and agencies).  For reasons which will be 
explained below, this research has chosen to compare the UK’s approach with 
those of the United States of America (US) and Australia. The thesis employs 
doctrinal and comparative methodologies and will define ‘economic crime’ before 
examining and analysing, government policy, legislation and anti-economic crime 
institutions. The thesis also explains why, some 28 years after major reforms into 
the investigation and prosecution of serious financial crime,6 combined with the 
relaxation of controls over financial markets,7 the time is right for a fresh 
perspective on the UK’s response to economic crime.8 This is not an historic 
review because, fleetingly, the Coalition Government embraced a proposal to 
create an independent Economic Crime Agency (ECA)9 but then the proposal 
mutated into merely being part of a different organisation, the National Crime 
                                            
1 The law is at 31 October 2014 
2 Edwin H Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (Yale University Press 1983) 56. 
3 J Kelly Strader, Understanding White Collar Crime (LexisNexis 2002) 11. 
4 Serious Fraud Office: ‘Our work is part of the overarching aims and objectives of the criminal justice system 
and we contribute to: reducing fraud and corruption and the cost of fraud and corruption; delivering justice and 
the rule of law; [and] maintaining confidence in the UK's business and financial institutions.’ 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘What we do and who we work with’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do-and-
who-we-work-with.aspx 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘We want consumers to use financial services with confidence and have products 
that meet their needs, from firms and individuals they can trust. To achieve this, we regulate firms and 
financial advisers so that markets and financial systems remain sound, stable and resilient.’ Financial Conduct 
Authority, ‘About us’ http://www.fca.org.uk/about accessed 3 August 2014. 
5 182 countries feature in Transparency International. Global Corruption Index 2011. 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults accessed 15 April 2012. 
193 countries are members of the United Nations. United Nations, ‘At a glance’ 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml accessed 3 August 2014. 
6 Fraud Trials Committee Report  (HMSO 1986) (hereinafter Roskill). 
7 J Fisher and J Bewsey, The Law of Investor Protection (Sweet and Maxwell  1997) 13. 
8 Following the Fraud Review 2005, Fraud Act 2006, impact of financial  crisis and revelations of misconduct – 
see chapters 5,6,7,8 and 9.  Bribery Act 2010 and Financial Services Act 2012, which will restructure Banking 
and financial regulation. 




Agency (NCA). Thus, instead of a single agency the outcome in relation to 
economic crime continues to be regime of individual agencies with overlapping 
responsibilities that lack a focused approach and a leading institution.10 This thesis 
considers the merits of such developments. Since 1986, as the UK emerged from 
economic recession, there have been many vicissitudes in the economic 
environment together with the global political change occasioned by the terrorist 
attacks in September 2001 (9/11) in the US, which resulted in President Bush 
engaging in the ‘financial war on terror’.11 In response to these events, US 
resources were diverted away from financial crime and towards anti-terrorism.12 
This was followed by the 2008 global financial crisis which brought poor financial 
practice and fraud to the surface.13 As a response to fraud emanating from the 
financial crisis, President Barak Obama introduced the Financial Fraud and 
Recovery Act 2009 that increased resources to Department of Justice (DoJ)14 by 
$330m, whereas in the UK, the government planned reductions in the Serious 
Fraud Office’s (SFO) budget by 40% to £30m.15 
The UK is not the only country to face issues over the management, prevention 
and control of the elements of economic crime since fraud, bribery and corruption 
                                            
10 National Crime Agency. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/nca/ accessed 15 April 2012. 
11 ‘On 24 September 2001 President George Bush proclaimed that “we will starve terrorists of funding”,thus 
instigating the “financial war on terrorism”. Nicholas Ryder Financial Crime in the 21st Century (Edward Elgar 
2011) 51. (Footnotes omitted). 
12 Nicholas Ryder, The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime – the Perfect Storm (Edward Elgar 2014) 37. 
US Department of State, ‘President Freezes Terrorists' Assets’ http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/5041.htm accessed 8 September 2014. 
R Suskind, The one percent doctrine (Simon & Schuster  2006) 142 as cited in Eckert, S. ‘The US regulatory 
approach to terrorist financing’ in Biersteker, T. and Eckert, S. (eds.) Countering the financing of terrorism 
(Routlege Cavendish  2008) 22. 
13 ‘you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.’, Warren Buffet, Chairman’s Letter to 
Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway 2001, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2001pdf.pdf accessed 10 
June 2010. 
14 U S Department of Justice, hereinafter DoJ. 
15 The SFO Budget showed actual reductions from £53.2m in 2009/9, £40m in 2009/10, £35.5m in 2010/11,  
and £31.6m in 2011/12. The projections showed similar reductions to £34.8m in 2012/13, £32.2m in 2013/14 
and £30.8m in 2014/15. In the event, the outturn for 2012/13 was £38m and 2013/14 £51m, reflecting the 
availability of ‘blockbuster’ funding. The 2014 projections showed budget £37m in 2014/15 and £35.4m in 
2015/16. ‘The Serious Fraud Office investigates the most serious and complex cases of fraud, bribery and 
corruption as described above. The quantity of such work is unpredictable. The SFO has a core budget for this 
purpose but some exceptionally large cases may require additional resources. The Government has 
previously made clear that where the SFO needs additional resources, these will be provided. The current 
agreement with HM Treasury is that any exceptional case funding should be agreed as part of the 
Supplementary Estimates process.’ 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12’, 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/223353/annual%20report%20and%20accounts%202011-12.pdf accessed 17 
June 2013. 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/268927/sfo%20ar-
2014%20sps-26-6.pdf accessed 27 August 2014. 
Nicholas Ryder, ‘White collar crime and the global financial crisis; How long will we have to wait for the day of 
reckoning?’ (2013) 57 Criminal Law News 5,11.  
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feature in all countries.16 In order to inform the discussion, it is instructive to review 
how two other countries, the US and Australia, dealt with the same issues. These 
countries were chosen for comparison because the former is the UK’s most 
significant trading partner outside Europe17 and the latter is regarded as having 
more successfully withstood the effects of the financial crisis than other leading 
industrial nations.18 Thus, the focus of this research is on the UK where the last 
major study of investigation and prosecution of fraud was in 1986, presaging the 
SFO’s creation but, in the field of financial regulation, the institutions of Securities 
and Investment Board (SIB) and Financial Services Authority (FSA) were 
established and then disbanded. Responsibility for the regulation of the financial 
services sector was given to the FSA under the ‘tripartite’ regime,19 which was 
subsequently discredited in the aftermath of the financial crisis. According to Rider, 
the new Coalition government’s upheaval of financial regulation has restored 
primacy of regulation to the Bank of England under a new ‘twin peaks’ regime with 
a new or rebranded regulator,20 the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), taking over 
some of the FSA’s responsibilities. During this time, fraud, bribery and corruption 
legislation21 was introduced to provide prosecutors with additional powers.22 
However, the adverse effect of the financial crisis on the banking sector led to calls 
for the prosecution of senior executives and for further legislation to criminalise 
alleged illegal conduct by bankers. This turmoil in the banking sector was 
exacerbated by the revelation that the key financial market interest benchmark, the 
                                            
16Transparency International (n 6). 
 United Nations, ‘At a glance’ (n 6). 
17 Note: the European Union was not selected for comparison, primarily because EU directives to establish a 
common regime across member states are absent, through lack of political will, as evidenced by complaints of 
patchy adoption of international corruption conventions. 
‘Several EU Member States have ratified all or most of the existing international anti-corruption instruments. 
However, three EU Member States (Austria, Germany, Italy) have not ratified the Council of Europe's Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption, twelve have not ratified its additional Protocol (Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Spain) and seven have not 
ratified the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
the UK). Three Member States have not yet ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (The Czech 
Republic, Germany, and Ireland ). Five EU Member States (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania) 
have not ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.’ EU ‘Commission steps up efforts to forge a 
comprehensive anti-corruption policy at EU level.’ 3 June 2011. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/376&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en accessed 9 April 2012. 
18 Michael Levi & Russell G Smith, ‘Fraud vulnerabilities and the global financial crisis’ in ‘Trends and issues in 
crime and criminal justice.’ Australian Institute of Criminology No. 422 July 2011 
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/1/1/A/%7b11A2A2CE-75E7-4D98-A0A9-FD3471B6E841%7dtandi422.pdf 
accessed 4 June 2013. 
19 Bank of England, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority.’ http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/legislation/mou.pdf accessed 
8 September 2014. 
20 Barry Rider, ‘A serious fraud?’ (2010) 31(12) Co Law 381. 
21 Fraud Act 2006. Bribery Act 2010. 
22 See chapter 5. For example Bribery Act 2010, s 7 ‘failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery’. 
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London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR),23 was manipulated by banks for their 
own benefit, with similar accusations regarding the foreign exchange, gas and 
petroleum markets were similarly afflicted.24 The LIBOR scandal revealed an initial 
lack of enthusiasm by the FSA/FCA to take regulatory action against individuals 
and firms involved or by SFO to investigate and prosecute.  This allowed the 
perception to continue of a lack of accountability of those who contributed to the 
financial crisis. The rear-guard actions of the regulator of imposing large financial 
penalties and of the SFO in investigation and prosecution owed much to 
government and parliamentary pressure, including in the SFO’s case making 
available ‘blockbuster’ funding from HM Treasury to procure resources.25 This led 
to the SFO seeking to amend the Bribery Act 2010 (BA2010) to create a new 
offence of ‘failing to prevent all acts of financial crime.’26 These considerations of 
multiple change of regulator, the largest financial crisis since the Wall Street 
Crash,27 and inertia through no one regulator having primacy to address economic 
crime issues are some of the reasons why this research is of contemporary value. 
The importance of placing the UK into an international context has assisted in the 
redefinition of the doctoral study into the research question: ‘A critique of the 
counter economic crime regime in the United Kingdom, with reference to the 
United States of America and Australia.’ The objective is to evaluate the outcome 
of the comparative research in order inform the discussion as to the most 
appropriate economic crime model that should be adopted by the UK. The 
spectrum of possibilities of the most appropriate economic crime model ranges 
between endorsement of the UK’s current model; wholesale changes to adopt 
either of those of the US or Australia; or a hybrid model. 
                                            
23 The London Inter-Bank Offered rate, hereinafter LIBOR. 
24 The Times, 28 July 2014. ‘HBOS ‘lowballed’ Libor during crisis, regulators to reveal’ 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/banking/article4158182.ece  
Lloyds Banking Group, ‘Settlements reached on legacy LIBOR and BBA Repo Rate issues’ 
http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/Media/Press-Releases/2014/lloyds-banking-group/settlements-reached-
on-legacy-libor-and-bba-repo-rate-issues/ accessed 3 August 2014.  
The Financial Times 4 February 2014. ‘Forex claims ‘as bad as Libor’, says FCA’, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d2f697a-8da8-11e3-bbe7-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wz74O2Ae accessed 25 
March 2014. 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Barclays fined £26m for failings surrounding the London Gold Fixing and former 
Barclays trader banned and fined for inappropriate conduct’ http://www.fca.org.uk/news/barclays-fined-26m-
for-failings-surrounding-the-london-gold-fixing . Accessed 23 May 2014. 
25 For details of SFO finances, see (n 15). 
26 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Ethical Business Conduct: An Enforcement Perspective’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-
us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2014/ethical-business-conduct-an-enforcement-perspective.aspx 
accessed 19 May 2014. 








1.1 The research context 
Economic crime is a major drain on the UK economy, with fraud alone estimated 
at approximately £76bn annually,28 and yet attracts little public attention.29 This 
thesis examines the UK counter-fraud system, which is regarded as out dated and 
complex.30 It will consider how the current strategy has developed, whether by 
design or in an ad hoc manner before evaluating whether a new ‘super agency’ 
that would centralise all counter-fraud, bribery and corruption activities31 could 
succeed and, if so, what role would be played by existing agencies. Examination 
of the literature shows that there has been little evidence of other academic 
research on the economic crime sector as a whole. This may be explained 
because until comparatively recently, fraud prevention, detection and prosecution 
was not considered to be a core policing priority unlike money laundering and 
counter-terrorism financing.32 As a consequence, fraud received only minor public 
                                            
28 National Fraud Authority, ‘Annual Fraud Indicator’ March 2012. 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/nfa/annual-fraud-indicator/annual-fraud-
indicator-2012?view=Binary accessed 7 April 2012. 
29 Jonathan Fisher, The Times 11 March 2010  http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2464153.ece accessed 
16 October 2014. 
In 2013-2014, the ‘horsemeat’ scandal did attract headlines and a government report. 
‘Professor Chris Elliott, director of the Institute for Global Food Security at Queen’s University Belfast, has 
recommended that the Food Standards Agency establish a national food crime unit to protect the sector from 
organised criminal gangs, who were “adulterating, tampering, stealing and counterfeiting” food within the 
supply chain.’ 
Financial Times, ‘Horsemeat report calls for ‘food fraud’ unit’ http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecc37282-3409-11e4-
8832-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Fdy6nUDY accessed 9 October 2014. 
H M Government, ‘Elliott Review into the Integrity and Assurance of Food Supply Networks – Final Report’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/350726/elliot-review-final-
report-july2014.pdf accessed 9 October 2014. 
30 Fisher (n29).    
31 Otherwise referred to as ‘The Economic Crime Agency’. 
32 Nicholas Ryder, ‘The fight against illicit finance: A critical review of the Labour government's policy.’ 
 (2011) 12(3) JBR 252. 
‘Investigating and prosecuting fraud does not count in terms of measuring the delivery of those 43 agendas or 
league tables of performance, and so is not seen as a priority by politically attuned Chief Constables.’ Alan 
Doig, Fraud (Willan 2006) 133. 
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attention until major cases in the 1980’s.33 The government’s response was 
establishment of the Roskill Commission to consider fraud trials, rather than the 
institutional arrangements. The key issue, according to Honess, Levi and 
Charman, was that cases were taken to trial but the expected convictions were not 
obtained, leading to the conclusion that the trials themselves were problematic 
because juries did not understand complicated fraud.34 Roskill recommended that 
non-jury trials should be established but this was not adopted, although the 
concept was included in later legislation but never implemented and subsequently 
removed.35 However, one significant outcome was the creation of the SFO in 1987 
as a single investigation and prosecution agency. The SFO has had a troubled life, 
with a poor reputation36 and perceived by public and media as a failing 
organisation37 which was contra to the original expectations of being the UK’s 
equivalent of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).38 That the SFO has not 
succeeded in winning public acclaim is a subject for debate alongside its 
relationship with the financial services regulators: firstly, the SIB; secondly, the 
FSA, and lastly, in 2013, the FCA. The outcome of Roskill was recognition that a 
single investigative and prosecution agency had merit and should be 
established.39 Some 20 years later, the SFO appeared to have lost its way by 
seeming to prefer negotiating civil remedies in preference to seeking criminal 
sanctions, while the regulator was also focused on income generation from fines. 
When the Coalition government entered office in May 2010, it was clear that the 
counter-fraud organisational arena in the UK was crowded, not just with the SFO, 
                                            
33 ‘The 1980’s provided a number of controversies in both public and private sectors, including the Crown 
Agents, Johnson Matthey bankers, John Poulson, London and County securities, London Capital Group’.  
Doig (n 32) 133. 
34 T M Honess,  M Levi and E A Charman,  ‘Juror competence in serious frauds since Roskill: a research-
based assessment’ (2004) 11(1) JFC 17. 
Michael Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial: An Overview of the Roskill Proposals’.  (1986) 13(1) JL & 
Soc’y 117. 
Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service (1965) Cmnd. 2627, para 80. 
35 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 43. 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 113. ‘Repeal of provisions for conducting certain fraud cases without jury. 
Omit section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (applications by prosecution for certain fraud cases to be 
conducted without a jury).’ 
36 Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v. Maxwell [1993] Ch. 1; Re Levitt [1992] Ch. 
457;   Re Arrows Ltd (No. 4) [1994] 3 All E.R. 814, R v Saunders [1996] Crim.LR.420 
36 R (on the application of Corner House Research and another) v Director of Serious Fraud Office (BAE 
Systems plc, interested party) [2008] All ER 927. 
37Daily Mail, 17 April 2010 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1266855/SFO-confesses-major-
blunder.html accessed 18 April 2010 
37 Daily Mail (n 37). 
38 US Federal Bureau of Investigation, hereinafter FBI. 
Ryder (n 12) 27. 
39 Roskill (n 6). 
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FCA, OFT but 43 Police forces, HM Revenue & Customs, Serious and Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA), a myriad of other agencies40 and Crown Prosecution 
Service.41 These organisations, some of which are in varying stages of 
reorganisation, have different priorities, as does the FCA which is a regulator, with 
some prosecution powers.42 Thus, the arena has potential to ‘simplify the 
confusing and overlapping responsibilities (...) in order to improve detection and 
enforcement.’43 Such comments support Levi’s  view that it was not intended by 
Roskill ‘that Customs and Excise, DTI, Inland Revenue and the Police / CPS 
[should be left] to go their separate and perhaps quite divergent ways.’44 By 
comparison, the FBI is a nationally organised force, which is part of the DoJ, 
headed by the US Attorney General. 
The recent extension of economic crime criminalisation by the Bribery Act 201045 
is regarded by the industry as ‘the single most important development’46 in 
combating white collar crime. The SFO is designated lead agency for investigation 
                                            
40 ‘Currently, economic crime is policed and prosecuted by a bewildering number of agencies and government 
departments – including the Serious Fraud Office, Financial Services Authority, Fraud Prosecution Service, 
Revenue & Customs, Office of Fair Trading, Trading Standards Department, Serious Organised Crime 
Agency, Home Office, Ministry of Justice, Treasury and Business Department. A single Economic Crime 
Agency, Mr Osborne said, would take over all of their work, saving the taxpayer large sums of money in the 
process.’  
James Chapman, Daily Mail ‘George Osborne: I’ll nail robbers in pinstripes and prosecute rogue banks’ 24 
April 2010 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1268416/George-Osborne-Ill-nail-robbers-pinstripes-
prosecute-rogue-banks.html# accessed 27 July 2010. 
41 43 police forces in England and Wales, together with Northern Ireland and Scotland.  
HM Inspector of Constabulary. http://www.hmic.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are/ accessed 29 August 2013. 
In Scotland, there has been a police reorganisation into a national force. The Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/public-safety/Police/ConsultationFuturePolicin accessed 29 August 
2013. 
In England and Wales, HM Inspector of Constabulary reports (21 July 2014) ‘A less fragmented, more 
structured approach to effective working between forces or between forces and other organisations is 
required. In particular, there is now a pressing need for greater clarity as to which policing services are best 
provided by forces at the local, regional or national level.’ ‘Policing in Austerity’ 33. http://www.hmic.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf accessed 22 July 2014. 
42 these powers were confirmed by the Supreme Court in R. v. Rollins [2010] UKSC 39R. v. Rollins [2010] 
UKSC 39 . 
In addition, the FCA has the following powers under Financial Services and Markets Act 2000: s 19 ‘General 
prohibition’; s 24 ‘False claims to be authorised or exempt’; s 85(3) ‘Prohibition of dealing’; s 21 ‘Restrictions 
on financial promotion’; s 56(4) ‘Prohibition orders’ ;  s 177 ‘Failing to cooperate’; s 398 ‘Misleading the 
authority’ Other provisions: ‘insider dealing’ Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 52; ‘Making misleading statements’ 
Financial Services Act 2012, ss 89, 90 & 91; ‘Terrorist financing or money laundering’, Counter Terrorism Act 
2008 ,Sch 7; ‘Money Laundering Regulations’,  Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
43 HM Treasury, ‘Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House’, June 16 2010, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm, 
accessed 18 December 2013. 
44 Michael Levi ‘Fraud on trial: what is to be done?’ (2000) 21(2) Co Law 54. 
45 Bribery Act 2010, hereinafter BA2010. 





and prosecution, both in UK and overseas.47 The SFO is experienced but, as with 
its abandoned investigation into bribery allegations against the defence equipment 
manufacturer BAE,48 its reputation has suffered in comparison with US 
counterparts. The international reputation of the DoJ and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)49 is of agencies which have a strong determination 
to prosecute fraud, bribery and corruption, mainly based on the international 
application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA). The DoJ and SEC 
appear to be more successful50 than UK agencies because of the headlines 
generated by firms agreeing to make very large financial settlements in order to 
dispose of actions against them. The DoJ and SEC were shown by a study 
initiated by the SFO of itself 51 to achieve higher outcomes in terms of cases 
successfully taken to trial and convictions obtained, in addition to which the US 
make heavy use of Deferred Prosecution agreements (DPA) to settle cases 
without the necessity of a trial but with the generation of significant income.52 The 
SFO, too, saw the advantages of DPAs and endeavoured to follow US practice by 
concluding agreements, though without underpinning legislative support, but these 
were heavily criticised by the courts.53 This has been remedied from 2014 when 
such agreements became permissible in UK but it remains to be seen when and 
how they are employed.54 The DoJ and SEC deploy DPAs in a manner whereby 
the mere threat of litigation causes defendants to wish to compromise with the 
                                            
47 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Bribery and Corruption’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/bribery--
corruption.aspx accessed 4 November 2014. 
48 BAE Systems plc. 
Eoin O’Shea, Nicola McLeod & Alex Beal ‘Regulatory: Back to the drawing board’ (2010) 160 NLJ 759. 
R (on the application of Corner House Research and another) v Director of Serious Fraud Office (BAE 
Systems plc, interested party) [2008] All ER 927. See Chapter 6. 
49 US Securities and Exchange Commission, hereinafter SEC. 
50 Total penalties and disgorgements 2012 $3.1bn; 2013 $3.4bn. The SEC has a performance objective of 
resolving 92% of its enforcement actions (exceeded in 2013). See Securities and Exchange Commission, 
‘Fiscal Year 2013 Agency Annual report ’ Table 1.10.  
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2013.pdf#contents accessed 11 September 2014. 
The DoJ state  between 2009 and 2013, it charged more white-collar defendants than during any previous 
five-year period going back to at least 1994. Since 2009,  in over 60 cases against financial institutions 
resulting in recoveries totaling over $85 billion. See Department of Justice, ‘Attorney General Holder Remarks 
on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law’ http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law accessed 30 September 2014. 
For UK fines by FSA/FCA, see chapter 9.6.1. from 2009 – 2014, these amount to £1.19bn. 
51 Jessica de Grazia, ‘Review of the Serious Fraud Office. Final Report. June 2008’  
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-policies-and-publications/jessica-de-grazia-review-.aspx accessed 14 
February 2010. 
52 ‘This Review [of SFO] compares the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) to two prosecutors’ offices in the US: the 
US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), a Federal prosecution agency, and the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office (DANY), a local prosecutor’s office. Both offices (whose caseload of 
serious and complex fraud is comparable to that of the SFO) occasionally work with the SFO.’ Both SDNY and 
DANY are part of US Department of Justice. de Grazia (n 51). 
53 R v Dougall  [2010] EWCA Crim 1048; R v Innospec (unreported). 
54 Crime and Courts Act 2013. 
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authorities (pace UK where defendants seem to be prepared to ‘take a chance’ on 
SFO prosecution, because of a combination of cases being abandoned before 
trial, trials collapsing or evidence not being sufficiently strong to cause a jury to 
convict).55 The US experience has led to significant income in terms of fines56 but 
seemingly relegated the role of the Judiciary into that of a ‘rubber stamp’, 
something which had been a concern of UK courts.57 Recent evidence is, though, 
that the Judiciary is being less compliant and more enquiring in this respect. With 
the advent of DPAs in the UK, there will be issues over implementation, bearing in 
mind the perception that white collar crime is treated differently from other crime 
and, in a post financial crisis era, that banks are ‘too big to prosecute’.58 
In the meantime, the FSA was considered to have failed in its objective59 of 
policing white collar crime and criticised by MacNeil for adopting a ‘light touch’ 
approach to enforcement.60 The government’s wish to overhaul the market and 
prudential regulation was originally intended to leave the FSA’s enforcement 
responsibilities as part of the ECA, but these plans were abandoned and, instead, 
the FSA has been re-engineered as the FCA.61 The FCA has also embraced the 
OFT, including supervision of 50,000 consumer credit firms,62 and where, in 
contrast to its role as regulator and licensing authority, Joshua considers that ‘the 
failure of OFT’s first criminal trial for cartels and price-fixing, raised particular 
concerns about its competence, strategy and tactical implementation.’63  
Although Fisher dealt with some of the issues in 2010 when calling for the 
establishment of a single economic crime agency,64 the key contributor to the 
                                            
55 de Grazia (n 51). 
56 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Fiscal Year 2013 Agency Annual report ’ (n 50). 
Department of Justice, ‘Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions’ (n 50). 
57 R v Dougall  [2010] EWCA Crim 1048; R v Innospec (unreported). 
58 The Telegraph, ‘Banks are 'too big to prosecute', says FSA's Andrew Bailey’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9743839/Banks-are-too-big-to-prosecute-
says-FSAs-Andrew-Bailey.html accessed 9 October 2014. 
59 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 6. 
HM Treasury. ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation to the Financial 
Conduct Authority’. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221913/consult_transferring_co
nsumer_credit_regulation_to_fca.pdf accessed 5 March 2014. 
Financial Services Act 2012, s 1B(3). Financial Services Act 2012, s 1D(1). 
60 Iain MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 11 
EBOR 483,484. 
61 See chapter 6.2.1. 
62 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘PS14/3: Final rules for consumer credit firms’, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/ps14-3-final-rules-for-consumer-credit-firms accessed 28 March 2014. 
63 Julian Joshua, ‘Comment: sending the wrong message’. (2010) LS Gaz, 20 May, 10 (2). 
64 Some issues have been overtaken, such as enacting the Bribery Act 2010 and, availability of DPAs, the 
NFA has been disbanded but the structure of multiple agencies remains. A significant suggestion of making 
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debate was de Grazia’s critical report on the SFO.65 Given that the UK does not 
operate in isolation internationally in its endeavours to counter economic crime, 
this thesis will research the regulatory response to economic crime in the US and 
Australia for comparison. The UK is a signatory to international treaties, including 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention66 and the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption 2003.67 
1.2  Research importance and contribution to knowledge 
The field of economic crime embraces fraud, bribery, corruption and financial 
regulation, yet examination of the research by Levi shows they are investigated 
individually rather than the field as a whole.68 This thesis brings together a study 
across the spectrum of economic crime as a base for proposing a new institutional 
structure, thereby providing a contribution to knowledge.  This thesis, in chapter 
four, takes as a base point for research both the state of fraud prosecution and 
regulatory systems which the government found in 1979. In relation to fraud, 
Roskill stated ‘[t]he public no longer believes that the legal system in England and 
Wales is capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book.’69 In relation to regulation, ‘[t]he system, if it warrants such a 
title, up to 1986 was a collection of largely single industry Acts, clustered around 
the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, supplemented by various 
Companies Acts provisions.’70 Thus, a key part of the research is to critically 
analyse the parallel regimes and the solutions adopted by government, which over 
                                                                                                                                    
firms vicariously liable for the actions of employees has gained traction in 2013 with engagement by the SFO 
in this proposal.  
Jonathan Fisher & Ted Sumpster, ‘Fighting Fraud and Financial Crime’. Research Note March 2010. 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/publications/category/item/fighting-fraud-and-financial-crime . Accessed 11 
June 2013. 
65 de Grazia (n 51). 
66 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(1997). http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf accessed 6 August 2013. 
67 ‘United Nations Convention Against Corruption’, (UNCAC)  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf Accessed 5 
August 2013. 
68 Levi, ‘Fraud on trial: what is to be done?’ (n 44)  54,55. 
M Levi, “The Roskill Fraud Commission Revisited: An Assessment” (2003) JFC 11(1) 38. 
Honess, Levi and Charman, (n 34) 17. 
R Wright, “Fraud after Roskill: A View of the Serious Fraud Office” (2003) 11(1) JFC 11(1) 10. 
69 ‘The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us suggests that the public is right.’  
Roskill (n 6) 1. 
70 ‘It was administered by either the Department responsible, often the then Department of Trade & Industry 
(DTI), or by self-regulating bodies, for example Lloyds or the Stock Exchange.’ House of Commons Library, 




28 years later are clearly shown not to have worked and are not ‘fit for purpose’.71 
This will involve examination, in chapter five, of the legislative changes which saw 
laws dating back to the nineteenth century replaced by the Fraud Act 2006 
(FRA2006)72 and the BA2010. 
The next part of this thesis deals with the current anti-economic crime endeavours 
in the UK, US and Australia. In chapter six, this thesis considers the current UK 
landscape because, since 1979, governments have created, reformed or 
abandoned some institutions in an endeavour to respond to the changing 
economic climate. 73 This research is timely because the outcome of a change in 
government was to  ‘promote pro-active regulators and the pre-eminence of the 
Bank [of England].’74 During the past three decades, the suite of laws available to 
prosecute economic crime has been considerably improved, by extending and 
recodifying definitions of fraud and bribery.75 The contrast with the US is marked: 
whereas the UK has two straightforward statutes to criminalise fraud and bribery, 
the US has a myriad of laws which are fragmented and rely on some nineteenth 
century legislation such as the Mail Fraud Act 1872, as discussed in chapter 
seven.76 Nevertheless, the FCPA is important legislation with international impact. 
In Australia, discussed in chapter eight, the constitution presents a confusing 
picture of state legislation to counter fraud while at Commonwealth of Australia 
level there has been anti-bribery legislation since 1999 but no prosecutions.77 The 
scope of UK legislation will be considered to evaluate whether it is effective, 
sufficient for their purpose and compliant with international standards. The 
comparison with US and Australia will inform consideration of possible deficiencies 
and consequent need for improvement. 
The conclusion of this doctoral thesis, encompassing a review of the current and 
historic economic crime landscape, makes a contribution to knowledge by 
                                            
71 House of Commons Library (n 70) 13. (Hoban).  
72 Fraud Act 2006, hereinafter FRA2006. 
73 The landscape has changed since Roskill including the creation of SOCA, the National Fraud Authority, 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. The Government has since created ‘The National Crime Agency’ to 
absorb the SOCA and establish within it a division, the  ‘Economic Crime Command,’ instead of the separate 
ECA. The fraud and prosecution activities of the (to be) dismembered FSA remain separate, as does SFO. 
SOCA was short-lived, as was the Asset Recovery Agency which it subsumed in 2007. 
74 House of Commons Library (n 70) 13. 
Financial Services Act 2012. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted accessed 11 June 
2013. 
75 Fraud Act 2006, Bribery Act 2010, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
76 For a discussion of other fraud legislation, see Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century (n 11) 102-111. 
77 See Chapter 8.4.1. re Securency. 
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reviewing the reality of the government’s plans and proposing a different model: 
that of a single ECA, in order to unite the disparate parts of the existing economic 
crime agencies into one entity. This thesis considers that the government was 
correct to advance a new ECA as a unified centre for anti-fraud matters, being a 
positive and exciting development. However, because of political ‘siren voices’78 it 
has lost its will and created yet more confusion, through government’s equivocal 
attitude to economic crime rather than fulfilling its pledge to be serious about such 
crime and holding those suspected of financial wrongdoing to account,79 thus 
perpetuating the errors of the past. The Coalition government has concentrated its 
reforms of preventing another financial crisis by its twin peaks model. The key part 
of this for government was the role of the Bank of England and PRA. The second 
peak, the FCA, supervises an area which is susceptible to economic crime and, 
thus, important to this thesis. The contribution which this thesis makes to 
knowledge is that it is centred on economic crime and not the individual parts 
where other agencies may be hobbled by conflicting priorities such as the FCA 
regulating 50,000 financial intermediaries and the NCA diverting resources 
between its commands to child exploitation and online protection or border 
controls in contrast to the SFO which has a single focus. 
The thesis advocates the positive alternative. An ECA would be a single entity, 
responsible for countering fraud, bribery, corruption and regulatory failings. It 
would take key elements of investigation and prosecution away from other 
agencies, which have a limited interest, and become a national centre of 
excellence. The ECA would be the national reporting centre for fraud, currently the 
only legal requirement to report is for authorised firms under the FCA’s Hand 
                                            
78 Peters and Peters, ‘Fears grow that SFO defections could hit Tchenguiz inquiry’ 14 April 2012. 
http://www.petersandpeters.com/News/fears-grow-sfo-defections-could-hit-tchenguiz-inquiry accessed 15 
April 2012. 
79  ‘(…) our position as one of the world’s leading global financial centres.  
I can also confirm that we will fulfil the commitment in the coalition agreement to create a single agency to 
take on the work of tackling serious economic crime that is currently dispersed across a number of 
Government departments and agencies. We take white collar crime as seriously as other crime and we are 
determined to simplify the confusing and overlapping responsibilities in this area in order to improve detection 
and enforcement.’ 
HM Treasury, ‘Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner’ (n 43). 
‘We take white collar crime as seriously as other crime, so we will create a single agency to take on the work 
of tackling serious economic crime that is currently done by, among others, the Serious Fraud Office, Financial 
Services Authority and Office of Fair Trading.’ 
Cabinet Office, ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf accessed 26 June 2010. 
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Book,80 and the single entity would remove the inconsistencies of approach 
inherent in having so many different separate bodies and fulfil the coalition’s 
objectives. By joining together the various existing bodies, the new agency would 
have the critical mass and authority to make a significant contribution to tackling 
economic crime, thus, demonstrating the importance of this research.  
The next chapter discusses the methodological approach adopted to researching 
the subject area.
                                            









This chapter discusses the methodological approaches adopted in this thesis. The 
field of economic crime embraces fraud, bribery, corruption and financial 
regulation. The context of this research is that fraud is a major drain on the United 
Kingdom (UK) economy.1 The thesis critiques the current UK counter-economic 
crime strategy and makes proposals for a new approach. This subject area is 
under-researched, an absence which may be partially explained by fraud not being 
a core policing priority, unlike money laundering and counter-terrorism financing.2 
Fraud at the lower level is thought of as benefit fraud, housing fraud and credit 
card fraud.3 It is a contemporary subject as indicated by the post 2008 financial 
crisis clamour to criminalise the alleged illegal misconduct of traders and bankers.4 
The central issues the thesis addresses are whether the legislative framework is 
appropriate for current needs and, if so, whether the UK has the agencies to 
implement effectively the underlying strategy. The conclusion of this thesis is that 
the existing suite of legislation is, with some modest additions,5 suitable for their 
purposes, whereas the agencies are disparate and in real need of unifying into 
one body. Existing research traditionally investigates the separate areas of fraud, 
bribery, corruption and financial regulation individually, rather than as a whole.6 
This thesis brings together a study across the spectrum of economic crime as a 
base for proposing a new institutional structure bringing together the disparate 
parts of the existing economic crime agencies into one entity. The approach taken 
in this thesis is not to consider the UK as a single universe for study but to 
embrace comparisons with two other countries and, combining investigations into 
                                            
1 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/nfa/annual-fraud-indicator/annual-fraud-
ndicator-2012?view=Binary accessed 25 April 2012. 
2 ‘Fraud has been propelled from its traditional tertiary position, behind money laundering and terrorist 
financing, to the top of the government’s financial crime agenda.’ This is due to the publication of the Fraud 
Review [in 2006] and the introduction of the Fraud Act 2006.’ 
Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century  (Edward Elgar 2011) 123. 
Nicholas Ryder, ‘The fight against illicit finance: A critical review of the Labour government's policy.’ 
(2011) 12(3) J Bank Regul  252-275. 
3 For a list of other types of fraud, see Action Fraud, ‘A-Z of Fraud’ http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/a-
z_of_fraud accessed 11 September 2014. 
4 Jed S Rakoff, ‘The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-level Executives Been Prosecuted?’ The New York 
Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/ accessed 2 April 2014. 
5 Discussed in  Chapter 9. 
6 M Levi, ‘Fraud on trial: what is to be done?’ (2002)  21(2)  Co Law  54,55. 
M Levi, ‘The Roskill Fraud Commission Revisited: An Assessment’ (2003) 11(1) J  F C 38-44. 
T M Honess,  M Levi and  E A Charman,  ‘Juror competence in serious frauds since Roskill: a research-based 
assessment’, (2004) 11(1) J F C 17 – 27. 
R Wright, “Fraud after Roskill: A View of the Serious Fraud Office” (2003) 11(1) J F C 10-16. 
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the current context of research with traditional scholarship, examining legislation 
and case law. This chapter employs the methodologies appropriate to the 
research: comparative, socio-legal and doctrinal. 
For research to be of value, and to be able to withstand critical examination, a 
systematic approach has to be adopted, working to a plan or system and 
employing a set of methods.   Academic study of law has a long tradition, though 
this long tradition is focused on one particular type of study, the ‘doctrinal’ or 
‘black-letter’ approach.7  However, ‘[a]lthough ‘traditional’ legal scholarship 
embraces many forms it is doctrinal research that has been predominant’.8  Vick 
stated that:  
Doctrinal research treats the law and legal systems as distinctive social 
institutions and is characterised by a fairly unique method of reasoning and 
analysis. In its purest form ‘black-letter’ research aims to understand the law 
from no more than a thorough examination of a finite and relatively fixed 
universe of authoritative texts consisting of cases, statutes, and other primary 
sources.9 
Although doctrinal research has been criticised for being ‘intellectually rigid, 
inflexible, and inward looking’,10 it does represent a yardstick by which other 
approaches can be judged. As an alternative to the pure approach of ‘black-letter’ 
law, the alternative ‘interdisciplinary’ approach, uses ‘ideas and techniques 
borrowed from other disciplines’,11 notwithstanding that these have been 
described by its critics as ‘amateurish dabbling with theories and methods the 
researchers do not fully understand.’12 The reason given for this is that: 
Members of a discipline, like members of other discrete social groups, 
develop their own distinctive ways of thinking, communicating, and operating. 
They adopt a common `body of learning, a style, a set of approaches, and a 
mechanism of problem formation, recognition, and solution.'13 
                                            
7 ‘The phrase ‘black-letter’ refers to black or Gothic type that was traditionally used in formal statements of 
legal principles or rules at the start of a section, which was typically followed by a descriptive exposition or 
commentary.’ M Salter and J Mason, Writing Law Dissertations (Pearson Education  2007)  44.  
‘As a distinct academic discipline, law can trace its origins at least to the middle ages’.  
Douglas W Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the discipline of law’ (2004) 31 JL & Soc’y 163, 174. 
8 Vick (n 7) 177. 
9 Vick (n 7) 178. 
‘The term ‘literary sources’ is used to describe books about law, as opposed to books of law, which contain 
‘official’ copies of legislation or case reports. Literary sources are sometimes referred to as secondary 
sources, to distinguish them from books of law, which are primary  sources.’ 
J A Holland and J S Webb, Learning Legal Rules (5th edn. OUP  2003) 34. 
10 Vick (n 7) 164. 
11 Vick (n 7) 163. 
12 Vick (n 7) 163. 
13 Vick (n 7) 168. 
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This means that the primary sources of legislation and conventions relating to 
economic crime are considered alongside changes in the social landscape where 
attitudes to practices change over time, as with the City of London. Furthermore, 
the benefit of using the doctrinal method of research is that ‘[w]ithin the common 
law jurisdictions legal rules are to be found within statutes’.14 Thus, in addition to 
analysing the law in the UK, any analysis of other countries from a common law 
tradition will have the same base approach.  This assists when posing the 
research question of ‘what is the law’ in particular contexts.15 This is essential 
because this thesis explores the counter economic crime regime in the UK, with 
reference to the United States of America (US) and Australia. The range of 
possible answers to that question ‘owes more to the subjective, argument-based 
methodologies of the humanities than to the more detached data-based analysis 
of the natural and social sciences.’16 There is a fundamental difference in 
approach employed in doctrinal research compared with empirical investigation, 
where ‘empirical’ research is defined as ‘based on, concerned with, or verifiable by 
observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic’.17 Chynoweth stated 
that: 
Scientific research, in both the natural and social sciences, relies on the 
collection of empirical data, either as a basis for its theories, or as a means of 
testing them. In either case, therefore, the validity of the research findings is 
determined by a process of empirical investigation. In contrast, the validity of 
doctrinal research is unaffected by the empirical world.18 
However, ‘[i]n practice, even doctrinal analysis usually makes at least some 
reference to other, external, factors as well as seeking answers that are consistent 
with the existing body of rules.’19 Thus, whilst this research will not involve its own 
empirical studies, it recognises external factors by understanding the socio-legal 
context to economic crime and the comparison with other jurisdictions which will 
inform the research by the exhibition of alternative approaches. 
A key element of the thesis is to devise a structured approach to conducting the 
research into a contemporary problem which has its roots in past regulatory 
changes. In considering proposals for the future, it is important to analyse the 
                                            
14 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in  Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds) Advanced Research Methods 
in the Built Environment (John Wiley 2008). 
15 Chynoweth (n 14)  
16 Chynoweth (n 14) 
17 Oxford Dictionaries,  http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/empirical?q=empirical accessed 9 
August 2012. 
18 Chynoweth (n 14) 
19 Chynoweth (n 14) 
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landscape at the time of the last structural changes. Chapter four identifies the 
base points both of the state of fraud prosecution and regulatory systems which 
the Conservative government created after 1979, considering the public’s lack of 
belief in the legal system’s ability to bring ‘serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book’20 alongside  examining the existing regulatory ‘system, if it 
warrants such a title’.21 A key part of the thesis is to critique the solutions adopted 
by government, which have been concluded not to have worked leaving a system 
considered as not ‘fit for purpose’.22 
2.2 Methodology adopted by this thesis 
The methods employed within this thesis are comparative, in combination with 
doctrinal and socio-legal.23  These are developed through the use of interpretation 
because economic crime is an area of law which is dynamic because attitudes to 
some behaviours and practices change over time. Although this thesis employs 
three different methods, they are inter-linked but considered separately to facilitate 
understanding of the individual components. This thesis adopts a doctrinal 
approach, because the subject lends itself to examination of existing material, 
such as legislation including for example the Fraud Act 2006, rather than creation 
of new research by undertaking empirical surveys. An important point that needs 
to be addressed here is the interpretation of legislation,24 because there is a 
common view that ‘statutes are precise and accurate, so that anyone can “look up” 
the law in a statute’,25 ‘[o]nce words appear in a statute they are open to all 
manner of argument and interpretation’.26 Thus, courts are invited to discuss and 
determine the meaning of words in statutes not merely as a dictionary exercise but 
putting the words in context, using a number of traditional ‘rules’.27 This thesis 
considers the rules of interpretation,28 the different approaches which can be 
adopted,29 whether there is a place for qualitative and quantitative analysis, and 
                                            
20 ‘The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us suggests that the public is right.’  
Fraud Trials Committee Report. (HMSO 1986) 1 (hereinafter Roskill). 
21 ‘It was administered by either the Department responsible, often the then Department of Trade & Industry 
(DTI), or by self-regulating bodies, for example Lloyds or the Stock Exchange.’ 
House of Commons Library. Research paper 12/08. www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05934.pdf 
accessed 14 April 2012. 
22 House of Commons Library (n 21). 
23 Salter and  Mason (n 7)  182. 
24 The action of explaining the meaning of something.’ Oxford Dictionaries. 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/interpretation?q=interpretation accessed 19 June 2012. 
25 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 252. 
26 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 252. 
27 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 252. 
28 The Literal Rule, The Golden (purposive) Rule, The Mischief Rule. 
29 Such as feminist approach, capitalist approach 
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comparative law which is ‘the comparison of different legal systems of the world.’30 
In addition to statutes, there is ‘common Law’,31  ‘soft law’32 and ‘customary law’.33 
Comparative methodology is employed because this thesis is directed at the 
counter economic crime regime in the UK but seeks to investigate and draw 
conclusions from analysing regulatory responses to economic crime in two other 
jurisdictions, US and Australia. Taking other countries’ experiences into 
consideration is not new because: 
The aim is to identify better legal solutions in foreign legal systems and then 
to recommend their incorporation into domestic law. As a result of such an 
approach to comparative law, for instance, the English law of contract 
embraced many transplants from Roman Law and Civil Law systems during 
the nineteenth century. But the traffic was a one way voyage, for French and 
German laws of contract betray no signs of influence by the Common Law.34 
The choice of US and Australia as comparators is precisely because those 
countries are leaders in their geographic and global economic spheres and have 
the same Common Law heritage.35 The common law heritage has the benefit that 
case law can be considered in UK trials, as with Murphy v Brentwood DC, which 
included consideration of the Australian case of Sutherland Shire Council v 
Heyman,36 such common law heritage also enables the Australian courts to 
consider UK cases, as they did in Bell Group v Westpac,37 citing the House of 
Lords decision in UK case of Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley.38  
The third component methodology adopted by this thesis is socio-legal research. 
This is selected because of the need to place the doctrinal approach and 
comparative law in the context of ‘law and sociology, social policy and 
                                            
30 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 2. 
31 ‘[a]ll those rules of law  that have evolved through court cases (as opposed to those which have emerged 
from Parliament) over the past 800 years.’ Holland and  Webb (n 9) 8. 
32 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’ (1990) 12 Mich. J. Int'l L. 420. 
33 Hartmut Hillgenberg, ‘A fresh look at soft law’ (1999) 10(3)  Eur J Int Law  505. 
34 Hugh Collins, ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (1991) 11(3) OJLS 397. 
35 Other Common Law countries are: ‘United States, Canada, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, 
Australia, New Zealand, many African countries and many more elsewhere.’ 
Francis Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation (OUP  2001) 3. 
‘We have so far assumed that throughout the length and breadth of the common law world there is, as one 
would expect, an agreed system of statutory interpretation. Broadly that is indeed the case, but we now need 
to recognise and deal with the fact that in the United States, a prominent common law country, there is some 
disunity on this point. It seems largely to arise because the United States has a written constitution whereas 
England, where the common law was born and first developed, does not.’ 
Bennion, (n 35) 177. 
36 Murphy v Brentwood DC  [1990] 3 WLR 414; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman  [1985] 60 ALR 1 
Holland and  Webb (n 9)  127. 
37 The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9]  [2008] WASC 239 
38 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164. 
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economics.’39 According to Salter and Mason, socio-legal research is difficult to 
define but ‘[w]hat binds the socio-legal community is an approach to the study of 
legal phenomena which is multi- or inter-disciplinary in its approach.’40 This thesis 
analyses the regulatory response to economic crime and involves a doctrinal 
analysis of ‘law in books’ which is enhanced by understanding the financial 
environment which makes provision of such laws and regulations a requirement. 
2.2.1 Doctrinal Methodology 
The adoption of the doctrinal methodology,41 together with comparative and socio-
legal, is because the analysis of economic crime is congruent with the ‘black letter’ 
approach, since it is based upon the study of statutes and cases but will also 
benefit from employing comparative methodology.42  Doctrinal methodology 
applies to researching law in UK, US and Australia, with comparative methodology 
being employed to evaluate the findings of all three countries.43 The field of 
economic crime is active, with new issues emerging on a regular basis, which 
prompts the authorities to consider both counter measures and penalties. 
Therefore, the research involves an extensive review of primary and secondary 
sources, such as legislation, government reports and other scholarly works. 
‘Black-letter’ law is used to analyse law ‘since it concentrates on examining 
                                            
39 Salter and  Mason (n 7) 123. 
40 Salter and  Mason (n 7) 123. 
41 ‘Methodology... concerns the research strategy as a whole’. 
Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein & Nick Foard, A short introduction to Social Research  (Sage  2006) 9. 
‘Doctrine. .... A principle or body of principles that is taught or advocated.’  
Collins Concise Dictionary  (4th edn. HarperCollins  1999) 421. 
‘[B]lack-letter approach is a particular way of interpreting what is deemed to count as legal research ... it is an 
interpretive scheme whose overall framework of categories, assumptions and concerns operate both to set up 
and demarcate the very meaning, scope and purpose of [research].’ 
Salter and  Mason (n 7) 44 
42 Salter and  Mason (n 7) 214. 
43 For a discussion with an Australian perspective, see 
Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 
17(1) Deakin LR 83. 
R P Austin, a former New South Wales Supreme Court Justice, provides an interesting perspective  
‘we have moved from a situation in which English law dominated Australian decisions, to one in which English 
cases are given much less significance than they deserve, and the case law in other countries is very seldom 
cited at first instance. I wonder if this is partly due to a form of insularity and parochialism within the bar (a 
characteristic demonstrated in Sydney, by the fact that so few barristers undertake postgraduate commercial 
courses at the Law School metres away from where they work, compared with the vast number of commercial 
solicitors who do so). Sometimes one observes a tendency for counsel to cite the most recent New South 
Wales case procured from the Internet, with no discernible regard for whether there is a better and more 
helpful precedent elsewhere.’  
R P Austin, ‘Academics, Practitioners and Judges’ (2004) 26 Syd LR. 463, 472.  
Lexis Nexis, ‘Austin & Black's Annotations to the Corporations Act. Author profile’ 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.au/products/campaign/austinblack/author-profiles.aspx accessed 10 October 2010. 
A Bradney, and others, How to Study Law (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell  2004) 17. 
F Cownie, Legal Academics: Cultures and Identities. (Hart  2004). 35. 
John Wightman, Contract: A Critical Commentary (Pluto1996) 11. 
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statutory materials and reports of judicial decisions’.44  However, ‘[m]erely looking 
at the law in books could only tell us what is supposed to happen’,45 as with 
bribery and corruption in the UK post the Bribery Act 2010 (BA2010) because 
cases have yet (late 2014) to be subject to judicial examination. Furthermore, this 
thesis also employs a socio-legal approach46 to consider the how law works in 
practice and ‘how legal rules are affected by the political, economic and social 
contexts in which law operates.’47  The reason for adopting this approach is that 
economic crime is an evolving and vibrant topic.  For example, bribery was often 
regarded as playing second fiddle to money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing until the enactment of the BA2010.48 This is no longer the case,49 yet it 
was not until 2008 that the UK undertook its first prosecution for overseas 
bribery.50 The environment has evolved with technological advances providing 
opportunities for new methods of crime including e-crime and high frequency 
trading.51  
Therefore, economic crime cannot be treated as a self-contained universe for 
study but as an active subject which is constantly developing and mutating and 
which represents a challenge for the authorities to counter.  
 
 
                                            
44 F. Cownie, Legal Academics: Cultures and Identities. (Hart  2004). 35. otherwise referred to as ‘the 
authorities’. ‘by the term ‘authorities’ we mean primarily statutes and reported cases that can be found in a law 
library’.  
Holland and  Webb (n 9) xiv. 
45 Bradney (n 43) 17. 
46 ‘[S]ociolegal studies are a branch of legal studies that are distinguished from doctrinal research through the 
deployment of one or more research methodologies drawn largely but not exclusively from the social sciences. 
Salter and  Mason (n 7) 132. 
47 Bradney (n 43) 21. 
48 Bribery Act 2010, hereinafter BA2010. 
49 Salens, ‘Anti-bribery and Corruption: the UK propels itself to the forefront of global enforcement’ 
http://www.salans.com/~/media/Assets/Salans/Publications/Salans%20Client%20Alert%20UK%20Bribery%20
Act%20Implementation%20Date.ashx accessed 24 July 2010. 
50 R v Tobiasen, Southwark Crown Court, 26 September 2008 (unreported). 
51  ‘The term ‘cyber crime’, ‘e-crime’ and ‘computer enabled’ crime are often used interchangeably. (...) we use 
the term „computer-enabled crime‟ and this will broadly focus on: Crimes that can only be carried out using 
the internet – such as malicious viruses and unauthorised access of data;  Crimes that can be committed 
without the internet, but have been transformed in scale by their use of the internet – such as fraud and theft; 
Crimes facilitated but not dependent on the internet, for instance for communication – such as drug trafficking.’ 
‘Computer-enabled Crime Stocktake’. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-
statistics/research-statistics/home-office-science/eoi-cecst-hos1147?view=Binary accessed 9 August 2012. 
‘Even the experts can’t quite agree a firm definition of what a high frequency trade is, so let me explain. 
I think everybody agrees that it is made possible by the harnessing of superior technology. The race for speed 
has been critical. It usually relies on the ability to capture, process and respond to information more quickly 
than your rivals. Proximity to the execution engine is often a feature.’ 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Regulating High Frequency Trading’ http://www.fca.org.uk/news/regulating-high-




The issue of ‘interpretation’ is important because ‘[‘l]aw does not operate in a 
vacuum. Obviously legal disputes only arise out of factual situations’.52 On the 
basis that ‘[i]n any legal argument that gets to court someone wins and someone 
loses,’53 it must be clear that the opposing parties to a dispute have differing views 
of the same facts. Furthermore, the authorities themselves may not be definitive. 
Thus, although the wording of statute or case law may appear to be clear, there is 
a paradox in a pure doctrinal approach for whilst: 
Most people are willing to believe that case law can present problems 
because facts are never precisely repeated; at the same time most people 
believe that statutes are precise and accurate so that anyone can ‘look up’ 
the law in a statute. For the most part the implementation of statutory 
provisions will indeed be a routine matter, but this is not universally true.54 
These positions cannot be reconciled because merely looking up words in a 
statute or judgment invites interpretation and relation to particular situations the 
relevance of which is that there has been ‘a clear shift in styles of interpretation 
used by judges when looking at statutes. There has been a steady move towards 
what is termed a ‘purposive’ approach to interpreting legislation’.55 The purposive 
rule, otherwise known as the ‘Golden Rule’, is one of the three classic means of 
reading legal documents, the others being, the ‘Literal Rule’ and the ‘Mischief 
Rule’. The shift in style away from the ‘Literal Rule’, does not view the words used 
in any way other than their normal plain usage.56 ‘That rule demands that one 
looks at what was said, not what it might mean’57 as Lord Diplock commented: 
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not 
for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give 
effect to its plain meaning because they consider the consequences of doing 
so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.58 
Textbooks contain examples of the literal rule in action, such R v Harris where the 
court considered the question of whether teeth, real or false, were weapons when 
                                            
52 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 99. 
53 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 99. 
54 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 208. 
55 Holland and  Webb (n 9) xvi. 
56 ‘taking words in their usual or most basic sense without metaphor or exaggeration.’  
Oxford Dictionaries http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/literal?q=literal accessed 23 July 2012. 
57 Holland and  Webb (n 9) 212. 




used in an assault.59  However, courts ‘should take into consideration not merely 
the literal terms (…) but also the way in which they may be presumed to be 
understood by a normally experienced [person].’60  Sometimes referred to as ‘the 
man on the Clapham Omnibus’,61 or ‘man in the street’ is a legal fiction belonging 
to ‘an intellectual tradition of defining a legal standard by reference to a 
hypothetical person, which stretches back to the creation by Roman jurists of the 
figure of the bonus paterfamilias.’62 Lord Reid, quoting Lord Radcliffe stated ‘[t]he 
spokesman of the fair and reasonable man (…) is and must be the court itself.’63 In 
the field of economic crime, there can be different interpretations of whether a 
crime has been committed, as discussed in chapter six64 where the FCA found 
market abuse was not a crime but breach of regulations, which some 
commentators questioned.65 Furthermore, an outcome of the financial crisis has 
been a clamour for punishment but where the SFO have merely been able to 
charge thirteen people with conspiracy to defraud, in the absence of breach of 
statute, as discussed in chapter five. One person, described as a ‘senior banker’ 
has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud.66  
                                            
59 ‘a statute made it an offence to “stab, cut or wound” another person. Harris bit off her friend’s nose in a fight 
– and then the policeman’s finger’. 
Holland and  Webb (n 9) 213 citing R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446. 
60 Homecare at Home Limited v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49. (Advocate General Jacobs). 
61 ‘The Clapham omnibus has many passengers. The most venerable is the reasonable man, who was born 
during the reign of Victoria but remains in vigorous health. Amongst the other passengers are the right-
thinking member of society, familiar from the law of defamation, the officious bystander, the reasonable 
parent, the reasonable landlord, and the fair-minded and informed observer, all of whom have had season 
tickets for many years.’  Homecare at Home Limited v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49 
62 Homecare at Home Limited v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49 
63 Homecare at Home Limited v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49 
64 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’ 1.  http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2014/mark-stevenson accessed 2 April 2014. 
65 The Times 21 March 2014 ‘Ian King: Business Editor’s Commentary: Market abusers on every side’ 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/columnists/article4040153.ece accessed 2 April 2014. 
66 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Trader charged in LIBOR investigation. Tom Hayes, a former trader at UBS and 
Citigroup, has today been charged with offences of conspiracy to defraud in connection with the investigation 
by the Serious Fraud Office into the manipulation of LIBOR. Tom Alexander William Hayes, 33, of Surrey was 
one of the three individuals arrested and interviewed on 11 December 2012 by officers from the SFO and City 
of London Police.  He attended Bishopsgate police station this morning where he was charged by City of 
London Police with eight counts of fraud.  He will appear before Westminster Magistrates' Court at a later 
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The ‘Golden Rule’ seeks to consider what the parliamentary draftsman intended 
his words to convey (but had not achieved because a resultant anomaly had 
clearly not been apparent) by ‘looking at the purpose of the Act.’67 As Lord 
Blackburn explains: 
We are to take the whole statute together and construe it all together, giving 
the words their ordinary signification unless when so applied they produce an 
inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the 
court  that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary 
signification and to justify the court in putting on them some other 
signification which, though less proper, is one which the court thinks the 
words will bear.68  
Cases cited as examples of the ‘Golden Rule’ include R v Allen, and Re 
Sigsworth.69 The BA2010 ‘adequate procedures’ defence, discussed in chapter 
five,70 might well offer scope for such argument. 
Thus, examining the purpose incorporates placing legislation into a social, 
economic or political context. The third interpretive approach, the ‘Mischief Rule’, 
is concerned with looking at the history of the legislation in order to discover the 
‘mischief’ the Act was intended to remedy.71 This was demonstrated in the case of 
Shanning v Lloyds TSB.72 In a similar manner, the Supreme Court judgment in 
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Perry v SOCA considered the extra-territorial effect of Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(POCA) Part 5.73  
Thus, the employment of doctrinal methodology, whilst providing the bedrock for 
the thesis, is in the context that primary sources are likely to have been subject to 
interpretation, ‘as to how and why a particular authority should or should not be 
applied’.74 This is important for this research because, as will be seen in Chapter 
four,75 there are differing attitudes towards economic crime in UK. 
2.2.3 Comparative Law Methodology 
The second methodological element adopted for this thesis is the comparative 
methodology.76 This is because economic crime is not merely a UK phenomenon 
since it affects all countries and research into some other countries provides an 
opportunity to consider whether external experiences might have some beneficial 
relevance including that ‘[s]ensitive transplants of rules and techniques should be 
possible.’77 
Zweigert and Kotz define comparative law ‘an intellectual activity with law as its 
object and comparison as its process’.78 Kahn-Freund stated that it is ‘not a topic 
but a method. Or better: it is the common name for a variety of methods of looking 
at law, and especially at looking at one’s own law.’79 This thesis compares the 
counter economic crime regime in the UK with reference to the US and Australia, 
which are all members of the ‘Anglo-American Legal Family’, a common law 
tradition. There are other ‘legal families including Romanistic, Germanic, Nordic, 
together with those of China and Japan, and Islamic and Hindu traditions.80   The 
difference in legal traditions is an important feature when considering international 
responses to common issues and may explain the difficulties in establishing 
common regulations.81  The UK is not insulated from economic or economically 
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criminal issues from around the globe. Whilst it might be tempting to consider that 
the whole world should play to British rules and laws, other nations with whom the 
UK transacts business have their own deeply ingrained attitudes and beliefs.’82 In 
essence, ‘[s]o long as Roman law was the essential source of law on the 
Continent of Europe, an international unity of law and legal science did exist, and 
in a similar unity, the unity of the Common Law, can still be found, up to a point, in 
the English-speaking world.’83  
Thus, to acknowledge the reality that differing legal and attitudinal systems exist, it 
is important for this research to understand other viewpoints:  
Law can be analysed as the expression of a continual social, political, and 
economic debate concerning the appropriate balance between the frequently 
conflicting interests of, for example, employers, employees and the general 
public.84 
The intention behind comparing the law in differing systems is that ‘[o]ne of the 
virtues of legal comparison (...) is that it allows a scholar to place himself outside 
the labyrinth of minutiae in which legal thinking so easily loses its way and to see 
the great contours of law and its dominant characteristics.’85 Thus, as Salter and 
Mason state, ‘[a] comparative approach facilitates more critical, questioning 
attitudes towards laws by undermining the “taken for granted” positions on legal 
provisions and practices.’86 Therefore, the research has to be approached with an 
open mind, recognising the important role of US and Australia in global anti-
economic crime practice. This is explored by considering the institutions 
designated to deal with economic crime and the legislative measures they can 
deploy in light of their constitutional structures. These countries share the bedrock 
of Common Law, which allows comparison on a base of similar conceptual theory 
which would not be the case with other legal families. 
2.2.4 Justification of choice of methodologies and methods 
The research embodied in this thesis has been identified and explained but these 
are not the only methodologies and methods which were available. As a 
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consequence, the question arises as to how the choices of methodologies and 
methods used can be justified.87 As Crotty observes: 
The long journey we are embarking upon arises out of an awareness on our 
part that, at every point in our research – in our observing, our interpreting, 
our reporting, and everything else we do as researchers – we inject a host of 
assumptions. These are assumptions about human knowledge and 
assumptions about realities encountered in our human world. Such 
assumptions shape for us the meaning of research questions, the 
purposiveness of research methodologies, and the interpretability of research 
findings.88 
The selection of methodologies is a choice made by the researcher but is based 
upon a theoretical perspective that ‘the philosophical stance informing the 
methodology and, thus, providing a context for the process and grounding its logic 
and criteria.’89 Further, behind the theoretical perspective lies the theory of 
knowledge called epistemology. ‘Epistemology is the science of truth; it is “the 
branch of knowledge concerned with how knowledge is derived”,’‘90 or, simply ‘a 
way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know.’91 The financial 
‘crisis arose in part from an excessive reliance on the view that the future would 
resemble the past (…). [It] was truly complex and is poorly understood even to this 
day. No one saw it coming,’92 thus inviting the inquiry what was known and the 
unknowns.93 
There are two main epistemological philosophies: objectivism and constructionism. 
In the former paradigm,94 ‘the notion that truth and meaning reside in their objects 
independently of any consciousness’:95  
Objective knowledge (facts) can be obtained from direct experience or 
observation, and is the only knowledge available to science. Invisible or 
theoretical entities are rejected. Science separates facts from values; it is 
‘value-free’.96 
However, constructionism ‘asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are 
continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena 
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and categories are produced through social interaction but that they are in a 
constant state of revision.’97 This state of revision is demonstrated by the response 
to the financial crisis where, as Fisher observes, ‘reckless risk-taking on the 
financial markets does not amount to fraudulent activity because dishonesty is the 
litmus test of fraudulent conduct and reckless behaviour, however reprehensible it 
may be, falls short of dishonesty.’98 The soul-searching which followed the 
financial crisis sought to find an explanation for the catastrophic outcome 
demonstrating a moving target, constantly being revised and developing 
arguments ‘that serious problems were caused because in some cases senior 
management in investment banks were so reckless they did not even understand 
the risks they were running.’99 This is important because the regulators are not 
immune from criticism since ‘[i]n fairness, the regulators did not fully understand 
the risks either.’100 As Crotty observes: 
Not too many of us embark on a piece of social research with epistemology 
as our starting point. ‘I am a constructionist. Therefore, I will investigate…’ 
Hardly. We typically start with a real-life issue that needs to be addressed, a 
problem that needs to be solved, a question that needs to be answered.101 
The context for this thesis is a major drain on the UK economy and that the current 
counter-fraud strategy is ineffective. Thus, this thesis far from considering that 
fraud and economic crime in general is an object ‘merely waiting for someone to 
come upon it’,102 follows the constructionist epistemology that ‘meanings are 
constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are 
interpreting.’103 According to Bryman, ‘[t]he study of the social world therefore 
requires a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects the 
distinctiveness of human as against the natural order.’104 That procedure is 
interpretivism.105  
Although the constructionist engages with the world and endeavours to make 
sense of it, it does not do so with an open mind. As Crotty explains: 
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it is clearly not the case that individuals encounter phenomena in the world 
and make sense of them one by one. Instead, we are all born into a world of 
meaning. We enter a social milieu in which a ‘system of intelligibility’ prevails. 
We inherit a ‘system of significant symbols’. For each of us, when we first see 
the world in meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses 
bestowed upon us by our culture. Our culture brings things into view for us 
and endows them with meaning and, by the same token, leads us to ignore 
other things.106 
The ideological stance of this thesis is that of a capitalist society, believing in profit 
making businesses but with laws and regulations being enforced by the 
authorities. However, notwithstanding the legislative framework, the principal 
investigative authorities take little interest in enforcement of economic crime and 
perpetuates the belief that ‘white collar crime’ is different from violent crime by 
adopting a ‘light touch’ approach to prosecution, which would be remedied by a 
single agency taking responsibility for investigation and prosecution. 
2.3 Sources of Law 
This thesis includes a discussion on the various sources of law, which are then 
subjected to analysis using the differing methodologies: common law, soft law and 
customary law. 
2.3.1 Common Law 
Common Law is defined as ‘[r]ules of law developed by the courts as opposed to 
those created by statute.’107 The genesis of the common law lies in the Norman 
Conquest of England and ‘emerged in the twelfth century from the efficient and 
rapid expansion of institutions which existed [in England] in an undeveloped form 
in 1066.’108  ‘The term “Common Law” is thus used as a means of defining all 
those legal systems in the world whose laws are derived from the English 
system.’109 These countries include, for example: Ireland, the United States, 
Canada, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong and Australia.110 In the Western 
world, there are two dominant ‘traditions’ which we call Civil and Common Law 
(the latter being the oldest national law in Europe).111 In the European Union of 27 
nations, only UK and Ireland share the common law tradition. The term ‘legal 
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tradition’ encompasses history and outlook as ‘a way of understanding the norms 
and values that make up a particular conception of the legal world’.112 
2.3.2 Soft Law 
As a source of law, the UK participates internationally in arrangements which 
impose ‘law-like’ obligations, for example, emanating from the United Nations.113 
This thesis has to consider the social, economic and political environment which 
gives rise to economic opportunity and its dark side, economic crime. In this 
environment, measures to combat economic crime are not merely contained in 
statute nor are they solely the preserve of UK government because, increasingly, 
the UK subscribes to and is bound by international obligations. The appellation 
given to non-statutory provisions is ‘soft law’.114  Soft law and co-regulation have 
gained prominence ‘in Brussels, as the European Commission seeks to improve 
lawmaking or “governance” in the EU [European Union].’115 The international 
dimension of ‘soft law’ is demonstrated by the EU as ‘the term applied to EU 
measures, such as guidelines, declarations and opinions, which, in contrast 
to directives, regulations and decisions, are not binding on those to whom they are 
addressed.’116 However, to the frustration of doctrinalists, the absence of a clear 
definition of ‘soft law’ leaves an open end to areas of research.  Pierre-Marie took 
the view that: 
"Soft" law is a paradoxical term for defining an ambiguous phenomenon. 
Paradoxical because, from a general and classical point of view, the rule of 
law is usually considered "hard," i.e., compulsory, or it simply does not exist. 
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Ambiguous because the reality thus designated, considering its legal effects 
as well as its manifestations, is often difficult to identify clearly.117 
Hard law is defined as ‘measures that contain legally binding obligations, are 
precise and delegate authority for interpretation and implementation.’118  There is 
a debate over whether regulation should be by law (hard) or some other form and 
this brings to the surface traditional tension between those seeking to have formal, 
enforceable controls and those who believe conduct can be regulated in another 
manner. For example, endeavours to strengthen UK banking supervision have 
revealed concerns that ‘[p]oor clarity over macroprudential tools means the Bank 
of England could run a ‘soft law’ regime that is incompatible with UK law’.119 
This is an important area to consider because of the reach of institutions and 
regulations across the globe has for the regulatory response to economic crime. 
An example is that UK domiciled banks which have a physical presence in the US 
or have securities traded on any US Stock Exchange are subject to any prohibition 
by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control which 
prevents dealings with Cuba, even if the transactions do not involve US.120 This is 
despite legal protection in UK afforded by Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 
which provides ‘protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments imposed 
or given under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the 
trading or other interests of persons in the United Kingdom.’121 
The thesis considers the responses of US and Australia to economic crime, in 
addition to UK. However, whereas these countries are indirectly affected by each 
other’s laws, the UK is directly affected by laws from outside, namely from the EU. 
Here, the EU use of soft law: 
reflects a recognition that the challenges of today’s economy and society – 
digitisation, globalisation, enlargement and monetary union – warrant a hunt 
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for alternative instruments of government to the traditional EU directive or 
regulation.122 
The advantage of soft law is that it ‘may signify an expectation of change over 
time, so where frequent negotiation is expected, its use is preferable with capacity 
for renegotiation built in.’123 However, as was seen with the ‘Stability and Growth 
Pact’124 which sought to regulate relationships between the EU countries in 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), ‘[s]oft law, which dominates the operation 
of the Pact, can be vague and opaque. Accountability mechanisms can be 
bypassed with no judicial review and no parliamentary input or scrutiny.’125 The 
increasing use of ‘soft law’ clearly exhibits the advantages that flexibility can bring 
to effect change in regulation, without formal Directives being adopted. This is in 
contrast to international treaties which are covered by the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969.126 The key element of this is that whereas ‘ “Treaty” 
means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law,’127 an alternative is ‘Non-treaty agreements [which] 
are concluded, however, because the states involved do not want a full-fledged 
treaty which, in the event of non-fulfilment, would result in a breach of international 
law.’128 
2.3.3 Customary Law 
The field of economic crime is also affected by international obligations created by 
Convention rather than Treaty, in support of which governments have changed UK 
law, as with criminalising bribery of foreign public officials through the Ant-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, in order to implement the OECD129 Anti-
Bribery Convention.130 This represents a further departure from a pure, doctrinal, 
approach as distinctions are drawn between hard law, soft law and ‘customary 
law’. Hillgenberg stated that ‘customary law is a form of hard law (...) characterised 
by an informal and uncertain nature’ such as ‘the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights, which has in the meantime acquired the force of customary 
international law’.131 In this vein, there is increasing influence of the OECD in 
relation to bribery and corruption and the rise of tax havens, ‘which were seen as 
eroding the revenue-raising ability of capital-exporting nations.’132 The steps taken 
by OECD included ‘a series of subsequent progress reports that named regimes 
deemed harmful by the OECD, called for sanctions on uncooperative member and 
non-member states and later reported on compliance.’133 This might be termed 
‘customary international law’. Customary international law is characterised by two 
fundamental elements: that states uniformly comply with it (sometimes referred to 
as the objective element), and they do so out of a sense of legal obligation 
(sometimes referred to as the subjective element).134 The conclusion to be 
reached is that by their actions in submitting themselves to comply with OECD, 
states are treating such requirements as a form of law, being analogous to but 
short of a formal treaty.  The mission of OECD is ‘is to promote policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world,’135 being 
guided by ‘the common thread of our work is a shared commitment to market 
economies backed by democratic institutions and focused on the wellbeing of all 
citizens..’136  
The OECD ‘has the power to adopt legal instruments, usually referred to as "the 
OECD Acts".’137 These ‘acts’ are binding on signatories to the conventions. The 
UK is a signatory to OECD Anti-Bribery Convention138 and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC).139 The OECD Convention, which 
the United Kingdom signed in 1997140 has thirty seven other countries as 
signatories, including the US and Australia,141 and ‘establishes legally binding 
standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
                                            
131 Hillgenberg (n 33) 505. 
132 Allison Christians, ‘Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation’ (2007) 25 Wisc. J. Int'l L. 325. 
133 Christians (n 132) 325. 
134 Christians (n 132) 325. 
135 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘About the OECD’. 
http://www.oecd.org/about/ accessed 9 August 2012.  
136 ibid  
137 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.  
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.  Convention on the Establishment of a 
Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy. Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property  
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention). 
http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/ accessed 9 August 2012. 
138 OECD Convention (n 130). 
139 UNODC. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ‘United Nations Convention against Corruption.’ 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html accessed 29 April 2011. 
140 OECD Convention (n 130). 
141 OECD Convention (n 130). 




transactions’.142  In chapter eight, it will be seen that the OECD review is critical of 
the performance of Australia. The UN Convention is ‘the world’s comprehensive 
platform for fighting corruption.’143 It is the first legally binding, international anti-
corruption instrument and provides a unique opportunity to mount a global 
response to a global problem.’144 As a ‘soft law’, UNCAC is reviewed on a regular 
basis by other countries to ensure compliance: the UK was reviewed by Austria 
and Greece in 2009 and by Greece and Israel in 2012. The commitment to, and 
oversight of, the OECD is important for the thesis because it provides a common 
reference point for the regulatory responses to economic crime in the UK, 
Australia and US. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the UK economic crime landscape, employing doctrinal and 
comparative methodologies, explaining what is meant by ‘economic crime’, and 
analysing current government policy, legislation and anti-crime institutions. The 
thesis also explains why, 28 years after major reforms to the investigation and 
prosecution of serious financial crime,145 combined with relaxation of controls over 
financial markets,146 the time is right for fresh research into the UK response to 
economic crime because the government has embarked upon further change.147 
This is not mere historic research because in the course of the first four years of 
the Coalition government, the proposal to create an independent ‘Economic Crime 
Agency’ (ECA)148 appears to have fallen by the wayside and mutated into being 
part of a different organisation, the National Crime Authority (NCA).149 This thesis 
will consider such developments in chapter six. 
The importance of putting the UK into an international context has assisted in the 
redefinition of the research project into a research question: ‘A critique of the 
counter economic crime regime in the United Kingdom, with reference to the 
United States of America and Australia.’ The objective is to evaluate the outcome 
of the comparative research in order to reach a conclusion as to the most 
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appropriate model that should be adopted by the UK. The spectrum of possibilities 
ranges between endorsement of the UK’s current model, wholesale changes to 









Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies and examines the existing literature in the area of economic 
crime and discusses their relevance to this thesis. ‘Economic crime’1 as a label 
includes fraud, bribery and corruption and features laws which are enforced by 
prosecutors and regulators and is distinguished from the label ‘financial crime’, 
which Ryder2 describes as having ‘evolved into a multifaceted business or industry 
with a global reach and is commonly associated with illegal drugs, human 
trafficking, organized criminals and terrorism3 and includes money laundering. 
Literature in the arena is historic,4 predating the development of the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) fraud strategy since the publication of the Fraud Review 2006.5 
The chapter identifies and discusses previous studies and highlights the 
development of the legislative and regulatory responses to economic crime and 
identifies opportunities for further research. 
Although the concept of an ‘Economic Crime Agency’ (ECA) is relatively new, the 
idea of creating such an entity is not because of the recommendation of the Roskill 
Committee.6 The attraction of an ECA is that it provides the opportunity to unite the 
disparate parts of the existing economic crime agencies into one entity. However, 
there is a dearth of literature that deals with such a concept which serves to 
emphasise the under-researched nature of the subject area in this thesis. There is 
some literature that generally covers the component parts of economic crime, such 
as the nature of fraud and then analysis of fraud related legislation.7 However, 
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there are no works that deal with the organisation of the anti-crime institutions 
tasked with the management of the response to economic crime. The Bribery Act 
2010 (BA2010) has brought discussion of the provisions of the legislation but the 
impact of that legislation has yet to be seen in court, apart from three small cases.8  
The starting point of the thesis is a period when government dissatisfaction with 
the workings of ‘the City’, and especially the inability of juries to convict people 
accused of major fraud, caused the commissioning of two major studies: the 
‘Roskill’ Report9 (Roskill) and the ‘Gower’ Report10 (Gower). The former reviewed 
the workings of fraud trials and the latter the role of investor protection. Both 
reports influenced government policies and resulted in major changes: such as the 
establishment of ‘the Serious Fraud Office’ (SFO); the  enactment of the Financial 
Services Act 1986 and the creation of the Securities and Investment Board. These 
reports provided the convenient base because they were broadly concurrent and 
appeared early in the life of the then new Conservative government. These reports 
represented two separate streams of research and subsequent legislation. 
However, these streams became intertwined because of the issues of fraud, 
insider dealing and market abuse in ‘the City’. The confluence of these streams 
came in with the new millennium which heralded the possibility of synergy 
between two ineffective regimes because the new FSA was given a statutory 
object to reduce financial crime.11 
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3.2 Themes for Literature Review 
This is a wide area of research encompassing four overlapping themes.  Firstly, 
the linear theme of government policy, which is split into three government 
periods:  
1. the Conservative government from 1979 to 1997;  
2. the Labour government from 1997 to 2010; and,  
3. the Coalition government from 2010.12  
The government policy theme is important because governments have been 
responsible for commissioning research,13 which informed government policy and 
the enactment of legislation.14  The second theme is analysis of research topics, 
many of which are inter-related including: white-collar crime; fraud; bribery and 
corruption; financial markets regulation; terrorist financing; and money laundering.  
The third theme is an international perspective. The UK is a signatory to 
international conventions, which establish common global standards.15 The fourth 
theme is of international comparison because the UK is not the only country to 
face the challenges of economic crime and it is important to compare the UK 
strategy with some other countries because such analysis has the potential to 
reveal alternative courses of action or approaches and their measure of success to 
determine whether these could be employed with advantage in the UK. Such 
analysis might alternatively show whether the UK approach could have a 
reciprocal benefit. The United States of America has been chosen because it has 
a dominant position as the largest single country in terms of international trade.16 
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Australia is chosen because it is ‘a significant economy, exporter and international 
investor’,17 and is regarded as having more successfully withstood the effects of 
the ‘financial crisis’ than other leading industrial nations.18 As such, since 
economic crime is a feature of all countries, it is of benefit when reviewing the 
counter economic crime in the UK to consider the experiences of two other 
important nations. 
3.3 Research topics 
3.3.1 Fraud 
The Roskill Committee Report19 represents a key stage in examining the arena of 
fraud and is of major importance to this doctoral study. Roskill’s report also invited 
comment, of whom a principal contemporary contributor was Levi.20 Levi’s view of 
government attitude to fraud prior to 1979 was of ‘benign neglect’,21 identifying  
cynicism in the City of London questioning whether juries could understand the 
cases put at trial.22 A consequence of this was that ‘commercial fraud was a 
subject of concern principally to a small group of academics.’23 Levi observed that 
for politicians and criminologists ‘street and household crime constituted “the crime 
problem” over which they would do battle.’24 Levi’s observation about street and 
household crime being the problem and consequently  being positioned as a 
priority serves to act as an entrée to the discussion of ‘white-collar crime’ initiated 
by Sutherland in 1939,25 to be considered later in this chapter. 
Roskill’s initial conclusion,26 which was congruent with Levi’s analysis27 was that: 
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The public no longer believes that the legal system in England and Wales is 
capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us 
suggests that the public is right.28 
The Roskill Report was commissioned because, Levi confides, ‘informed sources 
state that the aim was to get rid of the reputational problem caused by “failures” to 
convict.’29 There was contemporary research and comment during the preparation 
and following the report with Levi’s work being particularly prominent, though now 
dated.30 Wright, argues that Roskill’s conclusions regarding trials are still valid31 
but, although interesting and well argued, pre-date the Fraud Act 2006 (FRA2006) 
and BA2010 and subsequent government determination to remove the legislative 
option to establish non-jury trials for fraud.32 In a similar manner, the Fraud 
Advisory Panel revisited the question of whether fraud should be tried by a non-
jury tribunal.33 The FAP’s work brings a focus to the anti-fraud debate, yet the 
research has been overtaken by events and concentrates on fraud whereas this 
research embraces bribery and corruption in its definition of economic crime. The 
text by Doig is well regarded, yet it was published in 2006,34 which predates the 
Fraud Review 2006 and FRA2006, both of which are discussed in chapter six. 
More recently, Button and Gee look at fraud from a business perspective  as an 
enterprise cost and provides a practical analysis for businesses but which differs 
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3.3.2 White collar crime 
The expression ‘white-collar crime’ was first been coined by Edwin Sutherland in 
1939.36 However, there is some debate as to whether this assessment remains 
current because his contrast was that white collar crime was ‘committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’,37 as 
opposed to street crime,38 which was committed by lower class people of low 
economic status.39 Strader40 stated that although the term is flawed because crime 
is committed by people of all social levels and by Levi,41  who discusses attempts 
to demonise white collar criminals, nevertheless the expression ‘white collar crime’ 
is ‘a convenient moniker for distinguishing such crime in the public mind from 
“common” or “street” crime.’42 This label is important because it is congruent with 
the description of economic crime and subject to contemporary judicial comment43 
that there is at least a perception of preferential treatment for white collar 
criminals. Sutherland, Strader and Levi have made important contributions but 
what they do not include is the court’s view and the significant issue of economic 
crime and the inter-play between the SFO and regulators. A further aspect is that 
the type of activity labelled as white-collar crime can also be subject to another 
categorisation for, as Gurule,44 Ryder45 and Binning46 describe, terrorist financing 
frequently adopts non street crime methods. 
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3.3.3 Bribery and Corruption 
The arena of bribery and corruption had the benefit of the BA2010 coinciding with 
commencement of this research. The BA2010, was accompanied by Raphael’s 
excellent commentary,47 which provides a good background to and analysis of the 
Act. These were accompanied by explanatory briefings,48 reports from 
international organisations,49 and other articles.50 These make valuable 
contributions. This research uses such sources to establish a base for study of the 
bribery and corruption, whereas the existing literature is grounded in 2010, this 
research looks at the implementation of the BA2010 where, surprisingly there have 
only been three prosecutions and none of those by the SFO. Tellingly, one issue 
foreshadowed by Aaronberg and Higgins51 was that the SFO should be properly 
resourced, an issue considered in chapters five, six and nine. 
What none of these sources dealt with were the consequences of the financial 
crisis, which this research examines. In parallel with the government’s review of 
fair and effective markets,52 it was reported that ‘Downing Street has ordered a 
wide-ranging review of the UK’s ability to tackle bribery and white-collar crime 
amid concern that repeated scandals are tarnishing London’s reputation as an 
international financial centre.’53 The Home Office stated the imminent publication 
of ‘a cross-government anti-corruption plan’.54 
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3.3.4 Financial Markets Regulation 
The regulation of UK financial services has progressed from 1979 but, unlike the 
SFO, the regulatory framework has continued to develop. Part of this process of 
change which brought in new regulators in 1986, 1997 and 2013 was because 
formal regulation was a new feature and because, as Cohrs observes, ‘the 
international regulatory framework at the moment is complex, particularly on 
resolution that crosses regulatory boundaries.’55 The way in which the City worked 
in 1979 was a mix of non-intervention or self-regulation,56 with Irving,57 McRea and 
Cairncross,58 and Fisher and Bewsey59 putting into perspective the regulatory 
landscape based on the Prevention of Frauds (Investments) Act 1958. The main 
study, was by Gower.60 However, neither the 1997 nor 2013 changes were the 
result of government sponsored reports: incoming governments had already 
determined to make changes prior to taking office. Thus, whereas Gower and 
Roskill provided an opportunity to analyse and comment on proposals this practice 
affords the opportunity for retrospective analysis where Wilson and Wilson61 and 
Ryder62 explore FSA performance which gives this research an opportunity to 
consider the effectiveness of its ‘credible deterrence’ policy. Gray’s immediate 
analysis of the changes described them as controversial.63 This has assumed 
greater prominence following the announcement of a review into the way 
wholesale markets operate.64 However, it is not due to report until June 2015. 
Financial markets regulation included market abuse and insider dealing. 
Alexander65 considers insider dealing, described by Ashe as a ‘convictionless 
crime’66 alongside money laundering in relation to the European Union but, 
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although very well written, it was published in 2007 before the financial crisis, it 
concentrates on just two areas, only one of which is in scope for this research and 
does not cover either US or Australia. 
3.3.5 Terrorist Financing 
The financing of terrorism is another element in the financial crime arena and 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in the instigation of the ‘financial 
war on terrorism’,67 there has been much commentary on the subject, in particular 
detailed analyses from Gurule,68 D’Souza69 and Ryder.70 These are well informed 
and the first two concentrate on the US. However, terrorist financing is not the 
focus of this thesis.  
3.3.6 Money Laundering 
Money laundering is a significant financial crime because of the need to legitimise 
proceeds of crime, a process in which ‘proceeds of crime are converted into 
assets which appear to have a legitimate origin, so that they can be retained 
permanently or recycled into further criminal enterprises.’71 It is a subject area 
which is well researched by distinguished scholars such as Alexander,72 Gallant,73 
Stessens,74 Blair,75 and Ryder.76 The literature covers specific perspectives of 
banks and money laundering,77 money laundering and proceeds of crime,78  
financial crime policies adopted by the international community,79 or is aimed at a 
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particular market.80 One of Ryder’s contributions81 is especially relevant in relation 
to this research because it is a comparative analysis of anti-money laundering 
policies in the UK, US and Australia which are the same countries discussed in 
this thesis and, furthermore, includes discussion of international conventions and 
domestic legislation82 which overlap into the arena of economic crime. However, 
notwithstanding these contributions, the focus of this thesis is on economic crime, 
being fraud, bribery and corruption, rather than the wider aspects of financial crime 
which does include money laundering.  
3.4 Government Policy 
3.4.1 Conservative Government  
Chapter four analyses the events of 1979-2010, which provides the background to 
examination of the current state of economic crime in the UK. The first section of 
this time period was under a Conservative government and notable for a focus on 
two areas. Firstly, fraud, through the Roskill report,83 which has had a lasting 
impact as a result of the creation of the SFO.  Secondly, investor protection in light 
of the radical changes to financial services and markets, guided by the Gower 
report.84 Whereas the issues researched by Roskill remain current, the field of 
financial services and markets has remained in a state of flux as three 
governments have endeavoured to establish the best method of regulation. Key 
legislation in this period was the Criminal Justice Act 1987, which established the 
SFO; Financial Services Act 1986, which established the Securities and 
Investments Board; Criminal Justice Act 1993 which reformed criminalisation of 
insider dealing.85 Money laundering was first criminalised by the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986.86 Terrorism financing was criminalised by the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1986.87 These are discussed by Ryder,88 
                                            
80
 Jonathan Fisher, Money Laundering and Practice (OUP 2009). 
81
 Ryder, Money Laundering – an endless cycle?  (n 76). 
82
 Financial Action Task Force, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
83
 Roskill (n 9) 1. 
84
 Gower (n 10). 
85
 First properly criminalized by Companies Act 1980, then Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and 
then enacting EU Directive 89/592,  Andrew H Baker, ‘Insider Dealing’ in Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21
st
 
Century (n 2). 
86
 Drug Trafficking Offenses Act 1986, s 26B. 
87
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1986, s 9. 
88
 Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21
st




Levi,89 Alexander,90 Alldridge,91 Fisher92 and Gallant.93 These are important 
contributions to the field of financial crime, where proceeds of crime are managed 
but they are of peripheral relevance to this thesis which concentrates on the 
crimes of fraud, bribery and corruption rather than following fund flows. 
3.4.2 Labour Government 1997 – 2010 
The change of government in 1997 saw an immediate and dramatic change to 
financial regulation with the announcement of a new structure, resulting in the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and creation of the Financial Services 
Authority. In the field of fraud, bribery and corruption, the FRA2006 recodified 
fraud following the Fraud Review,94 while foreign bribery was criminalised by the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,95 leading eventually to a 
recodification by the BA2010. Recovery of the ‘fruits’ of criminal activity were aided 
by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) and Assets Recovery Agency (ARA), whilst terrorist financing and money 
laundering legislation were strengthened.96 The POCA 2002 and the creation of 
the ARA were important developments and, again, Gallant97 and Alldridge98 
discussed the relatively new legislation whereas, Alldridge99 and Ryder100 provide 
an up-to-date assessment though with differing conclusions: Alldridge stating that 
the ARA was an ‘unequivocal failure’;101 and Ryder that it ‘performed a very 
important task’.102 Nevertheless, these show helpful insights into government 
policy in an area tangential to this thesis but indicative of government 
capriciousness in creating and then abandoning an agency. 
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3.4.3 Coalition Government 2010 onwards 
Within weeks of the 2010 General Election,103 the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne MP announced that the government would take 
white collar crime seriously:104 
We take white collar crime as seriously as other crime and we are 
determined to simplify the confusing and overlapping responsibilities in this 
area in order to improve detection and enforcement.105 
The Coalition government announced that it would create an ECA106 but in the 
event the organisation which was created, the NCA, bore little resemblance to the 
original proposals. In the arena of fraud, bribery and corruption, there was no 
attempt to change legislation but the BA2010 was implemented. Financial 
regulation, though, was subject to immediate change with the FSA being replaced 
by the Bank of England, together with a new prudential Regulatory Authority and 
Financial Conduct Authority through the Financial Services Act 2012. In terms of 
economic crime, a review of the financial crisis revealed unacceptable practices in 
banking and financial markets that brought about new legislation in the event of a 
financial institutions failure107 and promised ‘tough new domestic criminal offences 
for market abuse’108 because of issues with manipulation of LIBOR and foreign 
exchange and other markets. 
Immediately prior to the formation of the Coalition government in 2010, Fisher 
argued that an Economic Crime Agency should be formed.109 This seemed to 
have had some attraction for the government but eventually other voices held 
sway and instead the NCA was created. Fisher, is a regular contributor on topical 
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areas, some of which bear on this thesis,110 but his works, although contemporary, 
only briefly deal with some elements of economic crime rather than this research 
which looks at the different areas in detail. Furthermore, Fisher does not consider 
whether lessons can be learned from either US or Australia. 
3.5 International Conventions 
The UK, US and Australia are all signatories to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC),111 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1997 (OECD 
Convention)112 and the Financial Action Task Force.113 The truism highlighted by 
Carr is that ‘the success of any convention lies in it being ratified, implemented 
and enforced.’114 The organisations themselves provide reviews of 
implementation115 in addition to other international monitoring organisations, such 
as Trace International.116 Carr,117 Feldman,118 and Christians119 have observations 
concurrent with this thesis which are useful for the research but, although timely, 
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3.6 International Comparisons 
3.6.1 USA 
A key part of this thesis is to examine the US approach to economic crime in order 
to determine whether that country’s experience might be of benefit when 
considering the UK. The US has a range of fraud statutes while bribery is centred 
on the FCPA enacted in 1977 and there is a considerable wealth of literature on 
the subject, not least by the DoJ and SEC which provide an up to date guide.120 
Against the background where the UK has a modern FRA2006, the US still uses 
the Mail Fraud Statute 1867 and its later partner the Wire Fraud Statute 1952. The 
structure is well analysed by a number of contributors with Podgor121 pointing to 
‘no specific group of statutes designated in the federal code as fraud statutes’,122 
and others such as Henning,123 Rakoff124 and, latterly, Zelcer125 looking at the 
operation of these two statutes. The importance for the thesis is that the use of 
these predicate acts explains the US system which contains a variety of fraud 
acts, rather than the single UK FRA2006 and provides a bedrock to understand 
the place of other US legislation.  
The financial crisis provided the impetus for contemporary comment concurrent 
with this thesis by Ceresney,126 Feldman,127 Ryder,128 Ryder and Chambers,129 
and Baber130 but, although helpful in understanding how the US authorities tackle 
the outcome of the crisis, this thesis is not about the financial crisis per se but is 
certainly about whether there are any lessons from the US which could be 
translated with benefit to the UK. The FCPA is a significant piece of US legislation, 
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not only because it has domestic application but because it extends US jurisdiction 
internationally and because it acts as a precedent for international criminalisation 
of bribery and corruption. As 37 year old legislation, there are some mature 
analyses such as Sorensen,131 Brown,132 Salbu,133 Griffin134 and Diersen135 but 
these predate the UK BA2010. The main contribution since 2010 is the DoJ/SEC’s 
own guide to the FCPA136 with other comment concurrent with this thesis by 
Cavico and Bahaudin,137 and Hansberry.138 The issue over FCPA permitting small 
‘facilitation payments’ separates US (which permits) and UK (which does not 
permit), but analysis of implementation of UK bribery legislation has to wait for the 
first prosecutions. 
The counter economic crime regime in the UK does not currently include 
‘whistleblowing’, although there is a consultation outstanding.139 However, in the 
US, the Dodd-Frank Act 2010, as a response to the financial crisis, introduced a 
formal whistleblowing regime analysed by Baber,140 Hansberry141 and Carr142 but 
is not researched as part of this thesis and where US experience is still 
developing.143 Thus, the unique part of this thesis is the evaluation of measures 
taken in the US to combat fraud, bribery and corruption where there is some 
historic analysis of the US legislation but the value to this research is to assess 
whether US experience, which is dynamic, can be beneficially applied to the UK. 
 
                                            
131
  Theodore C Sorensen, ‘Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals’ (1976) 54 Foreign Aff 
719. 
132
 H Lowell Brown, ‘the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act redux: the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act’ (1994) 12 Int’l Tax & Bus Law 260. 
133
 Steven R Salbu, ‘Bribery in the global market: a critical analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ 
(1997) 54 Wash & Lee L Rev 229. 
134
 Joseph  P Griffin, ‘New initiatives on bribery of foreign officials’ (1994)  5(10) ICCLR 341. 
135
 Kari Lynn Diersen, ‘Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (1999) 36 Am Crim L Rev 753. 
136
 US Department of Justice (n 120). 
137
 Frank J Cavico  and Mujtaba G  Bahaudin,  'Baksheesh or Bribe: Payments to Government Officials and 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' (2010) 2(1) JBSQ 83. 
138
 Heidi L Hansberry ‘In spite of its good intentions, the Dodd – Frank Act has created an FCPA monster’ 
(2012) 102 J. Crim. L & Criminology 195. 
139
 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Whistleblowing framework call for evidence: Government 
response. June 2014‘. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323399/bis-14-914-
whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence-government-response.pdf accessed 5 August 2014. 
140
 Baber (n 130) 237. 
141
 Hansberry (n 138) 195. 
142
 Carr (n 114) 362. 
143
 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Final Order’ http://www.whistleblower-
defense.com/files/2014/06/Final-Order7.pdf accessed 19 July 2014. Securities and Exchange Commission, 





The second country to be considered for evidence of a different approach which 
might be beneficially applied to the UK is Australia. Australia has a significant 
economy and it appeared to have more successfully withstood the effects of the 
economic crisis that both UK and US. The adoption of the ‘twin peaks’ plan for 
managing the regulators in 1998, which was cited with approval by the UK 
authorities, and where Taylor, the system’s proponent provides the background in 
1995144 with more contemporary reviews by Cooper145 and Bakir.146 These explain 
the rationale for the Australian system, which is helpful for this thesis, but this 
research is about economic crime. In this regard, ASIC is in change of financial 
markets where, although contributors such as Lui,147 Bakir,148 Cooper,149 and 
Gilligan150 provide descriptions of the regulator’s role, the manner in which ASIC 
performs its duties is subject to contemporary press criticism151 and parliamentary 
enquiry and is of more immediate interest.152 
Not only is ASIC criticised but although bribery of foreign public officials has been 
part of the Commonwealth criminal code since 1999, there has not yet been a 
prosecution.153 Davids and Schuster154 provide a useful summary but the law is 
plain from the criminal code and to date there are no cases to analyse. In the field 
of fraud, in addition to government explanations,155 Tomasic,156 Smith,157 Johns158 
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and Steel159 all contribute to an understanding of the fragmented Australian fraud 
landscape which, when seeking to draw conclusions on the Australian experience 
in countering fraud enables legislation and institutions to be put into perspective 
allowing consideration of whether the Australian experience can translate to the 
UK.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Economic crime is a field that is not well understood, suffering from variable 
terminology and overshadowed by the expression ‘white-collar crime.’ The latter is 
not perfectly understood either but this thesis establishes that economic crime is 
serious fraud, bribery, corruption and market regulatory failure and, as such, 
equate to the high ideal set by the coalition government.160 The literature reviews 
the terminology which is further complicated by labels such as terrorism financing, 
and money laundering, these together demonstrate the need to collate the crimes 
of serious fraud, bribery, corruption and market regulatory failings into a grouping 
called economic crime to emphasise the significance to the economy. A further 
consideration identified is the priority given to terrorist financing, especially in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, which diverted attention 
towards laundering the proceeds of crime, rather than the underlying criminal 
activity.  Analysis of the three government periods under review shows the 
progression of financial services regulation from treating the City as a ‘club’ with 
rules to being regulated by a powerful regulator (FSA), which the 2008 financial 
crisis revealed to be ill placed to be able to meet its wide remit. Nevertheless, 
breach of regulations by such as market abuse and insider dealing have been 
treated as having more of a character of misdemeanour than crime and dealt with 
by way of civil penalties and fines rather than the criminal law, which is 
demonstrated by the inertia over prosecuting bankers involved in the LIBOR 
scandal. While the thesis discusses the various separate streams of 
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criminalisation and regulation, analysis of LIBOR has revealed gaps in regulation 
and underlap and overlap between prosecutors and regulators, which provides 
further demonstration that a single ECA is required in order to properly counter 
economic crime. 
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted deficiencies in the UK’s fragmented counter 
economic crime regime but, recognising that the UK has international obligations, 
the thesis has considered those obligations and then looked at two other 
jurisdictions to see if their experiences differed from the UK. The existing literature, 
again, considers each country individually, whereas this thesis draws comparisons 
with US and Australia and identifies where the UK can learn lessons. Thus, the 
contribution which this thesis makes is to propose the creation of an ECA and 
provide a template for adoption. 
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Chapter 4: UK Historic Context 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter critiques the economic crime regime in the United Kingdom (UK) by 
reviewing the historical context to the establishment of the three important 
agencies; the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Financial Services Authority (FSA)1 
and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). This is important because these bodies have 
failed to live up to the high expectations set at their inception, with the 
consequence that only the former has not been reformed.2 Thus, it is essential to 
understand the background to their creation and the powers they were granted to 
establish whether the original concepts were at fault or whether they were 
overtaken by events. Furthermore, this analysis will provide the bedrock for the 
analysis of current UK legislative and institutional frameworks, which will follow in 
chapter five. 
The importance of fighting economic crime cannot be understated. Economic 
crime is defined as those crimes perpetrated by ‘white collar criminals’, which have 
a significant and a negative impact upon society.3 The term ‘economic crime’ is 
distinguished from ‘financial crime’ which Ryder4 describes as having ‘evolved into 
a multifaceted business or industry with a global reach and is commonly 
associated with illegal drugs, human trafficking, organized criminals and 
terrorists.’5 These activities, which include money laundering, do not form part of 
the thesis, as discussed in chapter three.6 Over time, UK governments have 
                                            
1 Financial Conduct Authority from April 2013. 
2 ‘In June 2010 the Chancellor announced changes to the way that financial services will be regulated. These 
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by the FSA – to be carried out by two new organisations: the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). (…)  ‘Legal cutover’ is when the PRA and FCA will officially come into 
existence, and is expected to happen on 1 April 2013. This is dependent on the Financial Services Bill being 
approved by Parliament’. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg_reform accessed 4 January 2013. 
Financial Services Act 2012 received Royal Assent on 19 December 2012. 
The Office of Fair Trading merged with the Competition Commission to form the ‘Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA).’ The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) took over OFT’s consumer credit responsibilities 
from April 2014. Philip Collins, Chairman, Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 18 October 2012, King’s College. 
http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2012/0812.pdf accessed 4 January 2013. 
3 Fraud amounting to £73bn in UK. 
National Fraud Authority, ‘Annual Fraud Indicator’ March 2012. 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/nfa/annual-fraud-indicator/annual-fraud-
indicator-2012?view=Binary accessed 7 April 2012. 
4 Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century (Edward Elgar 2011) 1. 
5 Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century (n 4) 1. 
6 Chapter 3.2.6. 
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sought to restrict economic crime by enacting laws that criminalise illegal conduct;7 
giving powers to state prosecutors and by creating a body to regulate, control and 
discipline financial markets (the FCA). This chapter considers the background to 
the creation of the current institutional framework of the special prosecutor, to deal 
with serious fraud, bribery and the financial regulator. This examination illustrates 
how the endeavours of governments8 to adapt to changing financial markets and 
economic conditions, had the unforeseen consequences of providing increased 
opportunity for ‘white collar crime,’9 and according to Wright, leading to London 
being regarded as the ‘financial crime capital’ and the UK being condemned for its 
weak processes and controls.10 
The history of regulation of the markets shows that, as they became more vibrant 
and changing, governments11 proposed improvements to reflect the changing 
environment.12 This thesis takes as its base the changes occasioned as a 
consequence of the 1979 general election. The new Conservative government 
presaged a challenge to the status quo, resulting in ‘privatisation’,13 
‘deregulation’14 and a tougher response to serious fraud.15  Hitherto, as Levi notes, 
the attitude of governments of different political hues towards commercial fraud 
                                            
7 For example: Fraud Act 2006. Bribery Act 2010. 
8 Conservative Government 1979-1997; Labour Government 1979-2010; Coalition Government 2010 – 
onwards. 
9 See chapter 4.2.2. 
10 Rosalind Wright, ‘Keynote address to the 17th International Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime’ 
(2000)  9(4) JFC 304-307. 
11 For example: Interdepartmental Committee on Sharepushing (Bodkin Committee). 1937 Cmd 5539.  
Anderson Committee on Unit Trusts 1936 Cmd 5239.   
G W Keeton ‘Reports of Committees’ 1938 1(March) MLR 313. 
(The outcome of these reports was Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939.). 
Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of the Financial Institutions. (Wilson Committee)  
Cmd 7937 (HMSO 1980). 
12 For example: Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of the Financial Institutions. (Wilson 
Committee); Bodkin Committee (n 11); Anderson  Committee (n 11); Fraud Trials Committee Report. (HMSO 
1986) (hereinafter Roskill Committee); Attorney General’s Office, Fraud Review - Final report (Attorney 
General’s Office 2006); Financial Services Authority, ‘A regulatory response to the global banking crisis March’ 
(Turner Review), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf accessed 23 September 2014. 
13 ‘Privatisation is a term which is used to cover several distinct, and possibly alternative, means of changing 
the relationships between the government and the private sector. Among the most important of these are 
denationalisation (the sale of publicly owned assets), deregulation (the introduction of com- petition into 
statutory monopolies) and contracting out (the franchising to private firms of the production of state financed 
goods and services). J. A. Kay and D. J. Thompson, ‘Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale’  (1986) 
96(3) The Economic Journal 18-32. 
14 ‘The reduction of government control over an industry.’ Dictionary of Accounting, s.v. "deregulation," 
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy.uwe.ac.uk/entry/acbaccount/deregulation accessed November 21, 
2012, 
15 ‘to protect society from extensive, deliberate criminal deception which could threaten public confidence in 
the financial system.’ Serious Fraud Office, ‘SFO Budget 2009-2010’  http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ accessed 7 
February 2012. 
Kay and Thompson (n 13) 18-32. 
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was of ‘benign neglect’,16 which had the effect of fostering apathy among City of 
London (City) institutions because when cases were prosecuted they failed to 
achieve the expected convictions, which was attributed to juries not fully 
understanding the cases.17 Levi notes that, ‘fraud was not part of the law and 
order agenda’,18 stating that: 
Commercial fraud in Britain was a subject that was of concern principally to a 
small group of academics. For almost all politicians and criminologists, 
conservative and radical alike, street and household crime constituted ‘the 
crime problem’ over which they would do battle.19 
Levi added that ‘the relative immunity from law enforcement agencies has been 
enjoyed by both professional criminal and criminal professional types engaged in 
fraud’, is because ‘criminal types’ have been policed more heavily than 
‘respectable’ people.20 Thus, as Roskill stated, ‘it is all too likely that the largest 
and most cleverly executed crimes go unpunished’.21 It was reasoned that 
because the ‘legal system’ was ‘archaic, cumbersome and unreliable’,22 criminals 
were able to escape without sanction and this was partly due to how cases were 
tried. Munday concluded, ‘perhaps the time has come to admit that the criminal 
trial ought no longer to resemble a crafty game where one side’s strategy may 
remain artfully concealed until the last moment to no real end other than to 
frustrate the interests of justice.’23 
The disquiet about fraud trials centred on the performance of juries.24 The Fraud 
Trials Committee (Roskill),25 was established ‘because the government 
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17 Levi, ‘Fraud in the Courts’ (n 16) 394. 
18 Michael Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial: An Overview of the Roskill Proposals’.  (1986) 13 JL & 
Soc’y  117. 
19 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 117. 
20 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 118. 
21 Roskill Committee (n 12) 1. 
22 ‘At every stage, during investigation, preparation, committal, pre-trial review and trial, the present 
arrangements offer an open invitation to blatant delay and abuse. While petty frauds, clumsily committed, are 
likely to be detected and punished, it is all too likely that the largest and most cleverly executed crimes escape 
unpunished.’ 
Roskill Committee (n 12) 1.  
23 Roderick Munday,‘The Roskill report on fraud trials’ (1986) 45 CLJ 177. 
Roskill’s remedy was a greater use of ‘pre-trial reviews’ to allow issues to be more clearly defined to make the 
trial easier for juries to follow and understand. Roskill Committee (n 12) 82. 
24 Levi, ‘Fraud in the Courts’ (n 16) 394. 
25 HC 8 November 1983 vol. 48 Cols.  83-84W.  
 Lord Roskill. Roskill Committee (n 12) iii. 
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understands the concern which has been expressed about the range of problems 
generated by allegations of serious commercial fraud.’26 Its brief was:  
To consider in what ways the conduct of criminal proceedings in England and 
Wales arising from fraud can be improved, and to consider what changes in 
existing law and procedure would be desirable to secure the just, 
expeditious, and economical disposal of such proceedings.27 
Roskill’s key recommendation was to establish ‘a new unified organisation 
responsible for all the functions of detection, investigation and prosecution of 
serious fraud’.28 The organisation eventually created was the SFO and its 
performance is reviewed in chapters five and six.29 
Alongside fraud as a key component of economic crime is protection of 
investments and markets where the government initiated a separate enquiry into 
the protection of investors, concurrent with examination of the state’s response to 
fraud.30 The general approach to financial services regulation in 1981 was non-
intervention, or self-regulation.31 This is not surprising since financial services 
have a long history, dating back to ‘barter markets’ around 1,000 AD.32 These 
markets and institutions centred on the City have developed their own practices, 
generally without formal state intervention, as Irving notes:33 
The ways in which the City institutions work are governed by a blend of 
statutory and self-imposed rules. Standards of behaviours have developed 
over the years with the growth of the City. Reprisals which can follow the 
breaking of any institution’s rules are usually sufficient deterrent (...). The 
Bank [of England] (BoE) exercises its supervisory role in different degrees 
(...). The Bank itself see no good reason for basically changing the present 
mixture of statutory and self-regulation. (...) Voluntary rules are much easier 
to introduce and modify than legal ones, and to operate within the strict letter 
                                            
26 HL 8 November 1983 vol.444, col. WA 790.  
27 HL 8 November 1983 vol.444, col. WA 790.  
28 Roskill Committee (n 12) 2, 3, 147. 
29 National Fraud Authority (n 3). 
30 L C B Gower, Review of Investor Protection  (HMSO,1984). (hereinafter Gower Report). 
31 Editorial, ‘How many regulators?’ (1996) 17(2) Co Law 34. 
32 George P Gilligan, ‘The origins of UK financial services regulation’. (1997) 18 (6) Comp. Law 167-176. 
33 ‘the FSA had been criticised prior to the financial crisis for being too "heavy and intrusive" and was under 
pressure to become even more "light touch".‘ 
Roman Tomasic, ‘The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime’ (2011) 18(1) JFC 8. 
(footnote omitted). 
Iain MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 11 
EBOR 483,484. 
The investment markets benefited from light regulation by government,33 as had been the case for centuries, 
apart from the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 (POFI). 
J Fisher and J Bewsey, The Law of Investor Protection (Sweet and Maxwell 1997) 13. 
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of the law does not amount to the kind of ethical behaviours that the City 
institutions demand, and the BoE expects.34 
Thus, an era, when the most effective regulator was the BoE ‘Governor’s 
eyebrows’,35 serves as a backdrop to the new landscape with which this thesis 
commences.   
Before considering the historic background to this research into economic crime, 
this chapter reviews the particular aspects of economic crime terminology and 
then the progression of financial services regulations and fraud criminalisation 
which provides the base to legislation and analysis of current institutions in 
chapters five and six. 
4.2 Economic Crime Characteristics 
4.2.1 Terminology, Inter-changeability of Economic Crime, Financial Crime 
and White Collar Crime. 
Before this thesis considers the historic background to how anti-fraud and financial 
regulation measures were established, it is appropriate to highlight the perceptions 
that offenders in this category receive more lenient sentences than other spheres 
of criminality.36  These types of crimes have their own label of ‘White Collar 
Crime’. 
The expression ‘White Collar Crime’ was first used by Sutherland in 1939.37 He 
was examining sociological differences amongst criminals and defined this 
category as ‘a comparison of crime in the upper or white-collar class, composed of 
respectable or at least respected business and professional men, and crime in the 
lower class, composed of persons of low economic status,’38 and according to 
                                            
34 Joe Irving , The City at Work. (Andre Deutsch 1981) 26, 27. 
35 Attributed to Montagu Norman, (Lord Norman), Governor of the BoE 1920 – 1944. 
See also: L C B Gower, ‘ “Big Bang” and City Regulation’ (1988) 51 MLR 21. 
36 R v Dougall  [2010] EWCA Crim 1048; R v Innospec (unreported). (Lord Judge). 
Edwin H Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (Yale University Press1983). 56. 
37 B George, ‘Edwin Hardin Sutherland: Sociological Criminologist’. (1951) 16(1) American Sociological 
Review 2-9. For a discussion on nineteenth century ‘attempts (…) being made in the public domain to orient 
financial crimes alongside and against ‘ordinary crime’ a century earlier than Sutherland’s famous work,’ see 
Sarah Wilson, The Origins of Modern Financial Crime (Routledge 2014) 75-85. 
38 Edwin H Sutherland, ‘White Collar Criminality’ (1940) Am Soc Rev 1. 
Later, Sutherland refined the definition as ‘ “committed by a person of respectability and high social status in 




Strader ‘included crimes committed by corporations and other legal entities in his 
definition,39 which he conceded was ‘arbitrary and not very precise’.40 He 
concluded that the impact of white collar crime was greatly underestimated in 
society.41 
Sutherland drew attention to crimes being a ‘lower class’ activity with a low 
incidence in the ‘upper class’.42 He identified ‘robber barons’, ‘merchant princes’, 
and ‘captains of finance’ from past eras before concluding that ‘white collar crime’ 
is found in every occupation,43 citing a range of activities which ‘Al Capone called 
“the legitimate rackets”.’44 Furthermore, whilst asserting that ‘white collar crime is 
real crime’, Sutherland noted the poor criminal conviction rates by explaining 
preferences of victims for civil damages recovery or restitution or salvage because 
criminal prosecution would interfere with obtaining financial recompense.45  In 
modern times, Sutherland’s definition might appear out-dated because, as Strader 
notes, white collar crimes, ‘such as securities fraud and tax fraud are committed 
not just by people of “high social status” but by people of divergent 
backgrounds.’46 However, notwithstanding the blurring of Sutherland’s definition, 
the perpetuation of the term, ‘white collar’ remains ‘a convenient moniker for 
distinguishing such crime in the public mind from “common” or “street” crime.’47 
The Department of Justice defines white collar crime as:  
Non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by 
persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi-
professional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; 
also, nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by 
                                                                                                                                    
psychology” and some criminological perspectives on fraud and the criminal law.’ (2006) 70(1) J. Crim. L. 75-
92. 
39 J Kelly Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (LexisNexis  2002) 1. 
40 Edwin H. Sutherland, ‘Crime and Business’, (1941) 217 Annals Amer Acad Pol & Soc Sci 112.  
41 Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (n 39) 1. 
Although Sutherland does not explain why the impact of white collar crime was underestimated in society, 
Payne does detail the consequences. ‘Crime, by its very nature, has consequences for individuals and 
communities. White-collar crime, in particular, has a set of consequences that may be significantly different 
from the kinds of consequences that arise from street crimes. In particular, the consequences can be 
characterized as (1) individual economic losses, (2) societal economic losses, (3) emotional consequences, 
(4) physical harm, and (5) “positive” consequences.’ Brian K Payne, White-collar Crime (Sage 2013) 37. 
42 Sutherland, ‘White Collar Criminality’ (n 38) 1. 
Crimes include: ‘murder, assault, burglary,  robbery, larcency [sic], sex offences, and drunkenness, but 
exclude traffic violations.’ 
43 Sutherland, ‘White Collar Criminality’ (n 38) 1. 
44 Sutherland, ‘White Collar Criminality’ (n 38) 1. 
45 Sutherland, ‘White Collar Criminality’ (n 38) 1. 
46 Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (n 39) 1. 
47 Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (n 39) 1. 
58 
 
anyone having specialist technical and professional knowledge of business 
and government, irrespective of the person’s occupation.48 
Or, as Federal Bureau of Investigation put more succinctly, ‘lying, cheating, and 
stealing’.49  An alternative approach to a definition is that it may be more 
convenient to define white collar crime by what it is not: Strader suggests that the 
prime characteristics of white collar crime do not include violence, drugs, vice, 
common theft or challenges to national security such as immigration and human 
rights.50 
Public attitude to white collar crime is another consideration.51 Sutherland noted 
that, clearly, crimes such as murder and rape attracted as much public resentment 
as felonies but other crimes were categorised as misdemeanours, into which 
category white collar crime tended to be consigned, furthermore: 
The differential implementation of the law as it applies to large corporations 
may be explained by three factors: namely, the status of the businessman, 
the trend away from punishment and the relatively unorganised resentment 
of the public against white collar crimes.52 
The importance of public attitude is that it drives government policy. For example, 
the financial resources of the police are constrained and ‘the allocation of 
resources is being prioritised towards financial intelligence and money laundering 
and away from fraud.’53 Doig identifies the competing priorities: ‘[t]his is clearly a 
consequence of the wider public order, public safety and financial confiscation 
agendas pursued by successive governments.’54 The outcome of the maxim ‘what 
gets measured gets done’ is that ‘investigating and prosecuting fraud does not 
count in terms of measuring the delivery of these agendas or league tables of 
performance’.55 
 
                                            
48 Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, ‘Dictionary of Criminal Justice Data Terminology’ 
215 https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=76939 accessed 25 August 2014. 
49Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘White Collar Crime’ http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar/whitecollarcrime accessed 8 July 2011. 
50 Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (n 39) 1. 
51 Michael Levi, ‘Suite Revenege? The Shaping of Folk Devils and Moral Panics about White-Collar Crimes’. 
(2009) BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 48. 
52  Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (n 36) 56. 
53  Attorney General’s Office (n 12) 130 
54  Alan Doig, Fraud (Willan 2006) 133. 
55  Doig (n 54) 133. 
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4.2.2 The Enforcement of law on White Collar Crime 
Strader notes that a principal difficulty with white collar crime is that it is often very 
difficult to detect, relying on circumstantial evidence and complex paper trails with 
only the occasional obvious clues of a ‘smoking gun’.56 This is compounded by 
investigations which can last for years followed by lengthy trials.57  In the US, 
government agencies have sought opportunities to stretch existing laws.58 For 
example, in the PNP case,59 prosecutors were able to extend their charges for 
securities and tax fraud to other charges. Here, PNP having been charged with tax 
fraud, were also charged with ‘mail fraud.’ This was purely because it had used US 
Postal Service as part of the fraud by putting the tax returns in the post, something 
which would have been avoided by hand delivery.60 Strader explains the 
consequences: 
because it charged mail fraud, the government could bring charges under the 
RICO statute,61 [Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organisations62] with mail 
fraud as the principle predicate acts. And because RICO contains forfeiture 
provisions, the government could, and did, assume control over PNP’s 
assets prior to trial.63 
Blakey and Gettings observe that RICO was the end product of a long process of 
legislative effort to develop new legal routes by adapting the use of existing 
legislation to deal with ‘organized crime’.64 This case illustrates that as white collar 
crime changes, prosecutors have to respond and in the US, prosecutors looked to 
adapt existing legislation, unlike the UK approach to create new legislation, and  
‘Whatever its weaknesses, RICO gives the government an effective threat against 
                                            
56  Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (n 39) 1. 
‘Compare a domestic violence incident to white-collar crime, (…) police are called, they arrive at the scene 
and they immediately question participants about the incident. Records (…) might be gathered at a later date. 
If a banking employee is suspected of embezzling the bank, however, the investigators will wait until they have 
reviewed the records before interviewing participants. In many white-collar crime cases, multiple suspects 
might be involved. (…) Common strategies for gathering evidence in white-collar crime cases include: audits, 
record interviews, undercover strategies, whistleblowers and technological devices.’ 
Payne (n 41) 304, 305. 
57 Strader,  Understanding White Collar Crime (n 39) 1. 
58 For example: Mail Fraud Statute 1872, Wire Fraud Statute 1952, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organisations Statute. 18 U.S.C.§§ 1961-1964 (2006). 
59 9 United States v Regan,37 F.2d 823, 826-27 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
60 J Kelly Strader, ‘White Collar Crime and Punishment: reflections on Michael, Martha and Milberg Weiss.’ 
(2007) 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 94. 
61 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Statute. 18 U.S.C.§§ 1961-1964 (2006). 
62 18 USC CHAPTER 96 - RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-96 accessed 6 June 2012. 
63 Strader, ‘White Collar Crime and Punishment’ (n 60) 61. 
64 G Robert Blakey and Brian Gettings, ‘Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic 
Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies’. (1980) 53 Temp. L.Q. 1012. 
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sophisticated crime (…). At least for a while, for white-collar criminals as well as 
gangsters, RICO appears to be evening up the odds.’65 However, Strader reports 
difficulties created by ‘vagueness of many white collar statutes,’66 providing scope 
for prosecutors to overreach themselves ‘in instances of ambiguous harm and 
unproven legal theories.’67 The conclusion that ‘[m]ore carefully crafted statutes 
would begin to solve this problem’,68 is based on the reasoning that: 
Apart from being incomprehensible, the RICO statute’s potential application 
is nearly boundless, principally because of its inclusion of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes as predicate acts. These statutes can be used just about 
anytime anyone puts anything in the mail, makes an interstate phone call, or 
sends an email in suspicious circumstances.69 
The US system, discussed in chapter seven, has a tradition of multiple statutes to 
criminalise different varieties of fraud which looks complicated when compared 
with the Fraud Act 2006 and Bribery Act 2010. 
4.2.3  Criminal ‘Upperworld’ and Sentencing70 
In parallel with examining white collar crime, this thesis also considers the belief 
held at large71 that white collar criminals are treated differently from other 
criminals. Lord Judge CJ provides a reminder of the status of fraudsters, as not 
being some superior species of criminal: 
For all the respectable and reputable fronts that many fraudsters and corrupt 
businessmen may present, they are criminals. What is sometimes described 
as white collar crime or commercial crime taking the form of fraud and 
corruption in particular is crime. And it is not victimless: sometimes identified 
individuals are victims, and at others, unnamed, unknown individuals in the 
                                            
65 Blakey and Gettings, (n 64) 1012. (RICO: The Enforcer, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1979, at 82, col. 3.). 
66 ‘Stating that it refused to engage in the exercise of defining federal "common-law crimes," the court 
concluded that it would "resist the incremental expansion of a statute that is vague and amorphous on its face 
and depends for its constitutionality on the clarity divined from a jumble of disparate cases." This conclusion is 
all the more valid because the mail and wire fraud statutes are applied in circumstances where there is no 
discernable harm.’ 
Strader, ‘White Collar Crime and Punishment’ (n 60) 61, 96. (Footnote omitted). 
67 Strader, ‘White Collar Crime and Punishment’ (n 60) 61, 96. 
68 Strader, ‘White Collar Crime and Punishment’ (n 60) 61, 96. 
69 Strader, ‘White Collar Crime and Punishment’ (n 60) 61, 94. 
70 Gus Russo, Baltimore Sun ‘Target criminal ‘upperworld’.  11 June 2002. 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-07-11/news/0207110056_1_ethos-tax-evasion-dapper accessed 8 June 
2012. 
71 ‘Attending cases in  court, (…) Particularly noticeable is the absence of corporate offenders and the 
prevalence of small shop keepers restaurateurs, market traders and second hand car salesmen.’ 
Hazel Croall, ‘Who is the White-Collar Criminal?’ (1989) 29 Brit. J. Criminology 164. 
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entire community are victims, and sometimes the community itself is the 
victim. 72 
Lord Judge warned that, in fraud and corruption cases, the prosecutors  should not 
believe that these are ‘more respectable than other forms of crime,’73 or that these 
criminals ‘should not be ordered to serve prison sentences because such 
sentences should be reserved for those they regard as common criminals.’74 
Nevertheless, the reasons why there is an actual or apparent disparity in 
sentencing are worthy of examination. 
Suggestions of underlying reasoning include that: white collar crime is less 
important; or, that white collar crime is different from other crimes and requires 
different measures; or the legislators and judges come from the same social 
demographic groups as the perpetrators and are inherently biased. This was a 
view supported by Leong who noted that: 
the definition of white-collar crime is criticised for being too narrow as it does 
not include the differential associations between the ‘upperworld’ of 
corporations and the ‘underworld’ of criminal organisations. At the same time, 
it is criticised for being too broad as an all-encompassing category. In fact, 
the distinction between organised crime or ‘business in crime’ and the 
activities of white-collar offenders blurs, and organised crime often uses and 
abuses legitimate corporate enterprises.75 
This is an interesting distinction between the familiar organised crime ‘underworld’ 
criminal activities and ‘upperworld’ criminality, an expression coined by ‘Albert 
Morris in his textbook Criminology in 1934’,76 since ‘hardly a day goes by without 
new scandals coming to light concerning insider trading, money laundering or 
leveraged buy-outs.’77 
Robb analyses Sutherland’s definition of white collar crime as being undertaken ‘in 
the course of his occupation’ and contrasts that: 
                                            
72 Lord Judge CJ, R v Dougall [2010] EWCA Crim 1048 13 May 2010 http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2010/1048.html&query=dougall&method=boolean accessed 8 
June 2012. 
73 Lord Judge CJ (n 72). 
74 Lord Judge CJ (n 72). 
75 A Leong, ‘Definitional analysis: the war on terror and organised crime’ (2004)  8(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 22. 
76 George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England. (CUP 1992) 193. 
77 Robb (n 76) 7. 
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non-occupational crimes committed by members of polite society, such as 
murder or rape, would not be considered white collar crimes. Likewise work-
related crimes such as larceny by domestic servants or the theft of building 
materials by construction workers cannot be categorized as white-collar 
crimes because they were carried out by lower-class persons.78 
Croall observes that the label of ‘white-collar crime’ having entered the lingua 
franca is ‘traditionally associated with high status and respectable offenders.’79 
Furthermore, these are considered to be the “crimes of the powerful” and 
corporate crime.80 However, this stereotype, while convenient when applied to 
some major cases, does not cover the whole spectrum: ‘[s]ome white-collar 
offences are committed by offenders clearly not of “high status and 
respectability”.81 Croall considers that much crime labelled as ‘white-collar’ is 
perpetrated by many who ‘could not be described as “powerful”, high status, or 
even respectable.’82 These include ‘crimes against the consumer’, committed in 
the course of trade and business by small businesses and where ‘[l]arge legitimate 
corporations (…) are the victims of such frauds rather than the perpetrators.’83 
Croall identifies areas such as food fraud,84 weights and measures, trade 
descriptions and consumer credit.85  
The essential element in this upperworld is that of trust, as Robb notes where 
‘[w]hite-collar crime can be further defined as breaches of trust within business or 
professional communities or between those communities and the general public’.86 
Sutherland recognised this by observing that ‘[e]mbezzlement is usually a violation 
of trust by an employee at the expense of the employer, while most other white 
collar crimes violations of trust by businessmen at the expense of consumers, 
investors and the state.87 Thus, the positioning of white collar crime in this thesis is 
                                            
78 Robb (n 76) 4. 
79 Croall  (n 71) 157. 
80 Croall  (n 71) 157. 
81 Croall  (n 71) 157. 
82 Croall  (n 71) 157. 
83 Croall  (n 71) 157, 164. 
Croall considers ‘crimes against the consumer’, including health, safety and economic interests. The type of 
offender is seen as ‘small shopkeepers, restaurateurs, market traders and second hand car salesmen.’ ‘Many 
offences, even if detected, are unlikely to be reported. Frequently, there is only a minimal effect on individual 
consumers, and they may seem too trivial to warrant further action’. (…) The deficiencies of cheap goods 
bought at a sale or market stall may be dismissed as a “bad buy”.’ 
84 Financial Times, ‘Horsemeat report calls for ‘food fraud’ unit’ http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecc37282-3409-
11e4-8832-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3D6kg3eVz accessed 11 September 2014. 
85 Croall  (n 71) 157. 
86 George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England. (CUP 1992) 4. 
87 Sutherland, ‘Crime and Business’ (n 40) 112. 
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that, in relation to economic crime, the ‘upperworld’ is inhabited by respectable 
people of authority within business, even if not themselves of  high social status.   
4.3 The Paradoxical Old Lady: The Bank of England 
The ‘upperworld’ in the UK is exemplified by the BoE which has had an historically 
pivotal position as central bank, banking regulator and financial markets regulator: 
McRea and Cairncross note that the ‘paradoxical Old Lady is the link between the 
City and the government (…) [this] is an inherent contradiction (…) it is the 
government’s arm in the City, and the City’s representative in the government – 
the gamekeeper and the poacher, the foreman and the shop steward.’88 The BoE 
is a traditional looking institution: ‘[t]he Bank’s tall, windowless walls built (…) in 
1828, give it the look of an elegant fortress (…) guarded by pink coated 
doormen’,89 providing an emblematic view of the City’s premier club. The BoE, 
established in 1694 by Royal Charter, operated as a private institution until 1946.90 
Over time, according to Galpin, it ’had taken on a regulatory role and it could act 
flexibly and with understanding, which made it all the more acceptable to those 
whose affairs it chose to monitor.’91 Ritchie notes that ‘The twin aims of the Bank’s 
controlling activity in the City are regulation of institutions and implementation of 
policy,’92 which includes managing the government’s debt, issuing notes and coin, 
acting as banker to the government, acting as banker to commercial banks, 
managing the country’s gold and currency reserves and controlling the monetary 
system of the UK.93 The hallmark of these supervisory arrangements was its 
flexibility,94 however as Fisher and Bewsey comment ‘the secondary banking crisis 
of the 1970s had effectively undermined confidence in the informal system of 
supervision and the 1979 Banking Act was introduced.’95 Thus, after almost three 
centuries the Bank was given statutory authority for authorisation and supervision 
                                            
88 Hamish McRea and Frances Cairncross, Capital City. London as a Financial Centre  (Eyre Methuen 1974) 
193. 
89 McRea and Cairncross (n 88) 194. 
90 Bank of England ‘History’ http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/history/default.aspx accessed 26 
January 2015. 
BoE Act 1946. 
91 Rodney D Galpin, ‘A Central Banker’s view’ The Banks and Risk Management (The Chartered Institute of 
Bankers 1988) 5. 
92 Nicholas Ritchie, What goes on in the City?  (Woodhead Faulkner 1986) 22-25. 
93 Ritchie (n 92) 25. 
94 Galpin (n 91) 5. 
95 Fisher and Bewsey (n 33) 201. 
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of banks.96 However, this development did not take place in a vacuum, as 
discussed in chapter six, when the rapidly changing regulatory environment 
necessitated a review and then the Banking Act 1987.97 
Between 1946 and 1979, the BoE’s main concern was the provision of liquidity to 
the UK banking system, which it did through dealings with merchant banks. Thus, 
the BoE had regular contact with a privileged few banks through which it exercised 
supervision, although as Robb comments:98  
The Bank of England Act 1946 gave the Bank powers to ‘request information 
from and make recommendations to bankers’ and, if authorised by the 
Treasury, to ‘issue directions to any banker for the purpose of securing that 
effect is given to any such request or recommendation’. No such directions 
were ever issued.99 
The clear inference of this is that the BoE enjoyed informal power because 
‘[b]efore the introduction of the first Banking Act in 1979 there was no statutory 
requirement that a bank or similar deposit-taking institution be authorised to accept 
deposits or undertake banking business in the UK.’100 Existing legislation was the 
Protection of Depositors Act 1963 but this ‘prescribes the conditions under which 
companies may advertise for deposits from the general public.’101 In 1971, the 
BoE initiated reforms through ‘Competition and Credit Control’,102 which had the 
objective of engendering competition between the banks and, at the same time, 
provide greater control over monetary policy.103 Unsurprisingly, as Crockett notes, 
‘the new arrangements were arrived at by voluntary agreement with the banks.’104 
As Robb describes, ‘[t]he status of a banking institution was based in practice on 
what became known as “ladder of recognitions”, depending on its position under 
various statutes.’105 At the top of the ladder was ‘Authorised status under the 
                                            
96 Banking Act 1979 
Fisher and Bewsey (n 33) 201. 
97 Fisher and Bewsey (n 33) 201. 
98 Victoria Robb, ‘The Genesis of Regulation’ Financial Stability Review – Autumn 1997. BoE. 29. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/1997/fsr03.aspx accessed 31 October 2012. 
For a description of how the money markets worked at that time, see Ritchie (n 92) 29-37. 
99 Robb (n 98) 29. 
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101 Andrew Crockett, Money: Theory, Policy and Institutions. (Nelson 1973) 130. 
102 BoE ‘Competition and Credit Control’ September 1971. 
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Exchange Control Act 1947’ and at the bottom ‘recognition under Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1970’.106 The BoE’s 1971 reforms107 looked to take 
advantage of circumstances which Crockett describes as ‘particularly propitious for 
a new initiative. The recently elected Government had a commitment to greater 
competition; there was a slackening in loan demand and little risk that an easing in 
restrictions would lead to unmanageable growth in borrowing’.108 Such optimism 
proved to be short-lived, because government action to control the growth of 
money supply109 by increasing interest rates led to problems such as those 
experienced by London and County Securities.110 Other fringe lenders also faced 
difficulties and the BoE decided that it was important to rescue those in the sector 
suffering liquidity (as opposed to solvency) problems.111  
The  BoE mounted a rescue operation, establishing the ‘Control Committee of the 
 Bank of  England and the English and Scottish Clearing  Banks’ - a joint liquidity 
support facility that subsequently became known as the ‘Lifeboat’.112  The Lifeboat 
was managed by the BoE and the risks shared amongst the committee, the BoE’s 
exposure being capped at 10%. This was all handled without statutory 
underpinning.113 
                                            
106 Robb (n 98) 30. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/1997/fsr03.aspx accessed 31 October 2012. ‘The 
status of a banking institution was based in practice on what became known as “ladder of recognitions”, 
depending on its position under various statutes. 1  Authorised status under the Exchange Control Act 1947 — 
the Bank and the Treasury were responsible for establishing a list of banks authorised to deal in foreign 
exchange. This was regarded as the highest accolade a bank could attain.  2  Companies Act 1948 exemption 
from disclosure of certain information in company accounts.  3  Exemptions from the Protection of Depositors 
Act 1963 restrictions on advertising for deposits. 4  Companies Act 1967, section 123 certificate — issued by 
the Board of Trade to institutions it considered to be bona fide carrying on the business of banking. This 
certificate secured exemption from the Moneylenders Acts. 5  Recognition under Income and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1970 — granted by the Inland Revenue to bona fide banking businesses allowing them to pay and 
receive interest gross of tax. Some of the “lesser” recognitions only required decisions about the type of 
business carried on (eg section 123 certificates) rather than fitness and properness and sound- ness of the 
institution.’ 
107 Bank of England, ‘Competition and Credit Control’ September 1971. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1971/qb71q2189193.pdf accessed 10 
July 2014. 
108 Crockett (n 101) 195. 
109 Money Supply: ‘the total amount of money in circulation or in existence in a country.’ Oxford Dictionaries, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/money%2Bsupply?q=money+supply accessed 31 December 
2012. 
110 Robb (n 98) 30. 
111 Robb (n 98) 30. 
112 ‘Secondary Banking Crisis 1973-75’ (Lifeboat).  
Bank of England, ‘ The secondary banking crisis and the Bank of England's support 
operations’http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1978/qb78q2230239.pdf 
accessed 26 January 2015. 
Richard Dale, ‘Bank crises management: the case of the United Kingdom’.(1995) 10(8) J.I.B.L. 326-333. 
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The role of the BoE had evolved over time but the basic tenet was that it exercised 
its influence without and real form of statutory underpinning. Indeed, it successfully 
used the ‘Governor’s eyebrows’ not only to regulate but, as with the ‘lifeboat’, 
cause commercial organisations to risk their own capital to support the BoE’s 
rescue plan.  This is important in the research into economic crime because of the 
way it held sway over UK institutions. The following section to this chapter, 
includes areas where the BoE’s influence is evident. 
4.4 Dawn of Regulation  
The three decades after the end of the Second World War, were labelled as ‘The 
Welfare State’, which took ‘cradle to grave’ responsibility for British citizens.114  
During this time, there had been little legislative activity in relation to economic 
crime, save for the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 (POFI). However, 
at the end of the 1970s, and following the ‘Winter of Discontent’,115 a general 
election brought in a Conservative government with a radically different view:  ‘that 
the curse of the British economy lay in restrictive trade practices of every sort, and 
an overdependence by everyone on the state,’116 and introduced many reforms to 
the regulation of finance, some of which dated back to the Second World War.117  
The government embarked upon ‘privatisation’,118 after a slow start (…) the 
strategy gathered pace under (…) Nigel Lawson, ‘a vigorous free-marketeer’.119 
The range of state assets which were privatised  indicates ‘how far the post-war 
consensus had extended nationalisation across almost every sector of the 
economy.’120 Jenkins noted, ominously, ‘[t]hen in 1986 Lawson moved into the 
                                            
114 Simon Jenkins, A Short History of England (Profile Books, 2011) 310. 
115 ‘A strike-bound “winter of discontent” in 1978-9, came close to being a public sector general strike. Frozen 
rubbish piled up in the streets and there were improbable reports of bodies lying unburied.’ Jenkins (n 114) 
322. 
116  Jenkins (n 114) 325. 
117 For example, repeal of Exchange Control Act 1947.  Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939, Bank of 
England Act 1946, Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. 
118 ‘Privatisation is a term which is used to cover several distinct, and possibly alternative, means of changing 
the relationships between the government and the private sector. Among the most important of these are 
denationalisation (the sale of publicly owned assets), deregulation (the introduction of com- petition into 
statutory monopolies) and contracting out (the franchising to private firms of the production of state financed 
goods and services).  Kay and Thompson (n 13) 18-32. 
119 Jenkins (n 114)  330. 
120 Jenkins (n 114)  330. 
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hitherto sacrosanct territory of financial services,’121 ‘because it entailed admitting 
foreign firms into the most jealously guarded of markets [and] merchant banks.’122 
The outcome of the Lawson deregulation,123 known as ‘Big Bang’,124 was that the 
regulation of the City markets and institutions was relaxed. Galpin stated that ‘it is 
(…) something of a misnomer to describe this process as deregulation. It is rather 
a process of reregulation, since its effect has been not to do away with regulation 
but intensify it, albeit in a different way’.125 The explanation of deregulation had 
less to do with loosening supervision than ‘seeking no more than to convey the 
freedom to compete.’126 The specialist roles adopted by institutions and their 
traditional areas of activity became blurred, coinciding with the breakdown of the 
inherent protectionism of the City, because foreign owned institutions were 
allowed access to the City markets.127 Marr, though, traces the genesis to 
international monetary policy in the 1960’s and a change in US government 
attitude which gave an opportunity for London:  
The influence of the Eurodollar and Eurobond market on the culture of the 
City and by extension British business life general can hardly be overstated. 
From the early sixties, it was internationalising and shaking up London, 
introducing more aggression, fatter salaries and less of the old school tie.128 
This was significant because, Marr opines that in the 1970’s, there was a ‘Labour 
government intent on controlling everything’129 and, thus, mainstream domestic 
investment was controlled by HM Treasury whereas ‘in the side streets’,130 ‘[j]ust a 
whiff of the can-do, devil-may-care Wild West spirit was suddenly felt in the streets 
of old London.’131 This manifested itself in ‘1982, another slice of American 
                                            
121 Jenkins (n 114)  330. 
122 Jenkins (n 114)  330. 
123 Robb (n 98) 34. 
124 The proposals were based on the Gower Report. Gower, Review of Investor Protection  (n 30). 
The phrase ‘big bang’ was referred to by Professor Gower during the enactment of the Financial Services Act 
1986. Gower, ‘ “Big Bang” and City Regulation’ (n 35) 1. 
125 Galpin (n 91) 8. 
126 Galpin (n 91) 8. 
127 The Guardian 9 October 2011. ‘‘Big Bang's shockwaves left us with today's big bust .’ Twenty-five years 
on, Lawson is unrepentant, insisting that the benefits of the Big Bang far outweigh the disadvantages. But 
even he admits to a certain nostalgia for the old City: "The Stock Exchange was run as a kind of private club: 
no outsiders could come in and it was riddled with restrictive practices. It was a very charming club – I rather 
liked it – but there was no way in which it could be a strong player in that business in the modern world.".’ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/09/big-bang-1986-city-deregulation-boom-bust accessed 11 
June 2012. 
128 Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (Pan 2008) 423. 
129 Marr (n 123) 423. 
130 Marr (n 123) 423. 
131 Marr (n 123) 423. 
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business life came to London in the multi-coloured jackets and raucous bear-pit 
atmosphere of the new international financial futures market, or LIFFE.’132 This 
analysis is not just of historic interest but will be seen to contribute to the genesis 
of the LIBOR scandal and allied market manipulations revealed in the 2008 
financial crisis.133  
‘Big Bang’ was ‘something which has a claim to be the single most significant 
change of the whole Thatcher era, on a par with confronting the unions or 
privatisation.’134 It was, according to Plender:  
A scramble  in which most of the City's leading brokers and jobbers paired off 
with clearing banks, merchant banks and a host of other institutions including 
foreign banks, (…) [which] committed an estimated £1 billion or so to buying 
the cream of the London broking and jobbing fraternity. (…) Yet the 
purchasers were making a leap in the dark, because (…) [they did not] know 
how the regulatory framework might affect future revenues (…). [from] the 
assets that were being acquired  - dealing skills and customer contacts.(…) 
Perhaps most important of all, the buyers were paying large sums for a stake 
in a monopoly that was waning very rapidly.135 
This ‘leap in the dark’ may well be seen to have contributed to the breakdown in 
City integrity. 
Successive Labour governments presided over a period of economic ‘boom and 
bust’.136  This included financial crime issues such as terrorism financing and 
those emanating from the global financial crisis. This government built a new 
regulatory structure around the FSA, as a ‘super regulator’,137 which was to have 
significant consequences, as discussed in this chapter and chapters five and six. 
The UK recognised that financial crime was a threat to national security when it 
                                            
132 Marr (n 123) 423. 
133 Discussed in chapter six. 
134 Marr (n 123) 424. 
135 John Plender, ‘London's Big Bang in International Context’ (1987) 63 (1) International Affairs 39. 
136 ‘Definition. A type of cycle experienced by an economy characterized by alternating periods of economic 
growth and contraction. During booms an economy will see an increase in its production and GDP. During 
busts an economy will see a fall in production and an increase in unemployment.’ 
www.investorwords.com/7022/boom_and_bust_cycle.html#ixzz1xTy2flL5T  Accessed 11 June 2012. 
The Economist, ‘Who killed New Labour?’ 18 September 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12253070 
accessed 11 June 2012. 
137 Eva Z. Lomnicka, ‘Reforming U.K. financial Services regulation: the creation of a single regulator’ (1999) 
J.B.L. 480-489. 
BBC News. ‘Business: The Economy Is it a bird, is it a plane? No, it's Super-regulator’. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/104111.stm accessed 30 January 2012. 
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criminalised terrorist financing138 because of Northern Irish terrorism,139 thus being 
in advance of the US ‘financial war on terrorism, which followed the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.140 FSA was given a specific objective to reduce financial crime.141  
In 1997, the new Labour government announced an ambitious and ground-
breaking new financial regulatory regime which Ryder notes ‘would set basic 
standards and prevent systematic failure.’142 This change was not just a matter of 
political determination to stamp a new regime on the financial markets but ‘like all 
reforms, this one did not take place in a vacuum.’143 Drawing on Blair,144 it is clear 
that global financial markets had been evolving with new technology, market 
innovation and breakdown of traditional demarcations,145 which, as former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Greenspan remarked, ‘make it virtually impossible to maintain 
some of the rules and regulations established for a different economic 
environment.’146 Protection of the City was the raison d’être because that is how 
the UK financial markets are judged internationally.147 Consequently, effective 
regulation of the markets was needed to ensure international competitiveness.148 
Thus, to match the expectation of a ‘super regulator’,149 the Government heralded 
FSA’s creation as ‘a ground-breaking piece of legislation designed to thwart 
financial criminals, protect consumers and maintain London’s reputation as a 
global financial centre.’150  
                                            
138 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s 13. 
Terrorism Act 2000, s 15. 
139 Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century (n 4) 79. 
140 Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century (n 4) 51. 
141 The FSA had four equal objectives, one being ‘the reduction of financial crime’, the FCA has ‘a single 
overarching strategic objective to ensure that markets function well’. 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 6(3). 
HM Treasury. ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation to the Financial 
Conduct Authority’. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221913/consult_transferring_co
nsumer_credit_regulation_to_fca.pdf accessed 5 March 2014. 
142 N. Ryder, ‘An unhappy coupling’  (2008) 158 NLJ 609. 
143 W. Blair, ‘The reform of financial regulation in the UK’ (1998) 13(2) JIBL 43. 
144 William Blair later Blair J. 
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146 The Federal Reserve Bank, ‘Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan H.R. 10, the Financial Services 
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Representatives May 22, 1997’ https://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1997/19970522.htm accessed 
26 January 2015. 
147 B A K Rider, ‘Where Angels Fear’ (2008) 29(9) Co Law. 257-258 
148 Blair (n 143) 44. 
149 Lomnicka, ‘Reforming U.K. financial Services regulation’ (n 137) 480-489. 
150 N Ryder and C Chambers, ‘The Financial Services Act 2010: how will the FSA rise to meet its new 
challenges?’ FRI 26 May 2010 
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The previous regulatory system had an umbrella organisation, SIB,151 sitting 
above three SROs.152 This brought issues with rule books, claims of reductions in 
standards, structural complexity and demarcations between banking and securities 
industries being hard to delineate,153 and was later concluded by Rider to have 
‘failed to protect investors.’154 In the key area of financial crime, ‘the prosecutorial 
role of the SIB was limited to breaches relating to the authorisation to conduct 
investment business and insider dealing.’155  The SIB was criticised by Ryder for 
not tackling financial crime156 with Rider noting ‘their rose-tinted view of corporate 
ethics and their devotion to the “facilitative” approach to regulation.’157 Against this 
backdrop Gordon Brown championed the case for bringing financial regulation 
under the one roof.158 He argued that this was necessary because firms organise 
their affairs on a group-wide basis, and this regulatory structure would be in line 
with ‘the day’s increasingly integrated financial markets.’159 The headlines, 
naturally, highlighted the prudential and regulatory ‘cross-sectorial’ roles,160 which 
removed banking supervision from the BoE, but gave the new unified regulator a 
wide remit.161 As Blair observes, ‘setting up of a single regulator would be 
pointless if the existing structure merely continued under a new nameplate.’162 The 
previous approach was based on ‘moral persuasion’ and voluntary codes whereas 
the new structure was defined as ‘authorisation, supervision and enforcement’.163 
Whereas previously firms were subject to different disciplinary powers depending 
upon their individual regulator, the FSA presented a single dedicated unit to 
                                            
151 The government white paper originally proposed the creation of a parallel organisation, ‘the Marketing of 
Investments Board’ to regulate pre-packaged investments. In the event, one body (SIB) was formed. 
‘The regulation of financial services: art IV -- the marketing of investments.’ The Law Society Gazette, 9 
September 1987http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/the-regulation-financial-services-art-iv-marketing-
investments accessed 21 November 2012. 
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undertake investigation, enforcement and disciplinary work,164 in policing the UK 
financial services sector.165  
The importance of regulation is underlined by Wright because of the ‘threat to the 
reputation of the UK as an honest trustworthy market where you can safely do 
business.’166 Furthermore, the international ramifications are severe: ‘[a] financial 
services industry which is known to be riddled with crooks, awash with dirty 
money, is not the place where investors want to do business. It is not a trusted 
market.’167 Whilst this may seem an axiomatic truth, as Wright notes, in the US 
there was a view that: 
London had become the money-laundering capital of the world. It is an 
unenviable reputation to have. London’s huge financial markets are not 
surprisingly a magnet for the launderer; $1,000bn a day is exchanged in the 
foreign currency markets and the sheer volume of transactions makes it 
impossible to check every single one. We are also to an extent the victim of 
our own magnificent reputation: dollars ending up in a bank account in the 
UK are less likely to be thought to be tainted than if they were put through 
less reputable offshore banking centres.168 
This analysis by Wright, is important because it provides a contemporary view of 
the risks to the City from economic crime. The City’s ‘magnificent reputation’169 
depended upon the integrity of the markets and the informal style of regulation led 
by the BoE but which were suited to a different economic environment.170 Thus 
imposition of greater regulation became an imperative together with a focused 




                                            
164 Blair (n 143) 43. 47. 
165 This comprised: banks, building societies, friendly societies, credit unions; insurance companies, Lloyd’s 
insurance market; investment and pension’s advisers, fund managers; professional firms; stockbrokers and 
derivatives traders. 
Ryder and Chambers (n 150). 
166 Wright (n 10) 304-307. 
167 Wright (n 10) 304-307. 
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4.5 Financial Services Regulation 
The regulation of investments and markets has proved to be problematic, as 
demonstrated by the frequent changes in the structure and institutions,171 
because, according to Cohrs: 
the international regulatory framework at the moment is complex, particularly 
on resolution that crosses regulatory boundaries. As a result, the global 
financial institutions became experts in ‘global regulatory arbitrage’. While 
there are still some large gaps between policy makers in different countries 
on regulatory topics, we are making progress on closing down regulatory 
arbitrage.172 
When the Conservative government was elected in 1979,173 investor protection 
was regulated by POFI,174 and the general approach light regulation.175  In the 
fraud arena, issues surrounding the failure to convict such criminals for economic 
crime emerged.176 However, investor protection came to prominence through 
events, rather than as part of a grand political strategy.  
In 1979, the new government abolished exchange controls.177 This was a 
momentous decision since exchange controls established as a defensive measure 
in the Second World War,178 limiting investments and travel outside the UK 
                                            
171 Financial Services Act 1986, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Financial Services Act 2010. 
172 Michael Cohrs, Speech to The University of the West of England.  ‘Broken glass – moving towards 
sustainable financial regulation.’ 13 November 2012. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech620.pdf accessed 14 
November 2012. 
173 4th May 1979. 
174 Which replaced Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939. 
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176 Fisher and Bewsey (n 33) vi. 
177 Forrest Capie The Bank of England: 1950’s – 1979. (CUP 2010) 768. 
178 Later implemented by Exchange Control Act 1947. 
‘Exchange Control, modelled substantially on the system invented by Dr Schacht and the German Reichsbank 
in 1934, was introduced into Britain as a wartime measure under the Defence (Finance) Regs. 1939 and made 
permanent by the Labour Governments. Exchange Control Act, 1947. The world was divided into Scheduled 
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the benefit of foreign residents and there were elaborate related provisions about imports and exports. The 
permissions and orders under the Act put foreign exchange dealings into the hands of a narrow circle of banks 
and specialist dealers and resulted in due course in the creation of a system of Treasury spies abroad and in 




jurisdiction. At a stroke,179 the abolition of exchange controls changed the 
dynamics of the markets and, as Gower notes: 
faced the UK with the full consequences of the internationalisation of 
investment business. It made it far easier for the British to invest abroad and 
for foreign firms, straight or crooked, to induce them to do so. In particular, it 
led to British institutions, such as insurance companies, unit trusts and 
pension funds, diversifying their portfolios (…). The weakness of our 
indigenous financial services industry was highlighted when it became clear 
that the major part of this lucrative business had been undertaken not by it 
but by American firms.180 
One consequence of the internationalisation of the markets was the emergence of 
firms which did not share an heritage of compliance with City regulation.  
However, it was the collapse of Norton Warburg,181 which caused the government 
to consider amending the then Conduct of Business Rules under POFI,182 as a 
‘stop-gap’183 solution because ‘the act itself is based on a pre-war model, and may 
well not be best suited to modern conditions.’ Consequently, the government 
‘decided to commission a review to recommend proposals for a new legislative 
framework of protection for investors in securities and other forms of property.’184  
The ‘Review of Investor Protection’ (Gower)185 differed from Roskill: the former 
being ‘in house’ research;186 the latter independent.  
Against the background of abolition of exchange controls, which destabilised the 
markets, and a regulatory scandal involving the BoE,187 the investment markets 
                                                                                                                                    
Charles Arnold-Baker, The Companion to British History, (Routledge, 2001) 
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy.uwe.ac.uk/entry/routcbh/exchange_control accessed 5 November 
2012. 
179 The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an ‘immediate easement’ of controls on individuals on 12 
June 1979. HC Deb 12 June 1979 vol 968 cc244-5. Exchange Controls were progressively dismantled, with  
on 23 October 1979 ‘all remaining exchange control restrictions removed from midnight tonight’ HC Deb 23 
October 1979 vol 972 cc202-14 
180 Gower, ‘ “Big Bang” and City Regulation’ (n 35) 3. 
181 ‘The failure of several firms involved in investment management, in particular the failure of Norton Warburg 
in February 198 1 with losses of large sums by individual investors, drew attention to the deficiencies of the 
system.’ The Bank of England, ‘Change in the Stock Exchange and Regulation of the City’ 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1985/qb85q4544550.pdf  accessed 26 
January 2015. 
182 HC Deb 20 July 1981 vol 9 cc44-5W  
183 L C B Gower, Review of Investor Protection – A Discussion Document. (HMSO 1982) 2. 
184 HC Deb 23 July 1981 vol 9 c194W  
185 Gower, Review of Investor Protection  (n 30). 
186 Gower was the Department of Trade’s ‘research advisor on company law, with the assistance of officials.’ 
HC Deb 23 July 1981 vol 9 c194W 
187 ‘Regulatory responsibilities were divided among the Bank of England, the Treasury, the Department[s] of 
Trade and Industry, and the London Stock Exchange (…).’ Henry Laurence, ‘Spawning the SEC’ (1998) 6 Ind. 
J. Global Legal Stud. 660. 
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themselves were under pressure to break down ‘barriers between one class of 
investment and another,’188 where Gower comments that:  
The main difficulty peculiar to the UK has been that despite a remarkable 
freedom from inhibiting legal regulation (such as the [US] Glass-Steagall Act) 
there have been restrictive rules of trade and professional associations 
designed to protect the vested interests of their members.189 
Legislation prior to Gower was the outcome of two reports in 1936 and 1937, 
which responded to a ‘share-pushing’ scandal and ‘the birth and growth of the unit 
trust movement and of other new forms of dubious investment media, such as 
participation in mushroom farms, piggeries and the like’,190 which: 
accounts for its restricted scope and for its name [POFI] which, though 
understandably resented by those regulated under it, is an accurate 
description of its aims. It is in no sense a Securities Act such as (…) [US]. 
It[‘]s complicated, and in places obscure’.191 
Gower addressed the question why investors should need protection: 
It is sometimes argued that investment necessarily entails risk and that 
investors should realise this and not expect any special protection over and 
above the general law of theft and fraud. If they get their fingers burnt that is 
their own fault. However, this robust affirmation of laissez-faire principles has 
long since been rejected and it has been recognised that it is the investors’ 
own fault only if they were in a position to judge the extent of the risk.192 
Thus, Gower saw the object of his review as ‘to consider whether the existing 
system of disclosure [with criminal sanctions for failure] plus regulation affords 
adequate protection in an efficient and economical way’.193 Gower noted the 
confusion for dealers in securities who took deposits by their BoE license,194 and 
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190 Bodkin Committee (n 11). 
Anderson  Committee (n 11); A modern day term for ‘share-pushing’ is a ‘boiler room’. ‘A boiler room is a 
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191 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. 
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Insurance Companies regulated by various insurance acts and EEC Directives, 
and a plethora of other legislation and bodies and practitioners.195 
A key question for Gower was enforcement: ‘[i]t is not much use having 
regulations unless they are enforced:196  
It is not easy to detect any rationale for the choice of one method of 
regulation than another. (…) the practice has been to avoid any form of 
regulation until some scandal has shown that it cannot be avoided and then 
to choose statutory Governmental regulation unless there is a traditional self-
regulatory agency in existence to which the task may be left. In the last few 
years, however, there has been a tendency to encourage the creation of new 
self-regulatory agencies and assign the task to them, either wholly or partly 
and either by statute or persuasion.197 
Gower concluded198 that there was a trend towards more statutory controls: 
‘these, in the main, have been imposed on bodies which create investments rather 
than on the markets or intermediaries which sell them.’199 Furthermore, the burden 
placed upon intermediaries was to those ‘that did not bear traditional hallmarks of 
respectability.’200 As a consequence,’ [t]he result is a regulatory system which is 
difficult to enforce effectively.’201 
The ‘respectability’ attitude resembles paternalism ‘in that it bans activities which 
are innocuous and even desirable [unauthorised unit trusts] and in others it is 
excessively lax in that it fails to regulate activities where the public needs 
protection [investment managers].’202 Gower clearly sympathised with the 
Department of Trade,203 which ‘though it tries to be a watchdog, cannot be a 
                                            
195 Insurance Companies Act 1974; Insurance Companies Act 1980; Insurance Companies Act 1981. 
Directive 73/239/EEC. 
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bloodhound and its powers and ability to detect improprieties (…) are severely 
limited. It does in fact try to make discrete enquiries.’204 
Gower then considered ‘[t]he changing face of the securities industry.’205 Gower 
identified the main changes in the previous 50 years as: ‘[t]he movement from 
direct personal investment to indirect investment’; ‘[t]he distorting effect of tax 
considerations’; [d]istortions by differing methods of remunerating intermediaries’; 
[‘t]he growth of firms of investment managers and advisors’ and ‘multi-purpose 
firms and multi-national groups; ‘internationalisation of investment; and the 
‘influence of EEC.’206 Firstly, Gower pointed to a change in the way in which 
people invested. Whereas, people used to invest directly in Stocks and Shares, 
Gower observed that indirect investment had branched out from merely 
investment in ‘with profits’ insurance contracts to ‘a variety of packages such as  
unit trusts, commodity and futures funds, property  or index-linked policies, and 
occupational pension schemes.’207 The issue identified was that although the 
number of investments made directly by individual investors had declined, which 
on the face of it reduced the overall risks, the use of an investment packager or 
intermediary gave rise to different risks, not covered by existing legislation or 
regulation.208 Gower considered taxation considerations209 which created 
distortion in returns and pace the fine, upstanding, traditions of the City: 
it may be more attractive to the investor for his investments to be managed 
on the basis that the manager is rewarded, not by a fee (which is not tax 
deductible) but by whatever he can make on the side (for example by 
retaining interest earned on money awaiting investment and any share of 
brokers’ commissions that he may be able to extract).210 
It may be that Gower, perhaps unwittingly, identified the very issue which came to 
be seen as the trademark of the City. Rather than Probus et Fidelis (‘integrity and 
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205 Gower,  Review of Investor Protection – A Discussion Document  (n 183) 54. 
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faithfulness’),211 the assumption of ‘whatever he can make on the side’, perhaps, 
was a portent of things to come. 
Whereas taxation anomalies represent opportunities to be exploited outside the 
investment itself, the distortion identified by Gower relating to different 
commissions, acts as a powerful incentive to place an investment in one direction 
rather than another.212 
Gradually, it can be seen that Gower had identified a rich seam of self-interest. 
The report then turned to the increase in the number of investment managers and 
advisers,213 which had grown over 50 years from being a minor part of, say, a 
stockbrokers business it had become significant by 1985. Gower pointed out that 
investment management was outside the scope of formal regulation.214 Thus, a 
relatively new business activity of providing investment management services to 
private investors took place in an environment hardly touched by regulation or 
legislation and yet affording opportunity for enrichment ‘on the side’.  
The abolition of exchange controls exacerbated the issues over 
Internationalisation, because as Gower notes ‘no balanced portfolio of any size 
could afford to be restricted to British securities’.215 Thus, British investors were 
attracted to opportunities in overseas markets which were advertised by labels 
                                            
211 ‘The current crisis will not be over until confidence and trust are restored, and the credit channel starts to 
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such as ‘off-shore tax havens’216 with the consequence that this ‘has enormously 
aggravated the difficulty in providing British investors with effective protection. A 
regulatory agency, whether it be Governmental or self-regulatory, cannot operate 
effectively extra-territorially.’217 Indeed, UK parent companies have similar 
difficulties, as reported in Idmac v Midland Bank, because overseas subsidiaries 
(in that case Jersey) were used as a ‘cloak for fraud’.218 Just as investment 
opportunities challenged traditional geographic boundaries, operators became 
multi-national operating in more than one jurisdiction and multi-faceted by 
extending their range through engaging in activities undertaken by other firms in 
other parts  of the industry, as Gower comments: ‘and if it has to go to the trouble 
and expense of acquiring the knowledge [of other investments and markets], why 
not recoup it by cutting out other intermediaries and by putting clients into their 
own business rather than someone else’s.’219 An example of this is in relation to 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) where an investor wishing to buy or sell shares 
had to do so through a stockbroker, who in turn could only buy or sell through a 
‘stock-jobber,220 a process seeming ripe for rationalisation. However, the range of 
activities and jurisdictions pointed to the possible regulatory problems of 
‘overlapping jurisdiction[s] of a variety of regulatory bodies, both domestic and 
foreign, and may be faced with situations in which its interests while acting in one 
capacity conflict with those when acting in another.’221 Gower’s conclusion was 
that: 
It is not surprising that a framework which was erected 50 or more years ago 
and which has since been plastered over with a patch-work of ad hoc 
embellishments, but without any examination of its foundations, should have 
revealed cracks and subsidences. (…) The basic question (…) is whether we 
can continue to maintain the existing framework, merely papering over the 
cracks, or whether we should undertake a major structural rebuilding.222 
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Gower became the architect of a major structural reform and the reason why this 
thesis has delved back to this report and subsequent change is that with little 
change having taken place over a period of 50 years, the following quarter century 
has seen three major rebuilding exercises (Gower, Brown and Coalition) which will 
be considered in chapter six. Therefore, it is important for this thesis to survey the 
foundations. 
This analysis is not merely of academic interest, because the contemporary 
consideration of what constituted a ‘security’ had a bearing on whether they were 
covered by the POFI or not and ‘if they are not, there may be no control over 
them’.223 In a similar way, the 1984 invention of LIBOR,224 was later discovered to 
be ‘not designated a qualifying investment for the purpose of the legislation’,225 
with the consequence that a criminal prosecution could not be made following the 
LIBOR scandal.226  
Cracks in the foundations, included firms’ ‘working around’ regulations;227 ‘failure 
to treat like with like’, for example insurance policies being exempted from POFI 
while their underlying investments, acquired directly, are not; the public issue of 
shares to be traded on the LSE being regulated by the LSE, but any others were 
unregulated.228 The regulations were considered inflexible and lacking ‘discretion 
in many areas, particularly those covered by statutory government regulation’,229 
and pointing to the ‘grey areas in a rapidly developing field of activity.’230 The 
inconsistency of regulation was criticised: ‘the present system is in some respects 
too paternalistic in that it bans activities which are innocuous and even desirable, 
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and that in the other it is excessively lax in that it fails to regulate activities where 
the public needs attention.’231 Furthermore, the way the City worked was to 
concentrate on the honesty of people employed in investment to the exclusion of 
competence where Gower notes:  
statutory licensing schemes which purport to exclude those who are not ‘fit 
and proper persons’ generally succeed only in excluding those who are 
dishonest and, moreover, have been shown to be dishonest by being 
convicted of serious criminal offences, and that self-regulation all too often 
achieves no more than weeding out those who are obviously not ‘the right 
sort’. The investor, it can be argued, is entitled to some protection from 
ignorant fools as well as from convicted crooks and unfortunates who lack 
wealth and social graces.232 
Gower then addressed a ‘most fundamental question. Have we achieved a 
satisfactory balance between Governmental regulation and self-regulation?’233 
From a standpoint of having identified ‘certainly [a] very considerable diversity of 
regulations and of the agencies which operate them’,234 and, tellingly, for what 
subsequently transpired ‘[n]o country that I know of has found it practicable or 
desirable to regulate insurance, banking, dealings in commodities and dealings in 
stocks and shares in precisely the same way and through precisely the same 
agencies.’235 Rejecting Wilson’s conclusion236 that the balance between 
governmental and self-regulation was about right,237 Gower pointed to a spectrum 
of controls between ‘tight statutory regulation’, ‘no effective regulation’, and a 
broad middle of ‘relatively loose rein’, controlled by the BoE by its ‘statutory 
authority’, or ‘subject to its surveillance without such authority’, and ‘self-regulation 
under statutory authority’ and ‘self-regulation without statutory authority.’238 Gower 
identified the ideal solution: 
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The ideal would be to weld self-regulation and Governmental regulation into 
a coherent statutory framework which would cover the whole field that needs 
to be regulated and which would perform the role which it does best, working 
harmoniously together.’239 
While Gower was reaching his conclusions of a mix of statute and self-regulation,  
the government was not idle. Legislation240 was enacted to regulate the LSE; 
consolidate company’s legislation,241 and put in train to deal with insolvency, 
pensions, Building Societies and Trustee Savings Banks.242 These ‘contributed to 
the extraordinarily rapid transformation in the City.’243 Notwithstanding this, 
though, Gower noted the international dimension:‘[t]he world-wide trends towards 
the removal of barriers between the various branches of financial services and the 
growth of financial supermarkets had hitherto affected the United Kingdom less 
than other financial centres.’244 This was because of the ‘near monopoly of the 
securities’ markets’ enjoyed by the LSE,245 an organisation which was ripe for 
change because its: 
rules regarding single capacity, personal unlimited liability of partners or 
directors of member firms and the restrictions on the extent of outside 
participation in their ownership and management made it impracticable for 
those firms to be effectively integrated into financial supermarkets.246  
Thus, the financial services landscape was recognised to be ready for regulatory 
change and the Government’s response to Gower was to establish a system of 
self-regulatory organisations (SRO) under a new ‘SIB, reporting to HM 
Treasury.247 This major change was subsequently regarded as a failure.248 The 
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SIB was criticised for taking a narrow view of its responsibilities and ‘paying little or 
no attention to its supervisory role towards tackling or even preventing financial 
crime.’249  
This major change was viewed as: ‘It is no exaggeration to say that the Financial 
Services Act 1986 has proved to be one of the most controversial pieces of 
commercial legislation of recent times.’250 It is significant that Gray’s analysis 
shows that the much heralded de-regulation of the markets was accompanied by 
greater regulation of investment business. The ‘Big Bang’:251  
in the narrow sense involved no more than a change in the way shares were 
traded on the LSE – from trading on the floor of the Exchange to electronic 
trading. But it reflected other fundamental changes in the City brought about 
by the increasing competitiveness of the world’s financial system.(…) forming 
a global system of 24-hour trading. The pressure to open up the London 
market to competition was a recognition (…) it would have to re-organise and 
change its methods of doing business.252 
The controversy was not so much about the Act itself but ‘rather it centred around 
the way in which the Act was interpreted by the SIB and in turn by the SROs.253 
The issue being that the ‘detailed mass of regulations and rules produced by the 
SIB (…) had spawned a bureaucratic monster which would wreak havoc with the 
day to day running of investment business’.254 Notwithstanding Gower stating that 
he did not ‘favour regulating for the sake of regulation’,255 nor was this required by 
the Act which ‘nowhere requires a highly detailed approach from its lead regulator, 
it simply charges it to produce rules which embody and promote certain key 
principles of Investor Protection’.256 The regulators had ‘sacrificed the objectives of 
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achieving clear and workable investor protection in the interests of an obsessive 
need for legal certainty’.257 Not only was this a considerable change from the 
previous (inadequate) regime, it ran counter to ‘government concern about 
administrative and legislative cost-effectiveness.’258  Chancellor Lawson admitted 
that ‘what eventually emerged was something far more cumbersome and 
bureaucratic than I, or, I believe any of us in Government had ever envisaged.’259  
One feature introduced was a new funding structure for the SIB which Lawrence 
considered ‘was a constitutional novelty. It was financed by levies on the private 
financial firms it regulated, but was not accountable either to them or 
Parliament.’260 This was an attractive mechanism for its financing which has been 
retained (by both FSA and FCA) and which gave SIB, and its successors, 
considerable financial resources which did not depend on government department 
budgets. The hybrid nature of the SIB was the result of an ‘uneasy compromise’ 
between ’a strong and central regulator modelled along the lines of America’s SEC 
[Securities and Exchange Commission]’, which was Gower’s preference,261 and a 
government ‘known to be ideologically hostile to any extension of government that 
could be avoided.’262 The BoE’s position was that ‘[i]t was reluctant to see the 
establishment of an SEC-type body that would clearly undercut its pre-eminence 
as the chief overseer of London’s financial markets.’263 The outcome was a body 
‘deliberately kept less powerful than the BoE.’264 The position of the BoE was to 
return to the fore, or rather rear, in Chancellor Brown’s 1997 restructuring to create 
the FSA. 
Gray suggests that as a consequence of the disquiet about the SIB regulatory 
regime, the Companies Act 1989 was used to ‘introduce reforms to the whole 
regulatory structure to enable SIB’s new approach to regulation [to issue 
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statements of principles] to be employed by the SROs and other regulatory 
bodies’.265 This was alternatively seen as watering down and heralding a less 
onerous system of regulation.266 The importance of this episode to the thesis is to 
highlight that in an endeavour to remedy a deficiency in regulation, the creation of 
a new over-arching body (SIB) with its offspring (SROs and RPBs) gave scope for 
significant increase in regulation in a manner considered to be bureaucratic rather 
than value-adding, with echoes of ‘gold-plating’ seen in implementation of EU 
Directives.267 It is, perhaps, as Gray notes this inability to see ‘the wood for the 
trees’,268 which is a feature of subsequent regulatory changes, discussed in 
Chapter six. 
It is ironic that Gower’s report was entitled Review of Investor Protection and yet 
by 1994 Ashe reported that:  
It is now widely acknowledged – by investors, politicians of all parties, the 
industry and trade bodies and regulators – that the standard of protection 
afforded to investors in retails products, and the standard of conduct of firms, 
advisers, and sales forces in this sector need to be improved.269 
This gave rise to the creation of a new SRO, the Personal Investment Authority, to 
absorb FIMBRA and LAUTRO which had both experienced problems.270 Gray is 
sympathetic to this because ‘[r]ight from the start it was always apparent that the 
retail end of the financial services markets was going to present the most difficult 
and intractable problems for regulation.’271 Pointing to the ‘angst’ in retail markets 
(compared with the easier to regulate wholesale markets) and that ‘reconciling 
disaffected and disappointed ordinary investors to the vagaries of the markets was 
the ultimate impossible task.272 Thus, with regulations being relatively untouched 
for half a century, the endeavours to create a new regulatory regime in 1986 led to 
further significant refinements over the following eight years before Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Brown initiated a wholesale change to reform financial services 
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regulation by the creation of a new ‘super’ regulator, taking over all SIB activities 
and banking supervision, becoming a new FSA.273   
However, despite Brown’s intention to strengthen regulation, the FSA, too, is 
considered to have failed.274 This partly stems from its original brief and partly 
from the manner in which it had, or had not, discharged its duties. In the field of 
economic crime, Rider notes ‘[t]he City has always had a mixed take on insider 
abuse,’275 and Rider’s perspective is that although officially condemned, City 
spokesmen have played down the impact and the FSA gave little encouragement 
to those minded to act.276 This gave credence to the view that insider dealing may 
have been regarded as a 'naughty perk of the job'. 277 Ultimately, however, it was 
the FSA’s range of responsibilities which caused its downfall: ‘[t]he decision to 
divide responsibility for assessing systemic financial risks between three 
institutions meant that in reality no one took responsibility.’278 The issues over the 
FSA are analysed in chapter six.  
4.6 Fraud 
Fraud is a significant constituent of economic crime, alongside bribery, corruption 
and financial services regulation. To place the current fraud landscape in chapters 
five and six into perspective, this chapter provides an historical analysis. 
4.6.1 Fraud Trials 
Fraud is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, history provides many examples from 
The Carriers case in 1473,279 South Sea Bubble in 1720,280 and the share 
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scandals resulting in enactment of the POFI.281 More recently, Staple noted that 
‘there is some evidence to suggest that fraud, at any rate, company fraud, like the 
economy, is cyclical.’282 In boom conditions, there is market manipulation and 
then, when the cycle declines and insolvency approaches, deception emerges 
alongside false accounting and fraudulent trading.283 Thus, fraud opportunities are 
always present but the cycle determines the different types and, on some 
occasions, whether a fraud has been committed or not can be finely balanced with 
a small margin between success and failure according to Kirk and Woodcock: 
An enterprise, which may be intensely ambitious or of marginally dubious 
ethical standards, can, with a fair wind, become successful, popularly 
acclaimed and the recipient of a Queen’s Award. With ill fortune (...) the 
fragility of the original structure may be exposed and either lead to the 
commissioning of criminal offences, or to the perception that the whole basis 
of the business was criminally conceived.284 
Over many years, the response to fraud, and failure to prevent or convict, has 
been ‘something must be done’: that is, to set up a committee to examine the 
claim that ‘the system does not cope with serious frauds, and since they are 
serious crimes by any standards, effective ways must be found to bring offenders 
to court.’285 Furthermore, Munday comments that ‘the length and complexity of 
some fraud trials (…) aroused concern’,286 although Lord Devlin considered that 
‘[w]hat causes disquiet, I submit, is not the element of fraud but the length and 
complexity of the ensuing trial.’287  
In the years before structural changes to UK markets and regulation288 took effect 
in the mid 1980’s, the main issue in the fraud arena was dissatisfaction with the 
management and outcomes of fraud trials. A 1981 headline in The Times ‘£2½m 
trial ends with fees inquiry’ typifies the contemporary concerns.289 In that case, 
relating to a bogus bank,290 two trials were involved, both lasting 137 sitting days: 
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the first trial being halted because of allegations of jury interference. This case 
highlighted concerns over the length and cost of fraud trials and whether complex 
fraud trials should be before a jury or a panel of financial experts.291 Levi explains: 
As the potential social control risks of the democratisation of the jury have 
become apparent, in Britain at least, juries have been condemned for their 
alleged lack of commitment to legal values and susceptibility to bribery.292 
This dates back to 1972 when the need for a juror to be a property owner was 
abolished, giving rise to Levi’s concerns about ‘a reduction not only in the moral 
standards but also the educational level of jurors,’293 And he notes prior to 1979, 
the attitude of government to commercial fraud was of ‘benign neglect’,294 which 
had the effect of engendering apathy among City institutions towards the 
prosecution of fraud if juries could not understand the cases.295 At that time, ‘fraud 
was not part of the law and order agenda’,296 where: 
Commercial fraud in Britain was a subject that was of concern principally to a 
small group of academics. For almost all politicians and criminologists, 
conservative and radical alike, street and household crime constituted ‘the 
crime problem’ over which they would do battle.297 
Levi argues that ‘the relative immunity from law enforcement agencies has been 
enjoyed by both professional criminal and criminal professional types engaged in 
fraud’, is because ‘criminal types’ have been policed more heavily than 
‘respectable’ people.298 Thus, Roskill observed that ‘it is all too likely that the 
largest and most cleverly executed crimes go unpunished’.299 Because the 
‘system’ was ‘archaic, cumbersome and unreliable’,300 criminals were able to 
escape without sanction and this was partly due to the manner in which cases 
were tried. As Munday concludes, ‘perhaps the time has come to admit that the 
criminal trial ought no longer to resemble a crafty game where one side’s strategy 
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may remain artfully concealed until the last moment to no real end other than to 
frustrate the interests of justice.’301 
In a criminal trial for fraud, the fundamental issue which faced prosecutors was the 
degree of complexity, which gave scope for counsel, in the UK’s adversarial legal 
system, to extend the length of a trial by examining the minutiae, with the twin 
consequences of greater risk of confusion, or obfuscation, and increased costs.302 
Roskill concluded that ‘[t]he present arrangements may even encourage the 
defence to conduct its case like a prolonged and orderly retreat from the truth.’303  
Although Levi reports that juries can understand non-complex fraud in line with 
their ‘life experience’ (such as benefit fraud, cheque and banking fraud), more 
difficult matters would stretch jurors’ comprehension.304  A response to this was 
exhortations to judges to shorten summings-up and for prosecutors to limit the 
number of co-defendants to ‘real villains.’305 
The disquiet about fraud trials centred on the performance of juries rather than the 
other actors such as judges, counsel, police and prosecutors, to which was added 
corruption, and not just of jurors.306 As a response, in 1983, the government 
established an independent Fraud Trials Committee which reported in 1986. The 
Fraud Trials Committee (Roskill), was established by both the then Lord 
Chancellor and Home Secretary307 ‘because the government understand the 
concern which has been expressed about the range of problems generated by 
allegations of serious commercial fraud.’308 The brief given to Roskill was:309 
To consider in what ways the conduct of criminal proceedings in England and 
Wales arising from fraud can be improved, and to consider what changes in 
existing law and procedure would be desirable to secure the just, 
expeditious, and economical disposal of such proceedings.310 
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This was a wide remit for the enquiry which should have enabled the committee to 
make radical recommendations. 
Roskill summarises the report, by stating that ‘[m]uch of this report, and the 
majority of the recommendations, are concerned with changes in the procedures 
to be adopted.’311 Although inspired by the need to tackle fraud, Roskill saw that 
those procedural reforms would have general application to criminal cases as a 
whole.312  These were accepted by the government which said: ‘[t]he report shows 
that the legal and administrative machinery for this purpose has been creaking 
badly. We are determined to bring about the changes in law, practice and attitudes 
which are necessary.’313 The three key recommendations were: establishment of a 
‘Fraud Trials Tribunal’, being a judge sitting with lay members but not a jury, for 
serious complex frauds; ‘a new unified organisation responsible for all the 
functions of detection, investigation and prosecution of serious fraud’; and, ‘[a]n 
independent monitoring body (“the Fraud Commission”)’.314  The report was 
welcomed by the Home Secretary who said: 
We intend to create and seize every opportunity for stern action against 
fraud. We think this is crucial for the City and for the country so that private 
enterprise can flourish in a clean environment. It is crucial for public 
confidence, and our competitive position in international markets that the 
probity of our financial institutions, especially in the City, should be beyond 
doubt. Those who save and invest, whether grand or small, should be well 
protected by our law from dishonest practices, however complicated the 
transaction. We are determined that the pursuit and the bringing to justice of 
fraudsters should be carried out with commitment and skill. If our present 
instruments for cutting our fraud are blunt we must manufacture a new 
carefully directed scalpel.315 
The government viewed the report as radical but stated that measures had already 
been taken to ‘reduce the fragmentation in the investigation and prosecution of 
complex fraud cases’,316 a theme which remains current. That measure was the 
establishment of the Fraud Investigation Group by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, to concentrate on major frauds, discussed in chapter six. The 
government also pointed to the forthcoming Financial Services Act 1986, which 
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followed the Gower Report, and established the SIB to regulate investment 
business and other financial services,317 which was discussed earlier in this 
chapter and it was clear from the Home Secretary’s comments318 that Roskill’s 
recommendations should include protection for savers and investors. In the field of 
economic crime, this is still not embedded since overlap with FSA/FCA remains.319 
The Home Secretary observed that ‘[t]he committee’s message to the House and 
to the Government is that one cannot send a policeman on a bicycle to catch a 
runaway car. We have to equip those who chase fraud with the same speed 
already possessed by the fraudster.’320 This endorsement provides an entry to the 
Roskill Report. 
As an early indication of the committee’s findings, Roskill commenced the 
summary of the report with:  
The public no longer believes that the legal system in England and Wales is 
capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us 
suggests that the public is right.321 
Roskill found that the system of investigation and trial was open to ‘blatant delay 
and abuse and that whilst ‘petty frauds, clumsily committed’322 would be 
discovered and punished, the same did not apply to ‘large’ and ‘cleverly executed’ 
frauds. Roskill highlighted the government’s ‘vision of an “equity-owning 
democracy”,’323 and pointed out that if ‘ordinary families’ invested in the markets 
then the markets should be properly policed.324 This was further evidence of 
Roskill’s intention that his report considered financial markets to be with his 
committee’s purview. Tellingly, because subsequent events revealed significant 
inadequacies, Roskill foreshadowed the forthcoming self-regulation regime with 
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the warning that ‘[w]here those mechanisms are abused, the law must deliver 
retribution, swift and sure.’325  
At the outset, it might have appeared that the problem with fraud trials would be 
solved by tackling the issue from the standpoint of reforming or eliminating the 
involvement of juries.326 However, as Levi notes, ‘the collapse of most of the 
lengthy trials that had aroused public comment resulted either from judicial 
directions to acquit on technical / legal grounds, or from factors extraneous to jury 
competence.’327 Thus, much of the report and recommendations dealt with 
procedural changes and called for attitudinal changes by those involved in 
investigation and the courts, including administration, judiciary and the bar.328 
By the time Roskill reported, the ‘benign neglect’ of fraud had been replaced 
because ‘business crime in high places [had] become a central political issue’.329 
The committee’s title identifies that fraud trials themselves were the concern and ‘it 
seemed that its purpose was to decide principally what should be done about the 
jury.’330 However, proposals and submissions made to the committee caused it to 
‘broaden out into an examination of the policing and prosecutorial processes’,331 
which led to prosecutions (or decision to discontinue). This ‘system’ is scathingly 
described by Levi as, ‘if “system” is the appropriate word, given the poor 
communication between the multiplicity of agencies allegedly involved in the 
control process (…) of dealing with fraud’.332 
4.6.2 Complex or Serious Fraud 
The Committee addressed their attention to the ‘largest and most cleverly 
executed crimes’,333 but failed in their attempt to provide a precise definition of a 
‘complex fraud case’.334 In order to differentiate cases, they produced guidelines 
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which would identify a case for special treatment.335 Their view was that neither 
quantum nor volume of documentation or number of witnesses alone would 
denote complexity. Roskill opined that ‘complexity’ was found: 
In a fraud in which the dishonesty is buried in a series on inter-related 
transactions, most frequently in a market offering highly-specialised services, 
or in areas of high-finance involving (for example) manipulation of the 
ownership of companies.336 
The relevance is that it was a return to the original perception of the public that 
juries could not comprehend the issues; that frauds were perpetrated by people 
who were experts in their field; and that those fields ‘bear no obvious similarity to 
anything in the general experience of most members of the public.’337 The 
Committee had in mind: LSE; Lloyd’s of London; commodities and financial futures 
markets; having geographic presence or communication links to the City.338 This 
then supported a somewhat bizarre view (looking back over a quarter of a 
century), which Levi reported, that ‘criticisms from the City institutions were that 
there was no point in blaming them for failing to tackle fraud when the juries could 
not understand the cases brought before them.’339 
In essence, Roskill recognised the difficulties faced by those unfamiliar with such 
markets, whom they believed would need educating in order to understand the 
particular markets and appreciate the alleged dishonesty. Roskill believed this was 
an ‘intellectual challenge, to which only the exceptional could rise’, thus, perhaps, 
being self-serving in the conclusion that those ‘non-exceptional’ would not be 
suited to serving on a jury and that trials should be before Judges, who could be 
trained to have the exceptional financial knowledge required.340 Notwithstanding 
Roskill’s belief that better jurors delivered better convictions, the use of ‘bench 
trials’ is not supported by judges341 and undermined by prosecution failures.342 
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4.6.3 Non Jury Trials 
The right in England and Wales to trial by jury dates back to the Magna Carta in 
1215 when it replaced ‘trail by ordeal’343 and any attempt by government to move 
away from this form of justice evokes strong feelings and outcry from some 
sectors of the public, ‘on the ground that it would erode a fundamental principle of 
the justice system — the right to trial by a person’s peers.’344 Roskill reported a 
‘bitter struggle’ between opponents and defenders345 and would have been well 
aware of the heat the proposals would generate. Devlin’s observation that ‘[n]ot 
since the glorious revolution of 1688 has a citizen been imprisoned for any 
substantial time (…) otherwise than on the verdict of a jury’,346 is an example of 
the contra view. However, in the review of the contemporary landscape, Roskill 
pointed to the total number of criminal cases handled each year of some 
3,000,000, of which merely 32,000 were tried by a jury.347 Roskill concluded that: 
In almost every area of the law, society has accepted that just verdicts are 
best delivered by persons qualified by training, knowledge, experience, 
integrity or by a combination of those four qualifications. Only in a minority of 
cases is the delivery of a verdict left in the hands of jurors deliberately 
selected at random without any regard for their qualifications.348 
Thus, Roskill advanced the proposition that ‘non-jury trials’, for serious complex 
fraud, far from being an exception to the norm would be congruent with the 
overwhelming majority of criminal cases, where the judge or tribunal have to 
understand or interpret the law and make the decisions themselves. Roskill, in 
examining the characteristics of a complex fraud case, doubts whether the public 
appreciate the difficulties faced by the ‘average juror’ outwith their experience or 
knowledge and speculates that the presence on the jury of someone possessed 
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with such knowledge was mere happenstance.349  Indeed, earlier, Roskill drew 
attention to something more fundamental and recommended that in any fraud trial 
‘it is imperative that as a matter of principle that the members of the jury should be 
able to read and write English without difficulty.’350 This would appear to be self-
evident in relation to all trials and not just for fraud, as was concluded by the 
Morris Committee in 1965.351 
Roskill was persuaded that the interests of justice in complex fraud cases would 
be best served by a non-jury trial. The line of reasoning was that complex fraud 
cases possessed features of complexity, though ‘it is not possible to provide a 
precise definition’.352 Thus, because of the presence of such ‘complexities’, it was 
considered to be asking too much of an ‘ordinary’ juror to comprehend the issues 
and evidence, especially given the Committee’s perceptions in trial of ‘defence 
gamesmanship’.353 Roskill, therefore, recommended ‘trial by judge and two lay 
members should replace trial by judge and jury. We refer to the new tribunal as the 
“Fraud Trials Tribunal” (FTT).’354 A further significant issue is that those charged 
with economic crime are often ‘well resourced and lawyered up’355 because they 
have access to considerable financial resources to defend themselves, as the 
SFO found with Tchenguiz.356 
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Roskill settled on the proposal of a Fraud Trials Tribunal after considering and 
eliminating ‘special juries’ comprised of jurors with ‘above standard of education, 
training and experience’;357 trial by single judge; and trial by a panel of judges.358 
Rather scathingly, Lord Devlin described this exercise which was rooted in the 
Committee’s ‘bland’ terms of reference as: ‘seemingly to line up the existing 
method of trial by jury alongside any other method the committee can think of and 
to test them all by what is “just, expeditious and economical”.’359 
The chosen proposal was of a judge sitting with two lay members (assessors or 
adjudicators), ‘who would play an equal part with the judge in deciding questions 
of fact but the judge alone would deal with questions of law and procedure.’360 The 
lay members should have business experience and the ‘capacity’ to understand 
complex transactions.361 Commentators, such as Levi,362 point to rather the thin 
evidence presented by Roskill of lack of jury competence, though acknowledging 
the difficulties posed by Contempt of Court Act 1981 which made interviewing 
jurors unlawful.363 However, evidence from lawyers may have been tainted by their 
own  interests, as Page suggests: 
As lawyers never sit on juries, and often have their cherished arguments 
rejected by them, they tend to under-estimate the intelligence of 12 random 
people acting as a group. Swapping them for a number of ‘experts’ closely 
bound to the City is likely to result in even more leniency towards fraudsters 
than is currently the inclination of confused but impartial judges and juries.364 
Nevertheless, Roskill accepted the evidence of witnesses that it was the case that 
many jurors were ‘out of their depth.’365 
Roskill wanted the Courts to assign cases to judges with ‘appropriate special 
experience’366 as ‘a (thinly disguised) reaction to criticism from police, counsel and 
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judges that some judges are not capable of handling fraud trials.’367 Drawing on 
Levi, the rationale for this is that the complexity of fraud can be distinguished from 
other complex criminal cases because ‘technology and internationalisation have 
changed it more radically than other offences, frequently creating major 
jurisdictional and evidentiary problems.’368 For example, the use of modern 
communication methods and the easy facility to move monies through the 
international banking system gives rise to greater reliance on documentary 
evidence, including audit trails, than in other types of case.369  Thus, Roskill 
wanted to combat economic crime by providing specialist courts but defendants 
would still have access to their own counsel and the tribunal would still have to 
evaluate evidence so successful prosecutions would not be a foregone conclusion. 
4.6.4 Fraud Commission 
Roskill proposed ‘[a]n independent monitoring body, the “Fraud Commission”,’370 
because of their concerns over the fragmented nature of the existing system which 
led to inefficiencies and lack of cost effectiveness. The remit of the Fraud 
Commission was proposed to be to study and report on the new system and 
advise on improvements to policy and procedure.371 It is a clear conclusion by 
Roskill that the task of tackling fraud was not aided by the number of bodies 
involved, leading them to justify the Fraud Commission’s role by observing that 
‘[a]part from other advantages, we believe that this would provide a degree of co-
ordination of the numerous interests involved which is at present lacking.’372 
Congruent with this was an expectation that the Fraud Commission would work 
closely with other bodies in the same field, including SROs.373 This 
recommendation was not implemented because, as Doig shows, ‘the objectives of 
different bodies were so diverse and their accountability mechanisms were so 
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fragmented that it was difficult to see how overall supervision could occur.’374 The 
fragmented nature of the anti-economic crime institutions remains a current issue. 
4.6.5 Creation of the Serious Fraud Office 
Roskill recommended ‘a new unified organisation responsible for all the functions 
of detection, investigation and prosecution of serious fraud should be examined 
forthwith.’375 The context of this recommendation was that investigations into 
allegations of serious fraud ‘commonly involved long delays’ with the consequence 
that fraudsters may not have been brought to trial or, if they were, the passage of 
time weakened prospects of successful prosecution.376 This was because 
witnesses might not come up to proof or even upon conviction that sentences 
handed down were ‘hopelessly inadequate’, based on the elapse of time in 
bringing a case to trial.377 Thus, the conclusion reached by Roskill was that the 
nation and the City’s standing as ‘one of the world’s great financial centres’, was at 
stake through the lack of detection or prosecution thereby facilitating the growth of 
fraud.378 
A particular deficiency which the Committee examined was the significant number 
of different organisations which could be involved: 43 independent police forces,379 
The Department of Trade and Industry, Fraud Investigation Group, the Inland 
Revenue, and Customers and Excise. Anyone of those organisations might initiate 
enquiries ‘but the resources available to each vary both as regards their powers 
under existing legislation and the quality and range of their staffs.’380 Furthermore, 
in theory, where different departments are involved one department would co-
ordinate, however, Roskill did not find evidence of fully effective co-ordination,381  
rather they found the ‘fragmented nature of the powers of investigation (…) act as 
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a hindrance’382 and ‘traditional divisions are still part of the scene.’383 These are 
clear and important conclusions: serious and complex fraud is not served by 
investigation and prosecution being haphazardly undertaken by a variety of 
agencies, working without co-ordination. Indeed, the implication is that the varying 
bodies work independently on a ‘traditional’ basis in silos, having little desire to 
see themselves being part of a team. Roskill’s circumlocution cannot disguise this 
problem: ‘[w]e recognise that bringing about changes of this kind would not be 
easy, because it would involve bringing together under one roof organisations who 
have for historical reasons worked apart.’384 
Part of this new model was already in place because, concurrent with Roskill’s 
deliberations, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) had established the Fraud 
Investigation Group, which was a team of lawyers and accountants.  
Roskill proposed that policing and prosecution of fraud’385 should be undertaken 
by a ‘unified body to investigate and prosecute all frauds’,386 replacing the Fraud 
Investigation Group. Investigation and prosecution by one body was different from 
the ‘independent’ prosecution model established by Crown Prosecution Service 
(under DPP), which was separate from investigation undertaken by the police.387  
Roskill also proposed that the new body should have in its armoury the type of 
inspectorial powers available to DTI Inspectors appointed by Secretary of State.388 
Roskill proposed that the new body would operate with a ‘Case Controller’ from 
the outset who would control the case and deployment of officers, including early 
assignment of prosecuting counsel.389 The intention was to avoid ‘the existing 
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384 Roskill Committee (n 12) 26. 
385 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 117. 
386 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 117. 
387 although this unified model was already employed by Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, and 
Department of Trade and Industry (later, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills). 
388 Companies Act 1985, s 432. 
Inspectors appointed by Secretary of State have power to require production of documents and take evidence 
from ‘officers and agents of the company, and of all officers and agents of any other body corporate whose 
affairs are investigated’. Evidence may be taken on oath. S 434. 
Obstruction to be Contempt of Court,. S 435 
http://legislation.data.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/data.htm?wrap=true accessed 22 November 2012. 
389 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 117, 121. 
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tradition of individual and departmental buck-passing’,390 together with bringing the 
Bar ‘rules of etiquette’ into the twentieth century.391 
4.7 Office of Fair Trading392 
The third agency involved in countering economic crime was the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) which was established by Fair Trading Act 1973 with a ‘mission is 
to make markets work well for consumers.’393 It aims to achieve this by the 
enforcement of competition and consumer protection legislation and monitoring 
consumer credit.394 The mission was further explained as: 
Our goal is competitive, efficient, innovative markets where standards of 
customer care are high, consumers are empowered and confident about 
making choices and where businesses comply with consumer and 
competition laws but are not overburdened by regulation. Effective 
competition and well-functioning markets drive the long term productivity 
growth vital for economic recovery without adding costs to Government or 
business.395 
The establishment of OFT predated the reports which led to the creation of FSA 
and SFO. It played a different role in relation to economic crime because of its 
wider consumer focus. As a consequence, this chapter will not review the reasons 
for establishing OFT but will concentrate on its established role and the working 
arrangements with SFO and FSA. The role of the OFT in relation to markets is an 
example of overlapping jurisdictions of institutions.396 ‘Most obviously, some 
financial firms presently answer to two different regulators with different powers 
and approaches.’ According to Lomnicka, the reason for this is that: 
                                            
390 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 117, 120. 
391 Levi, ‘Reforming the Criminal Fraud Trial’ (n 18) 117, 121. 
392 ‘The Office of Fair Trading, ‘Accountability.’ ‘The Office of Fair Trading is an independent competition and 
consumer protection authority. For government accounting purposes, it is categorised as a non-ministerial 
government department. The Enterprise Act established the OFT as a statutory corporation on 1 April 2003.’ 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/oft-structure/accountability/#.UMX91qXBG5Q accessed 10 December 
2012. 
393 Office of Fair Trading, ‘What we do’ http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/what/#.UMX7f6XBG5Q accessed 
10 December 2012. 
394  The Office of Fair Trading, Frequently Asked Questions.‘The enforcement of competition law under the 
Competition Act 1998; the enforcement of consumer protection legislation in matters that affect consumers in 
general; monitoring consumer credit through a licensing system under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.’ 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/faqs/#.UMX-fqXBG5Q accessed 10 December 2012. 
395 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Annual Plan 2012-13’ About the OFT. 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/about_oft/ap12/OFT1382.pdf accessed 1 January 2013. 
396 Eva Lomnicka, ‘The future of consumer credit regulation: a chance to rationalise sanctions for breaches of 
financial services regulatory regimes?’ (2013) 34(1) Co Law. 13. 
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It is an accident of history that, although the FSA currently regulates almost 
the whole financial services sector under the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, the regulation of consumer credit presently remains the province of 
the Office of Fair Trading under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.397 
The overlapping responsibilities have led to OFT prosecuting fraud: for example in 
property sales fraud by prosecuting estate agents;398 and people involved in motor 
trade fraud.399 The OFT also provides strategic direction to local authority funded 
Trading Standards bodies which cover a broad area of consumer transactions.400 
Lomnicka points to a range of anomalies: a residential mortgage to finance a 
home purchase is regulated by FSMA while a second mortgage by CCA; payment 
protection insurance (PPI) premiums covered by CCA although the writing and 
issuing of the policies by FSMA.401 The OFT’s role in relation to consumer credit is 
governed by the Consumer Credit Act 1974,402 which:  
made it explicit that amongst the business practices which the OFT may 
consider to be deceitful or oppressive or otherwise unfair or improper, for the 
purposes of considering fitness to hold a consumer credit licence, are 
practices that appear to the OFT to involve irresponsible lending. (…) It 
covers the entire lending process from the initial lending decision up to the 
handling of arrears and defaults. 403 
The OFT also requires firms which it supervises to register with them under the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2007.404 Such firms are: Estate Agents and 
Consumer Credit Financial Institutions (CCFIs) - businesses carrying on consumer 
credit lending activity who are neither authorised by the FSA nor money service 
businesses supervised by HMRC.405 This explanation by OFT introduces another 
                                            
397 Lomnicka, ‘The future of consumer credit regulation’ (n 396) 13. 
398 OFT, ‘OFT announces criminal charges in estate agent investigations.’ http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2012/80-12#.UOn9WKXBG5Q accessed 6 January 2013. 
399 OFT, ‘Owner of mileage correction business jailed for car clocking.’ 22 November 2012. 
http://oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/112-12 accessed 7 January 2013. 
400 OFT, ‘Trading Standards impact’. Trading Standards ‘enforce a broad range of legislation which, as well as 
fair trading, often includes responsibility for animal health, food safety and underage sales of tobacco, alcohol, 
knives and fireworks.’ http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/about_oft/oft1085.pdf accessed 7 January 2013. 
401 Lomnicka, ‘The future of consumer credit regulation’ (n 396) 13. 
402 as amended by the Consumer Credit Act 2006. 
403 OFT, ‘Irresponsible Lending’ http://oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/legal-powers/legal/cca/irresponsible accessed 7 
January 2013. 
404 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, SI  2007/2157. 
405 OFT. ‘Anti-Money laundering Registration’  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/aml/guidance#named5 accessed 7 January 2013. 
HM Revenue & Customs. Money Service Businesses and Money Laundering Regulations 
‘What is a Money Service Business? The term Money Service Business has a special meaning under the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which came into force on 15 December 2007. Under the regulations, 
your business is a Money Service Business if it does one or more of the following: acts as a bureau de change 




element, namely that there are some businesses which are neither regulated by 
FSA or OFT but by HMRC. This is a further regulatory body in the field of financial 
markets. 
A major role of OFT is competition within markets and part of that role OFT is to 
investigate cartel offences. ‘In its simplest terms, a cartel is an agreement between 
businesses not to compete with each other. The agreement is usually secret, 
verbal and often informal,’406 and where: 
The Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02) makes it a criminal offence for an individual 
dishonestly to agree with one or more other persons that two or more 
undertakings will engage in certain prohibited cartel agreements, including 
price-fixing, limitation of production or supply, market-sharing and bid-
rigging.407 
Since there are two institutions with an interest in prosecuting fraud (OFT and 
SFO), it is clearly appropriate for there to be understandings between them 
regarding case management but it is another example of the anti-economic crime 
responsibilities being split. Joshua notes that the OFT’s first prosecution, against 
BA for airline fuel price fixing, collapsed in 2010 with ‘OFT's credibility is 
deservedly in tatters.’408 This high profile failure by OFT received the same type of 
press comment as that visited on SFO for its earlier lack of success409 and 
provides support for the central theme of this thesis that such prosecutions should 
be in the experienced hands of a single prosecution authority. 
                                                                                                                                    
money, in any way (just collecting and delivering money as a 'cash courier' isn't transmitting money); cashes 
cheques that are payable to your customers.’ 
 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/mlr/getstarted/register/msb.htm accessed 7 January 2013. 
406 OFT, ‘What is a cartel?’ ‘Typically, cartel members may agree on: prices, output levels, discounts, credit 
terms, which customers they will supply, which areas they will supply, who should win a contract (bid rigging). 
These agreements are prohibited by the Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU of the EC Treaty. In addition, 
the Enterprise Act makes it a criminal offence for individuals to dishonestly take part in certain specified 
cartels, essentially those that involve price fixing, market sharing, limitation of production or supply or bid 
rigging. Cartels can occur in almost any industry and can involve goods or services at the manufacturing, 
distribution or retail level.’  http://oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/cartels/what-cartel accessed 
7 January 2013. 
407 Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of Fair Trading and the Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office. October 2003. http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/enterprise_act/oft547.pdf  
accessed 7 January 2013. 
408 Julian Joshua, ‘OFT's credibility is in tatters following the failed BA price-fixing trial’ 
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/ofts-credibility-is-in-tatters-following-the-failed-ba-price-fixing-
trial/55531.article accessed 25 August 2014. 
409 Daily Telegraph, ‘Soaring ambitions of OFT get shot down’ 11 May 2010. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/damianreece/7707709/Soaring-ambitions-of-OFT-get-shot-
down.html accessed 7 January 2013. 
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As will be explained in chapter six, the OFT was to be merged with the 
Competition Commission to form the ‘Competition and Markets Authority (CMA),’ 
and the FSA successor, The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), took over OFT’s 
consumer credit responsibilities from April 2014. As Lomnicka describes, ‘this will 
not be a simple process’ because of the differing regulations under FSMA and 
CCA.410  
4.8 Conclusion 
The UK’s counter-economic crime landscape has been shaped over many years in 
a haphazard manner, thus, exhibiting the disadvantages of responding to events 
rather than as a result creating a formal plan. The UK emerged from the post war 
‘welfare state’ era with rudimentary protection for investors and an historic 
overseer in the form of the BoE without powers to regulate and relying on 
persuasion rather than force of law. Thus, the traditional ‘old lady’ relying on the 
‘Governor’s eyebrows’ could not police the attitudes of ‘whatever he can make on 
the side411 or a 'naughty perk of the job,'412 and had to give way to greater 
regulation. This process took thirty-one years under two long governments and 
several iterations of regulatory systems but another new government showed that 
the lack of a cohesive strategy is still apparent, as will be discussed in chapter six. 
The general field of crime is broad but economic crime is a specialised area, 
based on a contemporary label of white-collar but, regardless of neckwear, is not a 
new phenomenon. However, although the suggestion of this type of crime being 
undertaken by people of high social status still pervades, it is the paucity of 
convictions and inadequacy of penalties for such conduct which remains to be 
addressed. The review of literature has given an insight into the individual areas of 
regulation, fraud and the criminal (or regulatory transgressor). What the literature 
and this chapter demonstrate is the history that brought them the threshold of a 
new government in 2010, where the SFO had remained unchanged since its 
inception and the regulator had mutated. Sadly, the broad conclusions of Gower 
and Roskill remain valid, leading to the conclusion that further change is required 
                                            
410 Lomnicka, ‘The future of consumer credit regulation’ (n 396) 13. 
411 Gower,  Review of Investor Protection – A Discussion Document  (n 183) 55-56. (Emphasis added). 
412 Mansell (n 277). 
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The following chapters will review the legislation underpinning the criminalisation 
of fraud and bribery and regulation of investments and markets together with the 







Chapter 5: UK Economic Crime Legislation 
5.1  Introduction 
Economic crime enforcement in the United Kingdom (UK) is dependent upon 
specific legislation and enforcement institutions. The previous chapter has 
explained the historical context to the current economic crime landscape which is 
reviewed in chapter six. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the specific 
legislation deployed to criminalise fraud, bribery and corruption: namely Fraud Act 
2006 (FRA2006) and Bribery Act 2010 (BA2010). Enforcement of legislation falls 
mainly within the purview of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and its performance is 
examined alongside considering the particular external issues bearing on the 
subject area, which enables a discussion in chapters seven and eight of the 
approach of the United States (US) and Australia. The purpose of this approach is 
to understand how the UK has arrived at the current structure and the vicissitudes 
of prosecution and achievement of the objectives to criminalise economic crime. 
The conclusion of the thesis is a discussion of the UK experience and approach, 
informed by a review of US and Australia to determine whether and how UK 
economic crime enforcement can be improved. 
The importance of tackling bribery and corruption is illustrated by the outcry over 
the selection of Football World Cup venues for 2018 and 2022, with allegations 
that the English bid failed because of ‘foul play and double-dealing’.1 Here, the 
English Football Association is seen as a ‘victim’ but the UK is not immune from 
such accusations itself, as shown by the opprobrium brought on the government 
because it pressurised the SFO to cease bribery enquiries into BAE’s Saudi 
Arabian arms contract.2 The Tenaris case involving a Luxembourg based 
Argentina controlled company, with shares traded in Argentina, New York and 
Milan paying bribes to Uzbekistan government officials, shows the global reach of 
                                            
1The Telegraph, 6 December 2010.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/news/8182559/World-Cup-2018-
BBC-defends-Panorama-expose-of-alleged-Fifa-corruption.html accessed 6 December 2010.  
In November 2014, it was reported that ‘The English Football Association has been accused of flouting bidding 
rules in its attempt to stage the 2018 World Cup - but 2022 hosts Qatar have been cleared of corruption 
allegations. A FIFA report says the FA behaved improperly when trying to win the backing of a key voter. BBC, 
‘World Cup inquiry clears Qatar but criticises English FA’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/30031405 
accessed 25 November 2014. 
Subsequently, further reports showed that the issue was not closed. ‘Fifa to review World Cup corruption 
investigation to open door for re-running of Russia and Qatar's winning bids’ The Telegraph 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/11244301/Fifa-to-review-World-Cup-corruption-
investigation-to-open-door-for-re-running-of-Russia-and-Qatars-winning-bids.html accessed 25 November 
2014. 




corruption.3  These examples illustrate that global commerce, be it sport, 
armaments or commodities, face similar issues and it should not matter in what 
context bribery takes place. However, the ‘real world’ does not operate in a 
vacuum and any analysis must include reference not just to legal interpretation but 
varying global standards, political considerations and national security.  
The international context and obligations for the UK in countering economic crime 
will be discussed but are put plainly by Kofi Annan, explaining the need for 
transparency in international trade: 
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects 
on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations 
of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows 
organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish.4 
Lord Woolf emphasised that bribery ‘can paralyse the government and undermine 
trade and commerce’,5 however, although the UK enacted legislation6 more than a 
century ago to deal with domestic corruption,7 but it was not until 2001 that bribing 
foreign officials was criminalised,8 and that was only in response to criticism by 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).9 
The underlying reason for lack of action is that the idea persists that local cultural 
norms were of over-riding importance and that ‘doing in Rome what the Romans 
do’10 was acceptable. Some countries11 try to draw a distinction by making an 
exception for small payments which they term ‘facilitation payments’ as not really 
                                            
3 Reuters, Tenaris settles U.S. bribery probe. [Tenaris paid $8.9m to settle US actions.]17 May 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/17/us-usa-justice-tenaris-idUSTRE74G57L20110517 accessed 28 
June 2011. 
4 Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary General. 
United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention Against Corruption’ 2004 iii. http://www..  org/documents/treaties/, 
/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf accessed 29 April 2011. 
5 Monty Raphael, Blackstone’s Guide to the Bribery Act 2010  (OUP 2010) v. 
6 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916, 
7 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
Raphael (n 5) 14. 
8 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
Raphael (n 5) 116. 
9 ‘The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is to promote policies 
that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.’ Discussed in this chapter 
5.2.1. OECD, ‘Mission’ http://www.oecd.org/about/ accessed 31 August 2014. 
For ‘failure to address deficiencies in its laws on bribery of foreign public officials and corporate liability for 
foreign bribery’ which it considered ‘undermines the credibility of the UK legal framework and potentially 
triggers the need for increased due diligence over UK companies by their commercial partners or multilateral 
development banks.’ OECD, ‘Working Group on Bribery’ Annual Report 2008. 43. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/24/44033641.pdf accessed 19 September 2011. 
10 Raphael (n 5) v. 
11 United States and Australia: see chapters 7 & 8. 
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bribery. Facilitation payments are ‘unofficial payments made to public officials in 
order to secure or expedite the performance of a routine or necessary action. 
Sometimes referred to as “speed” or “grease” payments’.12 As Raphael notes, 
these are ‘a particularly insidious problem for undeveloped or less developed 
countries’,13 and caused friction between legislators and commercial organisations 
in framing the BA2010. 
The UK has legislated to make bribery and corruption a criminal offence. This 
chapter considers the provisions of the BA201014 which has four criminal offences, 
the newest of which is corporate liability:  bribing another person; being bribed;’ 
bribing a foreign public official; and ‘failure of commercial organisations to prevent 
bribery.’15 The first two offences, can be described as general bribery offences.16 
There is an ‘expectation’ test,17 which relates the improper performance to the 
yardstick of UK standards of good faith or impartiality. This means that if the 
intention is to bribe then it will be an offence in the UK irrespective of whether such 
a payment might be culturally acceptable in another country.18 The leads into the 
new offence where a commercial organisation can be criminalised for failing to 
prevent bribery, thus underlining the expected standards of good faith. 
The second element of economic crime for which there is legislative underpinning  
relates to fraud. The importance of tackling fraud is illustrated by the instances of 
fraud which have caused the collapse of multinational corporations.19 In US, 
                                            
12 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions’  
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery%20act%20joint%20prosecution%20guidance.pdf accessed 16 
April 2012. 
13 Raphael (n 5) v. 
UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries 
and Small Island Developing States. ‘The Least Developed Countries represent the poorest and weakest 
segment of the international community. They comprise more than 880 million people (about 12 per cent of 
world population), but account for less than 2 percent of world GDP and about 1 percent of global trade in 
goods The current list of LDCs includes 48 countries; 33 in Africa, 14 in Asia and the Pacific and one in Latin 
America.’ http://www.unohrlls.org/en/home/ . accessed 26 September 2011. 
14 Bribery Act 2010, It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a critique of these criminal offences. 
15 Bribery Act 2010, s 6. 
16 Bribery Act 2010, s 1 and s 2. 
Ministry of Justice, ‘explanatory notes’. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/en/ukpgaen_20100023_en_1 
accessed 24 July 2010. 
17 Bribery Act 2010, s 5. 
18 The then UK Government attitude was expressed by a Minister as:  
‘We recognise that many UK businesses still struggle with petty corruption in some markets, but the answer is 
to face the challenge head-on, rather than carve out exemptions that draw artificial distinctions, are difficult to 
enforce, and have the potential to be abused. Providing exemptions for facilitation payments, as the US does, 
is not a universally accepted practice, and not something that we consider acceptable.’  
Claire Ward, HC Deb 3 March 2010  Vol 506 Col 981. 
19 For example: Barings Bank. Laura Proctor, ‘The Barings collapse: a regulatory failure or a failure of 
supervisions’ (1997) 22(3)  Brook J.Int'l L 735;  
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Anu Arora, ‘The Statutory System of Bank Supervision 
and the Failure of BCCI’ (2006) August  J B L 487. 
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Bernard Madoff was found guilty of masterminding a £40bn fraud and sentenced 
to 150 years imprisonment while ‘Sir’ Allen Stanford was sentenced to 110 years 
imprisonment20 for a $7bn Ponzi21 scheme.22 The 2008 financial crisis has 
focused attention on the risks in ‘Casino’23 Banking, evidenced by Jerome 
Kerviel’s illegal transactions which cost Société Générale £3.7bn.24 On conviction 
he was imprisoned for three years.25 Similarly, Nick Leeson’s unauthorised trading 
presaged the collapse of Barings Bank, a UBS  trader  Kweku Adoboli,26  had lost 
£1.5bn27 and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.28  
Fraud was relatively neglected29 until the establishment of the SFO in 1987,30 and 
the enactment of the FRA2006. The financial regulator had limited prosecution 
powers under Financial Services Act 1986.31 However, it has raised its profile 
‘bringing criminal proceedings for conspiracy’, thus developing its role ‘as a 
specialist criminal prosecutor’.32  Criminalisation of fraud has evolved through 
various Theft Acts.33 According to Ormerod, the FRA2006 has simplified the law 
                                            
20 US Department of Justice, ’Stanford’   http://www.justice.gov/criminal/vns/caseup/stanfordr.html accessed 8 
February 2013. 
21 Securities and Exchange Commission,’ What is a Ponzi Scheme?’  ‘A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud 
that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. 
Ponzi scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to 
generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on attracting new 
money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors and to use for personal expenses, instead of 
engaging in any legitimate investment activity.’ http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm accessed 11 October 
2011. 
22 The Times. ‘Stanford’s bank “made up the numbers for more than 20 years.” ’. 4 February 2012. 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/banking/article3309416.ece  accessed 4 February 2012. 
The Guardian ‘Allen Stanford loses bid for retrial’ 23 March 2012. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/23/allen-stanford-loses-twitter-bid-retrial accessed 13 April 2012. 
There are some more recent examples of Ponzi schemes but they are of a smaller scale than Madoff and 
Stanford. For example: ‘Trevor Cook Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Swindling 923 Investors out of $158 
Million ‘ Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/usao/mn/downloads/082410.Cook%20sentenced.pdf 
accessed 4 September 2014. 
‘Scott Rothstein, the name partner in a 70-plus person law firm in Ft. Lauderdale, engaged in a $1.2 billion 
investment fraud scheme.   He is currently serving a 50-year prison sentence’ Department of Justice, 
‘Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division Speaks at the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners Annual Conference San Diego ~ Tuesday, June 14, 2011. 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110614.html accessed 4 September 2014. 
23 Rinita Sarker,  ‘UK equity markets: transparency in UK equity markets’ (1995) 16(8) Comp. Law.  248. 
24 George Gilligan, ‘Jérôme Kerviel the 'Rogue Trader' of Société Générale: Bad Luck, Bad Apple, Bad Tree or 
Bad Orchard? ‘(2011) 32(12) Co Law, 355-362. 
25 Reuters, ‘Ex Trader Kerviel sentenced to 3 years in jail.’http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/05/us-
socgen-kerviel-verdict-idUSTRE69414220101005 accessed 8 February 2013. 
26 The Times, ‘UBS trader was only ‘a gamble away from destroying Switzerland’s biggest bank’ 14 
September 2012. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3538412.ece accessed 8 February 2013. 
27 BBC, ‘UBS 'rogue trader': Loss estimate raised to $2.3bn’. 18 September 2011 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14965438 accessed 20 September 2011.  
28 R v Kweku Adoboli  http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/kweku-adoboli-
sentencing-remarks-20112012.pdf accessed 8 February 2013. 
29 Prior to the Fraud Act 2006, fraud was prosecuted under Theft Act 1968 and Theft Act 1978, and the 
common law offence of conspiracy to defraud. Alan Doig, Fraud  (Willan 2006) 36. 
30 Criminal Justice Act 1987, s 1. 
31 Financial Services Act 1986, s 47. 
Will Barnett, ‘Fraud enforcement in the Financial Services Act 1986: an analysis and discussion of s 47’ 
(1996) 17(7) Co Law 203. 
32 Now under Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 via Coroners & Justice Act 2009, s 113. 
33 Theft Act 1968, Theft Act 1978. 
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by providing a new offence of ‘fraud’ instead of a variety of the ineffective 
offences.34 In practice, the range of deception offences created ‘a hazardous 
terrain for prosecutors’ which, consequently, encouraged reliance on ‘conspiracy 
to defraud’35 retained as a failsafe.36  The new criminal offences are seen as being 
wide enough to meet current and future challenges, by being designed as ‘modern 
and flexible statutory offences of fraud’.37  
 
5.2 Bribery and Corruption 
The importance of tackling bribery and corruption is illustrated by allegations over 
the Football World Cup venues for 2018 and 2022.  It is alleged that the English 
bid failed because of ‘foul play and double-dealing’ by competing international 
organisations.38 The UK is not immune from such accusations itself, as shown by 
the opprobrium brought on the government because of the pressure it brought to 
bear on the SFO to drop bribery enquiries into BAE’s Al Yamamah contract.39 The 
US Tenaris40 case shows the global reach of corruption. These examples illustrate 
that global commerce faces similar issues and, in strict legal terms, it should not 
matter in what context bribery takes place. This chapter considers the need for 
transparency in international trade and the steps taken by UK to tackle bribery and 
corruption, set in the context of actions taken by other countries, including US. The 
US, as the largest single country in terms of international trade with 9% of global 
exports and 13% of global imports (UK accounted for 3% and 4% respectively),41 it 
there has an important role to play in tackling bribery and corruption but it has 
different methods and penalties as discussed in chapter seven. 
                                            
34 David Ormerod, ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalised Lying?’ (2007)  Crim LR 193-219. 
The Fraud Act removed such crimes as: Theft Act 1968: s.15, Obtaining property; s.15A, Obtaining a money 
transfer; s.16, Obtaining a pecuniary advantage;s.20(2), Procuring the execution of a valuable security. Theft 
Act 1978: s.1, Obtaining services;s.2(1)(a), securing the remission of a liability; s.2(1)(b), Inducing a creditor to 
wait or forego payment;; s.2(1)(c), Obtaining an exemption from or abatement of liability. 
35 Ormerod (n 34) 193-219. 
36 Fraud Act 2006. Explanatory Note 6. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/en/ukpgaen_20060035_en_1 . 
Accessed 11 October 2011. 
37 Jonathan Pickworth, ‘The Fraud Act 2006: a death knell for conspiracy to defraud – the “prosecutor’s 
darling”?’.  (2009) 64 Euro. News 1-4. 
38 Daily Telegraph,  6 December 2010.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/news/8182559/World-Cup-
2018-BBC-defends-Panorama-expose-of-alleged-Fifa-corruption.html accessed 6 December 2010. 
39 James Wilson, ‘The day we sold the Rule of Law’ (n 2). 
40 It involved a Luxembourg based, Argentina controlled company, with shares traded in Argentina, New York 
and Milan paying bribes to Uzbekistan government officials.  
Reuters, ‘Tenaris settles U.S. bribery probe’  (n 3). 
41 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2010. Leading Traders 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2010_e/its2010_e.pdf accessed 7 September 2011. 
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In the headline grabbing Football World Cup case,42 English public opinion was 
outraged that others had not ‘played fair’ or, to mix sports, ‘it’s not cricket’. 
Whereas, cricket is regarded as a game of personal integrity and high standards in 
all countries, international trade was considered to be different because it involved 
local practices which may not be understood, as in the Asian businessmen’s 
complaint that ‘their American partners often insist on paying a lot of money in 
bribes because they cannot be bothered to do things in the time-honoured way of 
endless talk over tea.’43  
Lord Woolf emphasised that bribery ‘can paralyse the government and undermine 
trade and commerce.’44 In the nineteenth and early twentieth century allegations of 
bribery brought about public outcry,45 and legislation to deal with domestic 
corruption.46  However, the concept of UK jurisdiction over overseas corruption 
was informed by the Privy Counsel judgment in 1891: ‘[a]ll crime is local. The 
jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed.’47 
This state remained and the Law Commission observed that the opportunity was 
not taken by Criminal Justice Act 1993, which extended the jurisdiction of English 
courts over a number of offences of dishonesty, to include overseas bribery and 
corruption.48 It was not until 2001 that it became a crime to bribe foreign officials, 
when as a temporary expedient the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(ATCSA2001) was expanded in order to comply with international obligations.49  
                                            
42 ‘A major investigation involving Europol and police teams from 13 European countries has uncovered an 
extensive criminal network involved in widespread football match-fixing. A total of 425 match officials, club 
officials, players, and serious criminals, from more than 15 countries, are suspected of being involved in 
attempts to fix more than 380 professional football matches. The activities formed part of a sophisticated 
organised crime operation, which generated over €8 million in betting profits and involved over €2 million in 
corrupt payments to those involved in the matches.’ Euopol. ‘Update – Results from the largest football match-
fixing investigation in Europe’. 6 February 2013. https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/results-largest-
football-match-fixing-investigation-europe accessed 8 February 2013. See also (n 1). 
43 Yerachmie  Kugel, and Gladys Gruenberg, 'International Payoffs: Where We Are and How We Got There' 
(1976) 19(4) Challenge (05775132) 13 
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=6117034&site=ehost-live>. accessed 5 
September 2011. 
44 Raphael (n 5) v. 
45 Raphael (n 5) 14. re Metropolitan Board of Works. 
46 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889,Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
Raphael (n 5) 116. 




action=append&context=21#keycasesciting accessed 26 September 2011. 
48 Law Commission, ‘Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption.’ 1998  
104.http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/lc248_Legislating_the_Criminal_Code_Corruption.pdf 
accessed 20 September 2011. 
49 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889,Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s 108. 
110 
 
The reason for this was that the UK had been strongly criticised by OECD for 
‘failure to address deficiencies in its laws on bribery of foreign public officials and 
corporate liability for foreign bribery’50 undermining the credibility of the UK legal 
framework with the effect that UK companies being subject to increased due 
diligence.51 The consequence of responding to local cultural norms on the ‘doing 
in Rome what the Romans do’52 principle turns a blind eye to facilitation payments, 
’unofficial payments made to public officials in order to secure or expedite the 
performance of a routine or necessary action.’53 In the US, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977 (FCPA1977) allows ‘modest hospitality expenditure and 
facilitation payments,54 as does Australia,55 which would not be permitted in the 
UK thus it can be seen that some counties seek an advantage for themselves by 
excusing such payments.56 These are double standards for none of the countries 
which permit such payments abroad would allow them at home.57 However, it ‘is a 
particularly insidious problem for undeveloped or less developed countries’, as 
Trace International show in their ‘Global Enforcement Report’.58 and a matter 
which has caused friction between legislators and commercial organisations in 




                                                                                                                                    
Raphael (n 5) 116. 
50 OECD, ‘Working Group on Bribery’ (n 9) 43. 
51 OECD, ‘Working Group on Bribery’ (n 9) 43. 
52 Raphael (n 5) v. 
53 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance’ (n 12).  
54 Salens, ‘Anti-bribery and Corruption: the UK propels itself to the forefront of global enforcement’ 
http://www.salans.com/~/media/Assets/Salans/Publications/Salans%20Client%20Alert%20UK%20Bribery%20
Act%20Implementation%20Date.ashx accessed 24 July 2010. 
55 Discussed in chapter 7 & 8. 
56 David Aaronberg and Nicola Higgins, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: all bark and no bite…? (2010) Arch. Rev 5,6-9. 
57 ‘Of the countries that permit these small bribes overseas, none permits them at home. A Canadian or 
Australian who makes a “grease payment” to a foreign customs official would face criminal penalties for 
making the same payment to an official at home.’ Trace International. ‘The High Cost of Small Bribes’ 4.. 
https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/The_High_Cost_of_Small_Bribes_2-65416-1.pdf accessed 11 
February 2013. 
58 Raphael (n 5) v. 
UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries 
and Small Island Developing States. ‘The Least Developed Countries represent the poorest and weakest 
segment of the international community. They comprise more than 880 million people (about 12 per cent of 
world population), but account for less than 2 percent of world GDP and about 1 percent of global trade in 
goods The current list of LDCs includes 48 countries; 33 in Africa, 14 in Asia and the Pacific and one in Latin 
America.’ http://www.unohrlls.org/en/home/ . accessed 26 September 2011. 
Trace International, ‘Global Enforcement Report 2011: Where is the misconduct occurring?’ Figure VI 
International Enforcement Activity By Country of Bribe Payment (four or more actions), 1977 - July 2011’ 
http://www.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/GlobalEnforcementReport2011_000-64723-1.pdf 
accessed 11 February 2013. 
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5.2.1 International Conventions 
Internationally, the BA201059 supports the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD Convention)60 and the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC), together with Council of Europe and 
International Chamber of Commerce conventions and rules.61 
The OECD Convention, adopted by forty one countries, including the UK,62 
‘establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public 
officials in international business transactions’.63 The OECD Convention is the only 
international anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the bribery 
transaction, the person making the bribe rather than the recipient.64 The OECD 
feels that their convention is working a point illustrated by over 300 sanctions 
being imposed.65 Enforcement action is taken by countries themselves, rather than 
OECD acting as a ‘global policeman’. According to Raphael, the use of 
ATCSA2001,66 ‘had the twin effects of extending the ‘jurisdiction of domestic 
                                            
59 The expedient of using ATCSA2001 to combat bribery and corruption was intended to be temporary until 
introduction of comprehensive corruption legislation. The BA2010 fulfilled that obligation. 
Raphael (n 5) 116. 
60 OECD, ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’ 
(OECD Convention) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 (UN Convention 
61 UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ‘United Nations Convention against Corruption.’ 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html accessed 29 April 2011. 
Council of Europe – ’20 Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption’ 1997; Council of Europe ‘Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption’ 1999 and ‘Civil Law Convention on Corruption’ 1999; International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) ‘ICC Rules of Conduct and recommendations on Combating Extortion and Bribery [in 
International Business Transactions]. Council of Europe, ’20 Guiding Principles for the Fight Against 
Corruption’. Adopted by UK in 1999. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Resolution(97)24_EN.pdf Criminal law Convention – 
adopted by UK in 1999 and ratified 2003. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG 
Council of Europe, ‘Civil Law Convention’. adopted by UK in 1999 but not ratified as at 11 February 2013. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=174&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/anticorruption/Statements/ICC_Rules_of_Conduct_and_Reco
mmendations%20_2005%20Revision.pdf accessed 27 September 2011. 
62 UK signed in 1997. OECD, ‘Convention’ (n 60). 
63 OECD, ‘Convention’ (n 60). 
64 OECD, ‘Convention’ (n 60). 
‘The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make 
this effective. It is the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the 
bribery transaction. The 34 OECD member countries and seven non-member countries - Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Latvia, Russia, and South Africa - have adopted this Convention’. OECD, ‘Convention’ (n 
60). 
65 ‘Highlights from the Working Group on Bribery Enforcement Data, as of December 2012  221 individuals 
and 90 entities have been sanctioned under criminal proceedings for foreign bribery in 13 States Parties 
between the time the Convention entered into force in 1999 and the end of 2012. At least 83 of the sanctioned 
individuals were sentenced to prison for foreign bribery. At least 85 individuals and 120 entities have been 
sanctioned in criminal, administrative and civil cases for other offences related to foreign bribery, such as 
money-laundering or accounting, in 5 States Parties.  Approximately 320 investigations are ongoing in 24 
States Parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention. Prosecutions are ongoing against 148 individuals and 18 
entities in 15 Parties for offences under the Convention.’  
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report 2013’ http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/AntiBriberyAnnRep2012.pdf accessed 4 September 2014. 
66 Raphael (n 5) 20. 
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courts [UK] to acts of bribery committed abroad by UK nationals’,67 and ‘ensured 
that the common law offence of bribery extended to persons holding public office 
outside the UK.’68 UNCAC69 is ‘the world’s comprehensive platform for fighting 
corruption, promoting integrity and fostering good governance.’70 It is the first 
legally binding, international anti-corruption instrument and provides a unique 
opportunity to mount a global response to corruption.’ UNCAC assists countries, 
particularly those with ‘vulnerable, developing or transitional economies,’71 to 
develop and use solid anti-corruption measures applicable to all spheres of 
society. Compliance with UNCAC is reviewed on a regular basis.  
Prosecutions for bribery have been few in number72 but it would be stretching 
credulity to believe that foreign bribery does not take place.73 By way of 
comparison, statistics from 2013 illustrated that since 1999 the US brought 139 
cases to trial and Germany 88, whereas UK brought seven.74 There could be a 
number of reasons for this: such cases may not have been discovered or may not 
have been reported, which is not unusual in the field of financial crime. A further 
possibility is that if matters have been reported, prosecutors’ focus may either lie 
elsewhere, or have been subject to political influence not to take cases to trial; 
alternatively, the laws which the prosecutors are able to deploy are inadequate. 
Here, Wilson notes ‘[t]he fact that the old law was in a slightly jaded state can 
scarcely be a complete explanation for the dearth of successful prosecutions.’75 As 
Wells remarks, ‘it is hard to think that laws that are rarely invoked are functional.’76 
However, whatever the reasons for such a small number of UK cases, post-2010 
legislation is not to blame. Following ATCSA2001, the UK only achieved its first 
                                            
67 ‘or bodies incorporated under UK law’ Monty Raphael Blackstone’s Guide to the Bribery Act 2010  (OUP 
2010) 20. 
68 Raphael (n 5) 20. 
69 Administered by UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
70United Nations, ‘Office on Drugs and Crime, Annual Report 2009’.  Integrity and good governance: 
At the top of the agenda http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR09_LORES.pdf accessed 7 
September 2011. 
71 United Nations, ‘Office on Drugs and Crime, Annual Report 2009’  (n 70). 
72 ‘Between the period 1993 and 2003, on average, 21 people were prosecuted each year under the 
Prevention of Corruption Acts, whereas by comparison 23,000 people were prosecuted each year for fraud 
between 1997 and 2001. There was, therefore, a significant difference between those prosecuted for public 
sector corruption and those prosecuted for private sector fraud.’ Saleem Sheikh, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: 
commercial organisations beware!’ (2011) 22(1) I C C L R 2. 
73 See Transparency International, ‘Bribe Payers Index 2011’ for an analysis of companies perceived 
willingness to pay bribes. Australia is 6th least likely, UK (8th) and US (9th). 
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/results/ accessed 8 November 2014. 
74 OECD, ‘Working Group on Bribery Annual Report 2013’ (n 65). 
75 James Wilson, ‘Time to Act’ (2010) 160 NLJ 1572. 
76 Celia Wells, ‘Bribery: corporate liability under the draft Bill 2009’ (2009) 7 Crim LR  479. 
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conviction of bribing a foreign public official in 2008.77 In this case, Tobiasen (a UK 
national) was convicted under Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (PCA1906) of 
bribing a Ugandan government official.78 
5.2.2 Bribery and Corruption Definitions  
Bribery has been described as ‘a princely kind of thieving’ 79 and has been 
unlawful since the Magna Carta declared ’to no one will we sell, to no one deny or 
delay right or justice.‘80 The Bible also states ‘[a]nd you shall take no bribe, for a 
bribe blinds the clear-sighted and subverts the cause of those who are in the 
right.’81 Notwithstanding this lineage, as the Law Commission observes, ‘[m]ost 
people have an intuitive sense of what “bribery” is. However, it has proved hard to 
define in law.’82 The modern-day cliché is a brown paper bag stashed with cash, 
but bribes are usually more subtle than that, suggested Benstead.83 Although 
accepting that ‘at common law, bribery and corruption were criminal offences’,84 in 
R v J, Lord Thomas CJ observed that a ‘single definition is not easy’85 and then 
followed the Law Commission stance  in using a general statement from Russell 
on Crime:  
Bribery is the receiving or offering [of] any undue reward by or to any person 
whatsoever, in a public office, in order to influence his behaviour in office, 
and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity.86 
There are three principal statutes, dating to ‘the end of the nineteenth century and 
beginning of the twentieth century (…), without abolishing the common law 
offence’,87 but they have different variations in their definitions of the term ‘reward’. 
                                            
77 Financial Times, ‘Guilty plea to bribery sets legal landmark’ 23 August 2008. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff993ec6-70ad-11dd-b514-0000779fd18c.html#axzz2HOoOoVvn accessed 8 
January 2013. 
78 Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Uganda where a government official (Tumukunde) was 
responsible for security measures and procured training and equipment from a UK firm (CBRN) worth 
£500,000. Tumukunde demanded extra payments for ‘local taxes’ from CBRN’s director, Tobiasen, who made 
payments totalling £83,000. Tobiasen was convicted under Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (PCA1906) s.1 
and  sentenced to five months’ imprisonment (suspended) and Tumukunde (intercepted at  Heathrow airport) 
convicted for money laundering and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment. Financial Times, ‘Guilty plea 
to bribery sets legal landmark’ 23 August 2008. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff993ec6-70ad-11dd-b514-
0000779fd18c.html#axzz2HOoOoVvn accessed 8 January 2013. 
The Commonwealth. ‘CHOGM Kampala 2007’ 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/33247/240789/182413/chogm_2007/ accessed 8 January 2013. 
79 A T Denning, 'Independence and Impartiality of the Judges, The;' (1954) 71 S African L J 345. 
80 Magna Carta 1215,  translation para 40.  http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/museum/item.asp?item_id=3 
accessed 2 May 2011. 
81 The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (HarperCollins 2007) Exodus 23:8. 
82 The Law Commission, Reforming Bribery  (HMSO 2008). 
83 John Benstead, ‘Biting the Bullet’ (2010) 160 NLJ 1291. 
84 R v J,B,V and S, and D [2013] EWCA Crim 2287. 
85 R v J (n 84). 
86 Russell on Crime, (12th edn Stephens & Sons 1964) 381. 
87 R v J (n 84). 
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In the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1989 (PBCPA1889), the nature of 
‘reward’ is defined as: ‘any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage whatever as an 
inducement’.88 In the PCA1906, the word consideration appeared in ‘any gift or 
consideration as an inducement or reward’89 (with ‘consideration’ being ‘valuable 
consideration of any kind’);90 and then simplified in Prevention of Corruption Act 
1916 (PCA1916) as ‘any money, gift, or other consideration’.91 The quantum of the 
reward is explained as: ‘the amount of the reward ‘must be more than a trivial 
amount’.92  A public officer was as ‘an officer who discharges any duty in the 
discharge of which the public are interested, more clearly so if he is paid out of a 
fund provided by the public.’93 According to the World Bank (WB) bribery is ‘the 
abuse of public office for private gain.’94 It estimates that bribery costs the world 
around $1tn a year95 and believes that ‘corruption is a product of bad governance 
and the weaknesses inherent in public sector institutions.’96 Transparency 
International (TI) ‘defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain. It hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on the integrity 
of people in a position of authority.’97 
In this context, the BA2010,98 which overhauled the UK’s patchwork of archaic 
corruption laws,99 is regarded in the industry as ‘the single most important 
development’100 in combating white collar crime. Salens consider that the BA2010 
‘provides the UK with some of the most draconian and far-reaching anti-corruption 
legislation in the world,’101 with the potential to ‘propel the UK to the forefront’ in 
                                            
88 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, s 1. 
“Advantage” includes ‘any office or dignity, and any forbearance to demand any money or money’s worth or 
valuable thing, and includes any aid, vote, consent , or influence, or pretended aid, vote, consent, or influence, 
and also includes any promise or procurement of or agreement or endeavour to procure, or the holding out of 
any expectation of any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage, as before defined.’ 
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, s 7. 
89 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s 1.1. 
90 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s 1(2). 
91 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, s 2. 
92 Paul Cohen and Arthur Marriott, International Corruption (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 3. 
93 R v Whitaker [1914] 3 K.B. 1283. 
94 World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, Corruption and  
Economic Development’  
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm accessed 4 September 2014. 
95 William Christopher, ‘Trillion Dollar Bribery’  (2011) 161 NLJ 25. 
96 Indira Carr, ‘Fighting corruption through the United Nations Convention on Corruption 2003: a global 
solution to a global problem?’ (2005) 11(1) Int. T.L.R. 24-29. 
97 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2010’ 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 accessed 28 June 2011. 
98 Ministry of Justice, ‘News’ 20 July 2010 http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease200710a.htm accessed 
24 July 2010. 31 January 2011 delayed. accessed 24 July 2010. 
99 Benstead (n 83) 1291. 
100 Salens (n 54). 
101 Aaronberg and Higgins (n 56) 5,6-9. 
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fighting international bribery and corruption.102 There is a negative consequence of 
having strict legislation which is the potential to disadvantage UK industry if other 
countries do not follow suit, as the US discovered when enacting the FCPA1977 
(discussed in chapter seven). Other actors, including government ministers and 
diplomats reside outside UK jurisdiction. Transparency International details an 
annual index showing the perceptions of corruption in 178 countries. The UK and 
USA being in 14th and 19th position, well behind Denmark and New Zealand at the 
head.103 Bribery and corruption is a wide field with a range of views: from those of 
the authorities, on one hand, who see it as an anti-competitive blight on trade; and 
the perpetrators, on the other hand, who see it as a source of competitive 
advantage if they can use such methods without sanction.   
5.2.3 Criminalisation of Bribery and Corruption 
When considering the UK’s international obligations, it is important to recall that 
the UK was late in joining international efforts to criminalise overseas bribery. Prior 
to the BA2010, the UK prosecuted the crime of bribery under common law104 and 
a variety of disparate provisions dating back to the nineteenth century, 
commencing with PBCPA1889.105 That Act dealt with bribery of public officials, 
whereas, the PCA1906 and PCA1916 extended the concept into the private sector 
(based on the Principal/Agent concept)106 and the presumption of corruption 
relating to any payments to government officials.107 The UK law on bribery was left 
                                            
102 Salens (n 54). 
Note: the ‘Act extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.’ Bribery Act s.18. 
103 On a scale of 100 (very clean), TI in 2013 rated UK at 76 in 14th position out of 178 countries, behind 
Denmark and New Zealand at the head (91) and the US (19th place) rates 73 whereas the last are Somalia, 
Afghanistan and North Korea, (zero is labelled as ‘highly corrupt’).Note: Qatar was in 19th place in 2010, 
reduced to 28th place in 2013. 
In 2013, all four Scandinavian countries are in the top 5. Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2013.’ {3 December 2013)  http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ accessed 30 August 2014. 
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2010’ (n 94). 
104 ‘Bribery at common law has evolved over time, and opinions differ as to whether it is to be regarded as a 
general offence (applying to a range of different offices or functions) or whether the common law is comprised 
of a number of offences of bribery (distinguished by the office or function to which a particular offence 
applies).’  
The Law Commission, ‘Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption’ (n 48). 
105 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889. Preamble ‘An Act for the more effectual Prevention and 
Punishment of Bribery and Corruption of and by Members, Officers, or Servants of Corporations, Councils, 
Boards, Commissions, or other Public Bodies.’ s.1. Corruption in office a misdemeanour. ‘s 1(1). Every person 
who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to 
receive, for himself, or for any other person,(…)’ s 1(2). ‘Every person who shall by himself or by or in 
conjunction with any other person corruptly give, promise, or offer any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage 
whatsoever to any person (…).’ 
106 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906  s 1. ‘ Punishment of corrupt transactions with agents. (1) 
If any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for 
himself or for any other person, (…) in relation to his principal's affairs or business.’ 
107 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906,   s 3. 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, increase penalties (s.1) and introduced the presumption of corruption for 
public officials such that the defence had to prove the contrary. s 2. 
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untouched until the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that the 
government clarify the law on bribery.108 This was followed by the Law 
Commission proposals ‘Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption.’109  The 
ATCSA2001 brought in provisions to strengthen the law on international 
corruption, putting beyond doubt that the law of bribery applies to acts involving 
officials of foreign public bodies, Ministers, MPs and judges, and to 'agents' of 
foreign 'principals'. This gave courts jurisdiction over the crime of bribery 
committed by UK nationals and UK incorporated bodies overseas.110 The Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 extended SFO powers to compel production of 
documents in foreign bribery cases.111  The BA2010 took effect from 2011 but was 
not retrospective. The general principle of criminal law being that earlier actions 
should be prosecuted under the old law.112 Thus, the existing laws remain 
operative. The effect of this is that cases continue to brought under the old 
legislation because the events on which they are predicated took place before July 
2011. Thus, it will take some time before cases appear under BA2010 and its 
provisions are tested in court.113 
This part of the chapter critically assesses the offences created by the BA2010114 
There are four criminal offences:  ‘Offences of bribing another person’; and 
‘Offences relating to being bribed;’ ‘bribing a foreign public official;’ and failure of 
commercial organisations to prevent bribery.’115 The first two offences, which 
consolidate existing law are general bribery offences.116 Offering a bribe consists 
of providing an advantage to a person in return for that person performing a 
‘relevant function or activity’ improperly. This includes making payments such as 
facility fees, referral fees and commissions. There is an ‘expectation’ test,117 which 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Steps taken to implement and enforce the OECD Convention’ OECD, ‘Convention’ (n 60). 
108 Committee on Standards in Public Life, First Report ‘Standards in Public Life’ (Nolan Committee) ( HMSO 
1995) 43. http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/Library/OurWork/1stInquiryReport.pdf accessed 20 September 
2011. 
109 The Law Commission, ‘Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption’ (n 48). 
Draft Corruption Bill 2003 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtcorr/157/157.pdf 
Bribery: Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO powers in cases of bribery of foreign officials. 
Home Office December 2005. Law Commission.  (Law Comm No 313) 2008. 
110 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 108. 
111 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 59. 
112 Raphael (n 5) 11. 
113 See Chapter 5.3.4. 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Printing company corruption charges’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-
releases/press-releases-2013/printing-company-corruption-charges.aspx 18 July 2014. Re Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1906. 
114 The Bribery Act 2010 (Commencement) Order 2011, effective from 1 July 2011. 
115 Bribery Act 2010, s 6. 
116, ‘Offences of bribing another person’; and ‘Offences relating to being bribed ‘. Bribery Act 2010 s 1 and s 2. 
Ministry of Justice, ‘explanatory notes’ (n 16). 
117 Bribery Act 2010, s 5. 
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relates the improper performance to the yardstick of UK standards of good faith or 
impartiality which a reasonable person in the UK may expect. This means that if 
the intention is to bribe then it will be an offence in the UK irrespective of whether 
such a payment might be culturally acceptable in another country. The only 
exception is if it is permissible by written law.118 This goes some way to 
acknowledge national differences but it is a narrow exception requiring ‘normal 
business practice’ being permitted by written law. This is in contrast to the US 
where the FCPA1977 allows ‘facilitation payments’ or ‘grease payments’,119 and 
payments to foreign political parties or officials ‘to expedite or secure the 
performance of a routine government action.’ 120 The UK Government stated:121   
We recognise that many UK businesses still struggle with petty corruption in 
some markets, but the answer is to face the challenge head-on, rather than 
carve out exemptions that draw artificial distinctions, are difficult to enforce, 
and have the potential to be abused. Providing exemptions for facilitation 
payments, as the US does, is not a universally accepted practice, and not 
something that we consider acceptable.122 
The new offences are: bribing a foreign public official, where the only requirement 
is an intention to influence a foreign official in their official capacity;123 and, failure 
of commercial organisations to prevent bribery,124 which targets situations where a 
person connected, or ‘associated’, with a commercial organisation is involved.125 
The term ‘associated person’ is very wide and encompasses employees, agents 
and third parties, including other intermediaries, suppliers or joint venture partners. 
It is noteworthy that lack of control over the associated person is not a defence, 
the precise relationship is irrelevant.126 This offence is one of strict liability and has 
only a defence that the organisation had in place ‘adequate procedures’ to prevent 
bribery.127  
Thus, whereas, US legislation permits payments to secure the performance of 
overseas ministerial and routine government action (issuance of permits, visas, 
unloading cargo or releasing goods from customs)128 or hospitality associated 
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expenditure such as travel and accommodation costs relating to the promotion and 
explanation of a product, the BA2010 criminalises such actions. The Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) and the SFO have indicated that they will treat each case on its 
merits and the BA2010 vests total discretion in the hands of the SFO, as 
prosecutors, to decide whether or not to pursue such payments as illegal bribes. 
Vesting prosecutorial discretion in the hands of the SFO is congruent with an 
objective to have one single economic crime agency and avoids issues of different 
bodies making contradictory decisions, which would be the case if the FCA use its 
regulatory powers to fine breaches of bribery procedures rather than allow the 
specific prosecutors to institute criminal proceedings. 
It is for the commercial organisation to demonstrate that it has in place adequate 
procedures in order to provide a defence; the consequences of failing to do so 
risks unlimited fines and imprisonment up to ten years. One particular challenge 
for a commercial organisation is to ascertain whether or not its foreign counter-
party is a government or public body because in other countries key sectors of the 
economy are not privatised leading to a risk of inadvertently dealing with foreign 
public officials. Because of the broad scope and disquiet over the strict liability 
nature of the offence, the government consulted widely before providing 
guidance.129 This is covered in chapter six. 
It is important to examine in detail the four offences which the BA2010 created to 
put into context apprehensions and misapprehensions, particularly of commercial 
organisations in enforcing the Act. The first offence is: ‘Offences of bribing another 
person.’ A person is guilty of an offence if he promises or gives a financial or other 
advantage to another person either with the intention that there should be 
improper performance of a function or activity or knowing that acceptance would 
constitute the improper performance: that improper performance being rewarded 
by the ‘advantage’.130 It does not matter whether the advantage is offered, 
promised or given directly between the parties or through an intermediary. 
Similarly, it does not matter whether the person receiving the offer is the same 
person due to perform the activity.131 This makes plain that the intention to bribe is 
paramount, not the mechanism and the provision removes the possibility of those 
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involved distancing themselves by adopting circuitous means to ensure there is no 
evidence of their involvement. 
The counterpart of the first offence is ‘Offences relating to being bribed.’ A person 
is guilty of an offence if s/he requests, agrees to receive or accepts an advantage 
with the intention that he should perform a relative function or activity improperly 
either by himself or by another person, or as a reward for such performance.132 
The mere request, agreement or acceptance constitutes the improper 
performance and it does not matter whether the advantage is received directly or 
through a third party nor whether the benefit is to those same parties or 
another(s).133 This includes cases where the improper performance has either 
been done or is yet to be done by the person or someone acting under his 
instruction or acquiescence. It does not matter whether the person performing the 
function or activity knows that it is improper. Improper performance occurs ‘in 
breach of a relevant expectation’134 which is of ‘good faith or impartiality’ arising 
from a ‘position of trust.’135 The implication of this is that the recipient of a bribe 
cannot hide behind a third party. The third bribery offence is that of ‘Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials.’136 A person who bribes a foreign public official is guilty of 
an offence if he intends to influence the official in performance of his capacity as a 
public official with the intention of obtaining or retaining business or a business 
advantage.137 However, there is relief if such payments are permitted by the 
written law of that country. Mere custom or tolerance will not suffice.138 This is not 
a new offence.  
Some bribes are excused as ‘facilitation payments’ but, nevertheless, are still 
bribes.139 This offence has the effect of penalising those who actively intend 
bribery as well as those who regard it as an accepted norm to facilitate or ‘oil the 
wheels of local bureaucracy’ by ‘greasing’ the palm of some public official to 
expedite performance, such as entry visas, permits, licenses or, say, loading, 
unloading and release of perishable goods from the docks or provision of a 
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telephone or electricity service.140 These payments are small bribes or 
backhanders made to secure or expedite the performance of a routine or 
necessary action to which the payer has a legal or other entitlement and believed 
to be wide-spread in some areas and considered necessary.141 In effect, ‘[s]mall 
bribe takers thrive on inefficiency and bureaucratic obstacles.’142 The distinction 
between a bribe and a facilitation payment is illusory. In reality, there is no 
distinction for ‘if companies pay these small bribes willingly, they are nevertheless 
bribes. If companies pay these bribes because they believe they have no choice, 
they are extortionate.’143 However, to add to the confusion, some payments of a 
small, customary nature are commonly made by the private sector: ‘tipping’, 
where, according to Horder: 
“Tipping” of waiters and cab drivers is an example widespread across the 
world. Such a practice is not regarded as criminal bribery, so long as the tips 
are small and associated essentially with a display of gratitude rather than an 
attempt to secure better service than other customers.144 
 
The fourth offence is ‘failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery.’ A 
relevant commercial organisation is guilty of an offence if a person associated with 
the organisation bribes another intending to obtain or retain business or a 
business advantage for the organisation.145 It is a defence for a relevant 
commercial organisation to prove that it had in place adequate procedures 
designed to prevent persons associated with the commercial organisation bribing 
another person.146 The BA2010 seeks to end the practice of paying bribes through 
intermediaries while the commercial organisation claims not to be aware that 
bribery was taking place. The Act makes clear that it does not matter whether the 
‘advantage’ is offered, given, requested, or received directly or through an 
intermediary. It is this new offence which caused concern and generated 
considerable debate because it is of strict liability, the scope is wide and the 
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consequences severe. The strict (or absolute)147 liability of the offence removes 
the opportunity for those not directly involved in making the bribe to avoid liability. 
This is because normally ‘criminal liability generally rests upon proof of two things 
– actus reus and mens rea.’148 That is, the ‘guilty act’ and the ‘guilty mind’ and the 
traditional maxim is: ‘the act is not guilty unless the mind is also guilty.’149  Thus, 
as Lord Goddard CJ explained:  
It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject 
that a court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute, clearly or by 
necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, 
the court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law 
unless he has a guilty mind.150 
The impact for a commercial organisation is that it is liable for the offence of 
bribery, if an ‘associate’ of the organisation commits bribery without its knowledge 
and it is clear that, no matter the circumstances, the commercial organisation 
cannot deny responsibility. Whatever the organisation did or did not know, it is 
guilty of the act. Notwithstanding the anxiety over BA2010 s.7, for which the 
adequate procedures defence is discussed below,151 by mid 2014, no such cases 
had come to court, although the SFO had announced investigations into bribery at 
Rolls Royce.152 
Penalties under the BA2010 are split between those for individuals and those for 
‘non-individuals’. The maximum penalty for individuals is an unlimited fine or 
imprisonment for up to 10 years or both.153 An offence committed by a person 
other than an individual is punishable by an unlimited fine.154 These penalties, 
which are congruent with those for fraud, nevertheless bear comparison with 
penalties in other jurisdictions, which will be discussed in chapters seven and 
eight, where is it clear that penalties are greater in the US. Whether the penalties 
are appropriate or not is an open question because by mid 2014, there had been 
just three prosecutions which is not surprising given that the SFO consider that ‘on 
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average, it takes 19 months to investigate allegations and bring a case to 
charge.’155 
The BA2010 took effect from July 2011 and was not retrospective. The first three 
cases did not fall within SFO parameters. Munir Patel156 had the dubious 
distinction of being the first person to be convicted in November 2011; the second 
was Mawia Mushtaq,157 and the third Yang Li.158  Patel was a Magistrates Court 
clerk who pleaded guilty to being bribed to manipulate the court traffic offence 
database so that penalty points would not be recorded.159 Although guilty of one 
charge of accepting £500, the prosecution believed there were another 53 
occasions.160 He was initially sentenced to six years’ imprisonment (later reduced 
on Appeal to four years) for the BA2010 s.2 offence and Misconduct in a Public 
Office.161 In the second case, Mawia Mushtaq failed a driving test for a private hire 
taxi licence, having failed several times before. He tried to bribe the licencing 
officer with between £200-£300. He was convicted of ‘Bribing another person’162 
and sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, and a 
two-month curfew order.163 In the third case, Yang Li was sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment for attempting to bribe, and possession of an imitation 
firearm, a university professor with £5,000 to pass his master’s degree.164 In the 
first case, Patel, a public officer, hence the seriousness of the sentence, sought 
and received a bribe whereas in the second and third cases a bribe was attempted 
but not made. However, important as these cases are, because they are the first 
under the BA2010, nevertheless, they are minor crimes in relation to SFO 
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parameters165 which is still prosecuting under pre BA2010 legislation.166 Thus, the 
theory is that BA2010 contains provisions which should enable the bribery and 
corruption aspects of economic crime to be prosecuted and convictions obtained. 
However, four years after enactment, the SFO has not yet taken a case to trial 
which leaves the Act’s provisions untested in court. This is important because, 
although acknowledging the SFO’s difficulties in facing a long lead time to bring a 
case to trial, the new key provision of making a commercial organisation 
responsible for failure to prevent bribery would benefit from being ventilated in 
court. The reason this is important is that having adequate procedures offers a 
complete defence and if the SFO is able to establish the issues to a court’s 
satisfaction then this offers opportunities for the SFO to engage in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, as discussed in chapter six. 
5.2.4 Risk Management and Reporting Bribery and Corruption 
The BA2010 extends responsibility for bribery beyond the individuals intimately 
involved, to include the ‘controlling minds’ and those organisations involved or on 
whose behalf bribery took place or was contemplated. This can include individuals 
and organisations which are many steps distant from the organisation itself. Any 
failure risks the organisation being subject to a fine in addition to any action 
against the individuals. The wide scope of the Act significantly increases the 
commercial organisation’s risk management issues. Thus, with there being 
corporate responsibility for failing to prevent bribery, with criminal consequences, it 
is vital for the organisation to put in place procedures and be alert so that, if 
necessary, it can report itself to the SFO. 
The ambit of the law is any commercial organisation with a business presence in 
the UK. This would bring into consideration any part of that organisation, even if 
the controlling body was overseas and the alleged bribery was also offshore.167 
This should encourage businesses to review their existing anti-bribery policies and 
procedures and ensure their ‘associates’ are similarly complaint. Those 
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organisations which are already subject to FCPA1977 will have existing policies 
and procedures but the BA2010 is more extreme with its ‘zero tolerance’ stance. 
Internationally, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises168 and OECD 
Business Approaches to Combating Corrupt Practices169 provide guidance, as do 
US Federal Sentencing Guidelines.170  
In the UK, the SFO is designated the national reporting point for 'all allegations of 
bribery of foreign public officials by British nationals or companies incorporated in 
the UK - even if the matter occurred overseas.’171 However, in the UK, the 
obligation to report is not well established because there is no statutory obligation 
report bribery, corruption or fraud, unlike money laundering where reporting is 
required by Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA2002),172 or terrorism financing 
where disclosure is required under Terrorism Act 2000.173 This omission continues 
in the fraud arena, that ‘not having a centralised body to co-ordinate fraud 
intelligence across the public and private sectors has made it easier for criminals 
to operate undetected and free to re-offend.’174 The National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureau seems to rely on ‘best endeavours’ and ‘encouragement’ to report175 
although such crimes should be reported to the police.176 By contrast, the other 
significant actor in the UK, the FCA, which is responsible for regulating financial 
services, imposes obligations.177 Regulated firms have to tell the regulator 
promptly anything relating to the firm of which the FCA would reasonably expect 
prompt notice’.178 The consequence is that the SFO, which takes the lead in 
bribery matters,179 lacks statutory backing to compel reporting, whereas, the FCA 
                                            
168 OECD, ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.’ 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html accessed 24 July 2010 
169 OECD, ‘Business Approaches to Combating Bribery’ http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/32/1922830.pdf 
accessed 24 July 2010. 
170 U S Federal Sentencing Guidelines, chapter eight - part b - remedying harm from criminal conduct, and 
effective compliance and ethics program. http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/8b2_1.html accessed 24 July 2010 
171 Serious Fraud Office,  Bribery & Corruption.  http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/bribery--
corruption.aspx accessed 24 July 2010. 
172 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, (Part 7). 
173 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 15-19. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 3. 
174 National Fraud Authority, ‘National Fraud Intelligence Bureau’. 
http://www.lslo.gov.uk/nfa/WhoWeWorkWith/Pages/NFIB.aspx accessed 22 April 2010. 
175 National Fraud Authority, ‘National Fraud Intelligence Bureau’ (n 174). 
176 Home Office ‘Counting Rules For Recorded Crime’. 
http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/countgeneral10.pdf accessed 29 April 2010. (Emphasis added). 
177 Financial Services Authority, ‘What we do: who we regulate’ ‘We regulate most financial services markets, 
exchanges and firms. We set the standards that they must meet and can take action against firms if they fail to 
meet the required standards’.  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/Who/index.shtml accessed 27 
September 2011. (Emphasis added). 
178 Financial Services Authority,  ‘Principles for Business’.  SYSC 6.3 (Financial 
Crime).http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/1999/099.shtml accessed 29 April 2010. 
179 Serious Fraud Office, ‘ Bribery & Corruption’.  http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/bribery--
corruption.aspx accessed 24 July 2010. 
125 
 
in the sector it regulates does require bribery to be reported.180 The relationship 
between SFO and regulator lies at the heart of UK efforts to control economic 
crime and there is a need for this to be addressed so that one agency is 
responsible for dealing with cases of bribery, corruption and fraud, the reporting of 
which should be made a statutory obligation in all cases and remove the overlap 
and gaps between agencies which would enable economic crime to be confronted 
by one body. Such lack of a single decision maker was subject to parliamentary 
opprobrium in relation to LIBOR. 181 
The SFO ‘Approach to Dealing with Overseas Corruption’182 provides guidance 
and industry specific codes of practice which give, for example, advice that ‘a 
negotiated settlement rather than a criminal prosecution’ would give protection 
against mandatory European Union (EU) procurement disbarring.183 Corporate 
hospitality is also covered: the government having recognised that the provision of 
corporate hospitality is part of business life and it has not been prescriptive in 
establishing parameters, preferring that the issue is best left to prosecutorial 
discretion and common sense,184 an uncertain state until tested at trial though 
there is government comfort: ‘[r]est assured – no one wants to stop firms getting to 
know their clients by taking them to events like Wimbledon or the Grand Prix,’185  
This guidance recognises that corporate hospitality and promotional expenditure is 
an everyday part of business life with general recognition by both giver and 
receiver that this is part of relationship building. Nevertheless, it is ‘clear that 
hospitality and promotional or similar business expenditure can be employed as 
bribes.’186 This means that commercial organisations have to put in place clear 
procedures with the emphasis on expenditure being ‘reasonable and 
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proportionate’187 and give direction to their employees to ensure that, at best, their 
motives are not misinterpreted.188 
The risks managed by a commercial organisation are increased by the extra-
territorial application of BA2010 because the UK has joined other countries in 
extending its jurisdiction over bribery beyond its borders in support of the global 
effort to reduce economic crime.189 The BA2010 creates an offence that is 
committed if ‘any act or omission which forms part of the offence takes place (...) 
in the UK’;190 or, if not in the UK, then it would be an offence if ‘done or made in 
the UK’191 and the person had a close connection with the UK. A person is a 
‘British Citizen, British resident or body incorporated in the UK192 or is an 
‘associated person’. An Associated person is ‘a person who performs services for 
and on behalf of a relevant commercial organisation.193 The capacity in which 
those services are performed does not matter and, thus, the person can be an 
employee, agent or subsidiary.194 The reach of s.7 jurisdiction to prosecute is 
unclear since the MOJ guidance states that mere admission of a company’s 
securities to UK Listing Authority’s Official List and trading on London Stock 
Exchange does not necessarily qualify a company as carrying on a business in the 
UK which does appear perverse and has not yet been tested in court195 but the 
regulator,196 acting against market abuse has fined executives of a Turkish 
company (Genel Enerji) for insider dealing relating to the company’s UK Listing.197 
Although the government’s ‘common sense’ approach was intended to assuage 
international business fears, the courts would have to rule on jurisdictional 
disputes which, if the regulator can and does take action would leave SFO in the 
position of it, too, having jurisdiction. Two civil cases demonstrate that a business 
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presence of nine days198 or a mere office199 were sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
The nature of association is more closely defined in FCPA1977.200  
There is no clear definition of ‘performing services’ but the presumption is that an 
employee is performing services whilst the act stipulates that the relationship ‘is to 
be determined by reference to all the relevant circumstances’.201 However, as a 
‘strict liability’ offence, the commercial undertaking can still be liable even if the 
activity was unknown by anyone. This is a significant change from the previous 
position which stated that ‘senior’ management had to be involved.202 
The intention of this ‘broad reach’ is that multinational companies (and others) 
avoid responsibility for bribery and corruption by saying that it happened 
elsewhere and they knew nothing about it. However, the Act’s provisions go 
further than FCPA1977 and, thus, may ‘catch out’ US Corporations. An example 
might be of a US incorporated corporation, which does business in UK, employing 
a Korean agent which pays a bribe in China. If it fails to show that it had ‘adequate 
procedures’, it can be criminally liable.203 
5.2.5 Adequate Procedures Defence 
The BA2010, having put in place a crime of ‘failure of commercial organisations to 
prevent bribery’ also provides a full defence to prosecution if a person associated 
with it bribes another person.204 This is welcome and recognises that, whatever 
procedures it puts in place, there is a risk of failure. However, the commercial 
organisation has to demonstrate that it had in place adequate procedures 
designed to prevent persons associated with the commercial organisation from 
bribing another person. This builds on the requirements of the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007 (MLR2007)205 of customer due diligence, training and 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR).206 The expression ‘adequate procedures’ 
generated much debate. The MOJ published guidance to commercial 
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organisations.207 The SFO underlines that this is not an offence of strict liability 
because of the availability of the defence of ‘adequate procedures’. Thus, ‘if there 
are adequate procedures, then no offence has been committed. This is a complete 
defence and not just mitigation.208 
The MOJ guidance is formulated around six principles of general application which 
it regards as not being either prescriptive or ‘one size fits all’. There is a health 
warning that questions of adequacy of procedures would have to be determined by 
the courts but that departure from the procedures would not give rise to a 
presumption of inadequacy.209 Commercial organisations are invited to take a ‘risk 
based’ approach and it is accepted that ‘no bribery prevention regime will be 
capable of preventing bribery at all times,’ and, thus, invites self-reporting to 
SFO.210 
The first principle was that the procedures put in place should be proportionate to 
the risks faced by the organisation;211 secondly, is that in order to embed anti-
bribery and corruption behaviours, top management (that is board of directors or 
owners) must be able to demonstrate commitment to preventing bribery;212 thirdly, 
is that a commercial organisation has to assess the risks of bribery for its 
business, which is familiar territory because it is standard practice for money 
laundering;213  fourthly, that the organisation will undertake due diligence214 on all 
                                            
207 Bribery Act 2010, s 9.  
208 Richard Alderman, Speech ‘the Bribery Act 2010 – The SFO’s approach and international compliance’  9 
February 2011 http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2011/the-bribery-act-
2010---the-sfo's-approach-and-international-compliance.aspx accessed 28 March 2011. 
209 Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 6. 
210 Discussed in chapter six.  
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 8. 
211 ‘A commercial organisation is required to put in place procedures to prevent bribery by persons associated 
but such procedures should be proportionate to the bribery risks faced by the organisation. These procedures 
should be clear, practical, accessible, effectively implemented and enforced, with such matters as 
performance appraisals and auditing control being effective methods of bringing the seriousness of the issues 
home.’ 
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 21. 
212 ‘A key element in embedding anti-bribery and corruption behaviours is the involvement of top management 
(board of directors or owners) to demonstrate commitment to preventing bribery by persons associated with it. 
They should foster a culture of integrity in which bribery is never acceptable, which could include appointing a 
specific anti-bribery officer.212 Notwithstanding the specific appointment, as with a Money Laundering 
Reporting Officer, this role could be undertaken by an existing compliance officer.’ 
Financial Services Authority, Handbook. SYSC 3.2.6. 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/SYSC/3/2#DES92 accessed 26 September 2011. 
213 ‘The risk-based approach means a focus on outputs. Firms must have in place policies and procedures in 
relation to customer due diligence and monitoring, among others, but neither the law nor our rules prescribe in 
detail how firms have to do this. Firms’ practices will vary depending on the nature of the money-laundering 
risks they face and the type of products they sell. For example, a large retail bank with many customers will 
likely need to develop or purchase customer monitoring software whereas a smaller organisation can may be 
able to monitor its customers using a low tech solution.’ Financial Conduct Authority, ‘The risk-based approach 
to anti-money laundering (AML)’ http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/protecting/financial-crime/money-
laundering/approach accessed 6 September 2014. 
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parties to its relationships;215 fifthly, for the organisation to communicate and 
embed its bribery prevention policies throughout the organisation, including 
training (similar to MLR2007);216 lastly, the sixth principle, is that procedures 
should be subject to monitoring and review which means that the policy has to be 
active rather than relying on, say, an external verification that standards are in 
place. 217 Thus, merely obtaining a lawyers certificate of compliance is not a 
defence.218 
As part of a risk management strategy and ensuring adequate procedures is 
the need for a whistleblowing policy, as an important safeguard,219 where 
existing legislation is the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.220 This is 
outside the scope of this thesis but the regulators FCA/PRA announced in 
mid 2014 proposals to undertake ‘regulatory changes necessary to require 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Commercial organisations have to assess a whole variety of risks to their business. However, this principle is 
designed to focus attention on its potential exposure to external and internal risks of bribery on its behalf. A 
risk based approach is a pragmatic assessment in light of the types of business undertaken by the 
organisation such as: country risk; business sector and transaction type; business opportunities and 
partnerships. Internal risks might include factors such as a bonus reward system which rewards excessive risk 
taking.’  
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 25. 
214 ‘5.  “Customer due diligence measures” means— 
(a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity on the basis of documents, data or 
information obtained from a reliable and independent source; 
(b) identifying, where there is a beneficial owner who is not the customer, the beneficial owner and taking 
adequate measures, on a risk-sensitive basis, to verify his identity so that the relevant person is satisfied that 
he knows who the beneficial owner is, including, in the case of a legal person, trust or similar legal 
arrangement, measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the person, trust or 
arrangement; and (c) obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.’ 
Money Laundering Regulations 2007,  s 5. 
215 The commercial organisation, having taken a proportionate and risk based approach will have identified all 
parties to a business relationship, including the supply chain, agents and intermediaries. Due diligence is 
already an established element of good governance and the guidance envisages that this will encompass anti-
bribery. 
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 27. 
216 The guidance objective is for the commercial organisation to ensure that its bribery prevention policies and 
procedures are embedded throughout the organisation. To ensure full understanding, the organisation is 
expected to plan an implementation strategy involving internal and external communication, training, 
monitoring (possibly externally) and a clear statement of the penalties for breach of the policy. This process is 
not prescriptive as organisations are envisaged to adopt strategies proportionate to the risks it faces, which 
may vary across different functions. 
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 29. 
217 The guidance makes plain that a commercial organisation should monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of 
their procedures on a regular (unspecified) basis and make improvements where necessary. Such changes 
may be necessitated by changes to the organisation’s activities as well as in its markets, perhaps to 
governments overseas. Some organisations may be able to obtain external verification of their standards but 
the guidance points out that such certification ‘may not necessarily mean that a commercial organisation’s 
bribery prevention procedures are “adequate” for all purposes where an offence under section 7 of the Bribery 
Act could be charged.’  
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 31. 
218 The BriberyAct.com, ‘Richard Alderman: A lawyers certificate of Adequate Procedures compliance. How 
much would you pay?’ http://thebriberyact.com/2011/08/02/a-lawyers-certificate-of-adequate-procedures-
compliance-how-much-would-you-pay/ accessed 6 September 2014. 
219 Reuters, Tesco whistleblower's warnings were initially ignored – report’ 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/uk-tesco-accounts-investigation-idUKKCN0HN0JL20140928 accessed 
29 September 2014. 
220 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
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firms to have effective whistleblowing procedures, and to make senior 
management accountable for delivering these.’221 This was in response to 
suggestions from Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and 
involved researching US practice222 but concluding that financial incentives 
to report would not be adopted.223 The US, as discussed in chapter seven 
does provide significant financial incentives.224 
Finally, the costs of implementing an anti-bribery regime for a commercial 
organisation are significant,225 notwithstanding government emphasis that its 
guidance was on  implementation in a workable way and that ‘combating the risks 
of bribery is largely about common sense, not burdensome procedures.226 Not 
only do commercial organisations have costs but so does the SFO which forecast 
costs of enforcing estimated at £2m per annum,227 however, this cost will have to 
be met from the SFO’s existing and already shrinking budget.228 The clear 
inference is that the SFO will have insufficient resources to take active steps to 
enforce the Act.  
                                            
221 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Financial Incentives for  Whistleblowers . Note by the Financial Conduct 
Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority for the Treasury Select Committee’ 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/financial-incentives-for-whistleblowers.pdf accessed 6 September 
2014. 
222 See chapter 7.3.1. 
223 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers’ (n 221). 
224 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower Award’ [$30m]. 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290#.VCktK77HthY accessed 23 
September 2014. 
225 Alexandra Wrage, ‘Anti-bribery compliance is getting expensive. Companies embroiled in enforcement 
actions routinely conclude that the fines are less expensive than the costs of the in- vestigations and 
remediation. Companies not in the middle of ongoing investigations are urged to do more, hire more and pay 
more to keep it that way.‘ Alexandra Wrage, TRACEInternational, ‘ Westlaw International Commentary Series’ 
http://traceinternational.org/data/public/AW_Anti-
BriberyResourcesthatCostWellNothingatAll_Westlaw_ThomsonReuters_01.2011-64899-1.pdf accessed 29 
September 2014. 
226 Ministry of Justice, ‘The Bribery Act: Guidance’ (n 185) 2. 
227 Lord McNally,  HL Deb 24 January 2011 Vol 724 WA90. 
228The Telegraph, ‘SFO given just £2m to enforce Bribery Act’  
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8290808/SFO-given-just-2m-to-enforce-
Bribery-Act.html accessed 13 May 2011. 
The SFO Budget showed actual reductions from £53.2m in 2009/9, £40m in 2009/10, £35.5m in 2010/11,  and 
£31.6m in 2011/12. The projections showed similar reductions to £34.8m in 2012/13, £32.2m in 2013/14 and 
£30.8m in 2014/15. In the event, the outturn for 2012/13 was £38m and 2013/14 £51m, reflecting the 
availability of ‘blockbuster’ funding. The 2014 projections showed budget £37m in 2014/15 and £35.4m in 
2015/16. ‘The Serious Fraud Office investigates the most serious and complex cases of fraud, bribery and 
corruption as described above. The quantity of such work is unpredictable. The SFO has a core budget for this 
purpose but some exceptionally large cases may require additional resources. The Government has 
previously made clear that where the SFO needs additional resources, these will be provided. The current 
agreement with HM Treasury is that any exceptional case funding should be agreed as part of the 
Supplementary Estimates process.’ 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12’, 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/223353/annual%20report%20and%20accounts%202011-12.pdf accessed 17 
June 2013. 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/268927/sfo%20ar-
2014%20sps-26-6.pdf accessed 27 August 2014. 
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5.3 Regulatory Bodies 
This chapter has examined the landscape of bribery and corruption including UK 
legislation to criminalise such conduct together with risk management measures. 
The regulatory bodies are responsible for enforcement, headed by the SFO. 
5.3.1 Serious Fraud Office  
It is logical that the SFO be given the lead role in enforcing the BA2010 because it 
was already the lead agency for prosecution of corruption, both domestically and 
overseas. The SFO which was established in 1987,229 to counter fraud and has 
had a chequered life being dogged by controversy because of adverse publicity 
arising out of its prosecution, or not,  of several high profile cases.230 This resulted 
in the Attorney General commissioned an external review by de Grazia.231  
de Grazia described SFO as a ‘demoralised and underperforming agency’ with 
‘inadequate management and leadership’, expending more resources whilst 
achieving far fewer convictions than US counterparts.232 She highlighted that the 
SFO had a conviction rate of 61% compared with Manhattan District Attorney’s 
Office (DANY) of 92% for comparable periods.233 de Grazia’s view was that there 
were no fundamental differences in role between the SFO and New York agencies 
but USA had two hundred years more experience.234 de Grazia evidences that in a 
five year period, SFO employed more lawyers (56), and spent over £4m on 
external counsel,235 than DANY which had 19 lawyers, and did not contract out to 
the external bar. de Grazia concluded that  ‘a criminal justice system that produces 
this little cannot be said to be effective in deterring, detecting or punishing 
                                            
229 Discussed in chapter 4. 
230 Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v. Maxwell [1993] Ch. 1; R v Saunders [1996] Crim.LR.420; 
Re Levitt [1992] Ch. 457;  Re Arrows Ltd (No. 4) [1994] 3 All E.R. 814. 66 charges of theft totalling £34m from 
Polly Peck International, which collapsed in 1990 with a deficiency of £1.3bn R v Asil Nadir 
 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Annual Report 2004-2005’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/annual-reports--
accounts/annual-reports/annual-report-2004-2005/proceedings-underway.aspx accessed 6 October 2011. 
231 Jessica de Grazia, ‘Review of the Serious Fraud Office. Final Report. June 2008’  
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-policies-and-publications/jessica-de-grazia-review-.aspx accessed 17 
March 2010. 
232 The Sunday Times, 1 February 2009. ‘She came, she saw, she scythed through SFO.’ 
233 A comparison is made between SFO and CPS which has conviction rates approaching DANY. Jessica de 
Grazia (n 231). 
234 US Attorney’s Office for Southern District New York established 1789. 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/officehistory.html accessed 6 August 2010. 
 Mail Fraud Statute, Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
Peter J. Henning,  ‘Maybe it should be called federal fraud: the changing nature of the mail fraud statute’, 36 
BCL Rev (1995) 435-477.   
235 £19.08m in 2013-2014.  
The Times 14 July 2014 ‘Lawyers land fraud agency with £19m bill, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article4146834.ece accessed 18 July 2014. 
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criminals who commit serious crime.’236 Essentially, the SFO was considered to be 
a costly and under-performing organisation. 
Tellingly, de Grazia’s key recommendations were not new for they had remarkable 
similarities with Roskill,237 calling for: improvement in personnel and judges; use of 
police powers; team ownership of cases, from cradle to grave; and bringing 
advocacy ‘in house’. de Grazia’s new point was the use of ‘plea bargains’. In the 
US, because of the high probability of conviction on indictment, most cases are 
dealt with by the defendant ‘pleading guilty at an early stage of the process in 
exchange for a reduced sentence.’ This conserves resources for cases which 
merit a full trial.238 ‘Plea bargaining’ utilises a concept of ‘Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements’ (DPA), a technique to ensure future compliance and performance, 
discussed in chapter six.239 
Following the review, the SFO promoted a new model of compliance by corporate 
entities with the criminal law ‘based in no small part on the US model of plea 
bargaining.’240 The SFO’s publication of Approach of the Serious Fraud Office to 
Dealing with Overseas Corruption, alongside the Attorney General’s Guidelines, 
made plain their willingness to negotiate on penalties to encourage self-reporting 
and co-operation with SFO investigators;241 the alternative being severe 
penalties.242 This guidance incentivised companies which self-reported their 
complicity in corruption, ‘with the emphasis being on the carrot and not the 
stick.'243 The attraction for a commercial organisation in self-reporting bribery to 
SFO is the prospect of a civil rather than criminal penalty which, apart from 
providing the opportunity to manage publicity ensures that the provisions of EU 
Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004,244 which prescribes exclusion from 
participation do not apply thus allowing continued participation in publicly funded 
projects. 
                                            
236 de Grazia (n 231) 10. 
237 Fraud Trials Committee Report (HMSO 1986) (hereinafter Roskill). 
238 de Grazia (n 231) 10. 
239 Discussed in chapter 6.2.2. 
240 Eoin O’Shea, Nicola McLeod & Alex Beal, ‘Regulatory: Back to the drawing board’ (2010) 160 NLJ 759. 
241 SFO is the reporting point for overseas corruption. There are no other requirements to report fraud to SFO. 
Attorney General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions in cases of Serious or Complex Fraud  
Attorney General, ‘Guidelines’ 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/Publications/Documents/AG%27s%20Guidelines%20on%20Plea%20Discu
ssions%20in%20Cases%20of%20Serious%20or%20Complex%20Fraud.pdf  accessed 15 February 2011. 
242 O’Shea, McLeod and Beal (n 240) 759. 
243 David Corker, 'Time for a serious (SFO) rethink' (2010) 160 NLJ 7420.  
244 Directive 2004/17/EC.  




This policy 'made a number of big assumptions novel to UK prosecutors but 
common to (...) [DoJ] practice.'245 To encourage self-reporting, lenient penalties 
would amount to civil fines and where prosecution is necessary, then the SFO and 
defendant company would determine the overall sanction.246 In US, such 
agreements are widely used and 'a policy of judicial acquiescence or self-restraint 
prevails.' 247  
The SFO is the lead agency for prosecution of cases of bribery and corruption248 
where the BA2010 redefines the UK approach to bribery and corruption for which, 
historically, there have been few cases taken to trial.249 This continued to be the 
case after the de Grazia review. However, in anticipating the future course of 
enforcement of the BA2010, it is instructive to consider how the SFO performed in 
a number of higher profile cases where it was employing the existing legal 
remedies.250 In Mabey & Johnson, a plea bargain resulted in a fine of £6.6m for 
paying €1m bribes through middlemen, together with two executives receiving 
custodial sentences.251 This was the first conviction in UK of a company for 
overseas corruption252 and for breaking Iraq sanctions.253 Balfour Beatty paid 
£2.25m the SFO the first Civil Recovery Order (CRO) relating to ‘payment 
irregularities’ on an Egyptian contract;254 and AMEC also agreed a £4.9m CRO 
                                            
245 Corker (n 243) 7420.  
246 Corker (n 243) 7420. 
247 Corker (n 243) 7420. 
248 Although there is overlap with FSA and City of London Police. See Chapter 6. 
249 Aaronberg and Higgins (n 56) 5,6-9.  40 cases between 2001-2005. 
250 The SFO has instituted proceedings in a number of cases, under existing law: 
‘Alstom Network UK Ltd, (…) has been charged with three offences of corruption contrary to section 1 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, as well as three offences of Conspiracy to Corrupt contrary to section 1 of 
the Criminal Law Act 1977.’ Serious Fraud Office, ‘Criminal charges against Alstom in the UK’ 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/criminal-charges-against-alstom-
in-the-uk.aspx accessed 31 August 2014. 
‘Smith & Ouzman Limited, two of its directors, an employee and one agent have been charged by the Serious 
Fraud Office with offences of corruptly agreeing to make payments totaling nearly half a million pounds, 
contrary to section 1 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  It is alleged that these payments were used to 
influence the award of business contracts to the company.’ Serious Fraud Office, ‘Printing company corruption 
charges’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2013/printing-company-
corruption-charges.aspx accessed 31 August 2014. 
251 ‘Two former directors and a sales manager of engineering firm Mabey & Johnson Ltd have been sentenced 
today for providing kickbacks to the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. Charles Forsyth, David Mabey and 
Richard Gledhill inflated the contract price for the supply of steel bridges and disguised illegal payments that 
were channelled through Jordanian banks.’  
The fine included compensation to Ghana, Jamaica and Iraq, confiscation and legal costs. 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Mabey & Johnson Ltd: Former executives jailed for helping finance Saddam Hussein's 
government’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2011/mabey--johnson-
ltd-former-executives-jailed-for-helping-finance-saddam-hussein's-government.aspx accessed 31 August 
2014. 
252 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s 1, after amendment by Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
253 'First UK company convicted for overseas corruption' Company Lawyer, ‘Case Comment’ (2010) 31(1) 
Comp Law 16. 
254 ‘The Serious Fraud Office has today deployed for the first time new powers made available to it as from 
April 2008. These powers include civil recovery under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, under which the SFO 
can recover property obtained by unlawful conduct. These provisions do not require a specific offence to be 
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relating to a South Korean contract for a Companies Act failure to keep accounting 
records.255 These cases evidence a change in prosecution with a first prosecution 
for overseas corruption, first CRO and first conviction under Companies Act with 
CRO. 
5.3.2 Other Regulatory Agencies 
Although the SFO has the ‘lead agency’ role, other authorities are involved in 
policing the area which can give rise to issues of overlapping responsibilities, 
leading to confusion over reporting and liability to differing sanctions. Whereas the 
FSA had four equal objectives, one being ‘the reduction of financial crime’,256 the 
FCA has ‘a single overarching strategic objective to ensure that markets function 
well’, as discussed in chapter six.257 Financial crime includes fraud or dishonesty, 
which the FCA interpret to include bribery and corruption.258 The FCA has another 
objective, which is impacted by allegations of bribery and corruption, that of 
maintaining market integrity259 on the basis that ‘because bribery and corruption 
distort natural competition’ this could ‘affect the UK’s reputation, making it a less 
attractive place for firms to conduct insurance or other business.’260 The FCA is 
careful to clarify that it ‘does not enforce or give guidance on the BA2010’,261 
nevertheless it does regulate bribery and corruption.262  The FCA confirms that 
                                                                                                                                    
established against any particular company or individual, merely that the property sought is the proceeds of 
unlawful conduct.’  
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Serious Fraud Office successfully obtains first ever Civil Recovery Order involving 
major plc’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2008/balfour-beatty-
plc.aspx accessed 31 August 2014. 
255 Companies Act 1965, s 221. 
'Legislative Comment: The United Kingdom Bribery Bill' (2010) 26(2) Const L J 146-152. 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘SFO obtains Civil Recovery Order against AMEC plc’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2009/sfo-obtains-civil-recovery-order-against-amec-plc.aspx 
accessed 31 August 2014. 
256 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 6. 
257 Chapter 6.2.1. 
HM Treasury. ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation to the Financial 
Conduct Authority’. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221913/consult_transferring_co
nsumer_credit_regulation_to_fca.pdf accessed 5 March 2014. 
258 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-Bribery and Corruption’ 33. 
http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/protecting/financial-crime/anti-bribery-and-corruption accessed 29 
September 2014. 
259 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘The FCA’s approach to advancing its objectives’ 25. 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/fca-approach-advancing-objectives.pdf accessed 29 September 2014. 
260 Financial Services Authority, ‘Anti-bribery and corruption in commercial insurance broking Reducing the 
risk of illicit payments or inducements to third parties.’ 6. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/anti_bribery.pdf accessed 
12 December 2011. 
261 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-Bribery and Corruption’ (n 258). 
262 ‘Corruption and bribery are criminal offences under current UK legislation and the Bribery Act 2010, which 
came into force on 1 July 2011. Authorised firms have additional, regulatory, obligations to put in place and 
maintain policies and processes to prevent corruption and bribery and to conduct their business with integrity. 
These are set out in SYSC 3.2.6R/SYSC 6.1.1R and Principle 1 of our Principles for Businesses (PRIN 
2.1.1R).’ Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-Bribery and Corruption’ http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-
regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/systems/anti-bribery accessed 7 April 2014. 
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enforcement action is in the realm of the SFO and guidance on the ‘adequate 
procedures’ defence to BA2010 s.7 offence of ‘failure to prevent bribery’ is within 
the MOJ’s purview.263 
The regulator ventilated its concerns, about the propensity of insurance companies 
to make illicit payments or inducements in order to obtain or retain business.264 In 
two significant cases, the FSA fined major insurance companies for failings in their 
anti-bribery and corruption systems and controls. For example, in 2009, AON was 
fined £5.25m for failing to ‘properly assess the risks involved in its dealings with 
overseas firms and individuals (…) and failed to implement effective controls to 
mitigate those risks.’265  Furthermore, Willis, was fined £6.895m in 2011 for similar 
issues and failure to record ‘an adequate commercial rational’ for the payments to 
high risk jurisdictions such as Egypt and Russia.’266 In both cases, as a result of 
both firms’ ‘weak control environment’, suspicious payments were made 
amounting to approximately US$7m and £27m respectively.267 It is clear from 
these cases that the regulator enjoys the flexibility of using discretion over 
sanctions, which is not the norm for the SFO. Moreover, the regulator’s credible 
deterrence strategy provides the opportunity to levy a fine in an ‘out of court’ 
process and gain publicity for its decisions,268 whereas the SFO has to prosecute 
with potential adverse publicity if unsuccessful. 
Another agency is the City of London Police (COLP) ‘Overseas Anti-Corruption 
Unit’,269 whose role is to investigate foreign bribery by UK business and 
nationals.270 It operates jointly with SFO on some cases which demonstrates an 
                                            
263 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Policy Statement 11/15. Financial Crime: a guide for firms.’  23-24. 
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269Ministry of Justice, ‘COMBATING OVERSEAS CORRUPTION: UK ACTION PLAN FOR 2007/08 – 
INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT Investigating and prosecuting bribery overseas.’  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/uk-action-plan-corruption-2007-8.pdf accessed 26 August 2011. 
270 ‘Since the creation of the unit in 2006 over 155 case of corruption or bribery have commenced with over 
115 suspects under investigation, leading to the interview and arrest of 80 individuals, the charging of 28 
suspects and 1 corporate entity.’ 
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overlap with the SFO. COLP have charged a London solicitor and two Dutch 
businessmen with ‘conspiracy to corrupt, conspiring to money launder and 
fraudulent trading in relation to alleged contract manipulation in a UN project to 
supply HIV and malaria drugs to [The Congo] one of the world's poorest 
countries.’271 However worthy COLP endeavours, the presence of another agency 
represents further confusion for SFO. 
5.3.3 Bribery and Corruption Enforcement 
It is the SFO’s cases against BAE, Dougall and Innospec which have proved to be 
problematic. The most ‘high profile’ case was BAE, a defence equipment supplier 
to UK and US governments and, in this case, to Saudi Arabia, a key ally in the 
fight against international terrorism. BAE was accused of corruption in its dealing 
with Saudi Arabia and since BAE is a UK based company, the SFO investigated. 
In addition to the ‘high octane’ nature of the arms sales sector in general, the 
SFO’s reputation was severely dented by the forced abandonment of its 
investigations into BAE Systems plc’s sale of the Eurofighter jet aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia, the Al Yamamah contract.  In the Al Yamamah  case,272 the SFO 
considered that bribery may have been involved by BAE being awarded highly 
lucrative contracts and they commenced  investigations. Saudi Arabia did not 
welcome this intervention and put pressure on the UK Government for the 
investigation to cease, citing damage to future commercial interests as well as a 
fracturing of their relationship to counter the ‘War on Terror.' Ultimately, the SFO 
discontinued the investigation: an action which was then subject to judicial review 
and which the House of Lords concluded was within his discretion.273 The SFO’s 
decision ‘resulted in widespread anger and indignation throughout the global anti-
corruption community.’274 
This case encapsulates the issues facing prosecutors; namely that commercial 
interests may ‘over-ride’ the strict rule of law. Although the Al Yamamah case 
predates the BA2010, it is unlikely to change the outcome because the SFO 
continues to have discretion to act. In this case, the SFO took a ‘balanced view’ 
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which naturally offends purists, offering such epithets as ‘shameless capitulation of 
the rule of law’, shameless ‘selling-out of principles’ and evidencing the ‘murky 
nature’ of the arms business.275 Of course, this is an unusual case but it highlights 
the ‘real’ issues faced in international commerce, when the SFO is superintended 
by the Attorney General, a government minister, who has to embrace political 
considerations.276 
Enforcement of the BA2010 is a key area and the paucity of prosecutions under 
previous legislation has already been noted.277 The SFO has been criticised for its 
handling of cases, with adverse comments on timeliness and cost-
effectiveness.278 As a response and in an endeavour to emulate the successful 
outcomes achieved by US authorities, the SFO have sought to use other methods, 
which obviate the need for trials, such as CROs.279 The SFO may say that it is 
pure coincidence that since 2009, when de Grazia reported, it has changed its 
approach to adopt different methods to achieve the aims of working on more 
cases a year and delivering outcomes faster at a reduced cost.280 To do this, the 
SFO has introduced two different approaches: self-referral and ‘plea bargaining’. 
Historically, one third of SFO’s work related to overseas corruption,281 and to deal 
with this, the SFO published its ‘Approach of the Serious Fraud Office to dealing 
with overseas corruption’,282 which highlighted the benefits to be obtained from 
self reporting. The attraction offered ‘to the corporate will be the prospect (in 
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appropriate cases) of a civil rather than a criminal outcome as well as the 
opportunity to manage, with us, the issues and any publicity proactively.’283  
In 2011, the SFO reported M W Kellogg Limited’s (MWKL) self referral because of 
corruption by its US parent’s joint venture company in Nigeria from which MWKL 
was due a dividend of  £7m.284 The parent company had been investigated and 
settled with the DoJ/SEC in 2009.285 The SFO obtained a CRO for the dividend 
and costs under POCA2002, without a criminal prosecution.286 In a clear invitation 
to others, the SFO commented that they: 
will continue to encourage companies to engage with us over issues of 
bribery and corruption in the expectation of being treated fairly. In cases such 
as this a prosecution is not appropriate. Our goal is to prevent bribery and 
corruption or remove any of the benefits generated by such activities.  This 
case demonstrates the range of tools we are prepared to use.287 
This philosophy is further demonstrated in relation to two publishers, MacMillan 
Publishers (MacMillan) and Oxford University Press (OUP). In MacMillan, an agent 
attempted to bribe officials in Sudan which MacMillan reported to SFO; OUP 
discovered tendering irregularities, investigated and self-reported. The similarities 
of the cases are that both involved supply of educational material to African 
countries, funded by the WB. 288 The issue in MacMillan was: 
The [educational] materials were supplied by publishers, often following the 
issuing of a public tender by the national government of a country [Rwanda, 
Uganda and Zambia] (…) which were susceptible to improper relationships 
being formed and corruption taking place. It was impossible to be sure that 
the awards of tenders to the Company in the three jurisdictions were not 
accompanied by a corrupt relationship.289 
                                            
283 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Approach of the SFO to dealing with Overseas Corruption’ (n 282) 1. 
284 Serious Fraud Office,’ M W Kellogg to pay £7m in SFO High Court action’ 16 February 2011. 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2011/mw-kellogg-ltd-to-pay-£7-million-
in-sfo-high-court-action.aspx accessed 18 April 2011. 
285 Department of Justice, ‘Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to 
Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine’ http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kellogg-brown-root-llc-pleads-guilty-foreign-
bribery-charges-and-agrees-pay-402-million accessed 8 November 2014. 
286 Serious Fraud Office, ‘M W Kellogg to pay £7m in SFO High Court action’ (n 284). 
287 Serious Fraud Office, ‘M W Kellogg to pay £7m in SFO High Court action’ (n 284). 
288 World Bank, ‘The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) aims to reduce poverty in 
middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, 
guarantees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory services. Established in 1944 as the 
original institution of the World Bank Group, IBRD is structured like a cooperative that is owned and operated 
for the benefit of its 188 member countries.’ 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTIBRD/0,,menuPK:3046081~pagePK:6416
8427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3046012,00.html accessed 8 January 2013. 
289 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Action on Macmillan Publishers Limited’ 22 July 2011. http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-




MacMillan agreed to pay £11.3m to SFO, representing the estimated earnings,  
which was taken under POCA2002, and barred from tendering for WB contracts 
for three years. 
OUP reported concerns relating to its subsidiaries in Kenya and Tanzania. OUP 
reached agreement with SFO to disgorge its gross profits on the contracts of 
£1.9m as a civil recovery under POCA2002 and volunteered to ‘contribute £2m to 
not-for-profit organisations for teacher training and other educational purposes in 
sub-Saharan Africa.’290 The SFO explained its reasoning for a CRO instead of 
prosecution as the difficulties a prosecution would face together with giving credit 
for the OUP self-referral. The SFO explained that it had ‘previously been subject to 
criticism in relation to the transparency of the processes and proceedings in civil 
recovery matters. As a result the Consent Order and Claim (…) have been made 
public.’291 Furthermore, the SFO explained that it would itself benefit from the 
recovery: ‘[t]he funds will be utilised in accordance with the Asset Recovery 
Incentivisation Scheme which, for cases of civil recovery, result in the SFO 
receiving up to 50% of the value the monies remitted to the Home Office’.292 
With the same objective in mind of expeditiousness and cost-effectiveness, and in 
parallel with its policy to engage with corporate through self-referral, the SFO 
endeavoured to respond to exhortations to adopt a more modern, or transatlantic, 
approach.293 This entailed changing tack to negotiate outcomes with defendants in 
order to realise the advantages of cost savings and certainty, which has not been 
without difficulty. In two cases  the SFO ‘plea with defendants caused tensions 
with the judiciary. Firstly, in Innospec,294 the Court of Appeal criticised SFO for 
‘usurping’ the Judge’s authority by agreeing punishment.295 Secondly, in 
Dougall296 the Judge rejected SFO claims for leniency.297 Since these cases would 
appear to be part of a ‘programme (...) instituted to encourage whistleblowing by 
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city insiders, lawyers and accountants and to expand the SFO’s role in public anti-
fraud initiatives,’298 judicial antipathy is of clear concern. DPAs are discussed in 
chapter six and offer the opportunity for a commercial organisation to accept a 
financial penalty and terms and then be free from prosecution.299 
Innospec was charged by SFO with conspiracy to corrupt employees of an 
Indonesian state owned oil refinery.300  A global settlement, to include Iraqi Oil-for-
Food sanctions breaking charges brought by the DoJ, was agreed with a 
combination of guilty pleas resulting in fines in US of $14.1m and the UK of 
$12.7m.301 Court approval was thought to be a formality.302 The Courts, however, 
took an early opportunity to establish their primacy by appointing a senior judge to 
hear the case,303 who said ‘the SFO cannot enter into an agreement under the 
laws of England and Wales with an offender as to the penalty in respect of the 
offence charged.’304 This affirmed the principle that sentencing is for the judiciary 
alone.305 However, the judge recognised the exceptional nature of the case and 
approved the agreement because ‘implicitly, that it would be too difficult to unpick 
the settlement.’306 Thomas LJ said he would have imposed a higher fine, further 
criticising SFO for using civil remedies in serious bribery or corruption cases where 
criminal sanctions were appropriate.307  Although this was before DPAs became 
available, in 2014, it does demonstrate the difficulties faced when endeavouring to 
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translate procedures from other jurisdictions with different traditions and culture. 
Here, the judge said ‘[t]here can be no doubt that corruption of foreign government 
officials or foreign government ministers is at the top end of serious corporate 
offending both in terms of culpability and harm. It is deliberate and intentional 
wrongdoing.’308 
In R v Dougall, the SFO sought to agree a suspended 12 month prison sentence 
for Dougall for various reasons, including that he was ‘the “first co-operating 
defendant” in a major SFO corruption investigation.’309 Although doing so, the 
Court of Appeal yet again made clear that the power and responsibility of 
sentencing lies with the court, and the court alone.310 This might create difficulties 
when the SFO wishes to conclude a DPA since ‘it should not seek to make 
recommendations on sentencing.’311 Lord Judge CJ, used the opportunity to 
provide a reminder of the status of fraudsters, which are not some superior 
species of criminal: 
For all the respectable and reputable fronts that many fraudsters and corrupt 
businessmen may present, they are criminals. What is sometimes described 
as white collar crime or commercial crime taking the form of fraud and 
corruption in particular is crime. And it is not victimless: sometimes identified 
individuals are victims, and at others, unnamed, unknown individuals in the 
entire community are victims, and sometimes the community itself is the 
victim.312 
The Court of Appeal identified key features of fraud trials and difficulties posed 
which make a ‘deal’ with the criminal attractive and endeavoured to balance DPA 
discussions with objectivity. 313 Thus, the Judge sympathised with the task: 
So often however the criminal activities are buried under mountains of paper 
and myriads of figures so that the process of investigation, and ultimately any 
trial, requires huge resources and painstaking and sometimes protracted 
study, examination and analysis. All that is immensely frustrating.314 
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Lord Judge warned that, in fraud and corruption cases, the SFO should not believe 
that these are ‘more respectable than other forms of crime,’315 or that these 
criminals ‘should not be ordered to serve prison sentences because such 
sentences should be reserved for those they regard as common criminals.’316  
The Court’s stance leaves the SFO with a potential difficulty regarding BAE 
Systems.317 In 2010, SFO and DoJ agreed a ‘global’ settlement with BAE for 
£30m318 and $400m respectively.319  BAE agreed to plead guilty to various 
'relatively trivial' accounting offences,320 and the SFO dropped considerably more 
serious bribery charges regarding BAE’s ‘dealings in a number of countries, as 
well as at least one individual’,321 and explained it was ‘very pleased with the 
global outcome achieved collaboratively with the DoJ. This is a first and it 
brings a pragmatic end to a long-running and wide-ranging investigation.’322  
Whilst undoubtedly pragmatic, bearing in mind multilateral investigations and 
prosecutors with their differing approaches, the Court’s surprise attack on SFO is, 
as O’Shea, McLeod and Beal noted, a ‘reminder that in criminal proceedings, the 
stick is mightier than the carrot and the court is the ultimate arbiter.’323 
5.4 Fraud  
This chapter looks at the current fraud landscape in the UK where, despite new, 
simplified, legislation, fraud continues unabated. However, fraud is far from a new 
phenomenon and is estimated to cost UK £73bn a year.324 The NFA data brings 
into sharp focus the issue confronting UK fraud authorities, a mere eight years 
after enacting the FRA2006. Although accepting that hard facts are difficult to 
obtain, this estimate from NFA compares poorly with five years earlier from 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) of £13bn.325 In the last eighteen 
years, governments made significant structural changes to the regulation of 
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financial markets and firms with the advent of the FSA (now FCA).326 In terms of 
criminalisation, money laundering is a crime,327 as fraud continues to be under 
new definitions.328 In the 1980’s, concurrent with deregulation of financial services, 
which had the unfortunate side effect of greater opportunity for fraud,329 the newly 
created SFO,330 found itself overlapping with the regulator, an organisation with 
greater resources, because its funding model did not rely upon the public purse. 
5.4.1 UK Fraud Policy 
The importance of tackling fraud is illustrated not just by the financial numbers 
involved but the significant instances of fraud which caused the collapse of 
multinational corporations in the UK, including for example BCCI and Barings and 
in the US Madoff and Stanford.331  The 2008 financial crisis has focused attention 
on the risks in ‘Casino’ banking, evidenced by Kerviel332 and Adoboli.333  However, 
large as these cases may be, the threat which has overshadowed the global 
financial markets is mortgage fraud estimated to cost UK £1bn pa and in US 
$10bn by 2011.334 US Government statistics show an increase in mortgage fraud 
reports from 6,900 in 2003 to 93,500 in 2011 and the development of fresh types 
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of fraud. Whilst fraud at origination of a loan is the most common (62%), rescue 
refinancing amounts to 20%.335 
UK governments have commissioned various reports in the arena of fraud, the two 
most important being the Roskill Report and Fraud Review.336 The Fraud Review, 
was asked to ‘recommend ways of reducing fraud and the harm it does to 
society’,337 positions fraud as it ‘may be second only to class A drug trafficking as 
a source of harm from crime.’338  However, unlike drug crime, police forces are 
often reluctant to take reports of fraud and, even if they do, take little action as a 
result because fraud has not been seen as a national policing priority.339 This then 
set the first question to be considered: ‘what is the scale of the problem?’340 The 
lack of ability to answer the question, because data was not available, led the 
report to conclude that a body should be created to devise a strategic response: 
the NFA.341 The review also recommended the creation of the National Fraud 
Reporting Centre (NFRC) to provide a central point for receipt of reports of fraud, 
together with the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) which would analyse 
and assess fraud. To complete the organisational changes, COLP would become 
the national lead force, acting as a centre of excellence for fraud investigations 
and undertaking the more complex investigations. 
The second and third questions considered by the review were to determine the 
appropriate role of government in dealing with fraud and, how could resources be 
spent to maximise value for money across the system.342 The review noted the 
range of departments and agencies involved and the range of penalties and 
remedies they may deploy in the three areas of criminal, civil and regulatory. 
There were two specific recommendations: to increase the sentencing options 
available in the Crown Courts; and establishment of a specialised ‘financial court’. 
The increased sentencing powers included the ability to order compensation to all 
victims, not just those specified in a particular case and the ability to make specific 
orders relating to other advisors such as solicitors and accountants.  The ‘financial 
court’ proposal recognised the difficulties of trying fraud cases and proposed 
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deploying judges with experience of financial cases to longer, more complex, 
criminal trials: according to Coolican, ‘All matters could be resolved on the basis of 
a single unified set of evidence at one facts hearing with a variety of outcomes 
under criminal, civil and regulatory powers.’343 
The review considered sentencing and concluded that the maximum sentence for 
serious or repeated fraud should be increased from ten years to fourteen years, 
which would match money laundering penalties.344  However, the proposal which 
excited the most comment was ‘plea bargaining’.345 The review proposed a 
system for reduced sentences in return for a guilty plea and agreement to other 
sanctions.  The rationale for this being the benefits to be gained by reducing the 
length of trials and shortening investigations: 
Any solution should provide an opportunity for the prosecution and defence 
to enter into negotiations at an earlier stage than is currently possible, 
preferably pre-charge, at the point where the prosecuting authority is in a 
position to show the essential core of a case against an individual or 
individuals.346 
At that stage there was no formal system in the UK for ‘plea bargaining’.347 
Although, clearly, discussions do take place between prosecution and defence 
legal teams, these provide no certainty unlike the US model. Hanley observes that 
‘plea bargaining is as integral to the US legal system as fast-talking, sharp suited 
attorneys,’348 and ‘if you look at fraud alone, you will see some form of plea 
bargaining in approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of cases.’349  As was be 
seen when considering Roskill,350 its predecessor by 20 years, implementation of 
the Fraud Review recommendations was slow with the NFA and COLP measures 
being the only concrete achievements. 
Against this backdrop, it is clear that fraud is a significant and costly matter for 
government to tackle, as the NFA report: 
The threats created by fraudsters are serious and real. Serious and 
organised crime groups are behind much fraudulent activity across the world. 
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Funds generated by fraud are being used to support and expand other 
serious criminal activity such as people and drug trafficking. Fraud has also 
featured in terrorist cases both in the UK and abroad.351 
It has been argued that the UK’s fraud policy can be divided into three distinct 
parts – criminalisation, financial/law enforcement agencies and the reporting of 
suspected instances of fraud.352  This neatly positions the importance of the issues 
which this thesis examines. The ‘three distinct parts’ to tackling fraud more than 
suggests that when policies are made they are not fully integrated with each other. 
As will be seen, it is disappointing to note that although a generation ago, 
problems were identified by Roskill and a way forward recommended, the fraud 
policy has evolved rather in a haphazard form rather than being mapped. This 
thesis will, firstly, consider the legal definition of ‘fraud’; secondly, review the 
legislation and consider whether they can be effective; thirdly, the myriad of 
enforcement agencies, which are ripe for rationalisation; and, finally, the limited 
way in which fraud is reported. 
Fraud is difficult to define. Although the FRA2006 is relatively new, interestingly, it 
does not define ‘fraud’, merely stating that ‘[a] person is guilty of fraud if he is in 
breach of any of the sections listed’.353 Furthermore, there is no universal 
definition at common law.354 The COLP defines fraud as ‘a criminal deception 
committed by a person who acts in a false and deceitful way.’355 However, the 
SFO defines as 'abuse of position, or false representation, or prejudicing 
someone's rights for personal gain'.356 As will be seen, the FRA2006 is closer to 
the SFO definition and provides a clear criminal offence. 
In the financial crime arena, fraud was neglected until the establishment of the 
SFO357 and then, following a significant gestation period, the FRA2006. The 
FSA/FCA was in a different category because it is a regulator of the financial 
markets, rather than primarily a prosecutor.358 However, it has raised its profile 
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‘bringing criminal proceedings for conspiracy’, thus developing its role ‘as a 
specialist criminal prosecutor’.359  Criminalisation of fraud has evolved over time 
with the various Theft Acts which eventually became seen as being inadequate to 
deal with complex fraud cases. Indeed, the ‘troublesome technicalities’360 of the 
Theft Acts left prosecutors falling back on the common law charge of ‘conspiracy 
to defraud.’361 The FRA2006 has simplified the law by providing a new offence of 
‘fraud’ instead of a variety of the ineffective deception offences under the Theft 
Acts (1968-1996).362 The FRA2006 removed such crimes as ‘obtaining a 
pecuniary advantage’ and ‘procuring execution of a valuable security’ from the 
statute book. In practice, the range of deception offences created ‘a hazardous 
terrain for prosecutors’ which, consequently, encouraged reliance on ‘conspiracy 
to defraud’,363 a common law offence which: 
has been described in Parliament as ‘repellent’; and the Law Commission 
has proffered the opinion that it is ‘indefensible’ and ‘so wide that it offers little 
guidance on the difference between fraudulent and lawful conduct’ and has 
recommended its abolition.364 
In R v Eric Evans the court accepted a further observation from the Law 
Commission that ‘[i]n effect, conspiracy to defraud is a “general dishonesty 
offence”, subject to the irrational requirement of conspiracy.’365 That case, which 
was pursued by the SFO, concluded, interestingly, ‘that a conspiracy to defraud in 
which both the object and the means are lawful is unknown to the common law.’366 
This case endeavoured to use the charge of conspiracy to defraud, 
notwithstanding the availability of the FRA2006. 
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In the FRA2006, a person is guilty of fraud by: false representation (s.2); failing to 
disclose information (s.3); and abuse of position (s.4).367 Conviction on indictment 
carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment or an unlimited fine or 
both.368  Fraud by false representation369 occurs when ‘(a) it is untrue or 
misleading, and (b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or 
misleading.’370 Thus fraud requires dishonesty, and the intention ‘to make a gain 
for himself or another, or to cause loss to another or expose another to a risk of 
loss.’371 It is intention that is key: an actual gain or loss does not have to take 
place. Dishonesty is, again, not defined in the act but is defined in R v Ghosh372 
which sets a two-stage test: 
The first question is whether a defendant’s behaviour would be regarded as 
dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people. If 
answered positively, the second question is whether the defendant was 
aware that his conduct was dishonest and would be regarded as dishonest 
by reasonable and honest people.373 
By representation, the Act ‘means any representation of fact or law including a 
representation of [any person’s] state of mind.’374 It can be express or implied and 
could be written, spoken or posted on a website. For example, ‘dishonestly using a 
credit card, phishing on the internet or selling fake designer goods’.375 To cover 
‘chip and pin’ and similar transactions (and, perhaps, ‘future proof’ legislation 
against technological developments), there is a provision to ‘ensure that a fraud 
can be committed where a person makes a representation to a machine and a 
response can be produced without any need for human involvement.’376 
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Secondly, ‘fraud by failing to disclose information’,377 is where a person 
‘dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information which he is under a 
legal duty to disclose.’378 Again, there has to be an intention to cause gain or loss: 
Such a duty may derive from statute (such as provisions governing company 
prospectuses), from the fact that the transaction in question is one of the 
utmost good faith (such as a contract of insurance), from the express or 
implied terms of a contract, from the customer of a particular trade or market, 
or from the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties (such as 
that of agent and principal).379 
Examples might be the failure of a solicitor to share vital information with a client 
or non-disclosure of a medical condition when entering into a life insurance 
contract.380   
Thirdly, ‘fraud by abuse of position’,381 again dishonestly and with intent. This 
recognises situations where a person ‘occupies a position where he is expected to 
safeguard, or not act against, the financial interests of another person’382 and 
covers situations where his ‘conduct consisted of an omission rather than an 
act.’383 This would apply in circumstances of: employee and employer; director 
and company; professional and client; agent and principal; business partners; 
within a family; or in the context of voluntary work.384 Some examples would 
include: where someone acts for personal gain against the client’s interests; an 
employee of a software company who clones the company’s products; someone 
employed to care for an elderly person having access to bank accounts and taking 
funds for own use; and includes omissions such as not taking up a favourable 
contract to allow a rival company to do so.385 
The FRA2006 has other provisions (s.6 – s.8) which replace the quaint sounding 
crimes of ‘going equipped for stealing’ and ‘when not at his abode’386 with 
‘possession etc. of articles for use in frauds’387 which is a very far reaching 
provision. ‘A person is guilty of an offence if he has in his possession or under his 
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control any article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud.’388 As 
the COLP describes, ‘any article means anything anywhere’,389 and ‘includes any 
program or data held in electronic form.’390 The provision is constructed to bring 
across existing case law from the Theft Act 1968 where ‘it is enough to prove a 
general intention to use’.391 This provision brings computers and software 
programs into scope.392   
The next offence is ‘making or supplying articles for use in frauds, knowing that it 
is designed or adapted for use in a fraud.’393 This might, for example, include a 
device to cause an electricity meter to malfunction or a device to obtain satellite 
TV signal without payment.394 The first significant case, R v James McCormick,395 
was far removed from those prosaic examples. McCormack was convicted and 
sentenced to ten years imprisonment for selling fake explosives detectors to 
Iraq.396 
One provision retained is ‘conspiracy to defraud’ which the Law Commission 
wanted to abolish. It is retained because of serious practical concerns about the 
ability to prosecute multiple offences in the largest and most serious cases of fraud 
and acts as a failsafe to see how the new statutory offences worked in practice.397 
The new criminal offences are seen as being wide enough to meet current and 
future challenges, by being designed as ‘modern and flexible statutory offences of 
fraud’.398  However, the effectiveness of legislation is in the hands of prosecution 
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agencies which deploy them, principally the SFO and the FCA, which themselves 
are in the process of changing.399  
5.4.3 Reporting Fraud 
The UK does not have a legal requirement to report fraud per se. The NFA (now 
NCA) admitted that ‘not having a centralised body to co-ordinate fraud intelligence 
across the public and private sectors has made it easier for criminals to operate 
undetected and free to re-offend.’400 The minimal reporting regime and the lack of 
scope and consistency leave significant gaps in effectiveness. Notwithstanding the 
FRA2006 which repositioned the crime of fraud, there is no statutory obligation to 
report fraud as such, unlike money laundering and terrorist financing.  Thus it can 
be seen that fraud is only required to be reported if it is part of suspected money 
laundering or terrorist financing. The NCA and its offspring the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau, seem to rely on ‘best endeavours’ and ‘encouragement’ to 
report.401 The key statutory requirement to report fraud is POCA2002 (and 
Terrorism Act 2000):402 
Persons in the regulated sector are required to make a report in respect of 
information that comes to them (...) where they know or; where they suspect 
or; where they have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that a 
person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering or terrorist 
financing.403 
Consequently, it is quite plain that ‘if you have knowledge or suspicion that a 
money laundering offence is taking place then you must submit a SAR  to SOCA’ 
(now NCA).404 The submission of the SAR should be done in a timely manner, to 
allow NCA time to react. The form should include ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC), 
now also referred to as Customer Due Diligence (CDD),405 in addition to the 
grounds for suspicion and any known links to criminality. If a SAR is made before 
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a suspicious transaction is completed, NCA then have seven days to determine 
whether to give consent or whether to impose a 31 day moratorium to facilitate 
further enquiries. Penalties of completing a transaction or ‘tipping off’ are up to five 
years imprisonment and or a fine.406  This creates practical difficulties where, for 
example, a bank is required to process a transaction which being subject to a 
SAR, the bank is able neither to process the transaction nor explain why, because 
according to: 
POCA and the Terrorism Act each contains two separate offences of tipping 
off and prejudicing an investigation. The first offence relates to disclosing that 
an internal or external report has been made; the second relates to disclosing 
that an investigation is being contemplated or is being carried out.407  
K Limited v Nat West demonstrates the issues a bank faces. In this case, Natwest 
were suspicious of a receipt by K of monies from the Netherland Antilles and an 
instruction to transfer the monies the same day to a Swiss Bank. Because of their 
suspicions, Natwest reported to SOCA and refused to honour K’s instructions. K 
applied for an injunction requiring Natwest to explain its reasons. The CA stated 
that since it is unlawful under POCA2002 to honour the mandate, Natwest was not 
in breach of its contract with K. If the bank has suspicions (not defined) then the 
customer has no redress during the 31 day moratorium.408 This does, however, 
illustrate a practical problem for bankers: what can they say to their customer 
when they do not comply with their customers’ mandate? To make the payment 
when suspicions have been raised is to facilitate money laundering; to explain the 
reasons for non-payment to the customer is ‘tipping off’, with penalties of up to 
fourteen years imprisonment for the former and five years for the latter and / or a 
fine;409 or, being in the uncomfortable position of ‘stone-walling’ the customer by 
saying it is not in a position to make the payment and leaving the customer to 
reach his own conclusion as to the underlying reasons. 
There is also a duty to report ‘acquisitive’ crime (where items are stolen or 
acquired fraudulently (ie theft, burglary, vehicle crime and fraud.).410  The Police 
have a duty to record the crime under ‘Home Office Counting Rules For Recorded 
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Crime.’411  The FCA imposes obligations on Regulated firms: Principle 11  -  ‘A 
firm must deal with its regulators in an open and co-operative way, and must tell 
the FCA promptly anything relating to the firm of which the FCA would reasonably 
expect prompt notice.’412 This requires the firm, taking a ‘risk-based approach’ to 
establish Systems and Controls, policies and procedures ‘that enable it to identify, 
assess, monitor and manage money laundering risk.’ Interestingly, ‘Financial 
Crime’ is only mentioned in the heading, since money laundering is the focus.413 
A further area of reporting relates to higher risk situations which includes any high 
risk customers, which encompasses ‘Politically Exposed Persons’ (PEPs). PEPs 
‘are individuals whose prominent position in public life may make them vulnerable 
to corruption’;414 for example, individuals entrusted with prominent public 
functions415, such as Heads of State or Government with the definition extending 
to immediate family members and close associates.416 The clear danger is that 
these persons might be corrupt and involved in money laundering through the UK 
banking system. A significant case was that of General Sani Abacha, the former 
President of Nigeria, where, the regulator identified 42 personal and corporate 
account relationships linked to Abacha family members and close associates in 
the UK. These accounts were held at 23 banks which included UK banks and 
branches of banks from both inside and outside the European Union and had a 
turnover amounting to US$1.3 billion for the four years to 2000.417 For PEPs, 
MLR2007 require ‘Enhanced Customer Due Diligence and Monitoring,418 for which 
there are reporting obligations to FCA (but the onus is on the firm to report in line 
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with its ‘risk based approach’).419 In 2011, the regulator issued a reminder to 
regulated firms of ‘continuing need for vigilance and robust systems and controls’ 
because of political developments in the Middle East.420 
This analysis shows that fraud reporting in the UK is limited to areas where there 
is a connection to money laundering or terrorism financing and / or where a party 
involved is regulated by the FCA. Thus, there can be overlap between reporting to 
NCA and the FCA. Outside those reporting structures, there is no general 
reporting requirement which has the effect that other fraud information is not 
captured. As a result, anti-fraud agencies and government work in the dark on the 
basis of incomplete information. By contrast, in the US, FinCEN requires full 
reporting.421 It is a single reporting centre and, significantly, part of US Department 
of the Treasury. In sum, the lack of a statutory co-ordinated reporting regime in the 
UK has the twin effect of causing a significant administrative burden, yet, allowing 
much fraud activity to go unreported and consequently not pursued. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The UK economic crime regime depends upon national culture (sometimes with 
international exhortation) what are, and what are not, acceptable practices and 
then putting in place legislation to criminalise unacceptable conduct together with 
enforcement agencies. The previous chapter considered the historic landscape to 
UK economic crime and chapter six will consider critique the current institutions 
which apply the criminal legislation. 
This chapter has considered the relatively new bribery legislation which has yet to 
see a significant case come to trial and where the judicial process would create 
precedent and set a benchmark. Although the SFO has cases in train, it is still 
relying upon previous, century old, legislation and conspiracy to corrupt. The 
BA2010 includes a corporate offence and a mechanism providing a complete 
defence, for which testing at trial would provide confirmation of their effectiveness: 
at present how a court would react is pure conjecture. 
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In the fraud arena, where the annual UK fraud loss is estimated at £73bn,422 
legislation is slightly more mature and has been well deployed. This has enabled 
FRA2006 to be tested in court as in R v Meeson423 where the challenge was not 
about the law itself but sentencing where the provisions of FRA2006 are seen in 
light of Sentencing Council Guidelines.424 However, with general public perception 
that fraud is a ‘victimless crime’,425 the Sentencing Council issued new sentencing 
guidelines which: 
places victim impact at the centre of considerations of what sentence the 
offender should get. This may mean higher sentences for some offenders 
compared to the current guideline, particularly where the financial loss is 
relatively small but the impact on the victim is high.426 
This suggests that FRA2006 is working well and based on experience and a move 
to be victim centred and where gaps in legislation have not been identified upon 
appeal. 
There are two further aspects: reporting fraud; and a corporate offence. The 
quantum of fraud is unknown with any degree of accuracy because there is no 
legal requirement to report fraud, unless it is money laundering or terrorism 
related. The Government should act to make reporting of fraud mandatory and the 
agency to whom reports should be made would logically be NCA,427 because it 
already is the reporting centre for SARs and encompassing Action Fraud (recently 
realigned to COLP). There is already a template for this manner of reporting 
because it is employed in the US by FinCEN. The adoption of stringent reporting 
with ‘teeth’ for non-compliance would enable better direction of scarce resources. 
The final element, which is discussed in chapters six and nine428 is an amendment 
to the BA2010 in which the corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery is 
augmented by a new offence of failure to prevent all acts of financial crime.429 The 
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Chapter 6: The United Kingdom’s Economic Crime Institutions 
The previous chapters have explored the historical background to the creation of 
the current institutions charged with managing the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
response to economic crime. Chapter four concluded that governments of differing 
political hues had struggled to put in place an effective regime to meet those 
objectives. Chapter five showed that the UK had put in place new legislation to 
criminalise fraud and bribery.1 In chronological terms, both these chapters dealt 
with events prior to the change of UK government in 2010. The shape of the 
current UK anti-economic crime landscape is determined by the Coalition 
government and informed by the most recent financial crisis,2 and ‘has exposed 
the weaknesses of “light touch regulation” and “principles-based” regulation, which 
characterised the UK financial system in the pre-crisis’3 era, under the previous 
Labour government.   The Coalition government believed that the tripartite 
regulatory system had failed,4 and should be reformed because ‘[p]erhaps the 
most obvious failing of the UK system is the fact that no single institution has the 
responsibility, authority or powers to monitor the system as a whole, identify 
potentially destabilising trends, and respond to them with concerted action.’5 This 
conclusion led the Coalition government to propose reforms, as HM Treasury 
(HMT) stated ‘[t]his is a problem (…) referred to as “underlap”: a phenomenon 
whereby macro-prudential risk analysis and mitigation fell between the gaps in the 
UK regulatory system.’6 An early example of this is the criticism of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and Bank of England (BoE) in relation to the Northern 
Rock collapse and its nationalisation. Campbell stated ‘[i]t appears that there was 
a lack of co-ordination and information sharing between these two bodies and this 
indicates a weakness in the tripartite system’.7 The Coalition government adopted 
                                            
1 Fraud Act 2006, Bribery Act 2010. 
2 Nicholas Ryder, The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime – the Perfect Storm (Edward Elgar 2014) 179. 
3 Iain MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 11 
EBOR 483,484. 
4 House of Commons Library, ‘Financial services Bill – Research paper 12/08’ 11. 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP12-8/financial-services-bill-bill-278-of-201012 accessed 6 
December 2013. 
5 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: judgment, focus and stability’ Cm 7874 July 2010 3. 
6 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
7 Andrew Campbell, ‘The run on the Rock and its consequences’ (2008) 9(2) JBR 61, 62. 
‘The FSA was responsible for the authorisation, prudential supervision and conduct regulation of authorised 
firms. The Bank was charged with maintaining the stability of the monetary system and the financial system. 





a new regulatory structure, the twin peaks model which, in relation to economic 
crime, saw the ‘single monolithic financial regulator’,8 the FSA, replaced by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).9 The apprehension over the financial crisis 
was exacerbated by what the government characterised as ‘the most high profile 
current issue in the United Kingdom,’10 namely the alleged manipulation of the 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR).11  
The importance of the financial services sector in the UK cannot be understated.12 
MacNeil observes that: 
Another consideration is the disproportionately large scale of the financial 
sector (…) in the UK by comparison with many other countries. The reliance 
on financial services inevitably imposes political constraints on the extent to 
which tighter regulation leading to contraction and job losses can be 
countenanced.13 
This is reflected in political attitudes as demonstrated during the financial crisis, 
David Cameron, then leader of the opposition, called for a day of reckoning’ for 
‘those suspected of financial wrongdoing’ to be held to account.14 The context was 
related to the financial services sector and it is instructive for the analysis of what 
followed when he stated : 
In the good times, some people working in the financial services industry paid 
themselves vast financial rewards - salaries and bonuses beyond the 
comprehension of most of us. Now when it’s all gone wrong, they have been 
bailed out by the taxpayer. (…) I say it is fair and reasonable that those 
responsible are held to account for their behaviour and (…) there is not one 
rule for the rich and a different rule for everybody else. (…) The [Regulator] 
and the SFO should be following up every lead, investigating every suspect 
transaction. And the government should be urging them on, because we 
                                                                                                                                    
operation in the event of a financial crisis. Together this new regulatory architecture was known as the 
“ tripartite” system.’ (2012) 95 (Apr) C O B 1,3-4. 
8 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
9 The other ‘twin peak’ is the Prudential Regulation Authority. 
House of Commons Library (n 4) 12.  
10 Attorney General’s Office, ‘Fighting economic crime in the modern world’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/fighting-economic-crime-in-the-modern-world accessed 19 
February 2014. 
11 Attorney General’s Office, ‘Fighting economic crime in the modern world’ (n 10). 
12 ‘Financial services 9.6% share of UK GDP is higher than other major economies.’ 
The City UK, ‘Economic Contribution of UK Financial and Professional Services 2012’ 
http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/economic-contribution-of-uk-financial-and-
professional-services-2012/ accessed 6 December 2013. 
13 Iain MacNeil (n 3) 483, 484. 
14 BBC, ‘Cameron urges 'day of reckoning' 15 December 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7783350.stm 




need to make it one hundred per cent clear: those who break the law should 
face prosecution.15 
This is an important statement of intent, because when David Cameron became 
Prime Minister, ‘the day of reckoning’ speech was translated into the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s ‘serious about white collar crime.’16 In his first Mansion House 
speech George Osborne said: 
We take white collar crime as seriously as other crime and we are 
determined to simplify the confusing and overlapping responsibilities in this 
area in order to improve detection and enforcement.17 
In addition to announcing the abolition of the ‘tripartite’ regulatory regime and the 
FSA, in the field of economic crime he said: 
I can also confirm that we will fulfil the commitment in the coalition agreement 
to create a single agency to take on the work of tackling serious economic 
crime that is currently dispersed across a number of Government 
departments and agencies.18 
Thus, the high level commitment to reform was a positive step and the Coalition 
government was correct in proposing such reforms. 
This chapter critically examines the performance of the economic crime institutions 
since May 2010 and considers whether the institutions have met their set 
objectives.19  The Coalition government announced it would ‘create a single 
agency to take on the work of tackling serious economic crime.’20  Cleary, there 
was political momentum, with the Chancellor responding to the economic 
environment with statements such as ‘many of those who helped trigger the 
financial crisis, who should have been prosecuted, have escaped justice’.21 The 
                                            
15 Conservative Home, ‘Cameron: We won't treat the richest any differently from the poorest’ 15 December 
2008, http://conservativehome.blogs.com/torydiary/2008/12/cameron-we-wont.html accessed 18 December 
2013. 
16 HM Treasury, ‘Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House’, June 16 2010, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm, 
accessed 18 December 2013. 
17 HM Treasury, ‘Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner’ (n 16). 
18 HM Treasury, ‘Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner’ (n 16). 
19 Including: FSA, SFO, OFT 
20 Cabinet Office, ‘The Coalition: our programme for government‘ 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf accessed 26 June 2010 
21 Mr Osborne had in his sights fraud, bribery, miss-selling of mortgages and pensions and pyramid schemes, 
such as Madoff. ‘Currently, economic crime is policed and prosecuted by a bewildering number of agencies 
and government departments – including the Serious Fraud Office, Financial Services Authority, Fraud 
Prosecution Service, Revenue & Customs, Office of Fair Trading, Trading Standards Department, Serious 





government’s ambition was to target economic crime,22 recognising that the 
existing multiplicity of disparate agencies led to conflicting priorities and ineffective 
outcomes.23 Thus, the creation of an ECA should have been welcomed. The 
Policy Exchange24  argued that fraud detection, investigation and prosecution 
would be better served by a unified approach mandated to tackle economic 
crime.25  The principal agencies highlighted being: FCA and SFO. This chapter will 
discuss how the objectives set out in the coalition agreement have been met, by 
examining the variety of institutions which have a role to play in management of 
economic crime, grouped into: primary regulators, secondary regulators and law 
enforcement agencies, and trade associations.  
6.1 Primary Regulators 
The primary regulators in the UK are the government departments supported by 
‘single entities to tackle specific types of financial crime.’26 The relevant 
departments are: HMT, Home Office, and the BoE.  
6.1.1 H M Treasury 
HMT ‘is the government’s economic and finance ministry, maintaining control over 
public spending, setting the direction of the UK’s economic policy and working to 
achieve strong and sustainable economic growth.’27 In relation to economic crime, 
it is responsible for anti-money laundering,28 anti-terrorism and financial 
sanctions,29  ‘financial services policy: including (…) financial services regulation, 
                                                                                                                                    
Economic Crime Agency, Mr Osborne said, would take over all of their work, saving the taxpayer large sums 
of money in the process.’  
James Chapman, Daily Mail ‘George Osborne: I’ll nail robbers in pinstripes and prosecute rogue banks’ 24 
April 2010 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1268416/George-Osborne-Ill-nail-robbers-pinstripes-
prosecute-rogue-banks.html# accessed 27 July 2010. 
For a more detailed discussion, see Ryder, The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime’ (n 2) 43, 81. 
22 including fraud, insider dealing, bribery, corruption and money laundering. 
23 See Chapter 6.2.2. As an example, the LIBOR scandal, which in late 2014 has still to come to trial, has 
shown 13 individuals charged with ‘conspiracy to defraud’ rather than criminalized by existing statutes. 
24 Jonathan Fisher and Ted Sumpster,  ‘Fighting Fraud and Financial Crime’.  
Research Note March 2010 12. 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/fighting%20fraud%20and%20financial%20crime%20-
%20mar%2010.pdf accessed 3 March 2014. 
25 Fisher and Sumpster (n 24) 12. 
26 Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century, (Edward Elgar  2010).238. 
27 HM Treasury, ‘What we do’, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/about accessed 3 
March 2014. 
28 Nicholas Ryder, ‘Money Laundering – an endless cycle (Routledge 2012) 79. 
29 H M Treasury, ‘Financial sanctions: Regime-specific lists and release’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases 




financial stability, and ensuring competitiveness in the City’ of London (City).30  
HMT is the key driver of financial regulation, explaining its mission as: ‘the 
Government is committed to introducing a new approach to financial regulation – 
one which is based on clarity of focus and responsibility, and which places the 
judgement of expert supervisors at the heart of regulation.’31 HMT asserts that 
‘responsibility for the overall regulatory framework, and the protection of the public 
finances remains with HMT and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.’32  
The first step taken by the government was to make the role of the BoE pivotal by 
forming ‘a new macro- prudential body, the Financial Policy Committee, and a new 
micro-prudential supervisor, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).’33  
Secondly, ‘[r]esponsibility for conduct of business will sit with the new FCA, with 
the mandate and tools to be a proactive force for enabling the right outcomes for 
consumers and market participants, including through the promotion of 
competition.’34 These new bodies were described as ‘regulatory centres of 
excellence’, but there is clear overlap.35 The PRA and FCA are discussed below. 
6.1.2 Home Office 
The Home Office leads the government response to ‘immigration and passports, 
drugs policy, crime policy and counter-terrorism and works to ensure visible, 
responsive and accountable policing in the UK.’36 Of particular relevance to 
economic crime, the Home Office is responsible for the National Crime Agency 
(NCA), which gives this organisation a greater political dimension because the 
Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament for a department with a broad 
spectrum of responsibilities.37 The NCA includes an Economic Crime Command 
                                            
30 H M Treasury, ‘What we do’ (n 30). 
31 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
32 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
33 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
34 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
35 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
36 Home Office, ‘What we do’ https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office/about accessed 1 
March 2014. 
37 ‘working on the problems caused by illegal drug use; shaping the alcohol strategy, policy and licensing 
conditions; keeping the United Kingdom safe from the threat of terrorism; reducing and preventing crime, and 
ensuring people feel safe in their homes and communities; securing the UK border and controlling 
immigration; considering applications to enter and stay in the UK; issuing passports and visas; supporting 
visible, responsible and accountable policing by empowering the public and freeing up the police to fight 




(ECC) which straddles fraud bribery and corruption (the subject of this thesis) and 
organised crime.38 Clearly, the ECC name is an unhelpful confusion. 
6.1.3 Bank of England 
The Coalition government has positioned the BoE at the heart of ensuring financial 
stability for the UK by giving it prime responsibility for management of the 
economy.39 In relation to economic crime and regulation, the PRA has a role 
because it ‘will make judgments about the safety and soundness of individual 
firms, and will take supervisory and regulatory action to ensure that firms take 
necessary steps.’40 This appears to be a more formal approach than the 
‘Governor’s eyebrows.’41 
6.1.3.1 Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
The PRA, established by Financial Services Act 2012,42 is a subsidiary of the BoE 
and ‘its core objective will be to promote the safety and soundness of the firms it 
regulates.’43 The PRA ‘is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision 
of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms.’44 
The PRA has two statutory objectives: ‘the promotion of the safety and soundness 
of PRA-authorised persons;45 and ‘specifically for insurers, to contribute to the 
securing of an appropriate degree of protection for policyholders.’46  The PRA’ has 
been given statutory power to prosecute senior executives in the event of an 
                                            
38 National Crime Agency, ‘Economic Crime Command’ 
Economic crime covers a range of crimes including: Fraud; Intellectual property crime; Identity crime; 
Counterfeit currency; These crimes cost the UK millions of pounds each year, and prey on the most vulnerable 
members of society. The Economic Crime command's role is to fight economic crime by undermining criminals 
and educating those most at risk of attack. We do this by sharing intelligence and knowledge with partners, 
disrupting criminal activity, and seizing assets. http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-
do/economic-crime accessed 30 September 2014. 
39 ‘Responsibility for financial stability – both at the macro-level of the financial system as a whole, and the 
micro-level of individual firms – will rest within the Bank of England, in a new macro- prudential body, the 
Financial Policy Committee, and a new micro-prudential supervisor, the Prudential Regulation Authority.’ 
H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5). 
40 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5). 
41 See chapter 4.2.1 Attributed to Montagu Norman, (Lord Norman), Governor of the BoE 1920 – 1944. 
See also: L C B Gower, ‘ “Big Bang” and City Regulation’ (1988) 51 MLR 21. 
42 Financial Services Act 2012, s 6. 
43 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5). 
44 In total the PRA regulates around 1,700 financial firms. 
Prudential Regulation Authority, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/PRA/Pages/default.aspx accessed 3 March 
2014. 
45 Financial Services Act 2012, s 132. 
46 Prudential Regulation Authority, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/PRA/Pages/default.aspx accessed 3 
March 2014. 




institution’s failure.47 The legislative landscape has become more complicated 
because the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which introduced the 
new criminal offence48 of ‘relating to a decision causing a financial institution to 
fail.’49 If a person is convicted of this offence they could face a custodial sentence 
up to seven years and/or an unlimited fine.50 The power to institute proceedings is 
vested in the PRA, FCA, Secretary of State or Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP).51 There is no specific role intended for the SFO. However, this new offence 
is limited because the person committing the offence has to be a senior manager52 
and the financial institution has to have failed by among others, insolvency.53 That 
being so, significant losses caused to an institution either by someone who is not a 
‘senior manager’ or, though large, do not deal a catastrophic blow to an 
institution’s solvency would not be encompassed by this statute. Thus, there 
continues to exist a gap in the regulatory response to economic crime. Some 
conduct can be dealt with by administrative sanction by FCA but when David 
Cameron said that ‘those responsible should be held to account,’54 he had in mind 
prosecution but that would need a change in the law.55 Thus, the criminal offence 
of causing an institution to fail56 or ‘reckless banking’57 should be accompanied by 
                                            
47 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s 36. 
48 The key provisions are:  
(1) A person (“S”) commits an offence if— 
(a) at a time when S is a senior manager in relation to a financial institution (“F”), S— 
(i) takes, or agrees to the taking of, a decision by or on behalf of F as to the way in which the business 
of a group institution is to be carried on, or 
(ii) fails to take steps that S could take to prevent such a decision being taken, 
(b) at the time of the decision, S is aware of a risk that the implementation of the decision may cause the 
failure of the group institution, 
(c) in all the circumstances, S's conduct in relation to the taking of the decision falls far below what could 
reasonably be expected of a person in S's position, and 
(d) the implementation of the decision causes the failure of the group institution. 
49 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s 36. 
50 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s 36(4).  
‘(a) ‘on summary conviction— 
(i) in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or 6 months, if the offence was 
committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) or a fine, or both; 
(ii) in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum, or both; 
(iii) in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the 
statutory maximum, or both;’ 
51 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s 38. 
52 Designated as such by Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 59(6A)&(6B). 
53 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s 37(9). 
54 Conservative Home (n 15). 
55 Conservative Home (n 15). 
56 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s 36. 
57 Jonathan Fisher, ‘Risk, recklessness and Policing the Financial Markets’ in N Ryder, U Turksen and S 
Hassler  (eds),  Fighting financial crime in the global economic crisis: Policy, trends and sanctions.  (Routledge 




a criminal offence of ‘Reckless risk-taking on the financial markers.’58 As Fisher 
comments: 
Whilst it is true that reckless risk-taking on the financial markets does not 
necessarily involve behaviour which is deceitful, the affirmation of the 
principle that it is sufficient for the defendant’s conduct to imperil the 
economic interests of another is significant in this context.59 
Such a criminal sanction would complete the suite of sanctions available where 
there is conduct which imperils the financial system and ensure that, in future, 
questions such as those of Judge Rakoff of ‘[t]he financial crisis: why have no high 
level executives been prosecuted?’60 would not be for the want of appropriate 
legislation. This would be a counter-party to the suggested corporate offence of 
failure to prevent all acts of financial crime by its employees,61 and would include 
cases such as: Jerome Kerviel’s illegal transactions which cost Société Générale 
£3.7bn;62 Nick Leeson’s unauthorised trading which presaged the collapse of 
Barings Bank; a UBS  trader,  Kweku Adoboli,63  who lost £1.5bn;64 and J P 
Morgan’s ‘London Whale’ affair which cost it $6bn.65  
6.1.3.2 Markets and Banking 
In March 2014, the BoE launched its new ‘strategic plan’,66 which included the 
creation of a new Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking, who would be 
responsible for ‘efficient and effective financial markets.’67 Mark Carney describes 
                                            
58  Fisher (n 57) 2. 
59 Fisher (n 57) 14. 
60 Jed S Rakoff, ‘The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-level Executives Been Prosecuted?’ The New York 
Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/ accessed 2 April 2014. 
61 ‘I have suggested that the situation could easily be remedied by an amendment to s.7 of the Bribery Act to 
create the corporate offence of a company failing to prevent acts of financial crime by its employees. We need 
to tackle corporate criminal liability for DPAs to have maximum bite.’ 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘Ethical Business Conduct: An Enforcement Perspective’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-
us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2014/ethical-business-conduct-an-enforcement-perspective.aspx 
accessed 19 May 2014. 
See also chapter 5.1. 
62 George Gilligan, ‘Jérôme Kerviel the 'Rogue Trader' of Société Générale: Bad Luck, Bad Apple, Bad Tree or 
Bad Orchard? ‘(2011) 32(12) Co Law 355-362. 
63 The Times, ‘UBS trader was only ‘a gamble away from destroying Switzerland’s biggest bank’ 14 
September 2012. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3538412.ece accessed 8 February 2013. 
64 BBC, ‘UBS 'rogue trader': Loss estimate raised to $2.3bn’. 18 September 2011 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14965438 accessed 20 September 2011.  
65 ASIC, ‘Senate inquiry into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. Main 
submission by ASIC, October 2013’ 170, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byHeadline/13-
300MR%20ASIC%20lodges%20major%20Senate%20Inquiry%20submission?opendocument accessed 22 
November 2013. 
66 Bank of England, ‘News Release - Bank of England launches strategic plan’ 18 March 2014, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk//publications/Pages/news/2014/058.aspx accessed 25 March 2014. 




this as an ‘extraordinarily important task.’68 This is an interesting regulatory 
response which attracts attention because of the BoE’s role in the foreign 
exchange markets. It was reported that allegations of manipulation of the foreign 
exchange markets had come as a surprise,69 and were very serious, and Martin 
Wheatley, chief executive of the FCA, ‘told a parliamentary hearing that allegations 
traders had colluded to rig prices in the $5.3tn spot market were “every bit as bad 
as they have been with Libor”.’70  
Media reports of the BoE suspending a member of staff,71 were followed by the an 
announcement that it would ‘tighten its governance,’72 and ‘establish an enquiry 
led by a QC.’73 Price rigging would suggest fraudulent conduct in a similar manner 
to the LIBOR cases where thirteen people have been charged by the SFO with 
conspiracy to defraud, one of who has pleaded guilty.74 The BoE said: 
It is a matter of public record that the BoE has been conducting an internal 
review into allegations that BoE officials condoned or were informed of 
manipulation in the foreign exchange market or the sharing of confidential 
client information. This extensive review (,,,) has found no evidence that BoE 
                                            
68 Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney. 18 March 2014. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech715.pdf accessed 25 March 
2014. 
69 Financial Times, 4 February 2014. ‘Forex claims ‘as bad as Libor’, says FCA’, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d2f697a-8da8-11e3-bbe7-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wz74O2Ae accessed 25 
March 2014. 
70  Financial Times, ‘Forex claims ‘as bad as Libor’ (n 69). 
‘On 12 November 2014, the FCA reported: The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has imposed fines totalling 
£1,114,918,000 ($1.7 billion) on five banks for failing to control business practices in their G10 spot foreign 
exchange (FX) trading operations: Citibank N.A. £225,575,000 ($358 million), HSBC Bank Plc £216,363,000 
($343 million), JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. £222,166,000 ($352 million), The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 
£217,000,000 ($344 million) and UBS AG £233,814,000 ($371 million) (‘the Banks’).’ Financial Conduct 
Authority, ‘FCA fines five banks £1.1 billion for FX failings and announces industry-wide remediation 
programme’ http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fx-failings accessed 12 November 2014. 
Furthermore, the SFO announced in July 2014 that it was investigating the foreign exchange market 
allegations. Serious Fraud Office, ‘Forex Investigation’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-
releases/press-releases-2014/forex-investigation.aspx accessed 12 November 2014. 
71 Financial Times, 5 March 2014 ‘Bank of England suspends employee amid forex 
probe’,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/260bfb68-a45e-11e3-b915-00144feab7de.html accessed 25 March 2014 
72 BBC, 11 March 2014. ‘Bank of England in shake-up after rate manipulation criticism’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26523995 accessed 25 March  2014. 
73 Financial Times, 12 March 2014. ‘Top barrister chosen to lead Bank of England forex enquiry’, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e2a5e2b6-aa03-11e3-8bd6-00144feab7de,html accessed 25 March 2014. 
On 12 November 2014, The Times, reported ‘The Bank said it had dismissed its chief currency dealer 
following its own investigation into the foreign exchange market, which found that he had failed to report 
serious concerns to superiors. (…) The individual’s dismissal was not at all related to the allegations 
investigated by Lord Grabiner, but as a result of information that came to light during the course of the Bank’s 
initial internal review into allegations relating to the [foreign exchange] market and Bank staff,” the Bank of 
England said. This information related to the Bank’s internal policies, not to [foreign exchange].’ The Times, 
‘Banks fined over £2bn after currency rigging investigation’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11223764/Banks-fined-over-2bn-after-
currency-rigging-investigation.html accessed 12 November 2014. 




staff colluded in any way in manipulating the foreign exchange market or in 
sharing confidential client information.75 
The foreign exchange allegations are that the BoE ‘had concerns about 
manipulation as early as 2006’,76 at a time when the BoE’s role had diminished, 
because it was part of a ‘tripartite’ system, which had deconstructed ‘the old model 
of central banking,’77 which Governor Carney viewed to be a ‘fatally flawed’ 
approach.78 
Carney’s sideswipe was that for over a century the Bank’s responsibilities 
‘remained broad and largely informal until 1997.’79 This is a significant observation 
because in 1997, the Labour government took office and downgraded the BoE’s 
role:80 which previously had ‘informal responsibility for a broad range of policy 
areas.’81 Carney added that ‘it [the Bank] promoted financial stability through its 
role as the effective lender of last resort, and more generally, - through judicious 
exercise of the Governor’s eyebrows - as the institution which managed and 
resolved financial crises.’82 
The BoE clearly recognise that there are issues with the functioning of core 
markets, together with a ‘host of financial reforms’,83 and ‘most fundamentally, 
given the serious issues raised by the Libor and foreign exchange scandals, 
changes must be made to both the hard and soft infrastructure of core markets to 
ensure they are fair, effective and efficient.’84 However, this adds a further layer of 
complexity because the BoE is itself involved in LIBOR and foreign exchange as 
                                            
75 Bank of England,  ‘News Release - Foreign Exchange – The Perfect Storm’, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2014/044.aspx accessed 25 March 2014. 
As at 30 September 2014, the review had not been completed. 
Bloomberg, ‘FX Traders Surprised by Scope of BOE Probe’ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-09/fx-
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76 Financial Times, ‘Top barrister chosen to lead Bank of England enquiry’ (n 73). 
See also Ryder, The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime (n 2) 105, where LIBOR manipulation was noted 
the previous year in 2005. 
77 Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney’ (n 68). 
78 ‘While there were enormous innovations of enduring value during this period, the reductionist vision of a 
central bank’s role that was adopted around the world was fatally flawed (…) thus [a]return to a broad role is 
welcome’. Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney’ (n 68). 
79 Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney’ (n 68). 
80 Philip Rawlings, ‘Reform of bank regulation in the United Kingdom: the opening salvo’ (2010) J I B L R 522. 
81 Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney’ (n 68). (Emphasis added). 
82‘ In the late 19th Century the banking system was relatively unregulated (and partly self-regulated) – the 
Bank did not have an explicit supervisory infrastructure or system of prudential control until 1979. 
Nevertheless the scope of the Bank’s responsibilities was arguably as broad then as it is now, albeit that the 
mix was different.’ 
Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney’ (n 68). 
83 Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney’ (n 68). 




well as regulating the markets, where the ‘watchdog’ is the FCA and investigative 
and prosecutorial agency is the SFO. The BoE provides market liquidity,85 which 
entails being a participant in markets which it regulates. To add to the confusion 
over roles, the FCA ‘was accused of triggering a disorderly market in insurance 
company shares after revealing that the FCA was launching a review of zombie 
[insurance] funds and their treatment of 30 million customers.’86 It was reported 
that the BoE were concerned at the false market in shares87 because although it 
was the FCA’s ‘responsibility to oversee financial markets,’88 the BoE ‘has 
responsibility for the stability of the system as a whole.’89 This demonstrates that 
there should be one body with ultimate responsibility and that body should be the 
BoE. 
6.2 Secondary Regulators 
The UK’s main means of regulation lies with specific agencies, which report to 
sponsoring government departments. The FCA embraces a wide-ranging brief 
encompassing ‘consumer protection, competition and market integrity,’90 whereas 
the SFO’s role is in relation to serious fraud and bribery.91 Both agencies have 
available to them specific legislation for use in enforcing economic crime 
behaviour. 
6.2.1 Financial Conduct Authority 
The focus of this research is the regulatory response to economic crime but, in the 
FSA, the regulator had a wide range of responsibilities of which economic crime 
was merely a part. The financial crisis cast light on the performance of the FSA, 
                                            
85 ‘Banks and building societies ('banks') make long-term loans but fund themselves through on-demand or 
short-term deposits, so they are subject to liquidity risk: the risk that a material part of their funding is 
withdrawn before the assets can be realised at their true economic value.’ 
Bank of England, ‘Liquidity Insurance’ 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/liquidityinsurance.aspx accessed 7 April 
2014. 
86 The Times, 31 March 2014, ‘Hosking on Monday: waiting for the watchdog to fall’ 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/columnists/article4049293.ece accessed 8 April 2014. 
87 The Sunday Times, 6 April 2014, ‘FCA ignored warnings of ,’ 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Finance/article1396697.ece accessed 8 April 2014. 
88 The Sunday Times, ‘FCA ignored warnings of false market’ (n 87). 
89 The Sunday Times, ‘FCA ignored warnings of false market’ (n 87). 
90 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5). 
91 ‘We are investigators and prosecutors of the topmost tier of serious and complex fraud, bribery and 
corruption. We are not a regulator, a deal-maker or a confessor.’ David Green, ‘Speech to Cambridge 
Symposium 2013’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2013/cambridge-




where the Coalition government considered that it had failed in meeting its 
objectives. The outcome was the disbanding of the FSA and, notwithstanding 
government’s initial proposals to create an Economic Crime Agency (ECA), 
regulation and their enforcement form the new FCA,92 as ‘a dedicated and focused 
conduct of business regulator.’93 The government explain that ‘[e]ffective conduct 
regulation is vital to securing better outcomes for all consumers and restoring trust 
in the financial system.’94 
The Coalition government announced the abolition of the ‘tripartite’ regulatory 
system.95 The FCA 96 succeeded the FSA97 with a role to take ‘responsibility for 
conduct of business (…) with the mandate and tools to be a proactive force for 
enabling the right outcomes for consumers and market participants, including 
through the promotion of competition.’98 The FCA has a limited remit when 
compared to the FSA which, ‘until the financial crisis enjoyed jurisdiction over 
“virtually everything financial in the UK”.’99 The challenge for the FCA is to 
demonstrate that it is not merely a rebranded FSA.100 
The change is interesting because the FSA had four equal objectives, one being 
‘the reduction of financial crime’,101 the FCA has ‘a single overarching strategic 
objective to ensure that markets function well’.102  This is supported by three 
operational objectives: consumer protection; integrity objective; and 
competition.103 The integrity objective means ‘protecting and enhancing the 
integrity of the UK financial system,’104 and includes ‘not being used for a purpose 
                                            
92 The FSA responsibilities being split into three: Financial Policy Committee and Prudential Regulatory 
Authority and Financial conduct Authority. Financial Services Bill 2012. http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/RP12-8 accessed 13 April 2012. 
93 HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation to the 
Financial Conduct Authority’. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221913/consult_transferring_co
nsumer_credit_regulation_to_fca.pdf accessed 5 March 2014. 
94 HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation’ (n 93). 
 
96 The Telegraph, 17 March 2011 ‘W, for FSA?’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8386709/What-next-for-the-FSA.html 
accessed 3 March 2014. 
97 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
98 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ (n 5) 3. 
99 Gary Wilson and Sarah Wilson, ‘The FSA ‘credible deterrence” , and criminal enforcement – a “haphazard 
pursuit”?’ (2014) J F C 4,5. (Footnotes omitted.). 
100 Ryder, The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime’ (n 2) 18.  
Wilson and Wilson (n 99) 4,5. 
101 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 6. 
102 HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation’ (n 93). 
103 Financial Services Act 2012, s 1B(3). 




connected with financial crime.’105 Furthermore, the ‘integrity’ of the UK financial 
system includes: its soundness, stability and resilience; 106 its not being affected by 
behaviour that amounts to market abuse;107 the orderly operation of the financial 
markets,108 and the transparency of the price formation process in those 
markets.109 One significant change from April 2014 was for the FCA to ‘take over 
the regulation of around 50,000 consumer credit firms from the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT).’110 This is a major uplift in volume of firms from the existing 26,000 
firms regulated111 and the effect on FCA capability remains to be evaluated. This 
is in pursuit of the government’s intention of ‘delivering a regulatory regime under 
which the conduct of business of all retail financial services is regulated by a single 
body.’112 
The FCA, is responsible for dealing with financial crime within the regulatory 
framework, including the Money Laundering Regulations 2007,113 the Market 
Abuse Regime114 and maintenance of links with the police, SFO and NCA115. 
Furthermore, the FCA operated FIN-NET,116 the cross-government fraud and 
financial crime network.117     
                                            
105 Financial Services Act 2012, s 1D(2)(b). 
106 Financial Services Act 2012, s 1D(2)(a). 
107 Financial Services Act 2012, s 1D 2)(c). 
108 Financial Services Act 2012, s 1D(2)(d). 
109 Financial Services Act 2012, s 1D(2)(e). 
110 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘PS14/3: Final rules for consumer credit firms’, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/ps14-3-final-rules-for-consumer-credit-firms accessed 28 March 2014. 
111 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Regulating’, http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/regulating Accessed 28 March 
2014. 
112 HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: transferring consumer credit regulation’ (n 93). 
113 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 SI 2007/2157 
FSA, Handbook SYSC. 6.3. http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/SYSC/6/3 accessed 15 April 2012. 
114 ‘Certain types of behaviour, such as insider dealing and market manipulation, can amount to market abuse. 
Types of conduct constituting market abuse are set out in section 118 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 and in the Market Abuse Directive.’ 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Market Abuse’ http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/market-abuse accessed 7 
April 2014. 
115 The Home secretary announced that it ‘will close by 31 March 2014’, Rt Hon Theresa May MP, Home 
Secretary. ‘Written Statement to the House of Commons’ 2 December 2013 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/national-fraud-authority accessed 30 December 2013. 
116 ‘FIN-NET is a financial dispute resolution network of national out-of-court complaint schemes in the 
European Economic Area countries (the European Union Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway) that are responsible for handling disputes between consumers and financial services providers, i.e. 
banks, insurance companies, investment firms and others. This network was launched by the European 
Commission in 2001.’ European Commission, ‘Welcome to Fin-net’ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-
net/index_en.htm accessed 7 April 2014. 
117 ‘The BCCI case was a major banking fraud of some £800 million. The bank collapsed in 1991. Hundreds of 
thousands of people around the world lost their savings amidst accusations that the bank's senior executives 
had fraudulently siphoned off funds’ Serious Fraud Office, ‘Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)’ 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-work/our-cases/historic-cases/bank-of-credit-and-commerce-international-




The FCA’s Chief Executive stated that they would build ‘on the FSA’s direction 
[and] would involve retaining “our policy of credible deterrence, pursuing 
enforcement cases to punish wrongdoing”.’118 Although Wilson and Wilson note 
that this is not defined, ‘but can be discerned contextually from (…) key FSA 
publications,’119 the FSA state that it is ‘robustly deploying our civil and criminal 
prosecution powers.’120  The FCA state that they are ‘more committed than ever to 
showing firms and individuals that they must play by the rules; because if they 
don’t, robust sanctions are a matter of course.’121 
The FCA Business Plan122 states that their ‘enforcement powers123 enable them to 
deter firms and individuals from wrongdoing by making it clear that there are real 
and meaningful consequences for poor practice.’124 The FCA’s ‘credible 
deterrence’ approach enables them to ‘take effective, targeted action across the 
range of our regulatory responsibilities in support of our objectives.’125 The FCA 
highlight that they ‘have already delivered significant outcomes following intensive 
work on the attempted manipulation of LIBOR benchmark rate’.126 This is a 
surprising claim since this is an area which the FCA did not wish to enforce and 
which was subject to criticism from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards.127 Notwithstanding this, in 2014, the FCA published warning notices to 
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119 Wilson and Wilson (n 99) 4,5. 
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http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/plan/bp2012-13.pdf accessed 28 March 2014. 
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emerging issues’, 9 October 2013, http://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/financial-services-regulation-
enforcement accessed 28 March 2014. 
122 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Business Plan 2014/15’ 13. http://www.fca.org.uk/news/about-us/business-
plan-2014-15 accessed 1 April 2014. 
123 ‘We use a wide range of Enforcement powers – criminal, civil and regulatory – to protect consumers and to 
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124 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Business Plan 2014/15’ (n 122) 13. 
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126 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Business Plan 2014/15’ (n 122) 13. 
127 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Fixing LIBOR: some preliminary findings Second Report of 
Session 2012–13 Volume I’ http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/treasury/Fixing%20LIBOR_%20some%20preliminary%20findings%20-%20VOL%20I.pdf 




two individuals, relating to LIBOR manipulation, stating that it proposed to take 
unspecified action at some unspecified time.128 
In pursuit of the FCA’s credible deterrence approach, they ‘have the power to 
impose fines, withdraw or cancel authorization, stop firms or individuals from 
carrying out regulated activities, apply for injunctions and restitution orders, and 
prosecute certain financial crimes.’129 Cartwright 130 suggests that the deployment 
of these powers is to make people ‘sit up and take notice’131 and that it has a clear 
preference for ‘the imposition of a financial penalty as central to its policy of 
credible deterrence.’132 
The policy underlying the range of penalties which can be imposed is in the ‘FCA 
Handbook, Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual:’133 
The principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty or issuing a public 
censure is to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by 
deterring persons who have committed breaches from committing 
further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing 
similar breaches, and demonstrating generally the benefits of compliant 
behaviour.134 
Wilson and Wilson observe that ‘[n]o jurisdiction has had a great deal of success 
in utilising the criminal law in combating sophisticated abuse activity on its capital 
markets’,135 and that the response to market misconduct was ‘moving away from 
criminal enforcement, on account of this being perceived as costly and 
ineffectual.’136 Thus, the ‘effectiveness of the policy within the UK can be seen in 
                                            
128 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Warning Notice’ http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/warning-notice-
statements/warning-notice-statement-14-1individual.pdf  
‘The FCA appears to have issued the warning notices to ensure that it does not fall foul of a three-year limit on 
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2014, ‘FCA to punish bankers involved in Libor scandal’ 
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129 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Business Plan 2014/15’ (n 122) 13. 
130 Peter Cartwright, ‘Credible Deterrence and Consumer Protection through Imposition of Financial Penalties: 
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crime in the global economic crisis: Policy, trends and sanctions.  (Routledge Cavendish 2014). 5 [In Press] 
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132 Cartwright (n 130) 5. The FCA also has power under Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 56 to 
impose prohibition orders and made 43 in 2012-2013. Financial Services Authority, ‘Enforcement Annual 
Performance Account. 2012/13’ http://fca.org.uk/static/documents/annual-report/fsa-enforcement-
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the FSA’s enthusiasm for non-criminal enforcement of market abuse’.137 Such 
enthusiasm for financial penalties as a demonstration of the credible deterrence is 
examined by Cartwright who, rightly, points to the unlikelihood of firms undertaking 
a cost-benefit analysis regarding the adherence to FCA requirements as a 
conscious decision but, rather, that ‘[m]any breaches of FSMA occur where firms 
lack adequate controls, supervision and organisation rather than where they 
display wilful misconduct.’138 
The practical implementation of the credible deterrence pre dates the FCA where, 
the FSA had been criticised for its performance and ‘light-touch’ approach and an 
‘overly close relationship with the City.’139 However, Tomasic suggests that this 
was because ‘political pressure [which] may also be facilitated by governments 
which have been competing with each other to create business-friendly financial 
centres such as London and New York.’140 This attitude allowed the view to 
pervade of insider dealing  as ‘a naughty perk of the job’,141 however, ‘the number 
of insider trading cases brought by the FCA has risen sharply in the past few years 
[and] secured 23 convictions since 2009.’142 In parallel, the increase in the number 
of fines by the regulator143 appears to show that their strategy to prosecute a 
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138 Cartwright (n 130) 6. 
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steady stream of cases to demonstrate that they ‘means business’ is bearing 
fruit.144 The total fines were at modest levels until 2010 when they increased from 
£89.1m to £311.6m in 2012 and £476m in 2013. By November 2014, they 
amounted to £314m.145  
The regulator has successfully prosecuted and imposed record financial penalties 
for insider dealing offences and breaches of the Market Abuse Regime.146  
Examples include McQuoid and Melbourne,147 Uberois,148 Calvert,149 Ahmad,150 
Rollins151 and Littlewoods.152 The increase in the enforcement activities 
demonstrates its tougher approach towards insider dealing.  Furthermore, it 
banned 101 mortgage intermediaries because most of the individuals were ‘not fit 
and proper to work in regulated financial services through failings that led to 
mortgage fraud.’153 
The main engine for the increase in fines is the LIBOR scandal,154 where Barclays 
was fined £59.5m.155 This was followed by UBS £160m,156 RBS £87.5m,157 ICAP 
                                            
144 Jason D Haines, 'FSA determined to improve cleanliness of markets: custodial sentences continue to be a 
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2014. 
150 Financial Services Authority, ‘Ex-hedge fund trader sentenced for insider dealing’ 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2010/104.shtml accessed 19 February 2014. 
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http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2011/002.shtml accessed 19 February 2014. 
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£14m 158 and Rabobank £105m.159 These fines amount to £426m but, as a 
change from the previous regime, the FCA ‘must pay to the Exchequer all financial 
penalties we receive, less the enforcement costs that we incurred in generating 
these penalties.’160 Additionally, where the FCA say that ‘investigations against 
others [firms] continue,’161 the FCA have levied their second largest penalty162 of 
£137.6m on J P Morgan Chase Bank for misconduct in an activity known as the 
‘London Whale’ trades.163 The FCA explain that:  
The fine reflects the seriousness of the firm’s failure to ensure that 
fundamental controls were applied to the trading of its Chief Investment 
Office. The consequences of not applying those controls were perilous – the 
losses that resulted were around $6bn. It also reflects what followed 
thereafter – which serves as a lesson in how not to do crisis management.164 
This is an example of the application of the credible deterrence strategy and, 
tellingly, because ‘this was not some dim and distant pre-[financial] crisis past 
when people believed they had conquered the risk. This was in 2011 and 2012.’165 
Furthermore, the FCA stated that ‘we engaged with the firm, being very clear 
about the candour that we expected and the risks we were concerned about, J P 
Morgan failed to be open and co-operative, even on one occasion deliberately 
misleading us.’166 Even though J P Morgan lost $6.2bn,167 there is no reference to 
criminal charges against individuals in the UK.  However, it has been reported that 
the DoJ have charged two people with ‘conspiracy, falsifying books and records, 
wire fraud, and causing false statements to be made to the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SEC).’168 FSMA 2000 gives the FCA authority to set and 
enforce regulations, which includes levying significant financial penalties, the lack 
of criminal charges in the UK against any individual involved casts doubt on the 
credible deterrence influencing individuals. Indeed, as Judge Rakoff stated,169 ‘the 
failure of the government to bring to justice those responsible for such colossal 
fraud bespeaks weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that need to be 
addressed.’170 
The FCA could have considered action against Mark Stevenson who engaged in 
market abuse171 ‘for deliberately manipulating a government bond to make money 
out of the BoE’s quantitative easing programme.’172 The FCA said that this it 
regarded this as a particularly serious example of market abuse, which sought to 
profit unreasonably from Quantitative Easing, at the expense of the BoE and 
ultimately the Taxpayer.173 The financial penalty imposed by the FCA was 
£662,700,174 although noting that his remuneration for the year in question was 
£2.367m,175 and a ban176 from working in the City.177 This may, or not, be the 
appropriate case for criminal sanctions, but although the FCA describe the case as 
particularly serious, that view is not shared by some commentators: 
                                            
168 Reuters, 14 August 2013, ‘U.S. charges two ex-JPMorgan bankers over 'London Whale' loss’ 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/14/us-jpm-whale-charges-idUSBRE97D0QU20130814 accessed 2 April 
2014. 
169 Hon. Jed S Rakoff. United States District Court – Southern District New York. 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Rakoff accessed 2 April 2014. 
170 Rakoff (n 60). 
171 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’ http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2014/mark-stevenson accessed 2 April 2014. 
172 The Times, ‘Bond trader fined and banned for attempt to manipulate stimulus plan’ 21 March 2014. 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/banking/article4039438.ece accessed 2 April 2014. 
173 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’  (n 171) 2. (emphasis added). 
174 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’  (n 171) 1. 
175 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’  (n 171) 22. 
176 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 56(1) 
‘The FCA may make a prohibition order if it appears to it that an individual is not a fit and proper person to 
perform functions in relation to a regulated activity.’ 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Decision Notice’. 
‘The Authority considers that Mr Stevenson deliberately acted to increase the price of the Bond on 10 October 
2011 and considers that this amounted to deliberate market abuse. His behaviour is particularly egregious as 
it took place on the first day of QE2 and effectively sought to deprive the economy from QE’s full effect in 
order to maximise the potential profit from selling the Bond to the BOE in the QE2 reverse auction. The 
Authority considers that, as a result of this behaviour, Mr Stevenson lacks fitness and propriety in terms of his 
integrity.  
The Authority therefore makes a prohibition order pursuant to section 56 of the Act prohibiting Mr Stevenson 
from performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any authorised or exempt 
person or exempt professional firm. This order takes effect from 20 March 2014.’ 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’ 18.  Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA 
Final Notice 2014: Mark Stevenson’  (n 171) 18. 
177 The Times, ‘Bond trader fined and banned for attempt to manipulate stimulus plan’ 21 March 2014. 




the FCA has declared Mr Stevenson guilty of market abuse. His main 
offence, though, appears to have been greed. Hundreds of gilt-edged 
market-makers will have made money from the Bank’s asset purchases by 
loading up on gilts ahead of its wading into the market. Mr Stevenson bought 
too many (…) he sought to “profit unreasonably” from QE. Perhaps the FCA 
can say what a reasonable profit from QE might be.  
Either way, the punishment (…) looks harsh. The Bank and taxpayers 
suffered no loss (…) since the Bank got wise to what he was doing (…). 
Greed aside, Mr Stevenson’s other offence seems to have been messing 
with the Bank. Had he cornered the market in a gilt that, say, Goldman Sachs 
or Morgan Stanley was trying to buy, it is hard to see the FCA reacting as it 
has.178 
This comment is instructive because it suggests that there is something special 
about trading in the financial markets which should justify different treatment from 
other crimes and does not show that the credible deterrence policy either acts as a 
deterrent or has changed perceptions of integrity in the financial markets. This is at 
the heart of the debate over white collar crime sentencing.179 An example is the 
2014 case headlined  ‘Cyber gang led by former rave promoter dubbed the ‘Acid 
House King’ are facing years behind bars for plundering £1.25m’,180 received five 
and a half years imprisonment.181 
The FCA, has a role182 in countering the threat from bribery and corruption, where 
the SFO is responsible for prosecution:  
The FCA does not enforce the Bribery Act 2010 [BA2010]. Our regulatory 
powers apply where authorised firms fail adequately to address corruption 
and bribery risk, including where these risks arise in relation to third parties 
acting on behalf of the firm. We do not need to obtain evidence of corrupt 
conduct to take regulatory action against a firm.183 
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Thus, whilst the SFO does require evidence of corrupt conduct before taking 
action, the FCA does not. This has allowed the regulator to fine three insurance 
companies ‘for failing to take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective 
systems and controls to counter the risks of bribery and corruption associated with 
making payments to third parties:’184 Besso was fined £315,000;185 AON £5.5m;186 
and Willis £6.895m.187 Although the regulatory breaches took place before the 
BA2010 came into force, the SFO role was not mentioned in the FCA Decision 
Notice in March 2014 though new procedures under the BA2010 were 
mentioned.188 The SFO’s first prosecution under BA2010, yet to come to trial, is of 
four former employees of Sustainable AgroEnergy plc for fraud, conspiracy to 
commit fraud and ‘making and accepting a financial advantage.’189 A key provision 
of the BA2010 is s.7, which provides a complete defence to bribery where ‘the 
commercial organisation will have a full defence if it can show that despite a 
particular case of bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to 
prevent persons associated with it from bribing.’190 Therefore, although the FCA 
has a record of penalising regulatory breaches, the SFO has not yet had the 
opportunity to test the legislative provisions in the courts because it has yet to 
bring a case under BA2010 to trial. Thus, the relationship between SFO and FCA 
over bribery is unclear and the possibility remains of a firm being penalised by the 
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FCA and prosecuted by the SFO. This uncertainty could be dealt with by an ECA if 
it encompassed these two separate organisations. 
6.2.2 Serious Fraud Office 
The SFO, established in 1987,191 to tackle ‘the topmost tier of serious and 
complex fraud and bribery,’192 was hailed as the UK’s equivalent of the FBI.193 It 
was created due to disquiet about the prosecution of serious fraud in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s.194 It has had a troubled life being perceived as a failing organisation. 
Early high profile cases tarnished its reputation including Guinness, Barlow 
Clowes, Blue Arrow, Maxwell, Levitt and Saunders.195  Recently, it has been 
criticised over its handling of bribery allegations against BAE,196 the controversial 
abandonment of  investigations into arms sales to Saudi Arabia;197 its attempt to 
‘plea bargain’ has brought judicial opprobrium that, in economic crime cases, the 
SFO should not believe that these are ‘more respectable than other forms of 
crime’, or that these criminals ‘should not be ordered to serve prison sentences 
because such sentences should be reserved for those they regard as common 
criminals’.198   
The SFO is judged on its role as a prosecutor. Although its mixed success has in 
recent years shown an increase in activity, reporting an 80% conviction rate and 
states that ‘it is stronger, faster and leaner’199 and ‘delivering more for less’.200  
However, in 2014 it was reported that:  
A recent Freedom of Information request showed that enforcement actions 
by the SFO this year reached their lowest level since the financial crisis (…) 
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but the results will come through and we will have to weather the inevitable 
criticism in the meantime about case numbers and investigation costs.201 
For example, in 2011 the SFO made a case for its continued existence as an 
independent specialist investigator and prosecutor, the return of Asil Nadir to UK 
brought echoes of its past difficulties with major cases. Asil Nadir was due to be 
tried for theft in 1993202 but fled to Northern Cyprus and could not be extradited.  
On his return the SFO faced difficulties in prosecution because failing memory or 
death of some witnesses in the intervening 19 years, combined with problems of 
reassembling evidence, some of which documents were a health hazard.203 
Nonetheless, ‘[t]he conviction of Asil Nadir of theft on a grand scale from a public 
company nineteen years after he fled the jurisdiction is a remarkable 
achievement.’204 The then Director of the SFO stated that its ‘cases are high 
profile and carry high risk’205 and the significance of the Asil Nadir case is that it 
provided a reference back to its mixed success in achieving convictions in the 
early 1990s, when this case should have been tried and its ultimate success was 
not a foregone conclusion. 
The financial crisis provided the SFO with an opportunity ‘to investigate 
suspected offences committed within the UK jurisdiction in relation to Icelandic 
Bank Kaupthing prior to its collapse.’206 The SFO wanted to understand what had 
‘allowed substantial value to be extracted from the bank in the year prior to its 
collapse.207 The SFO said ‘this is a complex investigation which crosses numerous 
jurisdictions. We have been working closely with the Icelandic Special Prosecutor's 
Office to ensure that comprehensive and robust investigations are conducted.’208 
This was just the type of case for which the SFO was established.209 However, 
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when the SFO announced that it arrested people in London and Reykjavik,210 The 
Guardian,211 identified the SFO’s target as Kaupthing’s ‘biggest client Robert 
Tchenquiz.’212 The outcome was the SFO conceding that search warrants were 
flawed213 and SFO actions subject to adverse judgment of the Court because of  
‘serious mistakes’,214 resulting in the Tchenguiz brothers claiming £300m in 
damages.215 With clear echoes of past difficulties, the SFO eventually settled 
Tchenguiz216 by paying damages and significant costs.217 The SFO Director 
reports that: ‘[w]hilst the SFO accepts the criticisms of it made by the Divisional 
court the outcome of this particular case which concerned events in 2011 does not 
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reflect the quality of the SFO’s work in 2013.’218 This is understandable because 
‘high profile’ cases are ‘high risk’ and have the potential to embarrass, as with the 
earlier Guinness case. This potential for embarrassment was realised when the 
SFO had to seek additional funding from HMT to cover not only costs relating to 
the Tchenguiz claim but also ‘historic legal liabilities relating to the payment of 
VAT’219 and making unauthorised payments to its staff.220 
The management of the SFO has also suffered when, the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee221 reported on the SFO’s internal management had 
‘showed a disregard for the proper use of taxpayers’ money.’222 The Committee 
concluded that ‘[t]he reputation of the SFO has been undermined by a catalogue 
of errors and poor judgement and the morale of its staff has suffered.223 This is 
underlined by a headline from the Telegraph 'BAE' documents lost by SFO found 
at cannabis farm,’224 which was confirmed by the Attorney General.225 This was 
followed by the collapse of another prosecution: [f]resh reversal for SFO as £40m 
bribery trial collapses’226 the SFO had earlier announced that: ‘Dahdaleh, an 
international businessman, has been arrested today and charged with corruption 
offences relating to contracts for the supply of aluminium to Bahrain.’227 In 
December 2013, the SFO issued a statement: ‘[t]he SFO has today offered no 
evidence against Victor Dahdaleh, having concluded that there is no longer a 
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realistic prospect of conviction in this case.228 The was due to the principal witness 
changing his evidence and difficulties with two US witnesses who were unwilling to 
give evidence.229 Reuters230 reported that:  
Dahdaleh admitted making payments to Alba [Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C. 
(Alba), an aluminium smelter controlled by the government of 
Bahrain]231 managers but pleaded 'not guilty', citing ‘principal's consent’, a 
defence available under Britain's Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. 
In essence, his defence was that the payments were known of and approved 
by those in authority at Alba and in the Bahraini government, and were part 
of Bahraini custom and practice.232 
However, what puts this case into sharp relief is a parallel case in US where ‘Alcoa 
World Alumina admitted links to what US authorities called a “corrupt international 
underworld” and agreed to a $384m settlement over charges relating to bribery.’233 
The US Department of Justice (DoJ)234 detailed the outcome of fines and 
undertakings regarding future conduct but no criminal conviction against an 
individual, although it did refer to the middleman involved as ‘Consultant A’ a 
‘London-based middleman with close ties to certain [Bahrain] Royal Family 
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members as a sham sales agent and agreed to pay him a corrupt commission 
intended to conceal bribe payments, according to court papers.’235 
The contrast in outcome of the two matters with similar facts highlights the 
difference in approach where, until February 2014, the SFO had limited room for 
manoeuvre. The former Director commented on the facilities available to SFO:  
My view is that the prosecution-led approach with integrated teams of 
lawyers and investigators is needed in this very specialist and complex area. 
This view is shared by other experts in the field. It is the basis upon which the 
DoJ as well as the FSA works.236 
However, the DoJ have long had the ability to employ ‘negotiated outcomes’ or a 
‘plea bargaining’ strategy, where such deals are widely used and ‘a policy of 
judicial acquiescence or self-restraint prevails’.237 It has to be accepted that 
litigations has risks and that the outcomes are far from certain and, as Buchanan 
observes:  ‘[l]itigation is expensive. One has to consider not only the costs of the 
proposed court action but also the prospect of being unsuccessful in court and 
being ordered to pay the expenses of others involved in the particular court 
action.’238 It is understandable that the SFO saw the attractions of ‘negotiating 
outcomes’, bringing with them cost savings and certainty advantages. However, 
two cases where the SFO wished to ‘plea bargain’ caused judicial tensions.  
Firstly, in R v Innospec Limited,239 Court of Appeal criticised SFO for ‘usurping’ the 
Judge’s authority by agreeing punishment.  Secondly, in R v Dougall,240 the Judge 
rejected SFO claims for leniency.    
6.2.2.1 Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) 
A significant feature in the response to economic crime in the US is the availability 
of mechanisms to conclude agreements between prosecutors, the  DoJ and SEC, 
and corporate entities whereby in exchange for admission of guilt, payment of a 
fine and undertakings regarding remediatory action, the corporate entity and 
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employees escape prosecution. 241 As an example of the financial penalties 
imposed, The Times reports that:  
Since 2010 JP Morgan has paid penalties totalling $28.7 billion for various 
failings relating to such matters as the misrepresentation to investors of 
bundled bad home loans as high-quality securities and the mis-selling of 
mortgage bonds to pension funds and other investors.242 
This figure includes ‘a non-tax deductible penalty of $1.7bn(…) [relating to] the 
Madoff fraud.’243 This settlement includes an agreement to co-operate with the 
authorities and not to commit any federal crimes but, as is typical of such 
settlements, no individuals were to be prosecuted.244 
The Coalition government decided to provide its prosecutors, with a similar facility 
to that used extensively in the US, because ‘[t]ackling and combating financial and 
economic crime, which encompass an array of offences such as theft, fraud and 
bribery, is a key commitment within the Coalition agreement.’245 The government 
points to the only two remedies available to prosecutors: those of ‘criminal 
prosecution or, where this is not possible or appropriate, pursuing a civil recovery 
order against the person or organisation concerned.’246 The Ministry of Justice 
recognised the disadvantages of these remedies where lengthy investigations are 
involved ‘and in the case of a criminal prosecution there is a strong likelihood of 
protracted court proceedings with no guarantee of a successful conviction.’247 The 
outcome of a successful prosecution would be a financial sanction and, as outlined 
above, a financial penalty is a key ingredient of a DPA. The second remedy 
available to the SFO of Civil Recovery Orders, ‘even when successful, are solely a 
mechanism to recover the proceeds of “unlawful conduct” and do not enable 
sanctions for wrongdoing or compensation of victims.’248  
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In the absence of the facility to conclude a DPA, the SFO had previously 
endeavoured to conclude ‘plea bargains’.  In R v Dougall, the SFO sought to agree 
a suspended 12 month prison sentence for Dougall’.249 Although passing that 
(requested) sentence, the Court of Appeal ‘yet again made clear that the power 
and responsibility of sentencing lies with the Court, and the Court alone.’250 This 
created difficulties for the SFO, which might have wished to conclude a plea 
agreement, since the court’s view was that the SFO ‘should not seek to make 
recommendations on sentencing.’251 
Shortly after his appointment as Director of the SFO, David Green outlined his 
vision and stated that ‘I am keen on maximising the set of tools available to SFO 
as an investigation and prosecuting agency, and DPAs represent a new and 
imaginative tool to deal with serious economic crime committed by commercial 
organisations.’252 Green considered that ‘[four] very important principles need to 
be observed: firstly that ‘sentencing in this jurisdiction is for the judge not the 
prosecution (…),’ and [secondly] ‘corporates cannot be seen to be allowed some 
special kid glove treatment (…) individuals will be prosecuted where that is the 
appropriate course of action (…) [lastly] admissions as to conduct must be 
realistic, factual and not fanciful.’253 
Some eighteen months later, DPA’s became available to the SFO from by virtue of 
the Crime and Courts Act 2013.254 A DPA, which is a discretionary tool,255 is 
subject to court approval.256 The prosecutors are either the DPP or the Director of 
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the SFO, with the Act making it clear that powers to enter into a DPA must be 
exercised personally by the designated prosecutor.257 The Act specifies the 
‘persons who may enter into a DPA with a prosecutor’, which are in three 
categories: ‘P may be a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated 
association, but may not be an individual.258 This latter provision differs from the 
US so that in the UK, ‘DPA’s will not be available for individuals, whether for 
individual crimes or for action undertaken on behalf of an organisation.’259 
A DPA is likely to be available to companies which ‘self-report suspected criminal 
misconduct to SFO.’260 In such circumstances, the SFO would launch a formal 
criminal investigation to test the evidence and scale of offending.261 The SFO’s 
position is that:  
The available evidence may well pass the evidential test. But if the company 
has taken appropriate disciplinary action against those responsible, made 
appropriate amendments to its compliance regime, compensated victims, 
and genuinely and proactively cooperated with the SFO investigation, it is 
hard to see how it would be in the public interest to prosecute the company, 
as opposed to individuals.262 
The SFO warn that ‘if the corporate chooses to bury the misconduct rather than 
self-report, the risks attendant on discovery are truly unquantifiable.’263 The first 
DPA is awaited and will be subject to judicial supervision,264 and ‘as experience is 
built up by all parties, this will generate consistency and therefore predictability 
around the likelihood of achieving a DPA.’265 
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The reasoning for this is that ‘the most likely candidate for the first DPA will be the 
type of case that would attract the lowest level of fine on a plea of guilty if 
proceedings were to take place.’266 The clear issue for the SFO is that although it 
might well wish to avail itself of the new facility, given the history of judicial 
opprobrium, the SFO would not wish to risk an adverse outcome and the attendant 
publicity, of its first DPA presentation to court. Thus, it may be that the first cases 
of significance are more distant than immediately following the date the legislation 
took effect. 
6.2.2.2 Bribery Act 2010 
The SFO, is endowed with prosecutorial powers under the specific legislation of 
the BA2010 267 This legislation overhauls the UK’s patchwork of archaic corruption 
laws,268 and is regarded within the industry as ‘the single most important 
development’ in combating white collar crime.269  The BA2010 ‘provides the UK 
with some of the most draconian and far-reaching anti-corruption legislation in the 
world,’270 with the potential to ‘propel the UK to the forefront’ in fighting 
international bribery and corruption.271 The SFO’s prosecutions under the BA2010 
have been for relatively minor offences rather than the major instances of bribery 
projected when the legislation was enacted.272 The SFO’s first prosecution is of 
four former employees of Sustainable AgroEnergy plc for fraud, conspiracy to 
commit fraud and ‘making and accepting a financial advantage.’273 The trial 
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commenced at Southwark Crown Court in October 2014.274 This case was 
followed by charges against former employees of Smith and Ouzman Limited but 
under the previous legislation, Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, with the trial 
listed for November 2014.275 
6.2.2.3 LIBOR scandal 
The LIBOR scandal has been described as ‘the most high profile current issue in 
the United Kingdom.’276 The LIBOR scandal is ‘allegations277 that bankers have 
colluded to manipulate the London inter-bank lending interest rate.’278 LIBOR was 
managed by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) and used to calculate the 
interest rates for a range of financial instruments (…) [which were] used as the 
basis for many types of lending, from syndicated and commercial lending, to 
calculating rates on residential mortgages.’279 In July 2012, the SFO announced 
that it had agreed to investigate manipulation of LIBOR, since when, thirteen 
people have been charged with fraud or conspiracy to defraud.280 The SFO stated 
that would continue to work with the FCA and US agencies.281 The government 
said that ‘[i]t is vital that law enforcement agencies are seen to have both 
the will and the capability to investigate offences relating to complex 
financial transactions.’282 
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The LIBOR scandal erupted in June 2012 when the FSA announced a 
financial penalty of £59.5m had imposed on Barclays Bank.283 The FSA 
described the penalty as being for ‘significant failings’.284 The press and 
politicians referred to the issue as a scandal.’285 The issue was that LIBOR, 
‘something of an anachronism, a throwback to a time when many bankers 
within the square mile [City of London] knew one another and when trust 
was more important than contract.’286 As The Economist reports, ‘[w]hat 
may still seem to many to be a parochial affair involving Barclays, a 300-
year-old British Bank, rigging an obscure number, is beginning to assume 
global significance.’287 The FSA reported the misconduct of Barclays’ 
employees who ‘were involved in submitting artificially low estimate for the 
setting of the LIBOR, before and during the financial crisis.’288 LIBOR may 
well be a ‘throwback’ and the BBA, as discussed later, may well regret its 
role in managing a benchmark rate289 which was used for purposes outwith 
its original intention, however, the ‘LIBOR issue is serious.’290  
The reason why LIBOR is serious is that it, alongside ‘the Euro Interbank 
Offered rate (EURIBOR), are benchmark reference rates fundamental to the 
operation of both UK and international financial markets, including markets 
in interest rate derivatives contracts.’291 The FSA said that ‘LIBOR and 
EURIBOR are by far the most prevalent benchmark reference rates used in 
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euro, US dollar and sterling over the counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives 
contracts and exchange traded interest rate contracts.’292 The use made of 
this data affects ‘payments made under a wide range of other contracts 
including loans and mortgages’293 and involves ‘a wide range of 
counterparties including small businesses, large financial institutions and 
public authorities.’294 The volume of trades quoted by FSA is significant: 
The notional amount outstanding of OTC interest rate derivatives contracts in 
the first half of 2011 has been estimated at 554tn dollars. The total value oif 
volume of short term interest rate contracts traded on LIFFE [London 
International Financial Futures Exchange] in London in 2011 was 477 trillion 
euro including over 241 trillion euro relating to three month EURIBOR future 
contract.295 
Having established that LIBOR was far from an ‘obscure number’, it became clear 
that ‘[s]ince 2009, the FSA and other international regulators have been 
extensively investigating allegations of widespread attempts in the banking 
industry to manipulate’296 LIBOR. The Economist reported that:  
Regulators around the world have woken up, however belatedly, to the 
possibility that these vital markets may have been rigged by a large number 
of banks. The list of institutions that have said they are either co-operating 
with investigations or being questioned includes many of the world’s biggest 
banks. Among those that have disclosed their involvement are Citigroup, 
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, RBS and UBS.297 
Contemporaneously with Barclays’ financial penalty to FSA, ‘Barclays was also 
fined $200m by the US Commodity Futures and Trading Commission and a further 
US $160m penalty imposed by the DoJ in respect of attempted LIBOR 
manipulation and false reporting charges.’298 
                                            
292 Financial Services Authority, ‘Barclays Bank plc – Final Notice’ (n 291). 
293 Financial Services Authority, ‘Barclays Bank plc – Final Notice’ (n 291). 
294 Financial Services Authority, ‘Barclays Bank plc – Final Notice’ (n 291). 
295 Financial Services Authority, ‘Barclays Bank plc – Final Notice’ (n 291). 
296Other regulators included: United States, Canada and Japan. 
 Victoria Callaghan and Zia Ullah, ‘The LIBOR scandal – the UK’s legislative response’, (2013) 28(40 J I B L R 
160. 
297 The Economist, 7 July 2012 ‘The LIBOR SCANDAL: The rotten heart of finance’ 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558281 . Accessed 25 February 2014. 
298 Callaghan and Ullah (n 296) 160. 
Other charges: see Financial Conduct Authority (Chapter 5 – 5.2.1) 
 Financial Services Authority, ‘Barclays fined £59.5 million for significant failings in relation to LIBOR and 





A full review of the LIBOR scandal is outside the scope of this thesis, but there are 
other commentaries which provide greater details.299 However, a key issue was 
not just the ability of the regulator, to levy financial penalties300 but an examination 
of whether there had been breaches of the criminal law. George Osborne stated: 
every avenue for the possible criminal investigation of individuals involved in 
the attempted manipulation of LIBOR is being explored, but in the view of its 
chairman, Lord Turner, the powers given to the FSA do not allow it to pursue 
criminal sanctions. People in the country rightly ask why it does not have the 
necessary powers, and those who set up the tripartite system can answer.  
People also ask whether the gaping holes in the existing law mean that no 
action at all is possible. After all, fraud is a crime in ordinary business, so why 
should it not be in banking? I agree with that sentiment, and I welcome the 
Serious Fraud Office’s confirmation that it is actively and urgently considering 
the evidence to see whether criminal charges can be brought, particularly in 
relation to the Fraud Act 2006 and false accounting. It expects to come to a 
conclusion by the end of the month, and we encourage it to use every legal 
option available.301 
The outcome of the SFO review302 was that it ‘formally accepted on 6 July 2012, 
and involves an investigation into allegations of attempts by traders and submitters 
at a number of banks and other financial institutions to manipulate the rate at 
which LIBOR was set,’303 since when it has charged thirteen people with 
conspiracy to defraud.304 The issue of the relationship between FSA and SFO was 
highlighted in the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee which 
recommended a ‘formal and comprehensive framework’ be put in place: 
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The SFO is now conducting a criminal investigation into LIBOR. The 
Committee was surprised that neither the FSA nor the SFO saw fit to initiate 
a criminal investigation until after the FSA had imposed a financial penalty on 
Barclays. The evidence in this case suggests that a formal and 
comprehensive framework needs to be put in place by the two authorities to 
ensure effective relations in the investigation of serious fraud in financial 
markets. The lead authority must be clearly identified for the purposes of an 
investigation, and formal minutes of meetings between the authorities must 
be maintained. We recommend that the Wheatley review examine whether 
there is a legislative gap between the responsibility of the FSA and the SFO 
to initiate a criminal investigation in a case of serious fraud committed in 
relation to the financial markets.305 
The suggestion of a framework between SFO and FSA (now FCA) emphasises 
the need for cooperation between two agencies operating under the separate 
agency model, instead of reaping the benefit of matters being dealt with by one 
agency. 
A key challenge for the SFO is management of its financial resources which have 
recently diminished.306 Because of financial constraints, the SFO has to rely upon 
‘blockbuster’ funding,307 which the SFO describe as: 
This funding reflects the arrangement through which “Blockbuster” cases are 
supported. It is in the nature of the SFO’s work that significant additional 
funding can be required at short notice. In a very short space of time, it can 
become clear that an investigation, as wide as that into Libor, is required. At 
the same time, I consider it would be unacceptable to have expert 
investigators, lawyers and accountants as permanent employees waiting 
around in case such an investigation is required.308 
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In January 2014, the government announced further resources of £19m,309 but 
would not specify the resource allocation.310 However, the press reported that this 
was needed for the SFO’s inquiry into LIBOR, ‘Barclays fundraising from Qatar, a 
Rolls Royce investigation and to meet costs linked to a £300m damages suit 
launched by (…) the Tchenguiz brothers.’311 The latter being settled by the SFO 
paying damages and costs in August 2014.312 Unhappily for the SFO, the House 
of Commons Justice Committee has published more information,313 prompting the 
headline ‘Fraud Office gets £19m bailout after misleading taxman’314 because ‘it 
wrongly reclaimed VAT between 2009 and 2012 on fees paid to counsel.’315  
These issues are laid at the door of the previous Director.316 The Solicitor General 
having described the LIBOR scandal as ‘the most high profile current issue in the 
UK ,’317 the shadow Attorney General remarked that ‘it was entirely predictable 
that the scale and pace of budget cuts inflicted on the SFO would make it 
impossible for the agency to prosecute its workload.’318 In recognition of this, The 
Times report that the ‘Justice Committee is now to ask Dominic Grieve, the 
Attorney-General, if he thinks that “the current funding arrangements of the SFO 
are sustainable”.’319 
The perception of the SFO’s workload presents a further difficulty in that it does 
not provide a running commentary on its work, merely providing some occasional 
comment, such as: ‘[t]he biggest is Libor. This investigation employs a team of 60. 
Charges have been laid against [thirteen] individuals so far. There will be further 
                                            
309 Oliver Heald MP, HC Deb 30 January 2014, vol 574 col 39W 
310 Oliver Heald MP, HC Deb 4 February 2014, vol 575 col 147W 
311 Reuters, ‘UK fraud prosecutor seeks extra 19 million pounds for Libor, other cases’, (n 306). 
312 ‘The SFO has so far spent £8.1m defending the £300m claim by the Tchenguiz brothers, due to go to trial 
in October, the High Court heard’, Financial Times, 8 April 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f0e1f06-bf41-
11e3-a4af-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yUAjxFyc accessed 10 April 2014. 
‘The SFO has now agreed to pay Mr Tchenguiz and his business entities the total sum of £3 million plus their 
reasonable costs in full and final settlement of their civil claims.’ 
Serious Fraud Office, ‘The Serious Fraud Office and Vincent Tchenguiz announce settlement of civil claims’ 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/the-serious-fraud-office-and-
vincent-tchenguiz-announce-settlement-of-civil-claims.aspx . 
‘The SFO has now agreed to pay Mr Robert Tchenguiz, R20 and the Trustee the total sum of £1.5 million in 
full and final settlement, with costs to be determined by the Court if they cannot be agreed.’   
Serious Fraud Office, ‘The Serious Fraud Office and Robert Tchenguiz announce settlement of civil claims’ 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/the-serious-fraud-office-and-
robert-tchenguiz-announce-settlement-of-civil-claims.aspx accessed 20 August 2014. 
313 House of Commons Justice Committee, ‘Serious Fraud Office Supplementary Estimate 2013-14’ (n 306) 4. 
314 The Times, ‘Fraud Office gets £19m bailout’ (n 218). 
315 The Times, ‘Fraud Office gets £19m bailout’ (n 218). 
316 House of Commons Justice Committee, ‘Serious Fraud Office Supplementary Estimate 2013-14’ (n 306) 9. 
317 Attorney General’s Office, ‘Fighting economic crime in the modern world’ (n 10). 
318 Reuters, ‘UK fraud prosecutor seeks extra 19 million pounds for Libor, other cases’, (n 306). 




significant developments in due course.’320 Such statements are then augmented 
by further announcements of additional persons charged.321 The effect of this is 
that the SFO’s Director has no opportunity to advance his case, where Reuters 
report that ‘he has staked his reputation on the success of high-profile 
investigations such as the sprawling global investigation into Libor 
manipulation.’322 This then allows a vacuum to be filled by politicians, such as the 
shadow Attorney General observing: 
This is not a government that takes economic crime seriously, which is why it 
is allowing the SFO to stagger from crisis to crisis and providing temporary 
sticking plasters [blockbuster funding] where what is needed is a long-term 
plan to put it on a sustainable footing.’323 
In the meantime, parallel proceedings were instituted in the civil court in Graiseley 
Properties Limited v Barclays Bank Plc.324 In these cases, ‘[t]he Court of Appeal 
ruled (…) that two businesses bringing separate cases against Barclays and 
Deutsche Bank could include allegations about manipulation of the Libor lending 
benchmark in their cases.’325 However, Barclays settled the case before trial,326 
which had the effect of keeping documents and witness evidence private which 
might have shed light on the commercial issues giving rise to allegations of 
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6.2.3 The Competition and Markets Authority 
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)327 was established by the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA),328 taking effect from 1st April 
2014, at which stage the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and Competition 
Commission (CC) are abolished.329 It is a non-ministerial department of the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills.330 The government rationale for 
merging two ‘world class’331 organisations was provided by the CMA chairman: 
‘competition is a key driver for delivering greater productivity and growth in the UK 
economy, particularly in the context of the financial crisis and recession and the 
challenges that lie ahead in sustaining competitiveness.’332 The CMA was is a 
‘single competition and consumer authority, bringing together most of the OFT’s 
consumer role and all of its competition work together with the Competition 
Commission.’333 The OFT’s consumer credit activities being transferred to the 
FCA.334 The CMA was established as a ‘strong, independent competition 
authority’335 but given a ‘steer’336 by government as to its priorities, in particular: 
‘[s]ecuring strong, sustainable economic growth is the Government’s central 
priority and open and fair competition is a vital ingredient in achieving this.’337  The 
CMA is given a ‘steer’338 to enforce: ‘the CMA should select and conclude an 
appropriate mix of complex and simpler enforcement cases to maximise its impact, 
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end abuse and create a credible deterrent effect to anticompetitive behaviour 
across the whole economy.’339 
The significance of the establishment of the CMA is that it is the single entity to 
regulate competition and markets and it is a ‘unitary body (…) bringing together 
the OFT’s competition and key consumer functions with the functions of the 
CC.’340 The concentration of resource into one entity is precisely what was 
proposed in relation to the formation of an ECA. The government rationale is that 
by: ‘combining these roles in a single body, the regime will be more coherent and 
predictable, competition processes more efficient and there will be more flexible 
allocation of resources.’341 Clearly, the inference to be drawn is that a multiplicity 
of bodies is less coherent, less predicable and less efficient because resources 
cannot be managed to advantage. Furthermore, in pursuance of CMA’s objective 
to criminalise cartels, the prosecutor no longer has to prove dishonesty.342 
Unlike conspiracy to defraud, where dishonesty has to be present,343 the removal 
of the requirement to establish Ghosh344 dishonesty from the criminal cartel 
offence,’345 in addition to the ERRA346 which also addresses the concurrent 
enforcement powers ‘granted to certain sector economic regulators [which] is one 
of the more remarkable features of UK competition law.’347 These regulators were 
established as part of the privatisation348 of state-owned businesses, such as 
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water, gas and electricity349 and have their own regulatory powers. The 
government was keen to see increased enforcement activity stating that ‘the cartel 
offence should deter the most serious forms of anti-competitive behaviour but 
there have been only 2 cases prosecuted, only 1 successfully.’350 Thus, there is 
increased pressure on sector regulators to use antitrust powers to promote 
competition: [t]he CMA will also have powers to allocate cases, and in certain 
circumstances, take cases from sector regulators.’351 The clarity of purpose is 
plain and within the CMA structure including the network of statutory regulators, 
the expectation is that either the regulators use their powers of the CMA will do so. 
This offers a template which could be used with advantage in relation to an ECA. 
6.2.4 Crown Prosecution Service 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is headed by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.352 Since 2010, the CPS has also administratively encompassed the 
Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office (RCPO),353 although legislation to 
achieve formal transfer of powers had to wait until 2014.354 It is instructive to note 
that the previous government’s method of achieving an administrative merger was 
to appoint the DPP additionally as the Director of RCPO, but what this meant was 
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‘running two offices under one umbrella’.355 Thus, to achieve the amalgamation of 
two prosecutorial organisations, the simple mechanism of appointing the same 
person to head both organisations must have been intended to accomplish the 
objective without the necessity of formalising such change. However, this simple 
solution had still left in place an operational difficulty because since 2010, RCPO 
cases had been ‘ring fenced’.356 The manner in which this has been implemented 
is that RCPO cases remained to be ‘prosecuted by a specialist fraud division of 
the CPS’357 which is administratively cumbersome because of confidentiality 
considerations which limited RCPO cases to being handled by a small number of 
crown prosecutors, rather than by any similarly authorized CPS prosecutors.358 
The government considered that the ‘two offices under one umbrella’359 operating 
model was inefficient and time-consuming whereas the combined operation would 
provide ‘increased value for money that derives from minimising duplication and 
making economies of scale.’360 This is a further example of the muddled manner in 
which the UK government’s response to economic crime was hamstrung from the 
outset by not establishing a cohesive management structure for the CPS, 
underpinned by the proper legislative change, belatedly taking place in 2014,361 
which enables the relationship to be placed on a formal basis, which should have 
happened at the outset as the scrutiny committee confirmed that this was not a 
contentious matter.362 
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6.2.5 National Fraud Authority 
The NFA, was originally titled The National Strategic Fraud Authority and was 
established in 2008.363 However, its existence has proved to be short-lived 
because it ceased to exist from March 2014,364 and to ‘realign its responsibilities to 
reflect the creation of the NCA.’365 The government explained that ‘[w]hile the NFA 
has been successful in raising awareness of fraud and improving co-ordination, 
the focus should now be on cutting economic crime.’366 The government’s 
conclusion is that ‘[t]he closure of the NFA will strengthen the government’s fight 
against economic crime by concentrating effort into law enforcement bodies and 
improving the fraud reporting and analysis service.’367 The NFA responsibilities 
were spread amongst the Home Office, NCA, Cabinet Office and City of London 
Police (COLP).368 The latter change will see the reporting of fraud into the 
dedicated centre, Action Fraud,369 become the responsibility of COLP. Given that 
the creation of Action Fraud was a key recommendation of the Fraud Review in 
2006,370 when it would have been open to the review to conclude that the fraud 
reporting centre should be located within COLP, this is a significant change and 
takes away the independence of the fraud reports receptor. In April 2013, ‘all UK 
police forces started referring victims directly to Action Fraud’,371 in a move 
which saw all police forces reporting fraud to a non police organization but 
which is to be embraced within a single police force, as COLP observe: 
‘[t]his further integrates our functionality as the National Police Service Lead 
for Economic Crime and enhances our capability to combating fraud 
nationwide.’372 COLP state that they are ‘the acknowledged lead force within 
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the UK for economic crime investigation’,373 however, they will have to work 
with the NCA’s Economic Crime Command.374 This adds another level of 
complexity in managing the relationship between different organisations 
instead of one cohesive unit incorporating all the elements of the anti-
economic crime endeavours. 
6.2.6 National Crime Agency 
The NCA, formed by the Crimes and Courts Act 2013375 became operational in 
October 2013,376  took over the Serious Organised Crime Agency377 intended to 
be: 
front and centre in the UK’s fight to cut serious and organised crime. It will be 
a highly visible agency of crime fighters, drawing on a single, shared, national 
intelligence picture to lead the UK’s response to the most dangerous criminal 
groups and individuals.378  
‘The NCA is classified as a Non-Ministerial Department,’379 and directly 
accountable through the Home Secretary to Parliament.380 Although a new 
organisation, it encompasses a number of existing organisations.381 The NCA 
organises its activities into four command areas: Organised Crime Command; 
Border Policing Command; Economic Crime Command; and CEOP Command.382 
The government have set the NCA strategic priorities: ‘to identify and disrupt 
serious and organised crime including by investigating and enabling the 
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prosecution of those responsible.’383 ‘to support, and  where appropriate, lead 
cross-government work (…) strengthen protection against and reduce the impact 
of serious and organised crime’384 and preventing people becoming involved in 
such crime.385 The priorities also include collaboration with other departments and 
agencies together with facilitating ‘intelligence sharing and transparency.’386 
The Economic Crime Command (ECC) is the area of importance to this research, 
because it was established as part of NCA rather than being a separate ECA. The 
NCA sees the ECC’s role as ‘to cut economic crime by disrupting criminal activity 
and educating those most of risk of attack. It coordinates activity, shares 
intelligence and knowledge with partners, disrupting criminal activity, and seizing 
assets.’387 The NCA Annual Plan 2014/15388 ‘published at the start of the NCA’s 
first full operational year,’ forms ‘the basis for how the NCA will lead, support and 
coordinate the operational response to the threat from serious and organised 
crime.’389 It is clear both that the NCA have little to report in terms of ECC activities 
and the plan merely identifies themes for its future work: ‘fraud against the 
individual, the private and the third sectors; fraud against the public sector (these 
are high priority);390 bribery and corruption / sanctions evasion; counterfeit 
currency; market abuse / insider dealing.’391 Although the NCA has been in 
existence for a short time which does not allow conclusions to be drawn regarding 
its performance, the themes identified suggest a confused approach with yet 
another agency involved in anti-bribery and corruption and market abuse and 
insider dealing which already has areas of overlap with the SFO and FCA. 
6.3 Trade Associations 
There are three significant trade associations which make a contribution to a 
regulatory response to economic crime. The BBA represents the interests of the 
UK banking industry while the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) is 
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an association of financial services industry organisations with a focus on 
combatting money laundering. The Fraud Advisory Panel (FAP) seeks to raise 
awareness of fraud and provide advice to government and others. These trade 
associations do more than merely providing commentaries on the economic crime 
arena: JMLSG guidance is endorsed by government; FAP has been given a lead 
role in civil justice approach to fraud; while the BBA created and managed the 
international benchmark interest rates system which regrettably mutated into an 
instrument used in economic crime. These demonstrate the mixed effectiveness of 
non government bodies and suggest that a more cohesive approach is 
appropriate. 
6.3.1 British Bankers’ Association 
The BBA is ‘the UK’s leading association for the banking and financial services 
sector, representing the interests of more than 240 member organisations with a 
worldwide presence in 180 countries.’392  
The role of the BBA is to help customers, promoting growth, raising standards.’393 
The BBA has two high level strategic aims: ‘to restore trust and confidence in 
banking; [and], to be the principal trade association for banking.’394 This is a 
response to the economic crisis and recognition that ‘[t]rust and confidence in 
banking in the UK is at a low level and there is widespread hostility to banks 
among politicians, regulators, the media, consumer groups and some business 
groups.’395 The BBA recognise that ‘[t]his makes it difficult for banks to get their 
legitimate concerns addressed’,396 which is not assisted by the tarnished 
reputation of the BBA itself as the industry mouthpiece for they themselves 
acknowledge that their own reputation ‘has also been damaged.’397 The challenge 
for the BBA is to realise their ambition to ‘restore confidence and trust in banking 
so that BBA members can fully contribute to the delivery of sustained economic 
growth and support customers and clients, and so that the sector is no longer the 
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subject for political debate.’398 The ‘trade association’ work undertaken by BBA 
involves representing the banking industry on regulation and legislation at UK, EU 
and international level, recognising that ‘the bulk of regulation affecting banking 
[comes] from the EU.’399 This is an important area because the BBA point to ‘the 
divergence of regulatory approaches in international financial markets’400 which 
‘encourages “regulatory arbitrage” whereby financial service providers have an 
incentive to locate business in the most favourable regulatory regime.’401 Thus, the 
BBA recognise their role is as a trade association speaking for their members in 
an antipathetic environment, which should benefit from a line being drawn on their 
involvement in the LIBOR scandal which, regrettably, saw a helpful benchmark 
interest rate become an instrument of economic crime. 
6.3.1.1 BBA and LIBOR 
The BBA has faced the twin challenges of representing the banking sector at a 
time when banks themselves were in the spotlight because of the financial crisis 
and  the LIBOR scandal, where LIBOR: 402 
closely reflects the real rates of interest being used by the world’s big 
financial institutions. Central banks (…) fix official base rates monthly, but 
BBA LIBOR reflects the rate at which banks borrow money from each other 
each day. BBA LIBOR figures are issued daily on more than one million 
screens around the world and are widely reported in the press.403 
The reason LIBOR is important is that the rates are used widely around the world 
and for a significant number of financial transactions.404 Thus, BBA in its role as a 
trade association was endeavouring to be helpful in creating the LIBOR 
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benchmark but had not seemingly reacted to the growing importance of its data 
nor how such data was being utilised, with the consequence that its ‘systems, 
controls and governance arrangements (…) had proven inadequate.405 The 
Treasury Review noted that the BBA had voiced questions over the 
appropriateness of a trade body providing this function.406 The ‘Wheatley Review’ 
(Wheatley)407 concluded that: the ‘authorities should introduce statutory regulation 
of (…) LIBOR, including an Approved Persons regime, to provide the assurance of 
credible independent supervision, oversight and enforcement, both civil and 
criminal; and that the ‘BBA should transfer responsibility for LIBOR to a new 
administrator.’408 Another recommendation of Wheatley was that LIBOR should 
become a regulated activity which has been achieved by  the ‘Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2013.’409 The 
BBA involvement in LIBOR ceased in January 2014, when administration was 
handed over to another organisation.410 
6.4 Conclusion 
The Coalition government came to power with a bold mission ‘to hold those 
suspected of financial wrongdoing to account’411 as part of their ‘day of 
reckoning’412 and ‘serious about white collar crime’413 agenda.  In order to achieve 
this key policy objective the Coalition government agreed to ‘to create a single 
                                            
405 A clear finding of the Review is that the systems, controls and governance arrangements covering the 
processes of submitting to and administering LIBOR have proven inadequate especially given the pressures 
on LIBOR created by market developments in recent years. Given the importance of the benchmark to the 
stable and efficient operation of a wide range of financial markets, there is a strong case for bringing these 
activities clearly and explicitly within the regulatory perimeter.’  ‘H M Treasury, ‘The Wheatley Review of 
LIBOR: final report’, 11. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_libor_f
inalreport_280912.pdf accessed 17 January 2014. 
406 ‘It should be noted that on 25 April 2008, Angela Knight [BBA Chief Executive] is quoted as telling a 
meeting of senior UK bankers, as well as representatives of the Bank of England (including the Deputy 
Governor at the time, Sir John Gieve) that "Longer term, [she] thought it would be necessary to explore 
whether a trade association was best placed to continue to provide what represented a key piece of market 
infrastructure."[.’ Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Business Plan 2014/15’ (n 122) 57. 
407 H M Treasury, ‘The Wheatley Review’ (n 405). 
408 H M Treasury,‘The Wheatley Review’ (n 405). 
409 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Administrator and Submitter of specified benchmarks (LIBOR)’ 1 April 2013 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/firms/specified-benchmarks-libor accessed 17 January 2014. 
410 IntercontinentalExchange Group (NYSE: ICE), the leading global network of exchanges and clearing 
houses, today announced that ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) will officially take over as the new 
administrator of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) from February 1, 2014. Today the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) confirmed formal authorisation to IBA to administer LIBOR effective February 1, 
2014.’ Intercontinental Exchange Group, ‘Libor’ http://ir.theice.com/default.aspx?SectionId=5cc5ecae-6c48-
4521-a1ad-480e593e4835&LanguageId=1&PressReleaseId=3ad034fa-38c3-4161-903e-c5d8406289ff 
accessed 24 February 2014. 
411 BBC, ‘Cameron urges 'day of reckoning' (n 14). 
412 BBC, ‘Cameron urges 'day of reckoning' (n 14). 




agency to take on the work of tackling serious economic crime that is currently 
dispersed across a number of Government departments and agencies.’414 
The Coalition government considered that the previous financial regulatory, or 
‘tripartite’, regime centred on the FSA as a ‘super regulator’,415 together with HMT 
and the BoE, had failed to achieve its objectives by identifying ‘gaps in the UK 
regulatory system’.416  Furthermore, the FSA’s performance was attributed to the 
weakness of its ‘light-touch’ approach and an ‘overly close relationship with the 
City,’417 encouraged by political pressure to be ‘business friendly’ in competing 
with other financial centres, such as New York.418 The government’s response was 
to replace tripartite model with the ‘twin peaks’ model, where, firstly and 
pivotally,419 the BoE was given responsibility for Financial Stability and for the 
Prudential Regulation of banking institutions. The second ‘peak’ was the creation 
of the FCA to take responsibility for protecting consumers and the financial 
markets.  This meant the disbanding of the FSA and provided a challenge to its 
successor not to be seen as simply the beneficiary of a rebranding exercise. 
The PRA has the statutory role of ‘the promotion of the safety and soundness of 
PRA-authorised persons;420 and ‘specifically for insurers, to contribute to the 
securing of an appropriate degree of protection for policyholders.’421 Under the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, the PRA and FCA were given 
responsibility to prosecute a new criminal offence of ‘relating to a decision causing 
a financial institution to fail.’422 However, this would only apply to cases where a 
bank or financial institution had failed and entered insolvency, thus, poor decision 
making at a bank or institution which did not result in insolvency would not be 
penalised. This is a significant deficiency and is not congruent with the Prime 
Minister’s pre-government stance that ‘those who break the law should face 
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prosecution.423 Furthermore, the lack of criminal charges against any individual 
involved casts doubt on the FCA’s credible deterrence influencing individuals. 
Thus, although the FCA has a range of administrative penalties, there is a gap for 
conduct which warrants a criminal sanction in cases where there is no institutional 
failure or insolvency and the Fisher proposal of a crime of ‘reckless risk-taking’424 
provides an attractive solution. 
The replacement of ‘tripartite’ with ‘twin peaks’ regulatory model is a fulfilment of 
the Coalition agreement. However, in relation to the government commitment to 
establish an ECA, the government has ‘backtracked’.425 Instead of the SFO 
forming a key part of the overarching ECA, it has had to fight for its continued 
existence as the Home Office established a new non-ministerial department, the 
NCA, whose responsibilities range from border control to child exploitation and 
online protection but also encompass an ‘Economic Crime Command.’ This is a 
disappointment because instead of the ECA being accountable to either the 
Attorney General, as a specialist prosecutor,426 or HMT, with the same status as 
counter-terrorism financing, anti-money laundering or prudential regulation,427 the 
NCA is part of the Home Office bailiwick which states that it is ‘the department with 
the role of crime-fighting’, believing that ‘the government is determined to give 
greater focus to tackling both serious and economic crime’428 and ‘that the 
“piecemeal” approach to tackling white-collar crime will end’.429 As part of 
organisational changes, the NFA, which provided the government’s strategic lead 
on combating fraud, was subsumed into the Home Office in 2013 and formally 
disbanded in 2014.430  
Although the prospect of an ECA has receded, the two principal agencies have 
undoubtedly raised their profiles but whereas the former FSA Enforcement 
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Division looks to be settled as part of the FCA, the SFO’s future looks uncertain. 
The FCA, as a regulator, has been able to impose significant financial penalties 
(mainly as a result of LIBOR failings) totalling £476m in 2014.431 
The government’s intention for the FCA was of ‘delivering a regulatory regime 
under which the conduct of business of all retail financial services is regulated by a 
single body.’432 The FCA has ‘a single overarching strategic objective to ensure 
that markets function well’,433 unlike its predecessor the FSA which had four equal 
objectives, one being ‘the reduction of financial crime’,434 One of the FCA’s 
operational objectives is integrity:435 ‘protecting and enhancing the integrity of the 
UK financial system,’436 and includes ‘not being used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime.’437 In pursuit of these objectives, the FCA has continued the policy 
of ‘credible deterrence’, for which ‘the imposition of a financial penalty is central to 
its policy.’438 This policy has certain fiscal attractions because significant monies 
are raised for the Exchequer,439 however, as Cartwright observes, ‘[m]any 
breaches of FSMA occur where firms lack adequate controls, supervision and 
organisation rather than where they display wilful misconduct.’440 The ‘credible 
deterrence’ policy, whilst remunerative, has not answered questions such as that 
posed by Judge Rakoff in relation to the financial crisis of ‘[w]hy have no high level 
executives been prosecuted?’441 Thus, ‘the failure of the government to bring to 
justice those responsible for such colossal fraud bespeaks weaknesses in our 
prosecutorial system that need to be addressed.’442 Although Rakoff’s perspective 
is in relation to the US, the same questions and reasoning equally apply to the UK. 
Such a question is seen in sharp relief when the FCA had an opportunity in 2014 
to demonstrate the credibility of its deterrence by taking action against an 
individual who had sought to benefit from the financial crisis by profiting 
unreasonably from Quantitative Easing to the detriment of the BoE and, ultimately, 
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the UK taxpayer.443 The FCA’s response was a financial penalty of £662,700 and 
prohibition from working in the City.444 Clearly, the penalty was a significant sum 
for an individual but, set against his earnings for the previous year of £2.367m,445 
does not look especially credible and far from eliciting condemnation, City 
commentators believed he had been harshly treated446 which may be an indication 
of a ‘mindset’ dating back to the time of ‘light touch’ regulation.  
The heavier touch is associated with the SFO which has a unique role because of 
its power to both investigate and prosecute potential crimes unlike the Police and 
CPS who have separate roles. The SFO has the benefit of a relatively new 
BA2010 and the availability of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, though neither 
had the expected impact by mid-2014: firstly, because the prosecution of Bribery 
Act offences was for activities after July 2011 and there is a lengthy lead time 
cases to come to trial; and, secondly, because DPA’s only became available from 
February 2014. However, notwithstanding the lack of an SFO bribery case coming 
to trial, they have proposed an extension of the BA2010 s.7 offence of ‘failure to 
prevent bribery’447 as their contribution to answering the Rakoff question. Instead 
of having to prove that high level executives were the ‘controlling mind’, the SFO 
propose an offence of ‘failing to prevent all acts of financial crime, which would 
make the firm liable for all such offences by its staff. Not only would this have 
direct financial consequences but ‘threat of debarment from tendering for public 
contracts of any kind across the whole of the EU, which is thought to be far more 
worrying for corporations than one-off fines, whatever the size.’448 
However, in terms of performance, the SFO has also unable to shake off the past 
reputation of being maladroit because it seems that each success in investigation 
and prosecution is matched by examples of the SFO suffering from problems of its 
own making.  For example, the Tchenguiz investigation and prosecution revealed 
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problems with its search procedures, resulting in litigation against the SFO 
reported to be of £300m;449 documentation relating to the SFO investigation of 
BAE being found in a cannabis farm;450 the Dahdaleh trial collapsing shortly before 
DoJ agreed  a DPA including a  penalty of US$384m on broadly the same facts;451 
and most recently the SFO’s internal accounting issues of unauthorised payments 
to its own staff and wrongly claiming VAT refunds.452 Although these SFO issues 
can properly be laid at the door of the departed Director, nevertheless, the 
impression gains currency that the SFO is accident-prone. 
Furthermore, the SFO has inadequate resources and a diminishing budget forces 
it to rely upon ‘blockbuster’ funding for new investigations, as with LIBOR.453 This 
is in sharp contrast to the FCA which has seen its budget increase by 15% to 
£452m since transforming itself from FSA.454 
LIBOR is a scandal which erupted in 2012455 and involves the FCA, SFO, BBA 
and BoE is the ‘allegations that bankers have colluded to manipulate the London 
inter-bank lending interest rate.’456 Barclays were fined £59.5m, followed by UBS 
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£160m,457 RBS £87.5m,458 ICAP £14m 459 and Rabobank £105m.460 The reason 
why LIBOR is important is that it is the ‘benchmark reference rate fundamental 
to the operation of both UK and international financial markets, including 
markets in interest rate derivatives contracts.’461 In addition to the 
administrative penalties imposed by FCA, the SFO announced that it had agreed 
to investigate manipulation of LIBOR, since when, thirteen people have been 
charged with fraud or conspiracy to defraud.462 However, both the FSA and SFO 
were criticised by Parliament for failing to initiate a criminal investigation until 
Barclays had been fined.463 The government has described the LIBOR scandal as 
‘the most high profile current issue in the United Kingdom’,464 which serves to 
highlight the role of two different organisations where the regulator seemed 
satisfied to impose a financial penalty without addressing the issue of criminal 
sanctions. Clearly, with both FCA and SFO as part of an ECA, there could have 
been greater clarity of thinking and a cohesive approach.  
The BoE is responsible for ‘efficient and effective financial markets,’465 and ‘for the 
stability of the system as a whole,’466 whereas the FCA has ‘responsibility to 
oversee financial markets.’467 This is clearly confusing but is a demonstration that 
the anti-economic crime arena is multifaceted. This can be seen in serious 
allegations of manipulation of the foreign exchange markets,468 described by FCA 
as ‘every bit as bad as they have been with Libor’.469 The additional ingredient in 
this case is the involvement of the BoE which has suspended a member of staff,470 
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announcing that it would ‘tighten its governance,’471 and establish an enquiry.’472 
Thus, the interplay between the regulators of the markets and potential for SFO 
investigation will be interesting to observe because it has the potential to reveal 
either gaps in regulation or inertia caused by overlap between regulators. The 
need for primacy in regulation is underlined by the BoE’s concern that its parallel 
regulator the FCA had caused a false market in shares when announcing an 
enquiry into zombie (insurance) funds in 2014.473 If the tripartite regime was 
criticised for confusion over roles and responsibilities, it is important that the 
markets have one ultimate regulator and that should be the BoE because it is 
responsible for the stability of the system as a whole.  
The creation of the NCA has added another level of confusion because the ECC 
has ambitions: ‘it coordinates activity, shares intelligence and knowledge with 
partners, disrupting criminal activity, and seizing assets.’474 Some of these 
activities are already undertaken by the SFO and FCA. The next level of confusion 
is that the ECC has themes for its future work which includes fraud,475 bribery and 
corruption and market abuse / insider dealing,’476 which are certainly key areas for 
SFO and FCA. 
The UK needs a cohesive and effective anti-economic crime policy and that 
government was right to propose an ECA as part of its white-collar crime agenda 
where is said that its mission was to hold people suspected of financial 
wrongdoing to account,477 in a day of reckoning,478 which demonstrated that the 
government was serious about white-collar crime.479 Notwithstanding such lofty 
ambitions, the government was wrong to be diverted from that course. Whilst, a 
generation earlier, Roskill advanced a clear rationale for the SFO’s creation, it can 
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also be concluded that its limited role and remit owed more to political expediency 
and infighting rather than a firm belief in the finished article, with the consequence 
that it has failed to meet expectations. The government has successfully created 
the CMA, which has overarching responsibility for its sector and subsidiary 
regulators. This is a template which should be employed for the economic crime 
arena where an ECA encompassing the SFO and FCA (and employing the 
resources of the COLP and regional police forces).  The CMA is a credible agency 
in itself, whereas the current economic crime equivalent is merely a division of the 
NCA. What a strong ECA offers is the prospect of an independent authority to 
bring together the regulatory structure and enforcement regime of the FCA 
together with the investigation and prosecution powers of the SFO. Just as the 
CMA has the ability to take over actions by its constituent regulatory bodies, so an 
ECA should be able to deploy the powers of both the SFO and FCA to ensure that 
the correct sanction is advanced rather than each organisation being either 
hamstrung by its own powers or adopting civil remedies when a particular conduct 
demands a criminal sanction. In this regard, while the availability of an ‘Offence 
relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail’480 (or reckless banking) 
is of some benefit in relation to an insolvent financial institution, the gap between 
the tectonic plates of economic crime would be covered by the addition of a further 
criminal sanction for ‘Reckless risk-taking on the financial markers.’481 This may be 
modern language but it harkens back to the conclusion of Roskill that:  
The public no longer believes that the legal system in England and Wales is 
capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us 
suggests that the public is right.482 
Thus, the creation of an Economic Crime Agency, adopting the CMA template and 
encompassing the existing bodies of SFO and FCA would remove both areas of 
overlap and underlap and, within an overarching structure, ensure that existing 
and new legislative powers are available to match the imperatives of dynamic 
financial markets.   
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Chapter Seven: The United States of America  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically reviews and contrasts the United States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK) approaches to economic crime. The US is chosen as a comparator 
country to study because it has a dominant position as the largest single country in 
terms of international trade.1  
It is logical to suggest that the largest trading nation would suffer economic crime 
and illogical to ignore its methods of dealing with these issues. The nature of 
international trade is that within a framework of international conventions countries 
should have their own economic crime legislation but being aware of jurisdictional 
arbitrage, whereby adherence to one countries laws might be more advantageous 
than another’s. This chapter looks critically at the US approach to fraud, bribery 
and corruption, comparing its statutes with the UK and its regulatory bodies to 
ascertain whether the US experience can offer a template for the UK. 
The key US statute to combat economic crime internationally is the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA)2 which has a major difference with the UK in 
that it allows ‘modest hospitality expenditure and small facilitation payments’.3 
Additionally it permits payments to foreign political officials ‘to expedite or secure 
the performance of a routine government action.’4 The difference of approach is 
important because the US Department of Justice (DoJ) frequently prosecutes 
international companies alongside, or leading, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). 
The US takes breaches of FCPA seriously with threats of prosecutions leading to 
financial sanctions amounting to  ‘eye-watering’ proportions when compared with 
UK.5 Many organisations conducting business internationally are already familiar 
                                            
18.6% of global exports and 12.9% of global imports (UK accounted for 2.6% and 3.8% and China 11.4% and 
10% respectively) 
 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2012. Leading Traders 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf accessed 30 September 2014. 
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977. 
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with FCPA because, although it is US domestic legislation, it applies to non US 
companies such as those listed on the US Stock Exchanges or other capital 
markets or use US telecommunications or banking systems.  As an example of the 
extra-territorial application of FCPA related to Alcatel-Lucent who agreed to settle 
claims by the DoJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by paying 
$137m because they bribed foreign government officials in Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Malaysia and Taiwan in order to secure a number of telecommunications 
contracts.6 The DoJ’s comments put this into perspective: ‘[f]oreign bribery 
weakens economic development, erodes confidence in the marketplace and 
distorts competition.’ 7 The DoJ agreed a three year deferral of prosecution during 
which Alcatel had to institute an enhanced corporate compliance programme and 
employ an independent compliance monitor to oversee the company’s 
implementation and maintenance of an enhanced FCPA compliance program and 
to submit yearly reports to the DoJ. Alcatel resolved to cease using sales and 
marketing agents worldwide because Court documents showed that Alcatel’s 
business model was ‘prone to corruption’.8 Consultants were used as conduits for 
bribery payments to foreign officials and business executives of private 
customers.9 One Alcatel executive has been imprisoned for conspiring to violate 
the FCPA, making corrupt payments, and laundering the bribe payments through a 
third-party.10 Additionally, Siemens agreed to pay $1.6bn in fines, penalties and 
disgorgement of profits to US and German authorities.11 These headlines support 
the view that the US has taken the lead in anti-corruption endeavours with the 
FCPA  in the vanguard of compliance and ethical conduct or international 
businesses.12 The international nature of trade and the differing standards applied 
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http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html Accessed 8 February 2011. 
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by countries militated in favour of a global framework to standardise approaches to 
bribery and corruption. 
7.2 International Conventions 
In the economic crime arena, ‘[g]lobalization has forced like-minded western 
capitalists to interact with their counterparts in lower-income countries, where 
interpretations of trust, reciprocity, honesty and social engagement may differ.’13 
As a consequence, demand grew for a some  international standards to be 
created to which all countries should adhere in order to create a ‘level playingfield’. 
According to Eicher, in the US by the mid-1970s, ‘[m]ore than 400 [companies] 
openly admitted paying foreign government officials, politicians and political 
parties.’14 In response to ‘public discontent’ as to why ‘American companies [were] 
engaging in unethical practices and encouraging corruption in other countries,’15 
the US Congress created the FCPA, which ‘was ground-breaking for its time, as it 
was the first international anti-bribery statute of its type and scope in the world,’16 
or, to be accurate, domestic statute with international scope. 
One unintended consequence of the reach of the FCPA was that US Congress 
later considered that ‘American businesses have operated at a disadvantage 
relative to foreign competitors who have continued to pay bribes without fear of a 
penalty.’17 Furthermore, other countries were criticised for making such payments 
‘tax deductible’,18 which would indicate that such payments were treated as a 
legitimate business expense.19 The expectation of the US government was that 
                                                                                                                                    
In 2014, China has also become more active. See, for example, Glaxosmithkline, where the SFO has opened 
an investigation. Serious Fraud Office, ‘GlaxoSmithKline plc investigation’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/glaxosmithkline-plc-investigation.aspx  
‘GSK could yet face further action from US and UK authorities which have the power to punish the company 
for overseas corruption. Investigations are under way in both countries.’ 
Financial Times, ‘GSK to pay £297m fine for Chinese bribes’ http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dea9811e-3fd5-11e4-
936b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Eo0GXH00 accessed 30 September 2014. 
13 Sharon Eicher, ‘Introduction: What Corruption is and Why it Matters’ in Sharon Eicher (ed) Corruption in 
International Business: the challenge of cultural and legal diversity (Ashgate 2009). 
14 Sharon Eicher, ‘Risk management – playing by the rules’ in Sharon Eicher (ed) Corruption in International 
Business: the challenge of cultural and legal diversity (Ashgate 2009). 
15 Eicher, ‘Risk management – playing by the rules’ (n 14). 
16 Heidi L Hansberry, ‘In spite of its good intentions, the Dodd-Frank Act has created an FCPA monster’ 
(2012) 102 JCRLC 195. 
17 Department of Justice, ‘Proposed Legislative History. International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998’ 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/leghistory.pdf accessed 7 March 2013. 
18 Department of Justice, ‘Proposed Legislative History’ (n 17). 
19 Telegraph, 4 September 2012. Newspaper report indicates Russia takes a similar view. ‘Russian officials 
told bribes are not tax deductible.’ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9519292/Russian-




other countries would follow the US example in enacting similar legislation. 
However, as Griffin describes, ‘[f]oreign governments objected on a number of 
grounds’.20 Firstly, that ‘the extra-territorial application of national law is 
inconsistent with international law’,21 although that might have been because it 
was the US that was endeavouring to apply its national law extra-territorially. 
Secondly, that ‘ “bribery” and “corruption” are difficult to define and even more 
difficult to police’.22 Thirdly, the suggestion that bribery is a “public good” because 
‘the economic effects of bribery in developing countries often “trickle down” to 
disadvantaged members of the society’.23 Fourthly, that ‘the focus should be on 
officials that solicit bribes.’24  
The FCPA was not the only initiative in 1977, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) ‘produced its first Report on Extortion and Bribery in International 
Business Transactions.’25 The ICC objective was to end bribery and extortion by 
creating ‘the Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery’,26 which would be 
voluntarily adopted ‘by enterprises’.27 The ICC recommendation ‘that the United 
Nations adopt an international convention to prohibit corruption’, can be seen in 
light of FCPA as further supporting the international effort. However, as the  ICC 
report, ‘UN efforts to reach such an agreement fell through in the 1980s.’28 Griffin 
concluded that ‘[u]nfortunately, in the absence of an international treaty, there is 
no co-ordinating mechanism to ensure that the various initiatives do not result in 
inconsistent or burdensome legislation by numerous nations.29 It was not until 
2000, that the UN General Assembly recognised ‘that an effective international 
legal instrument against corruption (…) was desirable’,30 resulting in the United 
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25 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Combating Extortion and Bribery: ICC Rules of 
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Nations Convention against Corruption,31 to which 140 states are parties and a 
further 27 are signatories.32  
US ‘efforts to spread its gospel’33  culminated in the creation of OECD Convention: 
‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions’ in 1997.34 Furthermore, ‘the Council of Europe (COE) and 
the Organization of American States (OAS) each adopted recommendations that 
their member nations address the issue of bribery of foreign government 
officials.’35 The Council of Europe adopted both civil and criminal Law Conventions 
in 1999 and OAS ‘Inter-American Convention against Corruption in 1996’.36  
However, according to Carr:  
The scope of these conventions inevitably vary but all of them require 
contracting states to criminalize bribery from the supply side, although OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention is restricted solely to bribery of foreign public officials 
in the context of international business transactions.37 
The truism highlighted by Carr is that ‘[t]he success of any convention lies in it 
being ratified, implemented and enforced.’38 
What is apparent is an issue commented upon by ICC, which is that of co-
ordination of conventions.39 They highlight ‘from an international business 
standpoint the proliferation of anti-corruption instruments raises concerns about 
                                            
31 ‘United Nations Convention Against Corruption’,  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf Accessed 5 
August 2013. 
32 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention against Corruption  
Signature and Ratification Status as of 5 September 2014.  
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33 Hansberry (n 16) 195. 
34 US ratified in 1998 and took effect from 1999 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
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inconsistent rules, overlapping enforcement and lack of common definitions.’40 The 
remedy that the ICC propose is that ‘the OECD Convention should remain the 
principal instrument focusing on the supply side of international corruption.’41 The 
regional conventions (OAS, CE, African Union) ‘should give priority to issues on 
which progress can be made by cooperation among their participating parties’,42 
which would leave UNCAC to deal with issues which need world-wide 
cooperation.43 Since all these bodies have their own monitoring programmes, ICC 
propose that monitoring and assessment should be coordinated in order to remove 
duplication.44 
However, progress does appear to have been made for, as Feldman observed,45 
US advocacy that European and OECD nations should ‘ramp up enforcement of 
their anti-bribery laws on both a domestic and international basis’ has 
borne fruit, citing with approval the UK Bribery Act 2010.46 The US interest in this 
is because ‘the United States has, for better or worse, been viewed as the 
policeman for the world’47 and ‘remains by far the most vigorous enforcer of white 
collar offenses.’48 The US view is that ‘[i]n nations lacking strong legal institutions, 
law enforcement efforts against white collar offenses such as bribery of foreign 
officials has traditionally been spotty at best, and sometimes non-existent.’49 
Congruent with their belief that the US has set the standard for bribery 
enforcement, Feldman considers that ‘[a]lthough there is a movement in the 
international community toward greater white collar criminal enforcement, it will 
likely be some time before other countries take enforcement to the level that 
currently exists in the United States.’50 Thus, in the absence of internationally 
agreed and binding standards the US appears to have taken on the self-appointed 
role of ‘policeman’. At a time when ‘[w]estern-based multinational companies are 
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increasingly expanding into other regions and developing nations’,51 the 
challenges faced by companies are in extending the boundaries of commerce 
‘often in jurisdictions where there is a high susceptibility to corruption than is 
typical in the jurisdictions of more developed nations.’52 Here, Feldman cites 
China,53 where traders ‘will often be dealing with state owned enterprises (SOEs),’ 
and, in a telling phrase, ‘[u]nder the US Department of Justice’s typically 
expansive view of its jurisdiction employees of SOEs may well be viewed as 
government officials, creating potential exposure under FCPA.’54 The DoJ’s 
‘typically expansionist view of its jurisdiction’ can be seen in cases where it has 
endeavoured to extend the boundaries of its remit.55 
This chapter will now review the US criminalisation and regulatory regime which 
counters economic crime commencing with fraud.56  However, unlike bribery and 
corruption, fraud unfortunately does not benefit from an international convention.57 
7.3 Fraud  
The US government has, since enacting the FCPA given priority to combating 
economic crime, including the creation of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force (FFETF) to strengthen efforts to combat financial crime’ arising from the 
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2008 financial crisis.58 This followed an announcement in May 2009 that the DoJ 
‘has been given $330m to investigate any suspected instances of mortgage fraud 
and to pursue any potential prosecutions that arise from those investigations.’59 
The contrast with UK could not be more marked, since the budgeted resources 
available to SFO were progressively cut from £52m in 2008/9 to £30m in 2014/15 
before additional monies had to be made available,60 unlike its sister organisation 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) which is gaining a 15% increase in 
funding.61  Leaving aside the disparity in domestic budgets, there is a clear 
contrast between the US, which has allocated additional financial resources to 
combat economic crime, and the UK, which is intent upon driving down costs. At 
this stage, it is important to recognise that this does represent a change in US 
strategy which, under President’s Clinton and Bush, had concentrated resources 
on the ‘war on terror’.62 Ceresney highlights that ‘[f]ollowing the September 11th 
attacks, the FBI shifted more than 1,800 agents, nearly one third of all agents in 
criminal programs, including many of those trained in financial investigations, to 
counterterrorism and intelligence duties.’63 As a consequence, there were 
insufficient resources to deal with fraud and non-terrorism investigations.64 
Eventually, in 2008, ‘the FBI announced operation “Malicious Mortgage”, a multi-
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Serious Fraud Office, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/268927/sfo%20ar-
2014%20sps-26-6.pdf accessed 27 August 2014. 
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agency take down of more than 400 defendants charged with mortgage fraud 
schemes nationwide.’65 This presaged the creation of FFETF. 
The purpose in creating the FFETF was:  
the understanding that no matter the office or agency – federal, state, or 
local; law enforcement or regulatory – all of us within government share a 
common desire and have a core obligation to do everything that we can do to 
protect the American public from the often devastating effects of financial 
fraud, whether it be mortgage fraud or investment fraud, grant or 
procurement fraud consumer fraud or fraud in lending. And we know that we 
can accomplish so much more by working together than working in isolated, 
compartmentalised silos.66 
President Obama’s aim in creating FFETF is neatly encapsulated by stating that 
working together is better than in isolation, which is a key theme of this thesis 
when applied to the UK. However, in terms of prosecuting economic crime, while 
the UK has many agencies, as discussed in chapter six, the US as a federal 
country,67 is not streamlined either, hence the exhortation for agencies to work 
together: 
In the USA, the picture is complicated even more by the Federal and state 
infrastructure. Federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) have jurisdiction over a wide range of different types of fraud and 
corruption, such as public sector fraud and corruption, mass marketing fraud 
and identity fraud. However, there is also the [SEC], which takes the lead on 
investment fraud; the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation 
division, which deals with tax fraud; the United States Postal Inspectors, mail 
fraud; the United States Secret Service, credit card fraud / currency fraud; 
and many others with particular responsibilities. This is on top of a state 
bureaucracy of law enforcement which is often as diverse and complex as at 
Federal level.68 
In the US, according to Ryder,  ‘the prevention of fraud is an essential part of 
many criminal statutes and it shows no signs of abating.’69 However, as Podgor 
notes, the proliferation of fraud statutes is found to be ‘problematic in that there is 
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no specific group of statutes designated in the federal code as fraud statutes and 
no consistent definition.’70 Podgor’s view is that ‘the term “fraud” is a “concept” 
(…)’71 and ‘[a]lthough fraud is not a crime in itself, fraud is an integral aspect of 
several criminal statutes.’72 In the absence of a single fraud statute, ‘there appears 
to be an acceptance of an “I know it when I see it” approach. Judge Holmes of the 
Fifth Circuit stated that “the law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as 
old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity”.’73 The US is not alone in 
not providing a definition. The more recent UK Fraud Act also fails to do so.74 In 
light of the lack of definition, this chapter will not explore the various terms by 
which fraud is expressed.75 
US Fraud statutes are either generic, such as ‘conspiracy’, ‘mail’ or ‘wire’ frauds; 
or specific, such as ‘bankruptcy’ fraud, ‘healthcare’ fraud and ‘bank’ fraud. At the 
‘generic’ end of the spectrum the ‘focus of the [fraud] statute is almost exclusively 
on the fraud and not the object of the offense.’76 Thus, ‘the emphasis of the crime 
of mail fraud is the fraudulent conduct as opposed to the mailing.’77 In a similar 
manner, ‘a conspiracy to defraud does not require agreement to violate a specific 
statute.’78 The statute ‘Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United 
States’79 has been interpreted to be ‘so elastic over the years that it can potentially 
encompass any conduct which a court views as ‘collusive and dishonest’ if some 
federal rule or regulation was violated in the process.’80 As such, it is easy to 
understand the sentiments of the often quoted Judge Learned Hand who in 1925 
described the conspiracy statute as ‘that darling of the modern prosecutor’s 
nursery.’81 
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7.3.1 Criminalisation  
7.3.1.1 Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud 
The conspiracy statute dates back to 1867 and was followed in 1872 by the Mail 
Fraud Statute,82 which has mutated over time from being ‘merely one section 
within the postal act’83 into a general ‘nonspecific’ fraud statute.84 The origin of the 
US Mail Fraud Statute lies in a mid-nineteenth century desire to protect the US 
Post Office and prohibit its use for the transmission of letters or circulars for 
lotteries.85 Henning describes this statute as being ‘treated as a harmless 
stepchild by Congress’ but now it has universal application: 
Today, the mailing element seemingly provides federal prosecutors with carte 
blanche to prosecute virtually any activity to which the mail or a shipment by 
interstate carrier can be linked, no matter how tangential.86 
Indeed, Congress has chosen to expand the remit of the Mail Fraud Statute to 
include the use of private delivery services and because it has refused to define 
the meaning of its purpose87 to the extent that the Statute can be regarded as the 
Federal Fraud Statute.88 Judge Rakoff, when he was Chief of Business Fraud 
Prosecutions in New York, waxed lyrical about the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: 
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our 
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart – and our true 
love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law 
‘darling’, but we always come home to the virtues of 18 USC § 134, with its 
simplicity, adaptability and comfortable familiarity.89 
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The mail fraud statute was enacted in the aftermath of the American Civil War,90 
when the federal government embarked upon reconstruction of the United States 
and, according to Rakoff,  concluded that ‘rudimentary criminal codes, conceived 
for rural societies could not cope (…) [with the need] to dispel widespread fraud’.91 
Thus, the present day statute, although amended, is a ‘legal fiction’ because: 
it has led courts, (…) to describe the element of mailing as the ‘gist’, 
‘essence’, ‘gravamen’, and ‘substance’ of the crime of mail fraud, even 
though it is obvious that the prime concern of those who commit mail fraud, 
those who legislate against it, those who prosecute it, and those who judge it, 
is the fraud and not the mailing.92 
The attraction of the mail fraud statute, ‘together with its lineal descendent, the 
wire fraud statute,’93 is that it is used as a ‘first line of defence’ against the 
development of new types of fraud until specific legislation is enacted.94 The Wire 
Fraud Statute,95 enacted in 1952, is nearly identically worded to the mail fraud 
statute except that instead of mailing, ‘it requires some interstate or international 
communications by means of a “wire” (such as telephone lines), radio or 
television.’96 The advantage of this consistent approach is that it ‘utilizes the same 
definition of fraud (…) [with the consequence that] cases interpreting the mail fraud 
provision are of equal precedential value where (…) the defendant is accused of 
wire fraud.’97 In the UK, ‘Conspiracy to defraud’98 is the closest common law 
equivalent. 
The importance which the US authorities place on the mail and wire statutes (and 
for which there is no UK equivalent statute) is, according to Zelcer, shown by their 
expansion to cover ‘mailings delivered by private interstate commercial carriers’,99 
and modern ‘modes of communication such as facsimile, telex, modem, and 
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internet transmissions.’100 The applications of these statutes includes any ‘scheme 
or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.’101 Zelcer 
notes that this means that ‘Courts generally agree that the defendant has a duty to 
provide the victim with honest services’,102 which was redefined in 2010 as to 
‘criminalize only bribery and kickback schemes.’103 These statutes ‘provide federal 
courts with jurisdiction over a broad array of frauds’104 such as, consumer, stock, 
land, bank, insurance, commodity and election, in addition to blackmail, 
counterfeiting, bribery and money laundering.105 The provisions of 18 USC enable 
mail and wire fraud to be a predicate act for the purposes of the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 1970 (RICO)106 which ‘aims to eliminate 
organised crime’,107 ‘by preventing the reintegration of their proceeds of crime into 
the US economy.’108 
In the US, government agencies have sought opportunities to stretch existing 
laws.109 In the PNP case,110 which concerned ‘stock parking’ (an arrangement 
whereby an investor nominally sells his shareholding to another party with an 
understanding to re-purchase at a later stage, without loss), prosecutors were able 
to extend their securities and tax fraud charges in to other charges. In this case, 
PNP having been charged with tax fraud, was also charged with ‘mail fraud.’ This 
was purely on the basis that it had used the US Postal Service as part of the fraud 
merely by putting the tax returns in the post and which would have been avoided 
by hand delivery.111 The line of reasoning, according to Strader, was that: 
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Because it charged mail fraud, the government could bring charges under the 
RICO statute,112 with mail fraud as the principle predicate acts. And because 
RICO contains forfeiture provisions, the government could, and did, assume 
control over PNP’s assets prior to trial.113 
What PNP demonstrates is the linking of seemingly disparate legislation by the 
use of mail or wire fraud acts allows access to other parts of the criminal code than 
was originally intended: an alternative, as in the UK, would be simple and 
straightforward fraud legislation.114 In the US, the RICO Statute was the end 
product of a long process of legislative effort to develop new legal remedies to 
deal with an old problem: organized crime.115 At first, this might seem a strange 
bedfellow when linked with fraud, bribery and corruption but, as Ryder describes, 
RICO has been utilised to tackle insider trading because of the shortcomings of 
the Securities Exchange Act 1934,116 since under RICO, ‘it was only necessary for 
prosecutors to illustrate that “a defendant committed securities fraud twice within 
any ten-year period. Prosecutors also favoured the stiff penalties imposed for a 
RICO conviction”.’117 However, RICO is not without criticism because of its ‘broad 
and ambiguous language’ coupled with the judiciary ‘repeatedly interpreting the 
statute in a liberal, far-reaching manner.’118 Nevertheless, ‘whatever its 
weaknesses, RICO gives the government an effective threat against sophisticated 
crime (…). At least for a while, for white-collar criminals as well as gangsters, 
RICO appears to be evening up the odds.’119 However, Strader reports difficulties 
created by ‘vagueness of many white collar statutes (…)’,120 provide scope for 
prosecutors to overreach themselves ‘in instances of ambiguous harm and 
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unproven legal theories.’121 The conclusion that ‘[m]ore carefully crafted statutes 
would begin to solve this problem’,122 is based on the reasoning that: 
Apart from being incomprehensible, the RICO statute’s potential application 
is nearly boundless, principally because of its inclusion of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes as predicate acts. These statutes can be used just about 
anytime anyone puts anything in the mail, makes an interstate phone call, or 
sends an email in suspicious circumstances.123 
Notwithstanding the use of existing statutes, other events such as the ‘credit 
crunch’ and the earlier corporate accounting scandals caused US legislators to 
expand the range of legislation by enacting the Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Acts.124 
7.3.1.2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
The 2008 financial crisis, as Ceresney comments, ‘will be known as the modern 
financial system’s annus horribilis.’125 A natural consequence of a crisis is that 
‘citizens are asking angrily how this happened and who is to blame.’126 This then 
invites the enquiry that ‘[a]midst this wreckage, as legislators consider proposals 
for sweeping regulatory reforms, prosecutors and regulatory agencies have begun 
the arduous and time-consuming process of determining whether any criminal 
wrongdoing led to the credit crisis.’127 The outcome of this ‘soul searching’ was:  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act [Dodd-
Frank]128 (…) [which] set out to reshape the U.S. regulatory system in a 
number of areas including but not limited to consumer protection, trading 
restrictions, credit ratings, regulation of financial products, corporate 
governance and disclosure, and transparency.129 
The introduction to Dodd-Frank makes clear what the legislation’s intentions: ‘[t]o 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to protect the 
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American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.’130 
One particular aspect of Dodd-Frank, ‘the Volcker Rule, [which] prohibits a bank 
from engaging in proprietary trading, and from acquiring or retaining an ownership 
interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund.’131 The intent of the Volcker Rule 
was to endeavour to replicate ‘The US Banking Act of 1933, called the Glass-
Steagall Act after its sponsors, [which] separated investment banking from retail 
banking by limiting the range and volume of securities-related transactions that the 
commercial entities could perform.’132  This rule, though, does not merely affect 
US entities but also applies to foreign banks and entities which have a branch or 
agency in the US and clearly demonstrates the reach of US legislation.133 
An additional outcome of the review of the ‘financial crisis’ was that the SEC 
recognised that more information on breaches of securities law was required and 
has caused it to promote the role of the ‘Whistleblower’.134 Dodd-Frank 
encourages ‘whistleblowers’ to report suspected violations direct to the SEC 
‘Office of the Whistleblower, ‘135 which will reward136 such suppliers of information 
who  are eligible to receive between 10 percent and 30 percent of any 
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enforcement penalty in excess of $1 million that the agency ultimately recovers as 
a result of the report.’137 The largest reward was $30m in 2014.138 
However, Dodd-Frank was not the first attempt at encouraging ‘informers to come 
forward with information about fraud against the [US] government in return for a 
share of the damages recovered.’139 In 1863, pre-dating both conspiracy to 
defraud (1867) and Mail Fraud (1872), the False Claims Act empowered citizens 
to sue ‘on behalf of the government for fraud against the government’140 and share 
in the fruits of litigation: since 2009, the DoJ ‘has recovered more than $13.3 billion 
in False Claims Act cases.’141 In 2012, the DoJ brought an all-time high of 647 
whistleblower cases,142 thus demonstrating the economic value of an incentivised 
whistleblower. Thus, the rewards from SEC clearly ‘make it all the more likely that 
employees who notice such wrongdoing will take steps to bring it to light.’143 
However, this may be at the expense of reporting through companies’ internal 
corporate risk management or governance channels. Indeed, ‘[t]he SEC recently 
reported receiving one to two “high value” tips per day, up from about a dozen a 
year prior to enactment’ of Dodd-Frank.144 Furthermore, there is also the risk of 
‘repeat bad faith’ claims as in a 2014 case where the SEC banned an individual 
who had knowingly made 196 award applications which were false, fictitious or 
fraudulent in pursuit of an award.145 
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In noting the effect of Dodd-Frank, it is clear that the US has a long history of 
providing incentives. This is not a feature of UK culture and ‘legislation, including 
the UK Bribery Act 2010, does not provide for these rewards.’146 The UK 
regulators FCA/PRA have announced proposals to make ‘regulatory changes 
necessary to require firms to have effective whistleblowing procedures, and to 
make senior management accountable for delivering these,’147 but concluded that 
financial incentives to report would not be adopted.148 This area is outside the 
scope of this thesis but would warrant further research because of the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage where, for UK companies falling within the purview of the 
SEC, whistleblowers may be tempted to report wrongdoing in the US rather than 
either the UK authorities or through internal procedures, where no rewards 
exist.149 
Some eight years before Dodd-Frank, in the wake of ‘a spate of financial / 
accounting scandals’,150 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 was enacted ‘to protect 
Investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.151 This was a 
‘Congressional response to revelations of several high profile accounting fraud 
cases including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, (…) that resulted in mass destruction of 
investor value and loss of investor confidence in the integrity of the financial 
markets.152 Eventually, as Yeager notes, ’these cases led to criminal charges of 
company officials and the bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen LLP, at the time arguable 
the most prestigious independent auditing firm in the world,’ discussed later in this 
chapter.153 Consequently, a key feature of Sarbanes-Oxley was provision for 
whistleblowers: firstly, anti-retaliation measures, ‘which involves protecting 
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whistleblowers from employer retaliation after they disclose wrongdoing;’154 
secondly, reporting arrangements which ‘requires that corporations provide 
employees with a standardized channel to report organizational misconduct 
internally within the corporation.’155 A further feature of Sarbanes-Oxley was 
increased sentences: ‘the maximum penalty for wire and mail fraud from five years 
to twenty years imprisonment.’156 This can be compared with the UK Fraud Act 
2006 maximum of ten years.157 
7.3.1.3 Sentencing 
The white-collar offender with the longest prison sentence on record is Shalmon 
Weiss. Weiss, whose misdeeds resulted in the collapse of National Heritage Life 
Insurance, was sentenced [in 2000] by a Florida judge to 845 years in prison.158  
More recently, Bernard Madoff was sentenced to 150 years imprisonment159 and 
‘Sir’ Allen Stanford was sentenced to 110 years imprisonment160 for  $7bn Ponzi161 
scheme.162 In the UK, the maximum sentence under Fraud Act 2006 and Bribery 
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Act 2010 is ten years imprisonment and / or an unlimited fine.163 Asil Nadir, who 
fled to Northern Cyprus in 1993 before his original trial, was sentenced in 2012 to 
ten years imprisonment for fraud dating back to 1987.164  At first glance, it would 
appear that the UK might be unduly lenient in its sentencing options when 
compared with US. There appear to be two factors contributing to the US 
approach. Firstly, according to Anello and Albert, that legislators (Congress) have 
exerted: 
Pressure to increase the penalties associated with fraud offenses, [resulting 
in] changes to Sentencing Guidelines over the past decade [which] have 
transformed sentences in high-loss fraud cases from less than five years 
under the original guidelines to a sentence of life imprisonment.165 
What lies behind this is the federal government’s desire to ‘prosecute perceived 
white collar wrongdoing, along with the ever-expanding legislative response to the 
country’s various financial crises, which has resulted in hundreds of new criminal 
laws and the seemingly limitless application of existing criminal statutes.’166 The 
consequence of this is what Anello and Albert refer to as ‘overcriminalization’ 
whereby federal prosecutors have ‘access to too many charging choices’.167 The 
temptation identified is that ‘prosecutors could easily fall prey to the temptation of 
“picking the man, and then searching the law books (…) to pin some offense on 
him”.’168 The availability of a large number of laws upon which to charge gives 
prosecutors considerable discretion whether to charge or not.169 
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The second aspect is that ‘prosecutors will pile on charges to gain leverage in plea 
negotiations’.170 Reynolds identifies that:‘ [w]hen facing a hundred felony charges, 
the prospect that a jury might go along with even one of them is enough to make a 
plea deal look attractive, something many prosecutors count on.’171 An example of 
this, which Anello and Albert note, though with tragic consequences, is the case 
of: 
Aaron Swartz, the 26 year-old Internet activist who committed suicide after 
being named in a federal indictment containing 13 felony counts carrying a 
possible 50-year sentence for allegedly hacking into a computer database to 
download academic journals.172 
Concurrent with this disquiet is the concern of the US government about the costs 
of the prison system.173 The Attorney General said: ‘too many people go to too 
many prisons for far too long for no good law enforcement reason.’174 Holder 
poses a fundamental question regarding the US criminal justice system which is 
that ‘Statutes passed by legislatures that mandate sentences, irrespective of the 
unique facts of an individual case, too often bear no relation to the conduct at 
issue.175 Recognising that such sentences ‘breed disrespect and are ultimately 
counterproductive,176 Holder urged that ‘[w]e need to ensure that incarceration is 
used to punish, to rehabilitate, and to deter – and not simply to warehouse and 
forget.’177 
Meanwhile, in the UK, ‘[s]entencing for the common law offence of conspiracy to 
defraud is back in the spotlight following the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Levene 
v R and R v Kallis and Williams.’178 In these cases, the Court considered whether 
the Sentencing Council’s guidance on sentencing for substantive fraud offences 
should apply to conspiracy to defraud, for which there is no specific guidance. 
Additionally, the Court considered the question of whether sentences should be 
concurrent or consecutive and quoted the current guidelines: ‘There is no inflexible 
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rule governing whether sentences should be structured as concurrent or 
consecutive components. The overriding principle is that the overall sentence must 
be just and proportionate.’179 In 2014, the Sentencing Council introduced new 
guidelines (which for the first time included conspiracy to defraud)180 and a 
toughening of their approach to sentencing.181 
A key element in the criminalisation of fraud in the US is that of corporate criminal 
liability, a concept which was absent in UK until Bribery Act 2010.182 It was:  
established in the United States by the Supreme Court in 1909. In that year, 
the court held that any criminal act committed by a corporation’s employee 
within the scope of employment and in part intended to benefit the 
corporation could be imputed to the corporation.183 
The effect of this is that instead of prosecuting the corporate entity or individuals, 
the DoJ and SEC enter deferred prosecution agreements. This avenue is not 
available in the UK because ‘[c]orporate criminal in English law it depends on the 
identification principle. A corporation is only liable for criminal conduct if the 
controlling mind (ie the top personnel) of the company can be shown to have been 
complicit in the criminality.’184 As the SFO Director acknowledges, ‘[t]his is very 
hard to prove: rarely does the email chain go above a certain level.’185 
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7.3.2 Regulatory Bodies 
In the US, the primary regulatory body for fraud is the DoJ, which is considered in 
greater detail later in relation to bribery. 
7.3.2.1 Department of Justice  
The DoJ has ‘control over all criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the 
United States had an interest.’186 Created in 1870, after the Civil War, the DoJ is 
headed by the Attorney General and comprises 40 components, including the 
Criminal Division Fraud Section, 187 which:  
plays a unique and essential role in the Department's fight against 
sophisticated economic crime. The Section is a front-line litigating unit that 
acts as a rapid response team, investigating and prosecuting complex white 
collar crime cases throughout the country.188 
The role of the DoJ is ’[p]rotecting taxpayer dollars and consumers against 
financial fraud while ensuring competitive advantage.189 The current Attorney 
General stated that they: 
Have charged and had sentenced a number of defendants involved in 
securities fraud and related investment fraud, mortgage fraud and Ponzi 
schemes. These defendants include CEOs, owners, board members, 
presidents, general counsel and other executives of Wall Street firms, hedge 
funds and banks.190 
Although the DoJ state that they ‘do not hesitate to bring charges against anyone 
[and]  between 2009 and 2013, (…) charged more white-collar defendants than 
during any previous five-year period going back to at least 1994,’191 nevertheless 
the headlines are given to the significance of the penalties it imposes in ‘over 60 
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cases against financial institutions since 2009, resulting in recoveries totaling over 
$85 billion.’192  
The DoJ as primary regulator and prosecutor is supported by the investigative 
tools of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),193 which is another division of 
DoJ. Thus, the Attorney General has line management responsibility for both 
investigation and prosecution, as does UK SFO but with a more limited remit. 
Neither DoJ or SFO have control over financial intelligence through FinCEN and 
National Crime Agency respectively. The former being part of US Treasury and the 
latter UK Home Office.194 
7.4 Bribery and Corruption 
7.4.1 Criminalisation 
The ‘Watergate’195 scandal saw the resignation of President Nixon and provided 
the stimulus for creating the FCPA. 196 The Watergate Special Prosecutor, as 
noted by Brown, disclosed ‘corrupt payments to foreign officials and overseas 
agents by [US] domestic companies.’197 In a ‘reaction to a flurry of scandals during 
the 1970s,’198 the SEC reported to Congress that it had ‘discovered that many 
public companies were maintaining cash “slush funds” from which illegal [political] 
campaign contributions were being made in the United States and illegal bribes 
were being paid to foreign officials.’199 Incidents of international bribery were 
revealed as widespread ‘by over 300 companies involving corrupt payments of 
hundreds of millions of dollars.’200 According to Cavico and Bahaudin, the 
philosophy underlying the FCPA is:   
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The statute reflects the public policy of the United States that the payment of 
bribes to foreign officials in order to secure business was unethical, contrary 
to the democratic values of the people of the United States, as well as 
harmful to good governance and the rule of law, contrary to the principles of 
fair competition, an impediment to economic progress, and thus inimical to 
society.201 
Prior to ‘1976, bribery of a foreign official was not illegal if it occurred outside US 
territory.’202 The FCPA ‘has the noble goal of deterring corporations and 
individuals from engaging in corrupt dealings with foreign officials’203 and 
‘Congress intended the FCPA to be expansive, prohibiting not only the successful 
payment of bribes, but also attempts not fully consummated or effective in 
achieving their desired ends.’204 
The FCPA takes a two pronged approach.  Firstly, to ‘prohibit individuals and 
businesses from bribing foreign government officials in order to gain or retain 
business’.205 Secondly, ‘the FCPA contains accounting provisions applicable to 
public companies (…) [which] prohibit off-the-books accounting.’206 These are two 
different prohibitions that fall within the purview of two different regulators: the DoJ 
and SEC. The FCPA ‘focuses primarily on US entities and citizens’,207 together 
with ‘US and foreign public companies listed on stock exchanges in the United 
States or which are required to file periodic reports with the SEC issuers.208 US 
jurisdiction is, thus, established over ‘domestic concerns’209 and ‘issuers’,210 which 
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includes 940 foreign companies.211 However, the ambit of FCPA extends further 
because it takes territorial jurisdiction over ‘foreign persons and foreign non-issuer 
entities that (…) engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment (…) while 
in the territory of the United States.’212 The territory of the US is, though, extended 
outside the US because the statute includes the ‘use of the mails or any means of 
interstate commerce’.213 The use of ‘mails’ provides a link to Mail Fraud Statute214 
and ‘interstate commerce’, which is defined as: 
Means trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the 
several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any 
State and any place or ship outside thereof, and such term includes the use 
of – (A) a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any 
other interstate instrumentality. 
In this way, the use of telephone, fax, and or email or traveling across US state or 
international borders is included as is the use of the US banking system to make 
‘wire transfers’ to or from the US.215 
7.4.1.1 Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The DoJ describes the overall objective of the FCPA in relation to bribery as the 
‘business purpose test’, because ‘[t]he FCPA applies only to payments intended to 
induce or influence a foreign official to use his or her position “in order to assist 
(…) in obtaining or retaining business for, or with, or directing business to, any 
person.” ’216 The FCPA contains sections relating to the three areas prohibited 
(issuers, domestics concerns and foreign persons)217 and prohibitions, albeit with 
tailored introductions, being the same:  
It shall be unlawful for any [issuer; domestic concern; person other than 
issuer] (…) or for any officer, director, employee or agent (…) to make use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in 
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
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payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the 
giving of anything of value (…).218 
Thus, the Act encompasses anyone acting on behalf of the issuer (or domestic 
concern / person other than issuer), using a means of interstate or international 
commerce and providing or offering to provide, ‘anything of value’. Next, the 
recipient is identified as ‘any foreign official’.219 
The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department or agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a 
public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity 
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or 
instrumentality or (…) public international organization.220 
This definition includes ‘any foreign political party or official thereof or any 
candidate for foreign political office’221 or ‘any person, while knowing that all or a 
portion of such money or thing of value will be given (…) to any foreign official.’222 
The DoJ provides some clarification that ‘[t]he FCPA prohibits payments to foreign 
officials, not foreign governments, but warns that steps should be taken ‘that no 
monies are used for corrupt purposes, such as the personal benefit of individual 
foreign officials.’223 For example, in SEC v Willbros a defendant: 
Admitted that beginning in approximately late 2003, he conspired with others 
to make a series of corrupt payments totalling more than $6 million to various 
Nigerian officials and officials from a Nigerian political party to assist Willbros 
in obtaining and retaining the Eastern Gas Gathering System (EGGS) 
Project, which was valued at approximately $387m.224 
Additionally, the DoJ stated that not all foreign governments are organised in the 
same fashion as the US (and, for that matter, the UK) with clearly identified 
government departments or agencies.  
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Many [foreign governments] operate through state-owned and state-
controlled entities, particularly in such areas as aerospace and defense 
manufacturing, banking and finance, healthcare and life sciences, energy 
and extractive industries, telecommunications and transportation.225 
The FCPA also recognises and prohibits the possibility of routing payments 
indirectly, through a third party or intermediary.226 Although the DoJ understand 
the way in which foreign business is undertaken, they do warn that: 
Many companies doing business in a foreign country retain a local individual 
or company to help them conduct business. Although these foreign agents 
may provide entirely legitimate advice regarding local customs and 
procedures and may help facilitate business transactions, companies should 
be aware of the risks involved in engaging third-party agents or 
intermediaries.227 
Through the language of the FCPA and the enforcement department’s explanatory 
notes, it is clear that a strict regime is to be adopted towards bribery being ‘to “any” 
officer or employee of a foreign government and to those acting on a foreign 
government’s behalf.’228 The DoJ state that ‘[t]he FCPA thus covers corrupt 
payments to low-ranking employees and high-level officials alike.’229 
Violations of the FCPA means that ‘corporations and other business entities are 
subject to a fine of up to $2 million’ for each violation, whereas, ‘Individuals, 
including officers, directors stockholders, and agents of companies are subject to a 
fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.’230 Furthermore, 
‘fines imposed on individuals may not be paid by their employer or principal.’231 
What this range of penalties leads to, as is discussed later in this chapter, is 
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7.4.1.2 Facilitating or Expediting Payments 
Rather prosaically termed in the FCPA is ‘15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), Exception for 
routine government action’.232 This is not expressly an exception for the US 
government itself but: 
Means only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a 
foreign official in – (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents 
to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing 
governmental papers such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police 
protection, mail pick up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated 
with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across 
country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and 
unloading cargo or protecting perishable products or commodities from 
deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.233 
This exception is in contrast to the UK Bribery Act 2010 which does not permit 
‘facilitation or grease payments’.234 Furthermore, the DoJ recognise that it is 
against ‘the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery [which] recommends that all 
countries encourage companies to prohibit or discourage facilitating payments.’235 
This provision recognises that there is not complete agreement amongst countries 
for a strict requirement. There is a warning though that such payments must be 
properly recorded in the issuer’s books and records, failing which they will breach 
FCPA.236 This is an interesting point of disparity between the US and UK, because 
the FCPA exceptions were cited in submissions to UK Ministry of Justice when the 
Bribery Act was being drafted237 and which was criticised when not permitted.238 
Thus, in analysing a key difference between US and UK anti-bribery legislation it 
can be seen that the US exemption was considered by UK in drafting its Bribery 
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Act and not adopted: UK experience has not yet produced cases to cause this 
decision to be revisited.239 Indeed, such a change would be difficult for the SFO to 
justify because it stated that the UK prohibition on facilitation payments was 
consistent with the UN Convention and OECD policy, concluding with the 
‘Government and SFO are committed to stamping out bribery and upholding the 
rule of law. The SFO stands ready to take effective action against the use of 
facilitation payments, regardless of where they are requested.240 
In the US, there is also a debate,241 but Jordan’s view is that ‘the facilitation 
payments exception has become a dinosaur remnant of a bygone era [the 1970s], 
(…) when corruption was prevalent and no international treaty existed to prohibit 
foreign bribery.’242  While that may have been reasonable at the time, because the 
rest of the world had not proscribed foreign bribery, the US had ‘pushed hard for 
an international anti-bribery regime so that it would no longer be isolated in the 
fight against foreign bribery that left its domestic companies at an unfair 
disadvantage.’243 The consequence of leading international efforts to reform global 
bribery legislation is that ‘these efforts have also backfired on the United States, as 
it now finds itself awkwardly criticized by the rest of the world for its own anti-
bribery deficiencies inherent in the facilitation payments exception.’244 Thus, as 
Jordan proposes, the US should abandon the facilitation payments carve out and, 
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in doing so, ‘join the rest of the world in condemning facilitation payments and fulfill 
its leadership role in the fight against foreign bribery.’245 
7.4.1.3 Accounting Provisions 
The second prong of the FCPA is its accounting provisions,246 which are ‘designed 
to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books and records and the reliability 
of the audit process which constitute the foundations of our system of corporate 
disclosure.” ‘247 Sorensen describes the US commercial landscape leading to 
enactment of the FCPA as: 
The practice of exporters and investors offering special inducements to host 
country officials is at least as old as Marco Polo. But in the United States a 
post-Watergate climate of pitiless exposure for all suspect practices 
connected with government has intensified both the investigations of these 
payments and the oversimplified publicity given to them. (…) As a result, the 
U.S. corporate officials have engaged in the most painful rush to public 
‘voluntary’ confession since China’s Cultural Revolution.248 
At this time, there were clear tensions between all payments being condemned 
and the recognition that ‘[n]ot every foreign consultant or sales agent is corrupt or 
retained to perform some improper function,249 ‘but properly recorded payments, 
of an amount appropriate under the circumstances, to a qualified and responsible 
professional for his performance of legitimate and necessary services, may well be 
perfectly justifiable.’250 The words ‘properly recorded’ are key, according to 
Diersen, because: 
The record-keeping provisions are used to prevent three types of 
improprieties: (1) a failure to record improper transactions; (2) the falsification 
of records to conceal improper transactions; and (3) the creation of records 
that are quantitatively correct, but fail to specify the qualitative aspects of a 
transaction which might reveal the true purpose of a payment.251 
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The Act applies to ‘[e]very issuer which has a class of securities registered (…) 
and every issuer who is required to file reports.’252 This means: 
Any issuer whose securities trade on a national securities exchange in the 
United States, including foreign issuers with exchange-traded American 
Depository Receipts. They also apply to companies whose stock trades in 
the over-the-counter market in the United States and which file periodic 
reports with the commission, such as annual or quarterly report.253 
Thus, this part of the Act defines who falls within the purview of the SEC where 
‘[u]nlike the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the accounting provisions do not apply 
to private companies.’254 The SEC regulated ‘issuers’ are, firstly, required to ‘make 
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of assets of the issuer.’255 The 
second element applicable to ‘issuers’ is to ‘devise and maintain a system of 
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that’ 
transactions are properly authorised and recorded.256 Underlying these provisions 
is the knowledge that ‘[i]n the past, “corporate bribery has been concealed by the 
falsification of books and records”,’257 with the consequence that accounting 
records have been inaccurate and do not ‘fairly reflect the transactions and 
dispositions of assets of the issuer.’258 Furthermore, as the DoJ and SEC state, 
‘[t]he payment of bribes often occurs in companies that have weak internal control 
environments.’259 Although the act requires a system of internal controls to be in 
place, it does not prescribe the form of those controls. Instead, it is the 
responsibility of the ‘issuer’ to create controls appropriate to the business risks260 
which it faces: 
The SEC considers several factors in order to determine the adequacy of a 
system of internal controls, including: the (1) role of the board of directors; (2) 
communication of corporate procedures and policies; (3) assignment of 
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authority and responsibility; (4) competence and integrity of personal; (5) 
accountability for performance and compliance with policies and procedures; 
and (6) objectivity end effectiveness of the internal audit function.261 
It is the role of the ‘issuer’ to devise its own controls which ‘must take into account 
the operational realities and risks attendant to the company’s business’,262 such as 
‘[b]usinesses whose operations expose them to a high risk of corruption will 
necessarily devise and employ different internal controls that businesses that have 
a lesser exposure to corruption.’263 
Both the ‘books and records’ and ‘internal controls’ provisions are qualified by 
employing a ‘prudent man’ standard.264 ‘[T]he terms “reasonable assurances” and 
“reasonable detail” mean such level of detail and degree of assurance as would 
satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.’265 The reason for this 
qualification being adopted was ‘in light of the concern that a standard, if 
unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is 
unrealistic.’266 The DoJ further note that when Congress adopted the definition 
‘[t]he concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a 
number a relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.’267 Thus, it is clear 
that the FCPA contemplate a degree of interpretation of actions. 
Criminal liability arises when companies and individuals ‘knowingly circumvent or 
knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly 
falsify any book, record or account’.268 This requirement of intent, a (1988) 
refinement of the FCPA,269 ‘is an attempt to reduce the potential for unlimited 
liability as a result of accounting violations.’270 The expression ‘knowing’ also 
embraces, not knowing, or ‘wilful blindness, or conscious attempts not to know’, 
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such as ‘deliberately avoiding knowledge or adopting a ‘head in the sand 
approach.’271 
The penalties for each violation of FCPA accounting provisions are a fine of up to 
$25 million for corporations, with individuals subject to a fine of $5 million and 20 
years imprisonment.272 ‘Fines imposed on individuals may not be paid by their 
employer or principal,’273 which clearly can be seen as an incentive for individuals 
to reach an accommodation with the authorities whereby the corporation bears the 
burden. 
There is a defence ‘to ensure that mundane accounting deficiencies would not 
violate the Act’274 such as ‘technical or insignificant accounting errors.’275 
Furthermore, a parent issuer, owning less than 50% of a subsidiary may use its 
‘good faith’ as a defence if it ‘encourage[s] compliance with FCPA accounting 
controls’,276 on the basis ‘that it is “unrealistic to expect a minority owner to exert a 
disproportionate degree of influence over the accounting practices of a 
subsidiary”.’277  
‘The FCPA was not heavily enforced during the first twenty years of its 
existence’278 and it appeared to Hotchkiss that: 
For many years, international firms and executives treated the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act as the proverbial sleeping dog, best left alone. The 
FCPA was perceived as an overreaching and naïve attempt by the US 
government to impose unrealistic standards on global business conduct.279 
However, more recently, ‘[e]nforcement activities by both the DoJ and the SEC 
have increased dramatically.280 The DoJ report that the ‘Department has 
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expanded efforts to combat corruption at home and abroad.’281 ‘Since 2009, the 
Department’s FCPA-related enforcement has secured more than $2 billion in fines 
and penalties and increased prosecutions of individuals who have bribed foreign 
officials’282 and the SEC $1.2bn between 2010 and 2013.283 
7.4.2 Regulatory Bodies 
The Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission share 
responsibility for enforcement of FCPA and have the facility to either work 
independently or together.284 
7.4.2.1 The Department of Justice  
The DoJ Criminal Division, Fraud Section is responsible for authorising all FCPA 
criminal actions285 and ‘develops, enforces, and supervises the application of all 
federal criminal laws except those specifically assigned to other divisions.’286 
Thus, the DoJ ‘is solely responsible for criminal enforcement but may institute civil 
proceedings;’287 whereas, the SEC can only institute civil proceedings, with any 
criminal prosecutions being referred to DoJ.288 The DoJ maintains a FCPA Unit 
and works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whose ‘International 
Corruption Unit has primary responsibility for international corruption and fraud 
investigations and coordinates the FBI’s national FCPA enforcement program.’289 
The DoJ has instituted a new initiative: the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative to 
‘target and recover the proceeds of foreign official corruption that have been 
laundered into or through the United States.’290 Their first success in 2012 was a 
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$3 million restraining order against ’the former governor of the oil-producing Delta 
State in Nigeria’ (Ibori) followed by another order for $4 million.291 
In considering criminal penalties to be imposed for violation of FCPA, the DoJ also 
has the availability of ‘the Alternative Fines Act’,292 which can double the fines 
provided for in the FCPA.293 Furthermore, there is a procedure for calculating the 
magnitude of fines, contained in the ‘US Sentencing Guidelines’,294 which ‘provide 
a very detailed and predictable structure for calculating penalties for all federal 
crimes, including violations of the FCPA.’295 These are two significant differences 
between the manner in which enforcement is undertaken in US and UK, where 
there is no such degree of certainty for defendants when considering their options. 
An important point of difference between UK and US, is the ability of the US to 
negotiate an outcome with the defendant,296 a proposition which the UK SFO 
found attractive but which generated judicial antipathy297 prior to 2014 when 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements were allowed, see chapter six, but had not been 
used by mid 2014. In the US, the: 
DoJ may agree to resolve criminal FCPA matters against companies either 
through declination or, in appropriate cases, a negotiated resolution resulting 
in a plea agreement, deferred prosecution agreement, or non-prosecution 
agreement.298 
In a Plea Agreement, ‘the defendant generally admits to the facts supporting the 
charges, admits guilt, and is convicted of the charged crimes when the plea 
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agreement is presented to and accepted by a court.’299 For example, the publicly 
available letter detailing terms between DoJ and Siemens AG,300 shows a 
settlement where Siemens AG ‘and three of its subsidiaries, pleaded guilty to 
FCPA-related violations. The parent was not required to plead guilty to a bribery 
violation, thereby likely avoiding mandatory debarment in Europe.’301 In the US, a 
guilty plea does not result in automatic debarment from US government 
contracting because an independent debarment authority will consider the 
issues.302 However, in the UK, the EU Public Sector Procurement Directive 
applies.303 The effect of this is that a commercial organization is excluded from 
participation in public sector contracts if convicted of fraud, bribery and corruption 
under Article 45. This provides the incentive to ‘self report’ to SFO with the 
prospect of negotiating an outcome and incurring a civil rather than criminal 
penalty (see chapter five).304  
A second alternative is a DPA, which  operates as a ‘Sword of Damocles’305 in that 
the DoJ ‘files a charging document with the court, but simultaneously requests that 
the prosecution be deferred.’306 The deferral, or not proceeding with the 
prosecution, is on the basis that the defendant pleads guilty but in return for a fine 
or other penalties and agreement, as in the case of Daimler AG, to ‘an 
independent compliance monitor for three years’,307 the DoJ agrees to dismiss the 
                                            
299 DoJ/SEC (n 205) 74. 
300  United States v Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Court Docket Number: 08-CR-367-RJL   Plea Agreement 
dated 12 December 2008. http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-
plea.pdf accessed 30 April 2013. 
301 Robert W Tarun and Peter P Tomczak, ‘A proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign 
Corrupt  Practices Act Leniency Policy’ 47 (2010) Am Crim L Rev 153. (emphasis added). 
302 DoJ/SEC (n 205) 70. 
303 EU Public Services Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC Art. 45. Implemented in UK by The Public Contracts 
Regulations 2006, which provides revised rules for the procurement of supplies, works and services by public 
authorities. The Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006 implement the revised Utilities Directive (2004/17/EC) 
which provides, in a similar way, revised rules for procurement in the utilities sector. Office of Government 
Commerce, H M Treasury. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf accessed 15 
February 2013. 
304 Directive 2004/17/EC. 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:134:0001:0113:EN:PDF accessed 15 
February 2010 
305 ‘Sword of Damocles n. (also Damocles' sword) used by simile of an imminent danger, which may at any 
moment descend upon one.’  (‘Damocles, a flatterer, having extolled the happiness of Dionysius tyrant of 
Syracuse, was placed by him at a banquet with a sword suspended over his head by a hair, to impress upon 
him the perilous nature of that happiness.’) Oxford English Dictionary. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/47084?redirectedFrom=sword+of+damocles#eid7417619 accessed 14 May 
2013. 
306 DoJ/SEC (n 205) 74. 




charges upon expiry of the agreement.308 The attraction of a DPA is certainty, in 
the knowledge that a breach of the agreement would result in a criminal 
conviction, whereas, ‘a company’s successful completion of a DPA is not treated 
as a criminal conviction.’309 
A third alternative agreement is a ‘Non-Prosecution Agreement’ (NPA). A NPA is 
less formal and restrictive than a DPA and, although the facts are disclosed, a 
charging document is not lodged with the court but left to lie on the prosecutor’s 
file to be activated if there is a breach of the NPA. This would include a tolling310 
agreement to stay any statute of limitations issues.  
The use of a NPA is demonstrated in the 2013 agreement with Ralph Lauren 
Corporation (RLC), which had a subsidiary in Argentina.311 The facts were that 
over a five year period, a manager of the subsidiary paid bribes and gifts totaling 
$593,000 to customs officials in Argentina312 to: 
Improperly obtain paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs; permit 
clearance of items without the necessary paperwork and / or the clearance of 
prohibited items; and on occasion, to avoid inspection entirely. RLC’s 
employee disguised the payments by funneling them through a customs 
clearance agency, which created fake invoices to justify the improper 
payments. (…) RLC did not have an anti-corruption program and did not 
provide any anti-corruption training or oversight with respect to its subsidiary 
in Argentina.313 
In parallel with DoJ, SEC also agreed a NPA, which was the first occasion both 
regulators completed agreements with the same company. The SEC’s reasoning 
was ‘[w]hen they found a problem, [RLC] did the right thing by immediately 
reporting it (…) and providing exceptional assistance (…) we will confer substantial 
benefits on companies that respond appropriately to violations and cooperate 
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fully.’314 The DoJ agreement gave credit 315 for, and rewarded, self-reporting by 
not prosecuting and, instead, entering NPAs with substantial fines. RLC have 
closed the Argentina operation.316 This case involves the fashion industry where, 
‘[t]his investigation highlights the expanding reach of the FCPA across all 
industries and its global impact on operations in foreign jurisdictions.’317 
The DoJ has available the various options described above, as alternatives to 
criminal action. It also has a 'track record' of enforcement which has such severe 
consequences that encourage a defendant to compromise rather than fight a case 
through the courts. The DoJ emphasise that ‘fighting corruption is, and always will 
be, a core priority:’318 
Since 2005, the Department has secured close to three dozen corporate 
guilty pleas in FCPA cases. And just since 2009, the department has entered 
into over 400 corporate resolutions, including nine of the top 10 biggest 
resolutions in terms of penalties, resulting in approximately $2.5 billion in 
monetary fines. And, perhaps most important, in that same period, we have 
successfully secured the convictions of over three dozen individuals for 
engaging in foreign bribery schemes.319 
The ability of the DoJ to negotiate outcomes is graphically demonstrated by the 
differing experience of two of the world’s major accounting firms: Arthur Andersen 
(AA) and KPMG, as Bennett describes.320 In the fall out of the Enron scandal321 
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the first criminal charge in that case was also the first time a major accounting firm 
had been charged with obstruction of justice.322 There was a marked difference in 
experience of AA, which eventually had its guilty verdict overturned through 
Appeals to US Supreme Court and final withdrawal by the prosecution, and KPMG 
which negotiated with the DoJ. KPMG was subject to: 
An aggressive 2002 investigation into (...) [its] accounting practices (...). 
KPMG diligently cooperated with requests from US Department of Justice 
during the investigation and was rewarded with a deferred prosecution 
agreement in exchange for an admission of guilt and an agreement to 
remediate the wrongdoing and establish a more robust internal compliance 
system.323 
The outcome of these two cases is that whereas 'KPMG remains a successful 
business to this day',324 'it was already too late for Arthur Andersen. Shortly after 
the indictment, the firm effectively collapsed.325 Thus, although it achieved a 
victory against DoJ, it proved pyrrhic because '[t]he company's right to a jury trial 
was illusory, and the effect of the indictment was irreparable. Nothing from the 
Supreme Court could bring Arthur Andersen back from the dead.'326 These 
examples show the value to firms in identifying breaches of the FCPA and taking 
opportunities to negotiate a settlement with the DoJ. The use of DPAs would offer 
similar benefits to the UK in terms of certainty for a firm and for the SFO bringing 
breaches of the Fraud Act and Bribery Act to a conclusion without protracted court 
proceedings, in appropriate cases, as discussed in chapters five and six. 
7.4.2.2 The Securities and Exchange Commission  
The SEC’s mission ‘is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.’327 The SEC is governed by the  
Securities Act 1933 ‘Often referred to as the "truth in securities" law,’ which has 
two main objectives: firstly, to ‘require that investors receive financial and other 
significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale’; and, 
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secondly, to ‘prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of 
securities.’328 It also has powers under Securities Exchange Act 1934, Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002, Dodd-Frank Act 2010 and Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
(JOBS) Act 2012.329 
The SEC is responsible for civil enforcement over ‘issuers and their officers, 
directors, employees, agents,’ and has a ‘specialized FCPA Unit.’330 The 
emphasis for the SEC is on civil enforcement because, as Schipani notes, it ‘has a 
wide variety of civil and administrative powers to address corporate fraud.’331 The 
remedies available to it are financial penalties both in terms of fines and 
disgorgement of gains, together with preventing individuals from serving as 
directors or officers of public companies and it may suspend trading in a 
company’s stock.332  
After the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC may now also order a 
temporary freeze over payments the company is going to pay to its 
executives, and order CEOs and CFOs to forfeit any bonuses, incentive 
compensation and profits from the sales of securities when a company 
restates its financial statement due to misconduct.’333 
The SEC is judged on ‘performance metrics’ including case resolution: ‘A case is 
considered “successfully resolved” if it results in a favorable outcome for the 
SEC, including through litigation, a settlement, or the issuance of a default 
judgment.’334 Although the SEC states that it is a ‘law enforcement agency’,335 
tellingly it confirms that ‘In many cases, the Commission and the party charged 
decide to settle a matter without trial.’336 In 2013, the SEC took 686 enforcement 
actions and imposed $3.4bn in ‘monetary relief’337 with a strategy to be more 
aggressive in enforcement and ‘seeking stronger penalties, which raised the 
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opportunity cost of malfeasance.’338 The message conveyed to the market was 
clear: no institution is too large to be held to account and no violation is too small 
to escape scrutiny.339 
7.5 Conclusion 
The US has been the instigator internationally of a strong response to economic 
crime. It was an early adopter of domestic legislation to criminalise overseas 
bribery and has led the way in enforcement, achieving significant outcomes in 
terms of prison sentences and fines. The US has also brought into the 
enforcement equation the use of agreements either not to prosecute or defer 
prosecution (with the expectation of eventually not prosecuting) with the defendant 
agreeing the valuable consideration of paying a significant fine but not suffering 
either corporate or individual criminal convictions. 
The international adoption of conventions to combat economic crime eventually 
led to the UK enacting legislation to counter fraud, bribery and corruption, the latter 
statute being some 33 years after US legislation.340 In the UK, the SFO as lead 
prosecutor has been seen as slower to act, achieving less success than its US 
counterparts, and suffering from a near terminal damage to its reputation. This has 
resulted in pressure to ape the US by concluding ‘deals’ with defendants rather 
than prosecution. However, at a time when the UK has been enabled to conclude 
DPAs, the SFO have emphasised that they are a prosecution agency and ‘did not 
have a preference for risk-free civil penalties.’341 Furthermore, even though the 
BA2010 has yet to see anything more than modest cases taken to court,342 there 
is proposal to dilute its effect by allowing limited foreign bribery (facilitation 
payments) to match the US exception to its law. Such a change would see the UK 
lose its international pre-eminence, because it would then not have the strongest 
domestic law, and could expect to suffer international criticism. 
The US is also subject to internal criticism that its laws are too strict and, 
especially, that the post credit crunch Dodd-Frank legislation is too onerous. There 
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is also some evidence of judicial disquiet about their mere ‘rubber stamping’ role in 
DPAs and questioning whether the ambitions of prosecutors are weighted towards 
income rather than convictions. This latter aspect is one which had started to be 
seen in the UK. In relation to sentencing, there is a clear disparity between the 
length of sentences available in the US and in the UK: the former being criticised 
for being too long and the latter for being too short. 
It is the view of this thesis that the UK has simple, modern legislation to criminalise 
fraud and bribery and corruption, in contrast with the US which has a myriad of 
statutes and a reliance upon old statutes as a fall-back. Thus, in terms of 
legislation, this thesis does not consider that the UK would benefit from adopting 
US style statutes. 
The enforcement of legislation has two components: institutions and sentencing. In 
the US, enforcement is the province of the DoJ, which reports to the Attorney 
General. In the UK, there is a more fragmented approach with the SFO reporting 
to the Attorney General; the Police, and the National Crime Agency in 2013, to the 
Home Secretary. The view of this thesis343 is that a single, unified agency with 
clear lines of command is the preferred model: this is the model adopted by the 
US. However, it is also clear that enforcer has to be properly resourced. In this 
regard whilst the US government has shown determination and flexibility by the 
Obama Administration making significant funds available to the DoJ, in contrast, 
the UK’s prime agency has suffered successive funding cuts amounting to a 
reduction of 43% over five years. 
Alongside the institutions tasked with prosecuting economic crime is the 
availability of sanctions. Whereas the US has sentencing guidelines which 
facilitate prison sentences in excess of 100 years, the penalties in the UK have a 
ten year maximum. The view of this thesis is that the US guidelines would not 
translate into the UK because they are outwith the structure of sentencing in the 
UK. However, that does not mean that UK sentencing is not in need of review and 
new guidelines take effect from October 2014.344 
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The US experience demonstrates that having a regime which enjoys the possibility 
of lengthy prison sentences, together with a high probability of success at trial, 
gives the prosecutor the option to negotiate an agreement with the defendant in 
appropriate circumstances: since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the SFO has 
DPAs in its armoury. However, the perception of the SFO is that its success record 
at trial is low, thus, acting as a disincentive to defendants to plead guilty or 
recognise that they would be found guilty at trial, which would then encourage 
settlement. The view of this thesis is that the prosecution of economic crime is 
handled with more determination and success in US and that this is because the 
DoJ is properly resourced and organised as a cohesive unit. Thus, at this stage it 
is the conclusion that the UK prosecution authority should be similarly organised 
but the next chapter will examine the manner in which Australia approaches the 
same issues. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
344 ‘Longer prison sentences for frauds that target the vulnerable and fresh sanctions against money-
laundering are recommended in new judges' guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council.’  
The Guardian, ‘Jail fraudsters for longer, judges told’ http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/may/23/jail-




Chapter Eight:  Australia 
This chapter critically reviews and contrasts the Australian1 and United Kingdom 
(UK) approaches towards economic crime and follows the previous chapter which 
contrasted the United States of America (US) and UK. This chapter examines the 
place of Australia in the international financial community and its participation in 
international endeavours to combat economic crime. The issues of fraud, bribery 
and corruption are considered in light of the Australian constitution, which has a 
federal and state structure with fraud, in general, falling within an Australian state’s 
purview and external bribery being a Commonwealth of Australia matter. The 
design and implementation of the Australian financial regulatory structure is also 
examined since its ‘Twin Peaks’ model has been thought to successfully withstand 
the stresses of the 2008 financial crisis, as described by Lui, and Saunders and 
Wong.2 
Australia is chosen for comparison because, as the OECD comment, it is ‘a 
significant economy, exporter and international investor’, which means that it has 
the propensity to be a target for economic crime.3 It is also a member of ‘The 
Commonwealth’, ‘a voluntary association of 53 member countries.’4 Sometimes 
                                            
1
 ‘Australia's formal name is the Commonwealth of Australia.’ Australian Government  ‘Our Government’ 
http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government .  Under the Australian Constitution, the country is a 
federal country. ‘Under a federal system, powers are divided between a central government and several 
regional governments. In Australia, power was divided between the then Commonwealth Government and the 
governments of the six colonies, which were renamed 'states' by the Constitution. Specific areas of legislative 
power ('heads of power') were given to the then Commonwealth Government, including: taxation; defence; 
foreign affairs; postal and telecommunications services. (…) The wording of the law has often created 
situations where both the Australian Government and the states claim the authority to make laws over the 
same matter. See State and territory government for a discussion of the federal-state relationship and how 
these conflicts are resolved. http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government/australias-
federation#Thefederalsystem.  ‘There are six states in Australia: New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (Qld), 
South Australia (SA), Tasmania (Tas.), Victoria (Vic.) and Western Australia (WA). Each state has its own 
state Constitution, which divides the state's government into the same divisions of legislature, executive, and 
judiciary as the Australian Government. The six state parliaments are permitted to pass laws related to any 
matter that is not controlled by the Commonwealth under Section 51 of the Australian Constitution.’ 
http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government/state-and-territory-government .  
Accessed 16 September 2013. 
2
 Alison Lui, ‘Macro and micro prudential regulatory failures between banks in the United Kingdom and 
Australia 2004-2009.’ (2013) J F R & C 242,243. 
‘Many factors contributed to the resilience of the Australian economy over this period. One was the decisive 
fiscal stimulus measures introduced by the federal government in 2008 and 2009 that have attracted wide 
praise from international agencies like the OECD and the IMF, as well as from expert commentators.1 Another 
was the rapid return to growth in the Chinese economy which stimulated the demand for Australian mineral 
exports, while the strong financial regulatory framework introduced in Australia in the early 1990s and reforms 
to the labour market that increased flexibility have cushioned it from external shocks like the GFC. A large 
budget surplus and relative low public debt also provided room for the government to expand its fiscal stance 
without compromising its longer‑term fiscal sustainability.’ Peter Saunders and Melissa  Wong (2011) 46(3) 
,Australian Journal of Social Issues 292. 
3
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in Australia’  October 2012. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf accessed 15 July 2013. (hereinafter OECD). 
4




known as the British Commonwealth, its ‘roots go back to the British Empire when 
some countries were ruled directly or indirectly by Britain.’5 This includes Australia, 
whose common law heritage6 and ties to the UK provide an historic association 
which makes drawing comparisons pertinent. In the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Group, Australia was the ‘11th 
largest economy and 14th largest exporter of goods and services’ and its largest 
trading partner was China.7 Importantly, ‘Australia also plays a significant role in 
many countries in Polynesia and the South Pacific that have serious corruption 
risks.’8 However, Australia is not immune from such risks itself and the size of its 
economy and financial markets does make it ‘very susceptible to illicit financial 
activities’9 and, as Ryder notes, ‘Australia has been described as one of the 
easiest places to launder money.’10  Since the onset of the most recent financial 
crisis, and unlike the US and UK, Australia is regarded as having more 
successfully withstood the effects than other leading industrial nations which, thus, 
invites enquiry into the underlying reasons.11 One reason advanced for this is that 
Australia adopted the twin peaks12 model of financial regulation,13 which as 
discussed by Taylor ‘is to structure regulation around two agencies, one 
responsible for the safety and soundness of all financial firms and the other for 
regulating their sales practices.’14 Lui observes that ‘Australian banks have 
withstood the financial crisis better than UK banks. Australia did not have any bank 
runs. Four of the nine AA-rated banks around the world are Australian banks, so 
the Australian regulation system worked well.’15 The irony of Australia’s adoption 
                                            
5
 The Commonwealth, ‘History’  http://thecommonwealth.org/our-history accessed 10 December 2013. 
6
 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘About us. Legal system’  
http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/legal_system.html accessed 10 December 2013. 
7
 OECD, ‘Phase 3 Report’ (n 3). 
8
 OECD, ‘Phase 3 Report’ (n 3). 
9
 Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? (Routledge 2012) 6. 
10
 Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? (n 9) 6. 
11
 Michael Levi and Russell G Smith, ‘Fraud vulnerabilities and the global financial crisis’ in ‘Trends and issues 
in crime and criminal justice.’ Australian Institute of Criminology No. 422 July 2011 
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/1/1/A/%7b11A2A2CE-75E7-4D98-A0A9-FD3471B6E841%7dtandi422.pdf 
accessed 4 June 2013. 
12
 ‘The “twin peaks” idea and nomenclature are attributable to Michael Taylor, a former officer of the Bank of 
England (…). In 1995, Taylor wrote an article entitled: “Twin Peaks”: a regulatory structure for the new 
century.’ (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 1995).  
Jeremy Cooper, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Paper ‘The integration of financial 
regulatory authorities – the Australian experience’, 4-5 September 2006. 2. 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/integration-financial-regulatory-
authorities.pdf/$file/integration-financial-regulatory-authorities.pdf accessed 29 October 2013. 
13
 Cooper (n 12) 2. 
14
 Michael W Taylor, ‘The Road from “Twin Peaks” – And the way Back.’ (2009) 16(1)  Connecticut ILJ  61. 
15




of the twin Peaks structure is that this was first advocated by Taylor, a Bank of 
England alumni, in 1995 but this structure was not adopted by the UK.16  
8.1 Introduction 
The success of Australia in weathering ‘the global financial crisis far better than 
many other developed economies,’17 does not, however, imply that it is unaffected 
by economic crime.  As Tomasic observes, ‘[t]he global financial crisis has 
revealed massive financial frauds and misconduct that have long been a part of 
our markets but have been submerged by the euphoria that has dominated these 
markets’.18 Notwithstanding Australia’s economic success, neither it nor any other 
country is immune from economic crime but, against that background, its 
experience and response will form a key part of this research to establish whether 
its formula can be of benefit to the UK.  For example, the Australian Institute of 
Criminology, reports that: 
Serious fraud in Australia is both widespread and costly. The act of using 
dishonest means to gain an unjust advantage over another takes many forms 
including cheque and credit card fraud, fraudulent trade practices, social 
security fraud, forgery, counterfeiting and bribery. It is believed to be one of 
the most under-reported offences in Australia, with fewer than 50 per cent of 
incidents being reported to police or other authorities.19 
The acknowledgement by the Australian government of the shortfall in reporting, 
then invites a critique of the government’s response. In this regard, it is helpful to 
have an external assessment. As a result of Australia’s obligations under the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC),20 an external 
review  reported: 
                                            
16
 Caner Bakir, ‘The Governance of Financial Regulatory Reform: The Australian Experience’ (2009) 87(4) 
Public Administration 910. 
However, one of the first policy announcements by the new UK Coalition government in 2010, was the 
adoption of a ‘twin peaks’ model for the UK, with effect from April 2013. See chapter 6.  
H M Treasury, ‘Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House’ 
16 June 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-by-the-chancellor-of-the-exchequer-rt-hon-
george-osborne-mp-at-mansion-house.  
Prudential Regulation Authority, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx accessed 4 
November 2013. 
17
 International Monetary Fund, ‘Economic Health Check. Mining Boom Bodes Bright Future for Australia’ 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/car102810a.htm accessed 16 December 2013. 
18
 Roman Tomasic, ‘The Financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime’, (2011) 18(1) J F C 7. 
19
 Australian Institute of Criminology, http://www.aic.gov.au/crime_types/economic/fraud.html accessed 8 July 
2013. 
20
 UNCAC, ‘United Nations Convention against Corruption’  




Australia has several agencies, including the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which 
prevent and detect corruption. The Government’s approach to corruption is based 
on the idea that no single body should be solely responsible for anti-corruption. All 
Government agencies must maintain plans for preventing and reporting 
corruption.21 
It is significant that the UNCAC should highlight that no single body should be 
responsible for anti-corruption because, as this chapter illustrates, the Australian 
regulatory structure faces organisational challenges which are not present in the 
UK. 
The Commonwealth of Australia (the Commonwealth) has, under the Australian 
Constitution established ‘a federal system22 in which legislative, executive and 
judicial powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and six 
states’.23 The essence of this is that ‘[t]he Constitution does not confer on the 
Commonwealth Parliament the power to make laws on all subjects but list subjects 
about which it can make laws.’24 Therefore, in order to understand the legislative 
landscape, it is important to note that each state has its own constitution but is 
subject to the Commonwealth constitution, contained in the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900.25 However, it has been noted that, ‘except for a 
few matters, a state parliament can make laws on any subject of relevance to that 
state. Accordingly, state parliaments can pass laws on a wider range of subjects 
                                                                                                                                    
Implementation Review Group meeting on 18 June 2012. ‘Executive Summary’ 
http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/Pages/Globalleadershipincombatingcorruption.aspx 
accessed 16 September 2013 
21
 UNCAC (n 20). (Emphasis added). 
22
 Similar to US. See Chapter 8 7.3 Fraud. 
23
 ‘It also enables the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws in relation to territories. There are ten 
territories, of which three are self-governing.’ 
Australian Government, Attorney General’s Department. ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption’ 
http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/Documents/TheCommonwealthsApproachtoAntiCor
ruption.pdf accessed 1 October 2013. 
24
 ‘They include defence; external affairs; interstate and international trade; taxation; foreign, trading and 
financial corporations; marriage and divorce; immigration; bankruptcy; and interstate industrial conciliation and 
arbitration.’ Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 51 (Legislative powers of the Parliament) s 




Cq1UfhSB_tOxAbc3g&bvm=bv.76802529,d.d2s accessed 6 October 2014. 
25
 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. 




than the Commonwealth Parliament.’26 This brings into focus that, as Tomasic 
discusses, ‘[c]orporate law and practice is largely the product of national legal 
systems drawing upon their particular traditions and development trajectories.’27 
Therefore, this might appear complicated with potential for difficulties.  However, 
the Attorney General suggests not, since ‘the Commonwealth Parliament has 
vested state and territory courts with extensive jurisdiction to hear matters arising 
under federal law.’28 Thus, it is clear that the states and territories may avail 
themselves of federal law. However, in relation to matters of criminalising fraud, 
bribery and corruption it is instructive to note that ‘[t]he Commonwealth Parliament 
does not have specific power with regard to criminal law’29 since ‘[m]ost criminal 
activity is governed by the laws of the states. This is true for offences of corruption, 
including fraud and bribery.’30 Therefore, it can be seen that the six states are able 
to enact different laws that criminalise fraud, bribery and corruption. As Tomasic 
observes, in relation to national traditions, while they may be different from other 
nations and other structures might seem more logical, ‘[o]nce a pattern of 
corporate law and regulation is formed, deviation from this pattern becomes 
difficult, although not impossible, as the constitutional framework of Australian 
corporations law illustrates.’31  At the federal level, ‘Commonwealth criminal 
legislation is primarily restricted to criminal activity against Commonwealth 
interests, officers or property or is directed at crimes with an international element 
such as the bribery of foreign officials.’32 This is in contrast to the UK Bribery Act 
2010 (BA2010) which applies to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.33 However, it is interesting to note that the Fraud Act 2006 (FRA2006) 
does not extend to Scotland.34 Bribery of Foreign Public Officials is the subject of 
                                            
26
 Australian Government, ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption’ (n 23). 
27
 Roman Tomasic, ‘Governance and the evaluation of corporate law and regulation in Australia’, (2001) 1(3) 
Corporate Governance 24. 
28
 Australian Government, ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption’ (n 23). 
29
 ‘However, the Commonwealth can enact criminal laws relying on other powers, for example those that are 
expressly provided for under the Constitution.’ Australian Government, ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to 
Anti-Corruption’ (n 23). 
30
 Australian Government, ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption’ (n 23). 
31
 Tomasic, ‘Governance and the evaluation of corporate law and regulation in Australia’ (n 27) 24. 
32
 Australian Government, ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption’ (n 23). 
33
 Bribery Act 2010, s 18.  
34
 Fraud Act 2006, s 15. 
‘In Scotland, criminal fraud is mainly dealt with under the common law and a number of statutory offences. 
The main fraud offences in Scotland are: Common law fraud, uttering, embezzlement and statutory frauds.’ 
One of the main differences is a maximum sentence is life imprisonment in addition to or instead of unlimited 
fine, whereas in the rest of the UK, the maximum is 10 years imprisonment. 
Fraud Advisory Panel, ‘Fraud Facts: Fraud in Scotland’ 17 October 2013. 




the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 1997 (OECD Convention),35 which sets the 
international standards to which Australia subscribes. 
8.2 International Treaties and influence on domestic concerns 
Australia has adopted a number of international conventions36 in the arena of 
economic crime and these provide international benchmarks for the establishment 
of standards to counter economic crime and the monitoring of progress to 
implement such standards.37 For example, in 1999, Australia ratified the OECD 
Convention and, concurrently, amended the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 
199538 to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials.39 In 2008, the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery ‘recognised Australia‘s significant efforts to implement 
the Recommendations made by the Working Group,’ which deemed ‘that Australia 
has fully implemented 12 out of the 22 Recommendations made [earlier] (…), 
while 10 Recommendations have either been partially implemented or not 
implemented.’ 40 This report demonstrates, firstly, that there is an international 
mechanism to review the implementation of the OECD standards and, secondly, 
that Australia is working towards implementation. However, a review by OECD, 
found that: 
                                            
35
 ‘The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make 
this effective. It is the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the 
bribery transaction.’ OECD, ‘OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions’ (OECD Convention) http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm accessed 15 July 2013. See also chapter 5.2.1 and 7.2. 
36
 OECD Convention (n 35). 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC); 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html; http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-
corruptioninitiative/; Asian Development Bank OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia Pacific 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3355,en_34982156_34982385_1_1_1_1_1,00.html; Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
37
 OECD, ‘ AUSTRALIA: phase 2 follow-up report on the implementation of the phase 2 recommendations 
application of the convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions and the 1997 revised recommendation on combating bribery in international business 
transactions’ http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/41305864.pdf accessed 17 
December 2013. 
38
 ‘The Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Officials) Act 1999 (Cth) commenced on 17 December 
1999 and the Convention came into force in Australia on the same date. The Act inserted a new Division into 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) to criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials.’ 
Parliament of Australia, ‘Australia's implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.’ 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-
2012/AntiBribery accessed 10 December 2013. 
39
 ‘The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make 
this effective. It is the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the 
bribery transaction.’ http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm accessed 15 July 
2013. 
40




Australia’s enforcement of its foreign bribery laws has been extremely low, 
with just a single case leading to prosecutions out of 28 referrals in 13 years. 
Cases may have been closed prematurely. Australia must vigorously pursue 
foreign bribery allegations.41 
This is an important conclusion because ‘[a] significant portion of Australia’s 
international activities are exposed to risks of foreign bribery’,42 and the OECD 
note that ‘75% of the top 100 companies and 63% of the top 200 companies listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange operate in a high risk sector, a high risk country, 
or both.’43 The particular sector of vulnerability is mining and resources, both in 
Australia and overseas, especially Africa where ‘Australian companies (…) have 
more projects in Africa than any other region of the world.’44 The penetration of 
Australian companies into Africa is of particular concern because, as OECD 
comment, ‘African countries still face significant obstacles to economic 
development. Corruption and lack of transparency and accountability in business 
transactions remain high on the list of investment risks in Africa.’45 
Australia subsequently committed itself to further action against bribery when it 
signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003.46  The 
UNCAC was incorporated into domestic legislation by Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-terrorism Financing Act 2006.47 UNCAC ‘requires States Parties to 
criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in the course of international 
                                            
41
 ‘OECD seriously concerned by lack of foreign bribery convictions, but encouraged by recent efforts by the 
Australian Federal Police’. 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecdseriouslyconcernedbylackofforeignbriberyconvictionsbutencouragedbyrec
enteffortsbytheaustralianfederalpolice.htm accessed 15 July 2013. 
42
 OECD, ‘Phase 3 Report’ (n 3). 
43
 OECD, ‘Phase 3 Report’ (n 3). (Footnotes omitted). 
44
 ‘A significant portion of Australia‘s international economic activities are exposed to risks of foreign bribery. A 
recent study found that 75% of the top 100 companies and 63% of the top 200 companies listed on the 
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OECD, ‘Phase 3 Report’ (n 3) 8. 
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 OECD, ‘Stocktaking of Business Integrity and Anti-Bribery Legislation, Policies and Practices in Twenty 
African Countries - OECD-Afdb Joint Initiative to Support Business Integrity and Anti-Bribery Efforts in Africa.’ 
18.  http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Stocktaking%20of%20business%20integrity%20and%20Anti-
bribery%20Legislation,%20Policies%20and%20Practices%20in%20Twenty%20African%20Countries.pdf 
accessed 10 December 2013. 
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 Signed on 9 December 2003, ratified i7 December 2005. 
UNCAC (n 36). 
47
 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006,   s 212(4)’ In performing the AUSTRAC 
CEO’s functions under this Act, the AUSTRAC CEO must have regard to: 




business.’48 Interestingly, as will be discussed later in the chapter, ‘[t]he Legislative 
Guide for the Implementation of UNCAC49 does not differentiate between bribery 
and facilitation payments.’50 This is significant in the discussions which are current 
in Australia regarding their retention of the ‘facilitation payments defence’ to 
bribery of foreign public officials.51 
Although Australia took steps to legislate against bribery, in terms of enforcement, 
the risks of bribery and corruption are heightened when combined with poor 
money laundering control because, according to Ryder, ‘Australia has been 
described as one of the easiest places to launder money.’52  This is unhelpful 
because Australia has also been a member of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), since 1990.53 It has been argued by Ryder that ‘the FATF was highly 
critical of the minimal level of compliance with its 40 Recommendations which 
resulted in “both embarrassments for the Australian government and with it 
international scrutiny on the Australian AML system”.’54 This criticism of Australia’s 
enforcement record was especially significant because of Australia’s profile in 
promoting these standards in the region55 and because it has leadership of the 
G2056 in 2014, where it admitted in opening the G20 Anti-Corruption Roundtable 
that ‘in Australia we have recently seen serious allegations of widespread 
corruption within our trade unions, representing a threat to honest businesses and 
important projects.’57 
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Australia’s geographic and global economic presence facilitated it taking a leading 
role in the Asia/Pacific region where, Jensen and Png report that it ‘agreed to set 
up a Secretariat for the purpose of obtaining regional commitment and establishing 
a regional58 FATF-style body with practical objectives.’59 The objective for ‘the 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) 60 is to ensure the adoption, 
implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards’.61 Thus, Australia’s 
adherence to the FATF standards is important for the region because, according 
to Jensen and Png,  ‘the general level of compliance of these Developing Member 
Countries on a strict reading of the compliance ratings is not high.’62  
The FATF, although clearly originally skewed towards anti-money laundering, as a 
result of the US led ‘War on Drugs’63 and counter-terrorist financing strategies 
since 2001,64 does provide a structure to assess the steps taken by countries to 
combat economic crime. The FATF objectives are: 
to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory 
and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist 
financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial 
system.65  
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Furthermore, the FATF undertakes periodic reviews of member countries to 
evaluate compliance with its Recommendations.66 Although detailed analysis of 
such reports is outside the scope of this thesis because money laundering is not 
its focus, it is instructive to note that the FATFs ‘Third Mutual Evaluation Report’ 
was critical of Australia’s level of compliance: ‘the key issue in terms of effective 
implementation of the money laundering offence is the low number of money 
laundering prosecutions at Commonwealth level (…), indicating that the regime is 
not being effectively implemented.’67 This lack of prosecutions is a theme which 
recurs in relation to Australian prosecution of bribery.68 However, Ryder notes that 
the ‘Australian government responded by introducing the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Act 2006’69 (and Rules in 2007 and Regulations in 2008)70 
‘to improve compatibility with the 40 Recommendations of the FATF.’71 Thus, 
Australia has put in place legislation to meet its international obligations.72 
8.3 Fraud 
In Australia, ‘[m]ost criminal activity is governed by the laws of the states. This is 
true for offences of corruption, including fraud and bribery.’73 Furthermore, Smith 
comments that: 
in Australia, fraud is not recognised as a separate legal category of crime 
(other than conspiracy to defraud). Instead, a variety of property offences 
may be used to prosecute conduct which involves fraud and deception such 
as crimes of theft and obtaining a financial advantage by deception.74 
The Attorney General provides that ‘Australia has a strong legislative regime 
criminalising corrupt behaviour.’75  Furthermore, its ‘corruption offences cover a 
broad range of crimes, including bribery, embezzlement, nepotism and extortion.’76 
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This is given as a reason why such ‘corruption offences are not contained in any 
single Act of Parliament and are found in Commonwealth, state and territory 
legislation.’77 This makes the anti-fraud arena more complicated when compared 
with the UK for the Attorney General provides a shopping list of Commonwealth 
legislation: Criminal Code Act 1995, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997.78 These are then combined with state legislation to criminalise fraud, thus 
clearly demonstrating the fragmented landscape and can be seen in light of 
antipathy towards changing the structure.79 However, Australia is not alone in 
having a regime of fragmented legislation. In the US, as Podgor notes, ‘the scope 
of fraud is problematic in that there is no specific group of statutes designated in 
the federal code as fraud statutes and no consistent definition to create the 
boundaries of what is encompassed within the term.’80 Thus, while there are 
similarities between Australia and US these represent complicating factors when 
compared with the UK. The criminalisation of fraud in Australia reflects such 
constraints. 
8.3.1 Criminalisation 
Criminalisation of fraud in Australia reflects the constraints of operating in a 
fragmented constitutional system in that there is not just one piece of legislation to 
cover the Commonwealth, states, and territories. Some states and territories have 
criminal codes while others do not,81 where  ‘[c]odification has been defined as 
“the setting out in one statute of all the law affecting a particular topic whether it is 
to be found in statutes or common law”.’82 This is not part of the UK tradition. 
However, in 1991, the Commonwealth government started to prepare a criminal 
code for all Australian jurisdictions but when the Commonwealth Criminal Code 
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was enacted in 1995,83  to cover matters purely within its own purview (that is, not 
states or territories) the theft, fraud and bribery provisions were absent, until the 
Code was amended in 2000.84 These offences, which only apply to 
Commonwealth entities, all carried the same maximum penalty of ten years 
imprisonment.85 The purpose, according to Johns, was to simplify and reduce the 
Commonwealth statute book,86 ‘replacing overly complex provisions with a modern 
and transparent scheme as part of a national initiative.’87 However, this only 
affected matters within the Commonwealth bailiwick, since fraud is a matter dealt 
within individual state jurisdictions. 
The interplay between the authorities in the constitutional framework means that 
‘[f]raudulent offences can be statute or common law based criminal offences in 
federal and state criminal jurisdictions.’88 However, only two states in the 
Commonwealth, New South Wales (NSW) and South Australia ‘retain the common 
law approach to fraud regulation.’89 In NSW, which is Australia’s largest state 
economy and, thus, particularly relevant to this thesis,90  ‘the common law is based 
on the offence of larceny.’91 Thus, in terms of evaluating the legislative 
underpinning to countering fraud in Australia, the lack of federal or common state 
legislation is a disadvantage. However, it is instructive to note that in NSW, there 
has been legislative change by the Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and 
Forgery Offences Act) 2009.  It has been suggested by Steel that this law: 
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represents a significant change to fraud offences in New South Wales and 
introduces identity-crime offences. The Act continues to move away from 
offences based on common law larceny and interference with property rights 
toward general offences based on a statutory defined concept of dishonesty. 
However, larceny and related offences have been retained. Consequently, 
care needs to be taken to distinguish between the different ingredients that 
constitute the various offences.92 
The reason this step is instructive is because it post dates the UK FRA2006. As 
detailed in chapter six, the UK approach was to repeal various Theft Acts and to 
introduce a statutory offence of fraud. In NSW, as Steel notes, legislators have 
found themselves hamstrung by existing legislation because, ‘[t]he [Crimes 
Amendment] Act repeals over 30 fraud offences in the Crimes Act 1900 and 
replaces those offences with a new Part 4AA containing one general fraud 
offence, and three ancillary offences.’93 Whereas the UK FRA2006 represented a 
new departure, the foundations for the new NSW offences are the historic 
offences, which means that ‘[t]he complexity of this section is due to its heritage as 
the definitional section in the Theft Act 1968 (UK) – on which the theft and fraud 
offences in the Criminal Code (Cth) are based.’94 The NSW legislators did have an 
opportunity to follow the UK lead but, according to Steel, considered that 
‘[r]epresentation and general dishonesty based offences (…) [were] criticised for 
being too broadly defined,’95 which was found attractive by the UK. The NSW fraud 
offences are based on the ‘traditional requirement of dishonest deception’,96 which 
are found in the definition in R v Ghosh.97 The motivation for change can be traced 
back to the 1990’s when ‘the Standing Committee of the [Australian] Attorneys-
General established the Model Criminal Law Officers Committee (MCLOC).98 An 
outcome of which was to highlight ‘the importance of simplifying fraud and forgery 
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offences and orienting them to the use of computers.’99 Thus, according to Johns, 
the intention was that states would take steps to align their individual legislation 
with that of the Commonwealth:  
The reforms introduced in NSW in 2009 were intended (…) to bring NSW 
‘closer to the national approach’ of the Model Criminal Code, to replace 
‘outdated and redundant provisions’ with ‘simple and modern offences’, and 
to assist law enforcement to ‘keep pace with modern criminal conduct.’100 
If the Commonwealth and states aligned their legislation, then that might present a 
structure which could be used to compare with the UK. The ‘national approach’ is 
the code adopted by the Commonwealth in 2000, rather than identical state laws 
and whilst there may be ‘some correlation between the maximum penalties for 
fraud and forgery offences in NSW and the Commonwealth’,101 there are marked 
differences between some of the penalties for their respective identity fraud 
offences.102 However, what the Commonwealth does have is a ten-year head start 
in terms of judicial precedent which can inform state prosecution and sentencing 
decisions.103 There are two further aspects in relation to the application of 
Commonwealth and state law.  Firstly, when both laws apply, an offender 
punished under state law is not then liable for punishment under a Commonwealth 
offence, and vice versa.104  Secondly, there should be consistency in sentencing 
similar cases, as Johns identifies, 
Both state and federal governments have legislated in respect of drug 
offences, some of them very similar, even parallel. It may seem odd if, in 
respect of comparable crimes, an offender sentenced in, say, New South 
Wales, under federal law was treated markedly differently from an offender 
sentenced in New South Wales under State law.105 
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There is a degree of similarity between the Commonwealth and NSW maximum 
penalties of ten years imprisonment.106 In the Commonwealth, Johns notes, 
‘Obtain property by deception’, ‘Obtain financial advantage by deception’, and 
‘Conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth’;107 and, in NSW, ‘Obtain property 
belonging to another by deception’, ‘Obtain financial advantage or cause financial 
disadvantage by deception’.108 ’However, there are marked differences between 
some of the penalties for the Commonwealth and NSW identity offences,’109 where 
in NSW ‘the maximum penalties of seven years for possess identification 
information  and ten years for deal in identification information are double those of 
the Commonwealth, reducing the utility of sentencing comparisons.’110 
The purpose in comparing Commonwealth and NSW fraud legislation is to 
demonstrate that the federal government and the leading financial markets state 
are not in complete alignment. However, there are also differences in the other 
states.  In South Australia, ‘[t]he MCLOC model was regarded as “not comply[ing] 
with the drafting style of the South Australian statute book”.111  Furthermore, in 
Victoria, although following NSW and the Commonwealth, ‘numerous other fraud 
offences have been retained’.112 In Queensland, ‘there is still an assortment of 
provisions’ and a variety of sentences, none of which ‘correspond to the NSW or 
Commonwealth maximum penalty of 10 years for general fraud or forgery’;113 and, 
in Western Australia, ‘the general fraud offence (…) has a 7 year maximum 
penalty which, uniquely, rises to 10 years if the victim is aged 60 or over.’114 
This review of the Australian approach to criminalisation of fraud shows that 
although some progress has been made in aligning legislation in the states to the 
Commonwealth, this process is incomplete and differences remain. The example 
of changes in NSW illustrate that the UK FRA2006 developments were 
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considered, but rejected.115 At a time when the FRA2006 is working well116 and 
there does not appear to be a demand for change, the lack of a clear unified 
approach by the Commonwealth and all the states does not provide a basis for the 
UK to follow Australia.  
8.3.2 Regulatory Bodies 
The Australian constitutional structure of ‘a federal system in which legislative, 
executive and judicial powers are shared or distributed between the 
Commonwealth and six states’,117 also embodies  ‘the Government’s approach to 
corruption [which] is based on the idea that no single body should be solely 
responsible for anti-corruption.118 Thus, at the Commonwealth level there are three 
key regulatory bodies which cover the field of intelligence, investigation and 
prosecution.  The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Australian Federal Police. 
8.3.2.1 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC) 
A key element in the response to economic and organised crime is financial 
intelligence.  Financial intelligence is the ‘analysis and use of financial transaction 
report data’,119 ‘in the prevention, detection and prosecution of crime.’120 This then 
‘assists the authorities to trace the trail of illicit money, to combat money 
laundering and other serious crimes.’121 In Australia, this is the responsibility of 
AUSTRAC, ‘whose purpose is to protect the integrity of Australia’s financial 
system and contribute to the administration of justice through [their] expertise in 
countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism.’122 AUSTRAC, which 
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is a Commonwealth institution123 conducting its role through ‘two interdependent 
functions – as the [AML/CTF] regulator and as Australia’s specialist financial 
intelligence unit (FIU).’124 This includes working ‘with law enforcement and other 
agencies to protect the integrity of the Australian financial system and fight serious 
crimes such as drug trafficking, tax evasion, fraud and people smuggling.’125 The 
numbers of transactions involved are significant, with ‘84 million individual reports 
of financial transactions’ in 2012-13, totalling [AUD] $3.5 trillion.126 In addition, in 
2012-13 there were ‘40,000 suspicious matter reports.127 AUSTRAC point to the 
use made of its intelligence by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) which: 
contributed to 1,428 cases during the year and resulted in [AUD] $572 million 
in taxation assessments being raised. (…) [and assisted] law enforcement, 
intelligence, human services, regulatory and revenue partner agencies in 280 
other significant investigations.128 
This report of the use made of AUSTRAC’s intelligence appears to demonstrate 
improvements since Australia was earlier criticised for its weaknesses in anti-
money laundering.129 An outcome of this criticism was the AML/CTF Act 2006, 
which served to comply with the FATF 40 recommendations.130 This is something 
which Ryder applauds because ‘it is extremely rare for a country to formally 
provide the measures of the FATF with recognition in primary legislation.’131  
Recognising the importance of the Australian legislation, Ryder contrasts ‘with 
both the US and UK, which have adopted a piecemeal approach towards 
implementing the international AML legislative measures.’132 However, although 
money laundering per se is not the focus of this thesis, reporting instances or 
suspicious of economic crime is germane. Thus, in contrast to the strict money 
laundering reporting requirements of US and UK, the Australian approach is to 
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adopt a ‘risk-based’133 stance, ‘away from prescriptive, compliance-based 
approaches,’134 but this does place the onus on the ‘reporting entities’ to properly 
assess their own risks. AUSTRAC stated: 
AML/CTF programs are risk based. This means reporting entities can 
develop their own programs with minimal cost, tailored to their situation and 
money laundering and terrorism financing risks. This approach recognises 
that the reporting entity is in the best position to assess the risk of their 
customers, products and services and to allocate resources to counter those 
risks. The risk-based approach also ensures there is minimum impact on 
customers.135 
AUSTRAC regulates four sectors: banks and other lenders; gambling services and 
bullion; money service businesses; and non-bank financial services.136 The burden 
of establishing the parameters lies with the reporting entities137 which ‘would be 
expected to demonstrate to AUSTRAC (…) that their risk- based systems and 
controls are suitable to their particular businesses (having regard to their size, 
nature and complexity) and are consistent with prudent and good practices.’138 
The costs of compliance is significant,139 but non-compliance can bring 
enforcement,140 where ‘AUSTRAC has a range of enforcement powers at its 
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disposal,141 including issuing notices compelling businesses to provide information 
to the agency, and directing businesses to undertake a risk assessment or 
external audit.’142 In 2013, these amounted to eight actions.143  
8.3.2.2 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) ‘is an independent 
prosecuting service established by the Parliament of Australia to prosecute alleged 
offences against Commonwealth law.’144 CDPP’s role is in relation to offences 
against the Commonwealth, such as people trafficking, terrorism, money 
laundering and frauds against the Commonwealth,145 such as ‘tax fraud, Medicare 
fraud and social security fraud.’146 The CDPP ‘is not an investigative agency and 
has no powers or statutory function to carry out its own investigations.’147 This is in 
contrast to the US, where the Department of Justice and its agencies investigate 
and prosecute,148 and in the UK, where the key attribute of the Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) is its powers to investigate and prosecute.149Accordingly, it is a 
Commonwealth resource and ‘received briefs from 36 Commonwealth 
investigative agencies’150 in the last financial year, including Australian Federal 
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Police and ATO.151 In relation to economic crime, the role of the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) is significant. 
8.3.2.3 Australian Federal Police 
In the Commonwealth, the AFP ‘investigates serious or complex crimes against 
Commonwealth laws, it revenue, expenditure or property.’152 AFP provides police 
services: ‘in relation to the laws of the Commonwealth and the property of the 
Commonwealth (…) and the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests’;153 and, ‘in 
relation to the Australian Capital Territory (…) and Australia’s external 
territories.’154 AFP operates under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979155 and 
has strategic priorities relating to terrorism, organised crime and ‘safeguarding the 
economic interests of the nation from criminal activities such as serious fraud, 
money laundering, corruption, intellectual property crime and technology-enabled 
crime.’156 
The AFP has a limited role in policing across Australia because of the structure of 
the Commonwealth, its states and territories. Consequently, it works in ‘multi-
agency, multidisciplinary crime teams.’157 The AFP established a ‘Fraud and Anti-
Corruption business area’,158 in 2013, as a ‘response to serious and complex fraud 
against the Commonwealth such as corruption, foreign bribery and complex 
identity crime, including the manufacture and abuse of identity credentials.’159 ‘This 
                                            
151
 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions ‘Annual report 2012-1013’ (n 147) 11. 
152
 Australian Government, ‘The Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption’ (n 23). 
153
 Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report 2012-13: Role of the Australian Federal Police’ 20. 
http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-report-2012-2013.ashx 
accessed 14 November 2013. 
154
 Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report 2012-13’ (n153) 20. 
155
 Australian Federal Police Act 1979. 
156
 Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report 2012-13’ (n153) 22. 
157
 Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report 2012-13’ (n153) 67. 
158
 Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report 2012-13’ (n153) 67. 
159
 Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report 2012-13’ (n153) 67. 
‘The Coalition Government has formally established the Fraud and Anti-Corruption (FAC) Centre located in 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) headquarters, with the recent signing of a Commonwealth multi-agency 
Memorandum of Understanding—marking a new era in the approach to dealing with fraud and corruption at a 
federal level. The FAC Centre brings together the Australian Taxation Office, Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Australian Crime Commission, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 
Department of Human Services, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Department of Defence, 
and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in order to assess, prioritise and respond to serious fraud and 
corruption matters.’ 
Minister for Justice, ‘AFP-Hosted Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre’ 
‘http://www.ministerjustice.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2014/ThirdQuarter/31July2014-




specialist area will also address the OECD review of Australia’s response to 
foreign bribery allegations.’160 
Although the CDPP and AFP work together, they are separate institutions. Thus, 
the investigation and prosecution of serious economic crime is split, whereas, in 
the UK, the SFO is a single investigator and prosecutor. Furthermore, the SFO 
can operate across the whole of the UK, unlike AFP/CDPP which has a limited 
remit and has to operate through a variety of multi-agency, multidisciplinary crime 
teams, which consequently ‘can sometimes overlap with those of state and 
territory law enforcement, regulatory or criminal justice areas,’161 thus creating a 
need for a coordinated response in the form of a Framework.162  The purpose of 
the Framework is to ensure that ‘law enforcement, intelligence policy and 
regulatory agencies are collaborating effectively with each other, state, territory 
and international counterparts.163 The clear need for this in Australia is 
understandable because of their constitutional structure where ‘the 
Commonwealth does not have a head of power with respect to criminal law.’164 
However, because the UK does not have such a constitutional structure, the 
mechanisms employed in Australia to achieve a cohesive approach do not provide 
a template for adoption in the UK. 
8.4 Bribery and Corruption 
8.4.1 Criminalisation - Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
As a consequence of Australia’s obligations under the OECD Convention, 
Australia’s Criminal Code was amended 165 to criminalise bribery of foreign public 
officials.166 The Australian government set out its values as:  
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Bribery of foreign public officials in the course of international trade is 
unacceptable. Although Australian business has high ethical standards, it is 
important that Australia maintains a good reputation by supporting the OECD 
in this initiative and therefore benefiting from the improvements it should 
bring to world trade. In particular, a reduction in the role played by bribery 
should result in more merit based commercial decisions. This will advantage 
Australia because as a rule its businesses are competitive.167 
This is an important statement because it provides that Australia already had high 
ethical standards and it was being collegiate with other nations in wanting all 
countries to adopt such standards. The rationale was that this would benefit 
Australia because international trade, based on pure commercial considerations 
should reward competitive businesses. However, the government stated that their 
reputation would depend upon active enforcement of the law, although by 2011, 
only seven of the 37 signatories to the OECD Convention were considered active 
in enforcement (including US and UK), with Australia, noted by Davids and 
Schubert, as ‘one of the 20 countries that is judged as exhibiting “little or no 
enforcement”.’168 
Before considering enforcement, it is appropriate to examine the legislation. The 
criminal code dealt with ‘[t]he integrity and security of the international community 
and foreign governments: Bribery of foreign public officials’.169  S.70.2(1) provides 
that A person is guilty of an offence if:  
(a) the person: (i) provides a benefit to another person; or (ii) causes a 
benefit to be provided to another person; or offers to provide, or promises to 
provide, a benefit to another person; or (iv) causes an offer of the provision of 
a benefit, or a promise of the provision of a benefit, to be made to another 
person; and 
(b) the benefit is not legitimately due to the other person; and 
(c) the first-named does so with the intention of influencing a foreign public 
official (who may be the other person) in the exercise of the official’s duties 
as a foreign public official in order to: (i) obtain or retain business; or (ii) 
obtain or retain a business advantage that is not legitimately due to the 
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recipient, or intended recipient, of the business advantage (who may be the 
first-mentioned person).170 
These provisions are broadly the same as the BA2010.171 There are two defences 
to claims of foreign bribery: lawful conduct and ‘facilitation payments.172 
8.4.1.1 Lawful Conduct Defence 
The lawful conduct exemption173  applies for activities which are lawful in the 
foreign public official’s country, subject to ‘a written law in force in that place’ or ‘a 
written law in force in the foreign country or in the part of the country, as the case 
may be.’174 This, too, replicates BA2010.175 Davids and Schubert explain this 
defence in ‘the findings of the Cole enquiry176 into the Australian Wheat Board 
(AWB) affair.’177 In that case, payments were made to Iraqi government officials ‘in 
violation of United Nations [UN] sanctions imposed under the Oil-for-Food program 
but it was doubted that this alone could make them unlawful under Iraqi law.’178 By 
way of background, ‘[i]n 1990, following the invasion of Kuwait, the UN imposed 
sanctions on Iraq.’179 However, these sanctions imposed hardship on the Iraqi 
people because its government did not have hard currency to purchase 
foodstuffs.180 In response, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 986 
allowing Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase ‘humanitarian goods, including 
foodstuffs’.181 An outcome of the AWB case was a change to the Criminal Code to 
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clarify that ‘the benefit offered must be required or permitted in the written law of 
the place or country.’182 
8.4.1.2 Facilitation Payments Defence 
The second defence is that payments were ‘facilitation payments’.183 This is a 
contentious issue for Australia because ‘[t]he Government is considering whether 
to remove the defence for facilitation payments by repealing section 70.4 of the 
Criminal Code, and is seeking submissions from interested parties on this 
issue.’184 The Criminal Code states: 
(1)  A person is not guilty of an offence (…) if: 
(a) the value of the benefit was of a minor nature; and  
(b) the person’s conduct was engaged in the for the sole or dominant 
purpose of expediting or securing the performance of a routine 
government action; and 
(c) as soon as practicable after the conduct occurred, the person 
made a record of the conduct that complies with subsection (3); and 
(d) any of the following subparagraphs apply:  
(i) the person has retained that record at all relevant times; 
(iii) a prosecution for the offence is instituted more than 7 years after 
the conduct occurs.185 
 
The ‘facilitation payments’ defence is not available under UK BA2010, but it is 
available under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977.186 However, the 
OECD report a ‘general confusion about the facilitation payment defence (…). The 
evaluation team noted a lack of understanding of what constitutes a “facilitation 
payment” under Australian law.’187  This leads to misunderstandings such as 
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‘facilitation payments appear to be frequently equated with any bribes of small 
value.’188 The OECD reminder is that what is ‘[o]ften overlooked is the requirement 
that such payments must be made to secure routine government action of a minor 
nature that does not result in the obtaining of a business advantage.’189 
Furthermore, because such payments are lawful they benefit from tax 
deductibility.190  However, instead of pressing for abolition of facilitation payments, 
the OECD recognises the difficulties inherent in endeavouring to eliminate such 
payments by exhorting in their recommendation191 that Australia: 
continues to raise awareness of the distinction between facilitation payments 
and bribes, and encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of 
small facilitation payments in internal company controls, ethics and 
compliance programmes or measures, recognizing that such payments must 
in all cases be accurately accounted for in such companies’ books and 
financial records.192 
Thus, although OECD may not approve the use of facilitation payments, they 
recognise the reality that some countries, as in Australia and US, allow such 
payments within their anti-bribery laws. However, the Australian government 
recognises that there is an issue and conducted a public consultation in 2011, the 
results of which had not been published by late 2014.193 The consultation 
invitation,194 proffers reasons for and against removal of the ‘facilitation payments 
defence’, with key reasoning against being: 
Each of these arguments is based on an assumption that corruption and 
demands for bribes or facilitation payments are firmly entrenched in foreign 
jurisdictions. As the international business community continues to take steps 
against bribery and corruption, these arguments will become increasingly 
redundant.195 
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The Australian government cite ‘[c]ommentaries to the Anti-Bribery Convention 
[which] considered facilitation payments to be separate to bribery on the grounds 
that “small facilitation payments” did not constitute an attempt “to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage”.’196 Yet, in the following paragraph, the 
government points to Australia being a party to UNCAC, the purpose of which is to 
‘criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in international business.’197 This 
Convention, though, ‘does not differentiate between bribery and facilitation 
payments,’198 thus, adding weight to the view that the facilitation payments 
defence be reviewed. This is especially so because UNCAC thank Australia ‘for 
providing funding for the promotion’ of UNCAC.199 
The Australian government noted that ‘Australian businesses operating overseas 
may be subject to UK, US and Australian foreign bribery laws.’200 The Attorney 
General points to Australian law being ‘modelled’ on US law201 but ‘[a]s the UK 
defines facilitation payments as illegal, Australian law represents an 
inconsistency’.202 The clear implications are that Australia is moving closer to 
removing the ‘facilitation payments defence’. The case against such action being 
summarised as: 
Each of these arguments has, at its source, the problem of corruption. These 
arguments predominantly arise in business environments where facilitation 
payments are common and will become increasingly difficult argument to 
sustain. The Australian Government encourages Australian businesses to 
work actively to reduce corruption by resisting demands for facilitation 
payments and reporting them to authorities and works closely with foreign 
governments to improve governance and reduce corruption.203 
Although a decision has not been made, the direction of travel is towards following 
the UK lead, rather than adhering to the US position. The impact of such a 
decision is difficult to assess because the existing law has not been tested since 
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there have been no prosecutions under s.70, and, thus, the facilitation payments 
defence has yet to be considered by the courts.204 
8.4.1.3 Enforcement: Securency corruption case 
The ‘bribery of foreign officials’ provisions of the Criminal Code have yet to be 
tested in the courts, notwithstanding those provisions having been in place since 
1999. However, in 2011, a case emerged with such potential: Securency 
International Pty Ltd (Securency) is a multi-faceted case, involving allegations of 
bribery and corruption in Nepal, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Vietnam and the 
UK,205 Securency, ‘a joint venture between Australia’s central bank, the Reserve 
Bank of Australia and UK based Innovia Films’,206 was still awaiting trial by late 
2014: 
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has charged two Australian companies - 
Securency International Pty Ltd and Note Printing Australia Limited (NPA) - 
and six Victorian individuals with bribery of foreign public officials. The 
charges relate to alleged bribes paid to public officials in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Vietnam between the dates of 1999-2005 in order to secure banknote 
contracts. It is Australia’s first prosecution under foreign bribery legislation 
introduced on 17 December 1999.207 
The importance of Australia’s first bribery of foreign public officials cannot be 
overstated because of adverse comments from the FATF208 and the OECD209 
regarding its history of enforcement. There will be considerable attention on the 
eventual Securency trial but, in the meantime, there has been some peripheral 
activity.210 
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In 2012, Ellery, Securency’s Chief Financial Officer, pleaded guilty to one charge 
of false accounting.211 He received a six-month suspended prison sentence.212 It 
should be noted that the prosecution was predicated upon a charge of false 
accounting under Victorian state legislation, rather than the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code of bribery of foreign public officials. 
In the UK, the SFO charged a director of a connected company with conspiracy to 
corrupt,213 but he was acquitted at trial as the Financial Times report: ‘[a] 
Cumbrian businessman has been cleared by a jury at Southwark Crown Court in 
London of conspiring to bribe the former governor of Vietnam’s central bank,214 by 
helping his son to obtain a place at Durham University, paying fees and 
accomodation costs to induce the placing of contracts by the State Bank of 
Vietnam with Securency for the supply of banknotes.215 
One objective of a comparative analysis of the practice in Australia relating to 
prosecution of bribery of foreign public officials cannot be satisfied because the 
only case in the last 14 years (Securency) is still work in progress. As a 
consequence, there is no experience in Australia on prosecution of bribery of 
foreign public officials upon which to base comment. However, even within the 
constraints of the Securency case still being before the courts, the bribery issues 
have been considered by the Australian Parliament which concludes: 
The NPA/Securency case raises the critical importance of integrity standards 
and due diligence. These need to be matched with clear processes in relation 
to reporting suspected misconduct and corruption as well as effective 
protection of whistleblowers. The case demonstrates how, in a situation in 
which established policies and procedures were not adhered to or subject to 
effective oversight (for reasons including the poor relationship between the 
respective company boards and management), an opaque culture of secrecy 
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and collective amnesia (when asked to explain practices) came to 
characterise both companies.216 
It is clear that the Australian Parliament will wish to ensure that lessons should be 
learned from the case once it is concluded and, especially, in terms of protecting 
any whistleblower.217 
8.4.1.4 Sentencing 
The maximum penalties for individuals in breach of s.70 are ten years 
imprisonment and/or a AUD1.7 million fine. The penalty for companies are of the 
greater of: AUD 17 million fine; three times the value of the benefit attributed to the 
conduct (if it can be determined); or, 10% of the annual turnover.218 This compares 
with the UK of ten years imprisonment and / or an unlimited fine,219 and the US of 
$2m for corporates and five years and $100,000 for each FCPA violation.220 
However, in Australia, these provisions have yet to be deployed. 
8.4.2 Regulatory Bodies 
8.4.2.1 ‘Twin Peaks’: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
Australia became the first country in the world to adopt the so-called twin peaks 
model of regulatory reform in 1998. As discussed by Taylor, this approach is ‘to 
structure regulation around two agencies, one responsible for the safety and 
soundness of all financial firms and the other for regulating their sales 
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practices.’221 The Commonwealth created ‘[t]wo new regulators – prudential 
(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, APRA) and disclosure (Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission, ASIC).’222 This simplified the system 
because the ‘existing 10 regulators operating at federal, state and territory levels 
were abolished and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) lost its bank regulation 
powers.’223 The RBA’s role is focused on ‘monetary policy, stability of the financial 
system and the safety and efficiency of the payments system.’224 Another agency, 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, is responsible for 
competition policy.225 However, it is APRA226 and ASIC which are the twin peaks: 
‘APRA is responsible for prudential supervision of individual financial institutions 
and for promoting financial system stability in Australia,’227 this includes ‘Australia’s 
authorised deposit-taking institutions (banks, building societies and credit unions), 
life and general insurance and reinsurance companies, friendly societies and 
superannuation funds.’228 The supervisory role of APRA is focused on 
managing the risks of the institutions it supervises by establishing and 
enforcing ‘prudential standards and practices designed to ensure that (…) 
financial promises made by the institutions it supervises are met within a 
stable, efficient and competitive financial system.’229 The role of APRA as 
one of the twin peaks is important but its activities are not central to this 
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8.4.2.2 Australian Securities and Investment Commission  
The other ‘twin’ in the Australian twin peaks system is ASIC, ‘Australia’s 
corporate, markets and financial services regulator.’230 It is an independent 
Commonwealth [of Australia] Government Body, established by statute231 
and deriving its powers from the Corporations Act 2001.232 ASIC’s mission is 
to ‘contribute to Australia’s economic reputation and wellbeing by ensuring 
that Australia’s financial markets are fair and transparent, supported by 
confident and informed investors and consumers.’233 
ASIC has a wide remit to ‘regulate Australian companies, financial markets, 
financial services organisations and professionals who deal and advise in 
investments, superannuation, insurance, deposit taking and credit.’234 ASIC 
is organised into three regulatory areas: as ‘consumer credit regulator’,235 
‘financial services regulator’,236 and ‘markets regulator’.237 
Relatively shortly after the establishment of the twin peaks institutions of 
APRA and ASIC, came a ‘defining moment in APRA’s history [that of] the 
US$3.75 billion corporate collapse of Australian insurance group HIH in 
March 2001.’238 A Royal Commission investigated and reported239 ‘that 
there were difficulties in the relationship, which arose principally because 
APRA and ASIC had overlapping and clearly undelineated roles in relation 
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to financial services providers’.240 This is seen as one of the risk areas for 
twin peaks and serves to underline the need for proper exchange of 
information to ensure that regulation does not fall between two stools. The 
difficulty is explained by Carmichael, APRA’s then Chairman as: 
The difficulty for a prudential regulator is that it is much easier for the 
community to identify when you are doing a poor job than it is for them to 
identify when you are doing a good job. Unlike a conduct regulator [ASIC], 
which can at least count ‘heads on pikes’, there is no ready metric for 
APRA’s performance.241 
ASIC has a wide range of responsibilities, including 2 million corporations (of 
which 2,141 are listed on stock exchanges); over 6,000 deposit takers, credit 
providers, insurers, investment banks and hedge fund managers; and regulating 
18 authorised financial markets.242 ASIC notes that it is ‘[a] regulator with many 
hats’243 and, certainly, it has a significant number of matters within its purview. 
Accordingly, the adoption of a risk based approach, as an alternative to principles 
based is unsurprising, as Cooper explains: 
This means that ASIC focuses on areas that it assesses as being of the 
greatest risk, such as misconduct and non-compliance that affect consumers’ 
decisions, threaten the reputation of our markets or undermine Australia’s 
international reputation as a safe, well-regulated place to do business. It then 
decides what available regulatory tools best deal with those risks.244 
ASIC operates under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (ASIC Act) and administers the Corporations Act 2001.245 ASIC has, 
wide ranging powers and can counter financial misconduct by: investigating 
matters; prosecuting in a criminal court, applying for a civil penalty order; 
bringing a civil action; disqualifying people from managing corporations or 
dealing in financial services; and accepting and enforcing undertaking.246 
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Penalties for non-compliance with the ASIC Act range from 5 penalty units (total 
AUD 840) at one end of the spectrum to 100 penalty units (AUD17,000 and / or 2 
years imprisonment).247  
Notwithstanding the availability of powers of prosecution and regulation, the 
determination of the Australian government to take action is the subject of media 
speculation and parliamentary comment.248 As already discussed in relation to 
Securency, the Commonwealth has yet to achieve its first prosecution for bribery 
of foreign public officials. Although ASIC fairly state that bribery is not within their 
purview,249 it ‘has declined to investigate Securency and NPA directors for 
breaches of directors’ duties, despite a significant amount of evidence being sent 
to it by AFP’,250 the point being made that ‘[u]nlike the US and UK, Australia does 
have a public regulator that is empowered to prosecute individuals for breaches of 
directors duties.’251 The conclusion is ‘[o]ne of ASIC’s key problems is it is 
overstretched and understaffed, and, as a result Australia “gets what it pays for” 
from the regulator.’252 Resource constraint is also an issue for UK SFO, which 
suffered a budget cut from £50 million to £30 million between 2008 and 2013.253 
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Nevertheless, Carmichael’s analysis of ‘heads on pikes’ does strike a chord with 
media and parliamentarians for although such a measure ‘is not entirely reflective 
of our [ASIC’s] ability to achieve this objective, it does at least provide one 
metric.’254 In the year to 30th June 2013, ASIC secured 22 convictions, 9 of which 
resulted in custodial sentences,255 and the most significant case (Hobbs),256 
prosecuted by CDPP,257 was a AUD 50 million Ponzi scheme which achieved a 
‘penalty order of [AUD] $500,000 [which] is the largest awarded in ASIC’s 
history.’258 The judgment also included permanent prohibitions on managing 
corporations and disqualification from engaging in financial services.259 These 
penalties can be seen in the light of the Madoff and Stanford penalties in the US of 
150 and 100 years imprisonment respectively.260 In ‘June 2013 the Senate 
referred an inquiry261 into the performance of [ASIC] to the Senate Economics 
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References Committee,’262 ‘following revelations in Fairfax Media that the regulator 
took 16 months to act on information from whistleblowers about serious 
misconduct inside the Commonwealth Bank's financial planning unit [CFPL].263 
ASIC welcomed the inquiry into their performance264 by outlining issues regarded 
by them ‘as barriers to fulfilling [their] legislative responsibilities and obligations, 
and proposals for overcoming these barriers’.265 ASIC also acknowledged that in 
‘the public discussion of the handling of the CFPL matter there has been a 
misapprehension that (…) ASIC was not active in relation to the matter.’266 ASIC 
accept that ‘all stakeholders would have been better served if (…) ASIC had been 
public about CFPL’s agreement to undertake the [Continuous Improvement 
Compliance Program] in response’ to previous negative review findings.267 ASIC 
also accept that their communication with whistleblowers ‘was not adequate,’268 
and this has exposed areas of concern relating to whistleblowers, such as: 
‘expanding the definition’ of a whistleblower; ‘expanding the scope’ of information 
protection; and, protecting information about a whistleblower.’269 
In the face of a Parliamentary inquiry, ASIC has suggested a number of areas for 
enhancement, pointing to its ‘investigative powers were established in the 
Corporations Act and ASIC act over a decade ago.’270 ASIC then points out that 
‘financial services and markets have expanded rapidly and grown in complexity,’271 
as has technology but ‘ASIC’s investigative powers have not kept pace.’272 
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Furthermore, ASIC points to inadequacies in what it calls its ‘enforcement 
toolkit.’273 It identifies as the key issue that ‘[t]he penalties available in corporations 
legislation have not been comprehensively reviewed for over a decade, and, in 
many cases, do not meet community expectations.’274 ASIC make the point that 
the range of civil fines which they can make are markedly lower than those seen in 
UK and US.275 The example of the outcome of a major case involving J P Morgan 
illustrates the point they wish to make: 
JP Morgan was fined heavily for losses of over $6 billion on the so-called 
‘London Whale trades’ affair. The fines amounted to: £138 million by the UK 
FCA; US$200 million by the US SEC; US$200 million by the US Federal 
Reserve; US$309 million by the US Consumer Finance Protection Bureau; 
and US$300 million by the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In 
addition, JP Morgan will pay compensation to affected customers.  
In contrast, under the Corporations Act, the maximum civil penalty payable 
by a corporation for an offence is [AUD] $1 million. Due to the ‘totality 
principle’, multiple offences arising out of the same course of conduct will not 
usually give rise to a substantially greater penalty than a single offence. 
Accordingly, multiple offences cannot attract remotely comparable civil 
penalties in Australia, even assuming that the maximum penalty is applied.276 
The deterrence effect of ‘heads on pikes’ relies on the enforcement 
penalties available but ‘shortcomings in the consistency or size of 
penalties’277 can ‘create gaps between community expectations of the 
appropriate regulatory response to a particular instance of misconduct and 
what ASIC can do in practice.’278 They clearly adopt a cost / benefit analysis 
approach ‘when considering whether to take civil penalty action’,279 one 
component of which is that ‘[i]f only a low civil penalty would be available, 
this might be one factor weighing against taking this kind of action.’280  ASIC 
state that these issues ‘can risk undermining confidence in the financial 
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regulatory system’,281 which would appear to be precisely the case in 
Parliament undertaking a review. The Parliamentary report,282 published in 
June 2014, presented ASIC with an opportunity to undertake its own review 
of its activities and suggest improvements which is as well because the the 
report found that ‘ASIC has limited powers and resources but even so 
appears to miss or ignore clear and persistent early warning signs of 
corporate wrongdoing or troubling trends that pose a risk to consumers.’283 
Furthermore, ‘it showed ASIC as a timid, hesitant regulator, too ready and 
willing to accept uncritically assurances of a large institution that there were 
no grounds for ASIC’s concerns or intervention.’284 The Parliamentary report 
compared Australian penalties with other jurisdictions ‘while ASIC's maximum 
criminal penalties are broadly consistent with those available in other countries, 
there are significantly higher prison terms in the US, and higher fines in some 
overseas countries for breaches of continuous disclosure obligations and 
unlicensed conduct.’285 Moreover, ‘there is a broader range of civil and 
administrative penalties in other countries, and the penalties are higher.’286 This 
means firstly that Australia is found wanting in its penalties287 and, secondly, that 
the UK has no need to look to Australia for an alternative model to adopt.  
 The UK has already undergone a process of examining its regulatory 
structure and has adopted the twin peaks approach pioneered by Australia. 
A difference is that the UK FCA has a wider range of powers,288 and 
certainly greater maxima in terms of financial penalties,289 than ASIC290 but 
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even the UK lacks a single agency to deal with serious economic crime. The 
Commonwealth’s position ‘was that its multi-agency response is based “on 
the premise that no single body should be responsible”, and that there is “no 
convincing case for the establishment of a single over-arching integrity 
commission.’291 Thus, the prospects for a change of plan would appear to 
be limited for, as Tomasic notes, ‘[o]nce a pattern or corporate law and 
regulation is formed, deviation from this pattern becomes difficult, although 
not impossible.’292 
8.5 Conclusion 
The purpose in considering the regulatory responses to economic crime in 
Australia, a country which, according to Ryder, had successfully weathered the 
storm of post-financial crisis economies than other nations,293 was to establish 
whether it had methods and processes which might translate to the UK with 
benefit. 
The first aspect is in the nature of regulation itself. That Australia is considered to 
have managed its economy and institutions in a manner which has protected the 
country from the vicissitudes of the global market felt in UK and US.294 The basis 
of this regulatory structure is the twin peaks model: as deployed in Australia 
combines the prudential regulator (APRA) with the ‘corporate, markets and 
financial services regulator’ ASIC.295 It is ironic; therefore, that such a model 
should have a UK philosophical parentage by Taylor. However, as Ryder notes the 
twin peaks model is being successfully applied to Canada.296 This is another 
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interesting feature: firstly, the UK, through the Financial Services Act 2012,297 
adopted the twin peaks structure successfully implemented by Australia but then, 
concurrent with passing that legislation, appointed the then Governor of the Bank 
of Canada to be Governor of the Bank of England,298 in which role he Chairs the 
Prudential Regulation Authority, one of the UK’s ‘Twin Peaks.’299 Thus, it can be 
seen that the UK has adopted a regulatory regime and has had the benefit of 
Australia’s 15 years experience to inform its design. 
The role of ASIC is to regulate consumer credit, financial services and markets.300 
It has a wide range of responsibilities and a significant number of entities to 
supervise.301 However, ASIC’s enforcement record has been subject to criticism, 
resulting in the establishment of a Parliamentary inquiry.302 In response to the 
inquiry, ASIC acknowledged that their investigatory powers had not kept pace with 
changes in technology,303 and that the penalties available to them under 
corporations’ legislation were in need of review.304 Thus, it would appear that ASIC 
has, prompted by Parliament, recognised the opportunities for improving its 
enforcement activities and highlighting in its ‘London Whale’ case study305 the 
disparity between penalties available in UK and US and Australia. Therefore, with 
ASIC casting covetous eyes on UK and US sanctions, it is they who will be 
considering the new regulatory regime in the UK of FCA, PRA and SFO, rather 
than offering a template for UK adoption. The Australian Parliamentary inquiry306 
reported in June 2014 and considered whether Australia and ASIC would benefit 
from establishment of a SFO.307 The report reveals a range of views, including a 
former CDPP who said it would be a retrograde step308 and ASIC that it would lead 
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to fragmentation309 before concluding ‘that there needs to be a shake-up of how 
complex fraud, bribery and corruption is addressed in Australia.’310 
Notwithstanding this, the report stated: 
the committee is of the view that the public interest would be better served if 
ASIC was more willing to litigate complex matters involving large entities. 
There appears to be either a disinclination to initiate court proceedings, or a 
penchant within ASIC for negotiating settlements and enforceable 
undertakings. The end result is that there is little evidence to suggest that 
large entities fear the threat of litigation brought by ASIC.311 
This assessment highlights the preference for civil or regulatory penalties rather 
than criminal sanction as through the SFO and the committee ended by urging the 
government to consider the issues and, meantime, ensure that existing agencies 
were properly resourced.312 
Financial intelligence313 is an important aspect of the response to economic and 
organised crime. In Australia, this is the responsibility of AUSTRAC, a 
Commonwealth institution.314 In the past, Australia was criticised for weaknesses 
in anti-money laundering and responded by enacting the AML/CTF Act315 to 
comply with FATF requirements.316 This is a single piece of legislation in contrast 
to the UK and US which have adopted a piecemeal approach.317 Although outside 
the scope of this thesis, the example of primary legislation for AML/CTF may 
provide an example for other countries to follow, or provide a template for future 
FATF Recommendations.318 However, in relation to economic crime, the 
intelligence gathering through risk based reporting requirements does provide 
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information for other agencies to use, as with the ATO.319 This fulfils a similar role 
to National Crime Agencies SARs reports in UK.320 
Allied to AUSTRAC are CDPP and AFP. The former’ investigates serious or 
complex crimes’ against the Commonwealth,321 while the latter ‘is an independent 
prosecuting service (…) to prosecute alleged offences against Commonwealth 
law.’322 These are two separate institutions in contrast to the UK where the SFO is 
a single investigator and prosecutor. Furthermore, these are both Commonwealth 
institutions and, ‘can sometimes overlap with those of state and territory law 
enforcement, regulatory or criminal justice areas.’323 As a consequence of the 
Australian constitutional structure of Commonwealth, states and territories, their 
institutions have to work in ‘multidisciplinary crime teams’.324 The UK does not 
have the same structural issues for an insight into the Australian approach to be of 
benefit. 
The Australian approach to fraud is a reflection of its constitutional heritage with 
responsibility being divided between the Commonwealth and states. In its review 
of the theft, fraud, bribery and related offences landscape in 1995, MCLOC opined 
that:  
The excesses of the 1980s have focussed a great deal of attention on the 
prosecution of fraud offences in Australia. Corruption in the public sector has 
also found focus in the Fitzgerald Report in Queensland and WA Inc in 
Western Australia. That focus finds the substantive law in such areas as 
theft, fraud, secret commissions and bribery fragmented and complex. The 
nine jurisdictions operate under nine sets of laws which adopt fundamentally 
different criteria.325 
This demonstrates the extent of the task faced by Australian legislators to create a 
common standard which might then be described as the Australian fraud law.  
Since 1995, steps have been taken to move towards a ‘uniform national 
approach’326 but this is by no means complete and inconsistencies remain. 
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Although the Commonwealth and states may adopt different terminology, they are 
becoming more aligned. However, the general direction of travel promoted by the 
1995 Model Criminal Code report pre-dates the UK FRA2006, but it is clear from 
NSW 2009 legislation327 that the UK legislation was given consideration. However, 
the FRA2006 provisions were thought to be too broad and, therefore, not 
adopted.328 This thesis discusses the implementation of the Fraud Act in chapter 
six but, given that it is working well and meeting desired objectives, the patchy 
adoption of differing standards in the Australian states leads to a conclusion that 
the UK would not benefit from taking the Australian approach. 
In relation to bribery of foreign public officials, Australia has ratified both OECD 
Convention in 1999 and UNCAC in 2005. These conventions, which both the UK 
and US have also ratified,329 impose standards but while the UK has enacted 
recent legislation,330 which is congruent with those conventions, the other two 
countries have not. In particular, the UK has made clear that a facilitation payment 
(of minor value ‘for the sole or dominant purpose of expediting or securing the 
performance of a routine government action’)331 was, nevertheless, a bribe and 
therefore illegal.332 Thus, especially in view of the debate in Australia regarding 
following the UK lead, far from the UK potentially benefitting from the Australian 
experience, the reverse applies. 
Therefore, the conclusion of this chapter is that the issues of fraud, bribery and 
corruption are handled differently in Australia, where the Constitutional framework 
represents a complicating factor when considering whether any of its approach to 
economic crime could be translated with benefit to the UK. However, 
notwithstanding the constitution, it does have a different approach to prosecution 
which is not attractive. Where Australia has a structure of benefit is in relation to 
financial regulation where its twin peaks model of financial regulation is thought to 
have contributed to Australia successfully withstanding the stresses of the 2008 
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financial crisis.333 The UK, in 2013, has adopted such a structure, as discussed in 
chapter six.334 In considering the regulation and prosecution of economic crime, 
the Australian constitutional structure introduces some features which are not 
relevant to the UK and some complications, for example, regarding a variety of 
fraud legislation and the limited remit of some regulators and agencies, such as 
CDPP and AFP. The prime corporate and markets regulator, ASIC (one twin peak) 
is under scrutiny for its enforcement record and acknowledges itself that its 
armoury needs enhancing, whereas, the UK changed its regime in 2013.335 In 
relation to bribery of foreign public officials, the UK legislation, which is compliant 
with international standards, is more stringent than Australia which has still to 
decide whether or not to remove the ‘facilitation payments’ defence to bribery. 
Thus, the conclusion reached by this thesis is that the one area where the UK can 
usefully look to Australia for insight is the twin peaks approach.336 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Economic crime is a significant feature of the United Kingdom’s (UK) economic 
landscape and yet, as is clear from this research, is not a subject which readily 
engages with either the public or the authorities. As a consequence, and despite 
the Coalition government’s bold mission statements ‘to hold those suspected of 
financial wrongdoing to account’1 as part of their ‘day of reckoning’2 and ‘serious 
about white collar crime’3 agenda, it failed to achieve its objectives.4 This research 
examines the history to creation of the UK’s anti-economic crime institutions and 
accompanying legislation, providing a critique of their effectiveness and analyses 
of whether the regime established by the Coalition government is appropriate for 
the future and considers the contribution which could be made by reviewing the 
way two other countries face the issues. The conclusion of the research is that 
further change must take place: a new structure is required for the UK with the 
formation of a broad Economic Crime Agency (ECA) that incorporates the Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
In the previous chapters, this study has been guided by the available literature to 
inform the subject area and takes as its start-point the change of UK government 
in 1979. This thesis explains the significance of that political development which 
presaged a change in supervision of financial markets away from the metaphorical 
‘Governor’s eyebrows’ approach of informal control to the establishment of a 
succession of formal regulators, from the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) 
via the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and finally to FCA. Co-incident with 
designing a formal regulatory structure, government concerns over the 
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management of fraud trials and the failure to secure convictions led ultimately to 
the creation of the SFO. This study tracks the vicissitudes faced by regulatory and 
prosecutorial streams over the past 35 years.  
The range of regulatory and prosecutorial powers has been expanded, in 
particular with the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Fraud Act 2006 
(FRA2006) and Bribery Act 2010 (BA2010). Recent developments allow the SFO 
to reach court supervised ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements’ (DPA) with some 
potential defendants,5 in addition to allowing regulators to criminalise ‘a decision 
causing a financial institution to fail.’6 This latter provision is a consequence of the 
2008 financial crisis, which severely affected the UK and revealed failings in 
regulation and supervision of markets and institutions. 
The response to failure in regulation and successful prosecutions assisted in the 
discussion of what it is that is encompassed in the expression ‘economic crime’ 
and the nature of the term ‘white-collar crime’ and whether the perception of 
differential treatment from other crimes is correct. 
Examination of the UK financial services and markets landscape alone, is not 
sufficient upon which to base any recommendations. Accordingly, this study has 
also embraced consideration of the way in which two other countries faced similar 
challenges by critically examining the regulatory responses to economic crime by 
the United States of America (US) and Australia. They were chosen for 
comparison because the former is the UK’s most significant trading partner outside 
European Union7 and the latter is regarded, by Levi and Smith for example, as 
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having more successfully withstood the effects of the financial crisis than other 
leading industrial nations.8 
9.1 Research base information - Literature Review and Methodology 
The field of economic crime covers mainly fraud, bribery and corruption, and 
financial markets regulation,9  though some agencies encompass other criminality 
which makes application of the label less clear,10 as discussed in chapter three. 
This also builds upon research into white-collar crime, a label applied to non-
violent or common crime. The research is multi-layered in looking at UK 
government policy over three periods,11 a number of research topics, the UK’s 
international obligations and comparison with two other jurisdictions. This thesis 
has a convenient base because of two major studies,12 which although rooted in 
the 1980’s still have current application. These studies looked separately at 
different strands of economic crime (but not bribery and corruption) and other 
studies have also looked individually at different aspects but not bringing them 
together, and not accompanied by review of US and Australia. Furthermore, 
economic crime has been overshadowed by terrorism and the focus on terrorist 
financing and money laundering. 
The bedrock of the thesis is doctrinal research in combination with comparative 
and socio legal because the subject area lends itself to examination of existing 
material such as legislation rather than the creation of new research by engaging 
in empirical surveys.13 Comparative methodology is employed because the thesis 
takes advantage of the counter-economic crime experience in US and Australia.14 
Socio legal methodology places the research in the context of ‘law and sociology, 
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social policy and economics’15 because it is a contemporary subject as indicated 
by the post financial crisis clamour to criminalise the alleged illegal misconduct of 
traders and bankers.16 Thus, it can be seen that the research area is highly 
relevant to the UK economy and by employing traditional and contemporary 
methodologies is able to analyse both academic work and current information. 
9.2 UK Economic Crime Perspective 
The Coalition government came to power with a bold mission ‘to hold those 
suspected of financial wrongdoing to account’17 as part of their ‘day of reckoning’18 
and ‘serious about white collar crime’19 agenda.  In order to achieve this objective, 
according to Lomnicka, the Coalition government proposed ‘to create a single 
agency to take on the work of tackling serious economic crime that is currently 
dispersed across a number of Government departments and agencies’.20 
The immediate change which the Coalition government set in motion was the 
adoption of a new economic regulatory model called twin peaks because it 
considered that the previous financial regulatory, or ‘tripartite’, regime centred on 
the FSA as a ‘super regulator’,21 together with HM Treasury and the Bank of 
England (BoE), had failed to achieve its objectives, revealing ‘gaps in the UK 
regulatory system’.22  The FSA’s performance was attributed to the weakness of 
its ‘light-touch’ approach and, according to Tomasic, an ‘overly close relationship 
with the City,’23 encouraged by political pressure to be ‘business friendly’ in 
competing with other financial centres, such as New York.24 The government’s 
response was to replace the tripartite model with the twin peaks model, where, 
firstly and pivotally,25 the BoE was given responsibility for Financial Stability and 
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for the Prudential Regulation of banking institutions. The second ‘peak’ was the 
creation of the FCA to take responsibility for protecting consumers and financial 
markets.  The twin peaks model had previously been adopted in Australia and 
Canada, both of which are regarded as having withstood the financial crisis better 
than the UK and US. 
The government’s key concern was financial stability, which was a direct 
consequence of the way in which the financial crisis afflicted the UK. In the new 
structure, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) was created to be responsible 
for the prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit 
unions, insurers and major investment firms26 with the statutory role of ‘the 
promotion of the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons;27 and 
‘specifically for insurers, to contribute to the securing of an appropriate degree of 
protection for policyholders.’28 Concerns over the ‘reckless’ way in which some 
institutions imperilled their solvency without consideration of the risks to the 
country’s financial system led to the PRA and FCA being given responsibility to 
prosecute a new criminal offence of ‘relating to a decision causing a financial 
institution to fail.’29 However, this would only apply to cases where a bank or 
financial institution had failed and entered insolvency. Thus, poor decision making 
at a bank or institution, which did not result in insolvency would not be penalised. 
This is a significant deficiency and is not congruent with the Prime Minister’s pre-
government stance that ‘those who break the law should face prosecution’.30 
Furthermore, it has been suggested by Wilson and Wilson that the lack of criminal 
charges in the UK against any individual involved in the financial crisis casts doubt 
on the FCA’s ‘credible deterrence’31 strategy. Thus, although the FCA has a range 
of administrative penalties and some criminal offences,32 there is a gap for conduct 
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which warrants a criminal sanction in cases where there is no institutional failure or 
insolvency and the Fisher proposal of a crime of ‘reckless risk-taking’33 provides 
an attractive solution. 
The adoption of the twin peaks regulatory model represents a fulfilment of the 
Coalition agreement, in contrast to the government’s commitment to establish an 
ECA, where it has backtracked.34 Instead of the SFO forming a key part of the 
overarching ECA, it had to fight for its continued existence because the Home 
Office established the National Crime Agency (NCA), an organisation responsible 
for activities ranging from border control to child exploitation and online protection 
but within which includes an ‘Economic Crime Command’ (ECC). This is a 
disappointment because, instead of the ECA being accountable to either the 
Attorney General, as a specialist prosecutor,35 or HM Treasury, on a par with 
counter-terrorism financing, anti-money laundering or prudential regulation,36 the 
NCA sits, as a non-ministerial department within the Home Office. The Home 
Office states that it is ‘the department with the role of crime-fighting’, believing that 
‘the government is determined to give greater focus to tackling both serious and 
economic crime’37 and advances an aspiration ‘that the “piecemeal” approach to 
tackling white-collar crime will end’.38  
The creation of the NCA has added another level of confusion because the ECC 
has ambitions: ‘it coordinates activity, shares intelligence and knowledge with 
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partners, disrupting criminal activity, and seizing assets.’39 Some of these activities 
are already undertaken by the SFO and FCA. The next level of confusion is that 
the ECC has themes for its future work which includes fraud,40 bribery and 
corruption and market abuse, insider dealing,’41 which are certainly key areas for 
SFO and FCA. 
Notwithstanding the claim of ‘greater focus’, the economic crime arena has 
become more rather than less diverse. Although the prospect of an ECA has 
receded, the two principal agencies have undoubtedly raised their profiles, but 
whereas the former FSA Enforcement Division is part of the FCA, the SFO’s future 
remains uncertain.42 The profile of the FCA has been elevated because of its 
facility as a regulator to be able to impose financial penalties43. These penalties 
have been significant, mainly as a result of London Inter-Bank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) failings, and in 2013 totalled £476m44 and £314m by late 2014.45 
The government’s intention for the FCA was of ‘delivering a regulatory regime 
under which the conduct of business of all retail financial services is regulated by a 
single body’.46 The FCA has ‘a single overarching strategic objective to ensure that 
markets function well’,47 unlike its predecessor the FSA which had four equal 
objectives, of which one was ‘the reduction of financial crime’.48 One of the FCA’s 
operational objectives is integrity:49 ‘protecting and enhancing the integrity of the 
UK financial system,’50 and includes ‘not being used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime.’51 In pursuit of these objectives, the FCA has continued the policy 
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of ‘credible deterrence’, for which ‘the imposition of a financial penalty is central’.52 
This policy has certain fiscal attractions because significant monies are raised for 
the Exchequer.53 However, as Cartwright observes, ‘[m]any breaches of FSMA 
occur where firms lack adequate controls, supervision and organisation rather than 
where they display wilful misconduct.’54 The ‘credible deterrence’ policy, whilst 
remunerative, has not answered questions such as that posed by Judge Rakoff in 
relation to the financial crisis of ‘[w]hy have no high level executives been 
prosecuted?’55 Thus, ‘the failure of the government to bring to justice those 
responsible for such colossal fraud bespeaks weaknesses in our prosecutorial 
system that need to be addressed.’56 Although Rakoff’s perspective is in relation to 
the US, the same questions and reasoning equally apply to the UK.  
The SFO is an organisation whose raison d'être is ‘greater focus’ on economic 
crime. It has a unique role because of its power to both investigate and prosecute 
crimes, unlike the Police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who have 
separate roles. The SFO has the recent benefit of BA2010 and DPAs, though 
neither had made an impact by mid-2014 for two reasons.  Firstly, because the 
prosecution of BA2010 offences was for activities after July 201157 and there is a 
lengthy lead time cases to come to trial.  Secondly, because DPA’s only became 
available from February 2014. However, the SFO has contributed to discussions 
on learning the lessons from the financial crisis and answering Rakoff’s question: 
notwithstanding that it has not yet taken a prosecution to trial under the BA2010, 
they have proposed an extension of the BA2010 offence of ‘failure to prevent 
bribery’.58 Instead of having to prove that high level executives were the 
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‘controlling mind’, the SFO propose an offence of ‘failing to prevent all acts of 
financial crime’,59 which would make the firm liable for all such offences.  
However, in terms of performance, the SFO has also been unable to shake off the 
past reputation of being maladroit because it seems that each success in 
investigation and prosecution is matched by examples of the SFO suffering from 
problems of its own making.  For example, in Tchenguiz60 the investigation and 
prosecution revealed problems with the SFO’s search procedures, resulting in it 
making settlements for damages.61  Furthermore, in BAE,62 documentation relating 
to the SFO investigation was found in a cannabis farm.63 Also, following the 
collapse of the UK Dahdaleh trial, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) agreed a 
DPA including a  penalty of US$384m on broadly the same facts;64 and most 
recently the SFO’s internal accounting issues of unauthorised payments to its own 
staff and wrongly claiming VAT refunds.65 Although these SFO issues can properly 
be laid at the door of the departed Director, nevertheless, the impression gains 
currency that the SFO is accident-prone. 
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9.3 Lessons from the United States of America and Australia 
9.3.1 United States 
The US is chosen as a comparator country to study because it has a dominant 
position as the largest single country in terms of international trade66 and its 
experience67 of combating economic crime has, consequently, to be relevant. This 
is demonstrated by the lead it took in contemporary measures against bribery and 
corruption by criminalising bribery and corruption internationally when it enacted 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA).68 
The date of the FCPA is significant because it is just before the 1979 base point of 
significant structural changes in UK regulation and legislation. Thus, since 1977, 
knowledge of US experience would have been available to UK governments to 
inform domestic decision making. Over the succeeding time period, the FCPA, as 
deployed by the DoJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has 
become more prominent: considerable fines have been levied for FCPA 
breaches,69 together with an extensively interpreted extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, as Feldman notes, the US has been a driving force to encourage 
European and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
nations to ‘ramp up enforcement of their anti-bribery laws on both a domestic and 
international basis’.70 The motivation for the US was that as a result of the 
‘Watergate’ scandal,71 the government had discovered that ‘[m]ore than 400 
[companies] openly admitted paying foreign government officials, politicians and 
political parties.’72 As a consequence of the public disquiet as to why ‘American 
companies [were] engaging in unethical practices and encouraging corruption in 
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other countries,’73 the US Congress enacted the FCPA. The FCPA was then a 
unique and original piece of legislation because it was the ‘first international anti-
bribery statute of its type and scope in the world’,74 or, to be more accurate, 
domestic statute with international scope. However, having introduced this 
legislation, the motivation for extension to other countries resulted, in Feldman’s 
opinion, from the US being ‘viewed as the policeman for the world’.75 Congress 
later concluded that, because of the FCPA, ‘American businesses have operated 
at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who have continued to pay bribes 
without fear of a penalty.’76 Furthermore, other countries were criticised for making 
such payments tax deductible,77 which would indicate that such payments were 
treated as a legitimate business expense.78   
In looking to see what features of the US system to deal with fraud, bribery and 
corruption could be translated with benefit into the UK, this research has examined 
the US regulatory and legislative provisions and the institutions charged with their 
enforcement. Such research is in light of changes which have already taken place 
in the same areas in the UK of fraud; bribery and corruption. 
9.3.2 Australia 
Australia is chosen for comparison because it is ‘a significant economy, exporter 
and international investor’, which means that it has the propensity to be a target for 
economic crime.79 In the OECD, Australia was the ‘11th largest economy and 14th 
largest exporter of goods and services’ and its largest trading partner was China.80 
From a UK perspective, its connections with Australia ‘go back to the British 
Empire when some countries were ruled directly or indirectly by Britain,’81 and it 
also has a common law tradition. Furthermore, since the onset of the most recent 
financial crisis, and unlike the US and UK, Australia is regarded as having more 
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successfully withstood the effects than other leading industrial nations which, thus, 
invites enquiry into the underlying reasons.82 One reason advanced for this is that 
Australia adopted the twin peaks83 model of financial regulation84 which 
‘structure[s] regulation around two agencies, one responsible for the safety and 
soundness of all financial firms and the other for regulating their sales practices.’85 
Lui observes that ‘Australian banks have withstood the financial crisis better than 
UK banks. Australia did not have any bank runs. Four of the nine AA-rated banks 
around the world are Australian banks, so the Australian regulation system worked 
well.’86  
Nevertheless, The Australian Institute of Criminology is of the view that serious 
fraud in Australia is seen as both widespread and costly87 and ‘one of the most 
under-reported offences in Australia, with fewer than 50 per cent of incidents being 
reported to police or other authorities.’88 Furthermore, the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),89 reported that the Australian 
‘government’s approach to corruption is based on the idea that no single body 
should be solely responsible for anti-corruption.’90 These are interesting issues 
which this research has examined because it is a conclusion that a multiplicity of 
UK anti-economic crime agencies is counter-productive. 
Although Australia represents itself internationally as a single country, under the 
Commonwealth of Australia (Commonwealth) Constitution it is ‘a federal system91 
in which legislative, executive and judicial powers are shared or distributed 
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between the Commonwealth and six states’.92 The consequence of this structure 
for economic crime is that ‘[t]he Commonwealth Parliament does not have specific 
power with regard to criminal law’93 as a result of which ‘[m]ost criminal activity is 
governed by the [varying] laws of the states. This is true for offences of corruption, 
including fraud and bribery.’94 
This chapter will draw conclusions on the issues of economic crime and regulation 
from the standpoints of the UK, the US and Australia to identify areas where UK 
practice can be improved or, alternatively, where the US and Australia might 
recognise advantages in a UK approach. 
9.4 Fraud 
9.4.1 United Kingdom 
The UK has a number of agencies95 which may either investigate or prosecute 
fraud but the only agency with a specific role for fraud is the SFO.  The SFO was 
established96 to tackle ‘the topmost tier of serious and complex fraud and 
bribery,’97 in a clear contrast with financial regulators which have been criticised for 
a ‘light-touch’ approach and an ‘overly close relationship with the City.98 The SFO 
has a focused role: ‘[w]e are investigators and prosecutors of the topmost tier of 
serious and complex fraud, bribery and corruption. We are not a regulator, a deal-
maker or a confessor.’99 The key element for the SFO which sets it apart from 
other agencies is its unique role because of its power to both investigate and 
prosecute crimes, unlike the Police and CPS who have separate roles.  
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In the economic crime arena, fraud was relatively neglected until the establishment 
of the SFO and then, following a significant gestation period, specific legislation: 
the FRA2006. The FRA 2006100 ‘has simplified the law by providing a new offence 
of fraud instead of a variety of ineffective deception offences under the Theft 
Acts’,101 removing such crimes as ‘obtaining a pecuniary advantage’ and 
‘procuring execution of a valuable security’ from the statute book. In practice, the 
range of deception offences created ‘a hazardous terrain for prosecutors’ which, 
consequently, encouraged reliance on ‘conspiracy to defraud’.102 Conspiracy to 
defraud is a common law offence which in effect ‘is a “general dishonesty offence”, 
subject to the irrational requirement of conspiracy.’103 Nevertheless, even after 
FRA2006 and notwithstanding its opponents,104 the offence remains available to 
prosecutors. 
The FRA2006 has greatly simplified fraud offences:105 a person is guilty of fraud 
by: false representation (s.2); failing to disclose information (s.3); and, abuse of 
position (s.4).106 Conviction on indictment carries a maximum sentence of ten 
years imprisonment or an unlimited fine or both.107 
Since February 2014, the UK has been able to use DPAs,108 a mechanism to 
conclude agreements between prosecutors and corporate entities whereby in 
exchange for admission of guilt, payment of a (generally significant) fine and 
undertakings regarding remediatory action, the corporate entity and employees 
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would not be subject to prosecution. DPAs have been extensively used in the US, 
a practice which provided a clear example to inform UK thinking and is evidence of 
the UK learning,109 the lessons from the manner in which another country is able 
to tackle economic crime. The view of the SFO is that ‘DPAs provide an alternative 
response to some corporate criminality, a response which avoids that collateral 
damage. The route to a DPA should also be cheaper, quicker and more certain for 
all parties.’110  
The SFO, which leads the investigation and prosecution of fraud arising from the 
financial crisis, has recognised that even the FRA2006 might not be sufficient to 
counter the challenges faced in prosecuting the manipulation of LIBOR. The SFO 
have proposed an extension of the offence of ‘failure to prevent bribery’111 as their 
contribution to answering the Rakoff question. Instead of having to prove that high 
level executives were the ‘controlling mind’, the SFO propose an offence of ‘failing 
to prevent all acts of financial crime’,112 which would make the firm liable for all 
such offences by its staff. Not only would this have direct financial consequences 
but carry with it the ‘threat of debarment from tendering for public contracts of any 
kind across the whole of the EU, which is thought to be far more worrying for 
corporations than one-off fines, whatever the size.’113 
LIBOR114 involving ‘allegations that bankers have colluded to manipulate 
[LIBOR].’115 The FCA/FSA fined Barclays £59.5m, followed by UBS £160m,116 
RBS £87.5m,117 ICAP £14m 118 and Rabobank £105m.119 LIBOR is important 
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because it is the ‘benchmark reference rate fundamental to the operation of both 
UK and international financial markets, including markets in interest rate 
derivatives contracts.’120 Additionally, the SFO announced that it had agreed to 
investigate the alleged manipulation of LIBOR: thirteen people have been charged 
with fraud or conspiracy to defraud121 and, by October 2014, ‘one senior banker 
had pleaded guilty.’122 However, both the FCA/FSA and SFO were criticised for 
earlier failing to initiate a criminal investigation.123 The government described the 
LIBOR scandal as ‘the most high profile current issue in the United Kingdom’,124 
which serves to highlight the role of two different organisations where the regulator 
seemed satisfied to impose a financial penalty without addressing the issue of 
criminal sanctions. Clearly, with both FCA and SFO as part of an ECA, there could 
have been greater clarity of thinking and a cohesive approach.  
The LIBOR scandal has shone light on the financial system where the Bank of 
England is responsible for ‘efficient and effective financial markets,’125 and ‘for the 
stability of the system as a whole,’126 while the FCA has ‘responsibility to oversee 
financial markets.’127 This is clearly confusing but is a demonstration that the anti-
economic crime arena is multifaceted. Furthermore, other serious allegations have 
arisen of manipulation of the foreign exchange markets,128 described by FCA as 
‘every bit as bad as they have been with LIBOR’,129 and the SFO announced an 
investigation in July 2014.130  In this case, questions have arisen over the 
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involvement of the BoE131 which responded that it would ‘tighten its 
governance,’132 and establish an enquiry.’133  Following the revelations about 
manipulation of LIBOR, and there were similar issues in Australia,134 and the 
foreign exchange markets, it was revealed that similar manipulation had taken 
place in the London Gold Market which, hitherto, had ‘always managed to shroud 
itself in a carefully cultivated aura of glamorous mystery.’135 The FCA has fined 
Barclays £26m136 and banned a trader for offences relating to the manipulation of 
the market for gold at a daily meeting known, ironically, as gold fixing.’137  
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mid-rate for Reference Bank Bills, which are of similarly high credit standing, at a particular point in time each 
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Thus, the interplay between the regulators of the markets and potential for SFO 
investigations will be interesting to observe because it has the potential to reveal 
either gaps in regulation or inertia caused by overlap between regulators. The 
need for primacy in regulation is underlined by the BoE’s concern that its parallel 
regulator the FCA had caused a false market in shares when announcing an 
enquiry into zombie (insurance) funds in 2014.138 If the tripartite regime was 
criticised for confusion over roles and responsibilities, it is important that the 
markets have one ultimate regulator and that should be the BoE because it is 
responsible for the stability of the system as a whole.  
In the context of serious allegations about the markets and their supervision, the 
role of the SFO as an independent prosecutor is likely to be pivotal. The SFO is 
not the only prosecutor of fraud but, in most instances, the values and significance 
fall below the £1m entry threshold.139 However, the FCA is prosecuting a £5m land 
banking fraud with charges being: ‘conspiracy to defraud’; criminal offences 
relating to the carrying out of a regulated activity without authorization; and money 
laundering.140 This was a case described by the judge as ‘complex and 
substantial’141 and, although marketed to the public, is evidence of conduct which 
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would normally suggest serious fraud and, thus, be prosecuted by SFO. To show 
the contrary approach, in the JJB case which involved allegations of forgery142 and 
making misleading statements to the stock market, the prosecution is undertaken 
by the SFO under the FSMA,143 whereas since the conduct is related to the 
markets, the FCA would appear more appropriate. 
9.4.2 United States 
The US has demonstrated its commitment to combating fraud by establishing the 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) with ‘$330m to investigate any 
suspected instances of mortgage fraud and to pursue any potential prosecutions 
that arise from those investigations.’144 This is in marked contrast to the UK’s SFO 
where government planned to reduce its budget to £30m in 2014/15.145 Thus, a 
key difference is the disparity in resources between the US and the UK. This is 
also a matter highlighted in examining the FCA’s resources. Therefore, it can be 
seen that the SFO is not only disadvantaged in relation to its domestic regulatory 
counterpart but also to the US endeavour to prosecute fraud. 
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While the funding of FFETF is important, there is an underlying reason which is to 
do with the US constitutional structure of federal and state law and the number 
and variety of law enforcement and regulatory agencies, as is also seen in 
Australia.146 The rationale of the FFETF was ‘we know that we can accomplish so 
much more by working together than working in isolated, compartmentalised 
silos.’147 The UK may also have a variety of regulators and agencies but is not 
hampered by a federal constitution and this research does not propose a change 
to the UK’s constitutional structure but that does not mean that there are not 
aspects of the US response to fraud which should not be considered.  
Legislation to criminalise fraud is another area for consideration. In the US, fraud 
statutes are either generic, such as ‘conspiracy’, ‘mail’ or ‘wire’ frauds; or specific, 
such as ‘bankruptcy’, ‘healthcare’ or ‘bank’ fraud. In the former category, Podgor 
notes that the ‘focus of the statute is almost exclusively on the fraud and not the 
object of the offense.’148 Thus, in the Mail Fraud Statute 1872, Henning comments 
that ‘the mailing element seemingly provides federal prosecutors with carte 
blanche to prosecute virtually any activity to which the mail or a shipment by 
interstate carrier can be linked, no matter how tangential.’149 In 1952, a twin 
statute, the Wire Fraud Statute, was enacted with nearly identical wording to the 
mail fraud statute except that instead of mailing, ‘it requires some interstate or 
international communications by means of a “wire” (such as telephone lines), radio 
or television.’150 Together, these statutes amount to a federal fraud statute151 and 
are also used as a predicate acts for other statutes.152 In addition to being 
combined with conspiracy to defraud (‘Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud 
the United States’),153 Gordon observes that it has been interpreted to be ‘so 
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elastic over the years that it can potentially encompass any conduct which a court 
views as ‘collusive and dishonest’.154 
The main differences between the US and the UK lie in their fraud statutes. 
However, whereas the US not only retains but builds upon its structure of a variety 
of fraud statutes, in the UK, the FRA2006 has provided a clear statement that 
fraud is by ‘false representation’,155 ‘failing to disclose information’,156 and ‘abuse 
of position’.157 The conclusion of this research is that the UK has already 
modernised its legislation to produce a straight-forward suite of criminal offences 
and would not benefit from a change to US-style legislation. By the same token the 
US is clearly wedded to its pattern of legislation and adopting a simplified UK-style 
fraud act would be difficult.158 
While the US and UK use different mechanisms to criminalise fraud, another 
disparity is in sentencing. In the US, the economic crime offender with the longest 
prison sentence on record is Shalmon Weiss, sentenced in 2000 to 845 years in 
prison’.159  More widely known because of the financial crisis are Bernard Madoff, 
sentenced to 150 years imprisonment160 and Allen Stanford to 110 years.161 In 
contrast, in the UK, the maximum sentence under FRA2006 (and BA2010) is ten 
years imprisonment and / or an unlimited fine.162  The UK has not seen frauds of 
this magnitude, however, in R v James McCormick,163 McCormack was convicted 
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and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for selling fake explosives detectors to 
Iraq,164 the first maximum sentence. There is a clear disparity between headline 
sentences but, putting aside the appropriateness of UK sentencing, there is 
disquiet in the US about the length of sentences where Anello and Albert note that 
pressure from Congress has ‘transformed sentences in high-loss fraud cases from 
less than five years under the original guidelines to a sentence of life 
imprisonment.’165 As this research illustrates,166 there is concern over ‘over-
criminalisation’ whereby federal prosecutors have ‘access to too many charging 
choices’167 and that ‘prosecutors will pile on charges to gain leverage in plea 
negotiations’.168 The US Attorney General’s view is that legislation with mandatory 
sentences which bear little relation to the conduct at issue,169 results in ‘too many 
people go to too many prisons for far too long for no good law enforcement 
reason.’170  The outcome of this is that such sentences ‘breed disrespect and are 
ultimately counterproductive’,171 which means that there needs to be a change ‘to 
ensure that incarceration is used to punish, to rehabilitate, and to deter – and not 
simply to warehouse and forget.’172 
Thus, whilst there is some attraction in headlines given to long prison sentences in 
the US, as with the Australian ‘heads on pikes’,173 in the UK, the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council (SGC) has introduced new guidelines from October 2014 
which ‘places victim impact at the centre of considerations of what sentence the 
offender should get. This may mean higher sentences for some offenders 
compared to the current guideline, particularly where the financial loss is relatively 
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small but the impact on the victim is high.’174 Furthermore, ‘consecutive sentences 
may be appropriate for multiple offences where large sums are involved.’175 
Having considered whether there are lessons which the UK could usefully learn 
from the US, from a pure fraud viewpoint, this research concludes that the UK 
FRA2006, with its straight-forward approach consolidating previous legislation is 
more appropriate to the UK than the US style of a myriad of statutes. Sentencing 
is an area where the US differs from the UK by providing longer sentences where 
the ‘Fraud Review’ recommended a maximum of fourteen years176 instead of the 
current ten years but even without legislation this could be achieved by amending 
Sentencing Guidelines. One aspect of US practice which has been adopted is that 
of DPAs which have been available for fraud offences177 since 2014 and are 
discussed later in this chapter in relation to bribery and corruption. 
9.4.3 Australia  
Fraud in Australia, according to Smith, is criminalised by the individual states and 
territories under a variety of property offences such as ‘theft and obtaining a 
financial advantage by deception,’178 together with ‘conspiracy to defraud.’179 At 
the Commonwealth level, law has been codified,180 however, the Commonwealth 
Code 1995 (CC)181 only applies to matters within the Commonwealth purview and 
that does not extend to the individual states or territories. This thesis has 
considered the Australian constitutional structure but, as Tomasic notes, ‘[o]nce a 
pattern of corporate law and regulation is formed, deviation from this pattern 
becomes difficult, although not impossible, as the constitutional framework of 
Australian corporations law illustrates.’182  This provides a difficulty in considering 
whether the Australian endeavours to combat economic crime provide a template 
for the UK. However, in New South Wales (NSW), the Crimes Act 1900 was 
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amended in 2009 to introduce one general fraud offence and three ancillary 
offences but the significance of the change, according to Steel, was that NSW did 
not follow the UK’s FRA2006, criticising it for being too broadly defined, 183  and 
instead because of its legislative heritage based its new law on the UK Theft Act 
1968.184  The other Australian states and territories have differing approaches from 
each other and the Commonwealth, which exhibit complicating factors leading to a 
conclusion that there are no attractions for UK in adopting Australian fraud 
legislation.185 
Notwithstanding the complications occasioned by the suite of statutes to 
criminalise fraud, the second aspect of considering whether Australia provides an 
example which could be adopted by the UK is the manner in which the laws are 
deployed.  In this respect, although the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (CDPP) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) work together, not only 
are they separate institutions which means that investigation and prosecution of 
serious economic crime is split, unlike with the SFO, but they have no national 
overarching remit. As a consequence the AFP/CDPP has to operate through a 
variety of multi-agency, multidisciplinary crime teams where ‘Commonwealth 
responsibilities can sometimes overlap with those of state and territory law 
enforcement, regulatory or criminal justice areas.’186 Whereas Australia has 
created a framework187 to ensure that ‘law enforcement, intelligence policy and 
regulatory agencies are collaborating effectively with each other, state, territory 
and international counterparts188 the SFO has no need to establish its jurisdiction. 
Thus, although it is understandable that the Commonwealth should have to 
establish such structures because of its constitutional arrangements, the UK does 
not have such a need and, accordingly, the mechanisms employed in Australia to 
achieve a cohesive approach do not provide a template for adoption in the UK. 
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9.5 Bribery and Corruption 
9.5.1 United Kingdom 
The SFO is the prime UK agency for investigation and prosecution of bribery and 
corruption. Since 2011, the SFO has been provided with two new legislative 
instruments to prosecute bribery and corruption: BA2010 and DPAs. Taken 
together, these measures represent considerable enhancement defining criminal 
behaviour and providing an alternative approach to a criminal trial. 
Unlike the US, which legislated against foreign bribery in 1977, the UK waited until 
2001.189 Equally, it was various scandals which caused the UK to deal with 
domestic corruption in 1889, 1906 and 1916190 and it was a scandal which 
motivated the US to create the FCPA1977.191 Notwithstanding the temporary 
expedient of incorporating provisions in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001192 to criminalise bribery outside the UK, or if done in the UK would be 
corrupt, in order to satisfy the UK’s international obligations to OECD,193 it was not 
until 2010 that the comprehensive Bribery Act was enacted194 to overhaul the UK’s 
patchwork of archaic corruption laws.195 The BA2010 is regarded within the 
industry as ‘the single most important development’ in combating white collar 
crime.196 Aaronberg and Higgins are of the view that the Act ‘provides the UK with 
some of the most draconian and far-reaching anti-corruption legislation in the 
world,’197 and Salens is of the opinion that this has the potential to ‘propel the UK 
to the forefront’ in fighting international bribery and corruption.198 
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The BA2010 is discussed in detail in chapter five, where two particular features 
are noted.  Firstly, the introduction of a new corporate offence of ‘failure of 
commercial organisations to prevent bribery’.  Secondly, the absence of a 
provision for permit ‘facilitation payments.’ 
The corporate offence of ‘failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery,’199  
targets employees or associated persons such as third parties, intermediaries, 
suppliers or joint venture partners.200 Although a ‘strict liability’ offence, ‘or perhaps 
more accurately, vicarious liability based on the actions of an associated 
person,201 there is a defence if the commercial organisation can show that it had in 
place ‘adequate procedures’ designed to prevent persons associated with the 
commercial organisation bribing another person.’202  
The UK position regarding facilitation payments,203 which aligns with the OECD, is 
not to permit such payments. The government faced the issue clearly and 
acknowledged the disparity with the US:  
We recognise that many UK businesses still struggle with petty corruption in 
some markets, but the answer is to face the challenge head-on, rather than 
carve out exemptions that draw artificial distinctions, are difficult to enforce, 
and have the potential to be abused. Providing exemptions for facilitation 
payments, as the US does, is not a universally accepted practice, and not 
something that we consider acceptable.204 
Therefore, in terms of criminalising bribery and corruption, it is clear that the UK 
had taken cognisance of the US legislation in framing the BA2010 is more strict 
than the FCPA in not allowing facilitation payments, alongside creating a new 
corporate offence. Thus, unsurprisingly, the UK’s bribery and corruption legislation 
is not in need of improvement.  
Therefore, the UK has up-to-date legislation with which to tackle bribery and 
corruption, alongside a modern FRA2006. Both these sectors now benefit from the 
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facility for prosecutors to enter into DPAs.205 DPAs have been extensively 
deployed in the US, where the authorities: 
have placed an increasing focus on crime committed by commercial 
organisations and the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
through a deliberate policy of giving organisations meaningful credit for 
voluntarily disclosing their conduct and cooperating with (…) [DoJ] 
investigations by self-reporting.206 
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) saw the attraction of adopting the US model which  
recognised the ‘potentially harmful effects that prosecuting a commercial 
organisation can have on investors, employees, pensioners, suppliers, customers 
and associated communities who were not involved in the organisations criminal 
behaviour.’207 The bankruptcy of Arthur Anderson (discussed in chapter seven),208 
which was overturned by the US Supreme Court,209 caused the US to look for 
alternative sanctions, such as DPAs, which would not lead to the economic 
collapse of a firm. Further motivating factors are potential unequal treatment 
internationally in the event of conviction, and, opportunity for jurisdictional 
arbitrage. 
In the US, a guilty plea does not result in automatic debarment from US 
government contracting because an independent debarment authority will consider 
the issues.210 However, in the UK, the EU Public Sector Procurement Directive 
applies.211 The effect of this is that a commercial organization is excluded from 
participation in public sector contracts if convicted of fraud, bribery and corruption 
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under Article 45, thus, providing an incentive to ‘self refer’212 to SFO with the 
prospect of negotiating an outcome and incurring a civil rather than criminal 
penalty.213  
The opportunity for jurisdictional arbitrage is an interesting area. The MoJ point to 
the UK’s ‘double jeopardy’ law where, ‘under English law, there is a bar to 
prosecuting someone who has been already convicted or acquitted of the same 
offence.’214 The US does not have such a bar,215 and the MoJ highlight 
organisations which could be subject to UK authority choosing to engage instead 
with the US.216 Therefore, the historic disparity of enforcement mechanisms 
between UK and US prosecutors may mean that ‘[r]esolving a case in the US may 
also be attractive given the wider and more flexible range of enforcement tools, 
including (…) DPAs which do not result in a criminal conviction.’217  
Whilst it is quite clear that the UK was informed by US experience in creating its 
own DPA regime, it did not replicate its model instead creating a bespoke 
arrangement for the UK.218 The main difference between the two models is the 
involvement of the courts where the US is criticised for its lack of judicial 
oversight219 which would not be congruent with the UK constitution and legal 
traditions.220 Nevertheless, by mid-2014, there had not been any cases in the UK 
to test the new law. 
9.5.2 United States 
The US was an early adopter of measures to combat bribery of foreign officials, 
through enactment of the FCPA, whereas, the UK waited until 2001 to legislate.221 
The catalyst for the US was the ‘Watergate’ scandal222 which, according to Giuffo, 
revealed ‘that many public companies were maintaining cash “slush funds” from 
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which illegal [political] campaign contributions were being made in the United 
States and illegal bribes were being paid to foreign officials.’223  
This research has examined both the FCPA and BA2010. Prior to the FCPA, it 
was not illegal in the US to bribe foreign officials but that did not change in the UK 
until 2001.224 Thus, both countries criminalise bribery and corruption both at home 
and abroad, though the FCPA has a wide interpretation of its territorial jurisdiction 
including ‘US and foreign public companies listed on stock exchanges in the 
United States or which are required to file periodic reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (issuers).’225 US jurisdiction is, thus, established over 
‘domestic concerns’226 and ‘issuers’,227 However, the ambit of FCPA extends 
further because it takes territorial jurisdiction over ‘foreign persons and foreign 
non-issuer entities that (…) engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment 
(…) while in the territory of the United States.’228 The territory of the US is 
extended outside the US border because the statute includes the ‘use of the mails 
or any means of interstate commerce’.229 The use of ‘mails’ provides a link to Mail 
Fraud Statute230 and ‘interstate commerce’ to Wire Fraud Statute.231  There is, 
though, a significant point of difference between the US and UK (and also OECD) 
and that is the ‘exception for routine government action’.232 Salens state that these 
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are intended to be small “facilitation payments”,233  ‘to expedite or secure the 
performance of a routine government action,’234 but, according to Raphael, are 
alternatively considered to be ‘repetitive bribes which support a systemic culture of 
corruption and encourage the payment of low wages to public officials while 
continuing to foster low commercial ethical standards.’235 There is a warning that 
such a payment must be properly recorded in the issuer’s books and records, 
failing which they will breach FCPA.236 The UK position, which aligns with the 
OECD, is not to permit such payments.237 
Therefore, in terms of criminalising bribery and corruption, it is clear that the UK 
has taken cognisance of the US legislation in framing the BA2010, which has clear 
provisions but is stricter than the FCPA in not allowing facilitation payments. Thus, 
unsurprisingly, the UK legislation is not in need of improvement but, as discussed 
in chapter seven, there is international pressure for the US to adopt the UK stance 
on facilitation payments, as encouraged by the OECD.238 
9.5.3 Australia 
The Australian Commonwealth government stated, in amending the Criminal Code 
(CC) in 1999, that ‘bribery of foreign public officials in the course of international 
trade is unacceptable.’239 By this amendment, Australia implemented the OECD 
                                            
233
 Salens (n 196). 
234
 Salens (n 196). 
235
 Raphael (n 189) 112. 
236
 US Department of Justice and US Securities and Exchange Commission.  ‘FCPA.  A Resource Guide to 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.’ (n 210) 20. 
237
 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Facilitation Payments’ http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/the-bribery-
act/facilitation-payments.aspx accessed 27 January 2015.  
238
 ‘RECOMMENDS, in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable 
economic development and the rule of law that Member countries should:  
1. i)  undertake to periodically review their policies and approach on small facilitation payments in order 
to effectively combat the phenomenon;  
2. ii)  encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation payments in internal 
company controls, ethics and compliance programmes or measures, recognising that such payments 
are generally illegal in the countries where they are made, and must in all cases be accurately 
accounted for in such companies‟ books and financial records.  
OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions’ http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf 
accessed 21 August 2014. 
In US, violations of the FCPA leave ‘corporations and other business entities are subject to a fine of up to $2 
million’ for each violation. ‘Individuals, including officers, directors stockholders, and agents of companies are 
subject to a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.’ US Department of Justice and US 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  ‘FCPA.  A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.’ 
(n 210) 20.   
In Australia, the maximum penalties for individuals in breach of s.70 are ten years imprisonment and/or a 
AUD1.7 million fine. The penalty for companies are of the greater of: AUD 17 million fine; three times the value 
of the benefit attributed to the conduct (if it can be determined); or, 10% of the annual turnover. See chapter 
5.2.3. This compares with the UK of ten years imprisonment and / or an unlimited fine. See chapter 7.4.1. 
239
 ‘Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Bill 1999  
330 
 
Convention well ahead of the UK but by 2011, only seven of the 37 signatories to 
the OECD Convention were considered active in enforcement (including the US 
and UK), whereas Australia was cited as ‘one of the 20 countries that is judged as 
exhibiting “little or no enforcement”.’240 Indeed, in Securency, the first such case 
had still not come to trial by late 2014, as discussed in chapter eight. This research 
has considered the CC provisions in light of the BA2010 and there is one 
significant difference: facilitation payments. Facilitation payments are permitted 
under the CC,241 as they are in the US, but the OECD noted a lack of 
understanding about what constitutes a facilitation payment under the CC242 
pointing out that ‘facilitation payments appear to be frequently equated with any 
bribes of small value.’243 Instead, although permitted, what is ‘[o]ften overlooked is 
the requirement that such payments must be made to secure routine government 
action of a minor nature that does not result in the obtaining of a business 
advantage.’244 Although the Australian government launched a consultation in 
2011 on the elimination of facilitation payments, by late 2014 there had not been 
an outcome. In 2013, the government changed and, in 2014, Australia is President 
of the G20245 and also chairs the G20 Anti-corruption roundtable246 which states 
ironically that the G20 should lead by example in combatting foreign bribery.247 
Although Australia adopted the OECD Convention ahead of the UK, its bribery 
legislation remains less extensive than the UK BA2010 and it has yet to take its 
first foreign bribery case to trial, notwithstanding having legislated in 1999. 
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9.6 Regulatory Enforcement 
9.6.1 United Kingdom 
The UK financial services regulator is the FCA. Following the financial crisis, the 
nature of UK regulation changed with the adoption the twin peaks regulatory 
model, which ended the primacy of the financial services ‘super regulator’248, the 
FSA and, instead, launched a new model headed by the BoE.249 The 
government’s intention for the FCA was of ‘delivering a regulatory regime under 
which the conduct of business of all retail financial services is regulated by a single 
body.’250 The FCA has ‘a single overarching strategic objective to ensure that 
markets function well’,251 unlike its predecessor the FSA which had four equal 
objectives, of which one was ‘the reduction of financial crime’,252 one of the FCA’s 
operational objectives is integrity:253 ‘protecting and enhancing the integrity of the 
UK financial system,’254 and includes ‘not being used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime.’255 In pursuit of these objectives, the FCA has continued the policy 
of ‘credible deterrence’, for which according to Cartwright ‘the imposition of a 
financial penalty is central.’256 Ryder is of the opinion that the challenge for the 
FCA is to demonstrate that it is not merely a rebranded FSA257 which is more 
difficult because the ‘credible deterrence’ strategy has certain fiscal attractions 
since significant monies are raised for the Exchequer.258 However, the ‘credible 
deterrence’ policy, whilst remunerative, has not answered the Rakoff question: 
‘[w]hy have no high level executives been prosecuted?’259  
The scope of the FCAs activity was broadened in 2014 when it took over 
responsibility for regulating 50,000 consumer credit firms from the Office of Fair 
Trading.260 While it was the government’s intention that the FCA became the 
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single body to regulate all financial services,261 it is a major increase from 
regulating the existing 26,000 firms. The FCA stated that they are ‘more committed 
than ever to showing firms and individuals that they must play by the rules; 
because if they do not, robust sanctions are a matter of course.’262 
The FCA Business Plan263 states that their ‘enforcement powers264 enable them, 
to deter firms and individuals from wrongdoing by making it clear that there are 
real and meaningful consequences for poor practice.’265 The increase in the 
number of fines,266 according to Haines, appears to show that their strategy to 
prosecute a steady stream of cases to demonstrate that they ‘means business’ is 
bearing fruit.267 The total fines were at modest levels (£35m) until 2010 when they 
increased from £89.1m to £311.6m in 2012 and £476m in 2013. In the eight 
months of 2014, they amounted to £314m.268 However, the main engine for the 
increase in fines is the LIBOR scandal,269 which is noteworthy because the FCA 
was criticised by the Treasury Committee for not wishing to pursue criminal 
charges.270 
The FCA is also involved in measures to combat bribery and corruption,271 where 
criminal prosecutions fall within the purview of the SFO. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the SFO derives its powers from the BA2010 in which the FCA is not 
involved in enforcement.272 However, the FCA uses its regulatory powers ‘where 
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authorised firms fail adequately to address corruption and bribery risk,’273 and the 
FCA does not require evidence of corrupt conduct in order to take regulatory 
action.274 Clearly, the SFO as a prosecutor does require evidence of corrupt 
conduct in order to enforce under the BA2010 but if a commercial organisation can 
positively show it has adequate procedures to prevent bribery then it has a 
complete defence.275 This is a confusing picture where a prosecutor needs 
evidence on which to base a prosecution, whereas, a regulator can impose 
penalties in the absence of evidence. Clearly, such issues would benefit from a 
single agency being able to consider across its realm the appropriate regulatory or 
criminal course of action. 
9.6.2 United States 
In the US, the principal bodies for enforcement are the DoJ and SEC. The DoJ has 
‘control over all criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the United States had 
an interest’276 and has a criminal division, fraud section to prosecute crime and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate, which means that it is 
responsible for fraud, bribery and corruption prosecutions. However, whilst the 
DoJ ‘is solely responsible for criminal enforcement it may institute civil 
proceedings.’277 The SEC which shares responsibility for FCPA enforcement, can 
only institute civil proceedings, involving administrative and financial sanctions 
only, with any criminal prosecutions being referred to DoJ.278 In the UK, the SFO 
investigates and prosecutes fraud, bribery and corruption whereas the FCA only 
has limited prosecution powers relating generally to insider dealing.279 Both the 
SEC and FCA, as regulators, have the facility to impose financial penalties but the 
SFO as a prosecutor has only been able to prosecute, in contrast to the DoJ which 
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can either prosecute or conclude ‘plea bargains’ with defendants instead of taking 
cases to trial. Such ‘plea bargains’ or, formally, DPA have been part of the DoJ’s 
armoury since the 1990’s,280 and have been utilised on a frequent basis281 
whereas attempts by the SFO to agree outcomes with defendants in the absence 
of a DPA have been subject to judicial opprobrium. The DoJ’s reasoning was: 
the increased use of DPAs has meant far greater accountability for corporate 
wrongdoing.  Whereas prosecutors often declined when their only choice was 
to indict or walk away, now companies know that avoiding the disaster 
scenario of an indictment does not mean an escape from accountability.282  
This is clearly the issue that faced the SFO which, from 2014,283 also has the 
availability of DPAs and the first such use is awaited together with the level of 
court supervision in light of the court’s previous antipathetic views towards such 
agreements (albeit without legislative underpinning) and where the US courts 
complained about their role being merely to act as a ‘rubber stamp’. Thus, the 
historic disparity in tools to combat economic crime has now been eliminated and 
whilst this is an example of the UK adopting a successful US procedure, there 
does not appear to be any further procedure or legislation employed by the 
DoJ/SEC which the UK might beneficially duplicate.  
It is the level of enforcement which has marked out the DoJ/SEC and even making 
allowances for its head-start in having the FCPA and DPAs the US has given a 
lead for the UK’s SFO and FCA to emulate. 
9.6.3 Australia 
The Australian criminal enforcement landscape is, unsurprisingly because of the 
constitutional structure, more complicated than the UK. At Commonwealth level, 
intelligence, investigation and prosecution are split between three bodies: The 
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Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), CDPP) and 
AFP. 
AUSTRAC’s role is ‘to protect the integrity of Australia’s financial system and (…)  
countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism’284 and receives a 
significant number of transaction reports: 84 million in 2012-13.285 These reports 
cover a range of activities in combating ‘serious crimes such as drug trafficking, 
tax evasion, fraud and people smuggling.’286 In this area, according to Ryder, 
Australia has reacted to criticism287 of its anti-money laundering (AML) regime by 
incorporating the Financial Action Task Force 40 Recommendations into primary 
legislation, 288 in contrast to both US and UK which have a piecemeal approach to 
AML legislation.289 
In the key areas of Economic Crime, Australia’s constitutional structure means that 
deployment of its legislation follows a different pattern from the UK. Fraud is 
prosecuted at state level (apart from fraud against the Commonwealth body itself) 
with legislation differing between states. These measures do not offer benefits to 
the UK compared with the FRA2006. In relation to bribery, Australia has 
Commonwealth legislation to meet OECD obligations but has not by mid 2014 
achieved a prosecution, which lack of experience does not suggest any lessons to 
improve BA2010.  
However, Australia has particular experience of a different economic and 
regulatory structure which was seen to be of benefit and the UK has adopted the 
twin peaks approach. 
9.7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The UK needs a cohesive and effective anti-economic crime policy and that 
government was right to propose an ECA as part of its white-collar crime agenda 
where it said that its mission was to hold people suspected of financial wrongdoing 
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to account,290 in a day of reckoning,291 which demonstrated that the government 
was serious about white-collar crime.292 Notwithstanding such lofty ambitions, the 
government was wrong to be diverted from that course. Whilst, a generation 
earlier, Roskill advanced a clear rationale for the SFO’s creation, it can also be 
concluded that its limited role and remit owed more to political expediency and 
infighting rather than a firm belief in the finished article, with the consequence that 
it has failed to meet expectations. The government has successfully created the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which has overarching responsibility for 
its sector and subsidiary regulators. This is a template which should be employed 
for the economic crime arena by an ECA encompassing the SFO and FCA (and 
employing the resources of the COLP and regional police forces).  The CMA is a 
credible agency in itself, whereas the current economic crime equivalent is merely 
a division of the NCA. What a strong ECA offers is the prospect of an independent 
authority to bring together the regulatory structure and enforcement regime of the 
FCA together with the investigation and prosecution powers of the SFO. Just as 
the CMA has the ability to take over actions by its constituent regulatory bodies, so 
an ECA should be able to deploy the powers of both the SFO and FCA to ensure 
that the correct sanction is advanced rather than each organisation being either 
hamstrung by its own powers or adopting civil remedies when a particular conduct 
demands a criminal sanction. In this regard, while the availability of an ‘offence 
relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail’,293 or reckless banking, 
is of some benefit in relation to an insolvent financial institution, the gap between 
the tectonic plates of economic crime would be covered, suggests Fisher, by the 
addition of a further criminal sanction for ‘Reckless risk-taking on the financial 
markers.’294 This may be modern language but it harkens back to the conclusion of 
Roskill that:  
The public no longer believes that the legal system in England and Wales is 
capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us 
suggests that the public is right.295 
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Thus, the creation of an ECA, adopting the CMA template and encompassing the 
existing bodies of SFO and FCA would remove both areas of overlap and underlap 
and, within an overarching structure, ensure that existing and new legislative 
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